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This  thesis  argues  that  the  Commonwealth  was  a  key  institution  which  helped  shape  defence
cooperation amongst Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and the UK between 1947 and
1982.  It  suggests  that  the  changing  nature  of  the  Commonwealth  forced  those  countries  to
fundamentally  review  how  they  cooperated  on  defence  issues.  It  also  highlights  how  the
Commonwealth,  as a collective,  reinvented the very form and function of Commonwealth defence
cooperation. It advances the idea that after 1971 what develops are two strands of defence cooperation
that were pursued by Commonwealth countries. One strand, which had its roots in Commonwealth
defence cooperation since 1947, was focused on territorial defence against foreign states but was no
longer referred to as 'Commonwealth' defence cooperation. Another strand, which was driven by new
members  of  the  Commonwealth,  sought  to  provide  military  assistance  to  other  Commonwealth
countries in the pursuit of the values outlined in the Singapore Declaration of 1971. These two strands
existed in parallel  after  1971 and what becomes clear  after  the deployment of the Commonwealth
Electoral  Monitoring Force to Rhodesia  is  that  the Commonwealth,  as a collective,  was no longer
considered an appropriate vehicle for the territorial defence of its constituent countries. This thesis
advances our understanding of the Commonwealth generally, but particularly in the field of the military
history of the Commonwealth. It speaks to the military policies pursued by Australia, Canada, South
Africa, New Zealand, and the UK during the Cold War, and why the Commonwealth initially featured
quite strongly in those plans and increasingly became a burden which was shed in favour of smaller
more regionally focused defence organisations in pursuit of the same objectives. 
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This thesis argues that Commonwealth military cooperation persisted between 1947 and 1982
but was fundamentally changed by a variety of fiscal, political, and military pressures on Australia,
Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and the UK. These pressures existed as a result of a combination
of internal and external political developments inside those key Commonwealth countries and within
the  Commonwealth  collectively  throughout  the  period.  This  thesis  argues  that  these  pressures
transformed how the Commonwealth cooperated on defence issues. Central to the argument presented
in this thesis is that Commonwealth defence cooperation between 1947 and 1971 was focused on the
territorial  defence  of  the  Commonwealth.  Although this  form of  cooperation  continued after  1971
amongst certain members of the Commonwealth, it was no longer known as 'Commonwealth' defence
cooperation. Instead what developed after 1971 was an inward-orientated form of defence cooperation
that  did  not  advocate  or  engage in  the  type  of  external  defence  that  had  previously characterised
Commonwealth defence cooperation.  Key events leading up to 1971, culminating in the Singapore
Declaration, prompted a change in what was considered to be the goal of defence cooperation amongst
key Commonwealth countries. After 1971 Commonwealth defence cooperation focused on a new form
of defence cooperation which was not focused on external threats, but instead sought to support key
internal  values.  Central  to  the  overall  argument  is  addressing  the  point  that  the  Commonwealth
remained  a  key  relevant  interest  for  a  variety  of  Commonwealth  states  on  the  issue  of  defence
cooperation throughout the Cold War period. 
The overall argument will be advanced by providing clear evidence of joint Commonwealth
military endeavours  between  1947  and  1971,  including  the  Middle  East  Defence  Conference,  the
deployment of the 1st Commonwealth Division, and maintenance of the 26th Commonwealth Brigade in
its various forms. The ramifications of technological and political changes throughout the period, some
of  which  had  a  profound  effect  on  the  military  landscape  with  serious  implications  for  defence
cooperation between far-flung countries will also be considered. Part of addressing defence cooperation
amongst the Commonwealth between 1971 and 1982 will  include highlighting the Commonwealth
military support provided to Rhodesia in 1981 as well as highlighting some of the broader implications
for political decisions made in the Commonwealth between 1971 and 1982. This will point to how the
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style and purpose of defence cooperation amongst the Commonwealth changed over the years, yet
continued to remain relevant to key Commonwealth countries. Fundamentally the crucial  questions
answered  here  are  how,  and  why,  key  countries  in  the  Commonwealth  viewed  and  used  the
Commonwealth as a body of countries with which they could cooperate on defence matters between
1947 and 1982. Ultimately it will become clear that the changes in the Commonwealth fundamentally
altered the purpose of military cooperation amongst the Commonwealth. It will also become clear that
the pre-1971 style  of defence cooperation was preserved as key states in  the Commonwealth took
account of these changes in the Commonwealth and persisted with their own endeavours along the
lines of the pre-1971 style of defence cooperation. 
The changes in defence cooperation amongst the Commonwealth between 1947 and 1971 were
not the culmination of a steady decline from a height of Commonwealth cooperation in the post-Second
World War period to an intermittent and lacklustre approach to Commonwealth defence relations by
1971. There was rather a turbulent  development process of transformation that was punctuated by
instances of progression and advancement as to how Commonwealth defence relations might fit into
the new political  and strategic  framework1 that  dominated  international  affairs  during  this  period.2
These developments, particularly the political difficulties in the Middle East and the British economic
situation,  foreshadowed  the  decline  and  departure  of  the  UK  from  its  role  as  the  core  of
Commonwealth  military  cooperation.  This  was  not  a  development  that  was  entirely  foreseen  by
contemporaries. Indeed, such was the strength of the effort that successive British governments had
expended in maintaining its role between 1947 and 1971 that there was a certain level of surprise
expressed  in  Australian  and  New Zealand  political  circles  when  the  UK reduced  its  involvement
outside of Europe by 1971.3 
1 It should be noted that these internal difficulties in Commonwealth defence cooperation were not hidden, and successive 
American administrations at least seemed generally aware of the difficulties the UK faced. It was, for instance, a belief 
held by the American government in 1963 that the British would not remain in South-East Asia for 'much longer'. - 
Letter from McNamara (US) to Ministry of Defence FS/63/106 8 November 1963 DEFE 7/2389 UKNA
2 Even in the immediate post-war period there were some concerns that the Commonwealth, in its current state (i.e. before
the accession of India and Pakistan) was ill-suited to the new era and diverged on some major policy issues relating to 
the Soviet Union. - C.W.P. Waters 'Anglo-Australian Conflict over the Cold War: HV Evatt as President of the UN 
General Assembly 1948-49' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (1994) p 311 
3 Indeed the Australian government was split in its assessment of British indications of their decision to withdraw from 
East of Aden. There were competing views as to whether this was a bluff or hyperbolic request, and the action which 
should accordingly be taken, and a dissenting view which saw their withdrawal as an inevitability and encouraged what 
effectively amounted to an early adoption of what would become the Defence of Australian policy. - D. McDougall 
'Australia and the British Military Withdrawal East of Suez' Australian Journal of International Affairs 52 (1997) p 188. 
The American reaction was rather stronger, resulting in an exasperated Dean Rusk, the US' Secretary of State, to demand
that the British should 'act like Britain'. Cabinet Conclusions Part 1 12 January 1968  CAB 128/43 UKNA
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Officially designated Commonwealth defence cooperation re-emerged ten years later in 1981
with  the  creation  of  the  Commonwealth  Electoral  Monitoring  Force  Rhodesia.  This  new form of
Commonwealth military cooperation differed significantly from previous Commonwealth cooperation
between 1947 and 1971. Commonwealth defence cooperation was no longer focused on the territorial
integrity of the member states of the Commonwealth. Instead it had developed into an internal force
focused  on  its  own  values  to  help  ensure  the  transition  of  an  old  imperial  territory  into  a  new
democratic  member  state.  Furthermore,  such  was  the  development  of  the  Commonwealth  that  no
country could be assured of Commonwealth assistance in the face of armed aggression. In fact, it could
very likely be assured of at least some Commonwealth opinion to the contrary.4 The defence of the
constituent countries of the Commonwealth had devolved to bilateral defence arrangements, often with
non-binding terms. Those agreements usually included an acknowledgement or understanding that their
defence could only be guaranteed through regional support structures.5 
Nonetheless, the original concept of Commonwealth defence cooperation, as it was understood
in 1971 and earlier, persisted.6 Although it was no longer designated as a Commonwealth activity, and
had  been  seriously  curtailed  in  its  capabilities,  aims  and  the  number  of  countries  involved,  its
fundamental  form and  goals  had  hardly  changed  from the  heady  days  of  the  1st Commonwealth
Division.  The  transformation  of  the  Commonwealth,  coupled  with  other  pressures  on  key
Commonwealth  countries,  particularly  on  Australia,  Canada,  South  Africa,  New Zealand,  and  the
United Kingdom, put a huge amount of strain on the prospect of a continuation of 'Commonwealth'
defence cooperation. In places this strain led to its outright collapse. In Canada defence concerns had
shifted from Commonwealth cooperation to the defence of the Arctic circle in line with NATO and the
4 This was most clearly demonstrated in the Commonwealth reaction to the Falklands War of 1982 which saw limited 
military support from the Commonwealth for the UK, and even political support was far from certain. Some economic 
sanctions were offered by some of those countries which were still participating in pre-1971 forms of defence 
cooperation with the UK, such as Australia and New Zealand. - G. K. Daniel, The Falklands War: Britain versus the 
Past in the South Atlantic (London: MacFarland & company, 1998)  pp. 92-93
5 It had been recognised, by 1961, that the UK alone could not even be assured to offer the defence of Malaysia, 
Singapore, or anywhere in South-East Asia without the active engagement of supporting friendly forces. - Telegram to 
Ministry of Defence from Commander-in-Chief (Far East) 12th December 1963 DO 169/269 UKNA
6 Indeed it had developed to include greater consideration for counter-insurgency activities in addition to the traditional 
view on territorial defence, and the few new participants in such Commonwealth activities were directed towards 
planning and preparing for such operations. Furthermore, where a more recognisable effort existed, such as in the Five 
Powers Defence Agreement, it now lacked the clear and concrete commitment to defence both in practice and in theory 
that had driven Commonwealth defence cooperation for so long. So although it did survive the transition, it did not do so
unscathed. 
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US strategy. As well as the preservation of their own defence,7 there was a growing interest in the
potential  of  being  a  regular  contributor  to  UN  peace-keeping  initiatives.8 South  Africa's  attention
changed between its internal security9 to its borders and adjacent waters and back again during this
period. As a result South Africa had little involvement generally with Commonwealth military affairs,
even prior to South Africa's effective ejection from the Commonwealth in 1961.10 Australia and New
Zealand  too  became  very  regionally  focused  and  paid  particular  attention  to  their  'Near  North'.
Although the attention of the UK had turned towards the defence of its home islands and Europe,11
lingering involvement and interest in South-East Asia – coupled with interest from Australia and New
Zealand, as well as Malaysia and Singapore – formed a de facto continuation of the original expression
of  Commonwealth  strategic  planning  after  1971.  It  was  a  shadow  of  past  endeavours,  but  the
underlying concepts remained recognisable as being based on previously established Commonwealth
goals.
This all speaks to the heart of the issues involved here. Fundamentally this is a story of change,
progress, and persistence of Commonwealth defence cooperation. The Commonwealth starts shortly
after 1947 with a clear global strategic defence policy that manifested in a global plan amongst the
Commonwealth  to  defend  the  Middle  East  against  the  Soviet  Union.12 This  was  challenged  by
developments, both political and technological, during the period that prompted change. The response
7 At the end of the Second World War this was considered to be in Europe and Asia. This would have significant 
ramifications a few years later when discussions for pan-Commonwealth coordination began on the premise that the 
Middle East was the fulcrum around which the defence of the Commonwealth would pivot. -Memorandum on Canadian 
Defence Relations with the British Commonwealth 22 November 1944 RG 25 Volume 5724 LAC
8 They were, in fact, particularly sensitive to any commentary – either from the British government or private citizens – 
regarding what they considered to be ''Imperial' aspects of defence policy'. The Canadian High Commissioner to the UK 
pressed the point to such an extent that he ventured to say that the same considerations applied to Anglo-American 
defence arrangements (i.e. that the 'best hope of maintaining [them]... lay in their [the UK] saying nothing whatever 
about them') should be applied to Anglo-Canadian defence arrangements. - Telegram no. 2206 From the High 
Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 13 November 1946 RG 
25 Volume 5963 File 50227-50 Part I LAC
9 This inward direction in terms of defence policy is very important with respect to Commonwealth defence thinking of 
the time. The idea that the internal security of an independent country was the sole remit of that country was repeatedly 
stressed by the Commonwealth until its expansion fostered the creation of a very different thought process. This 
commitment that the internal security of a country was reserved to that country was reaffirmed during the discussions on
regional defence and particularly with respect to South Africa. - 'Exchanges of Letters on Defence matters between 
Governments of the Union of South Africa and the UK June 1955' Simonstad, and Cmnd. 9520 Memorandum on the 
need for International Discussions with regard to Regional Defence 30 June 1955 MV 190 SANDFA.
10 An exception should be noted with respect to their brief engagement with the Middle East Defence Conference of 1951, 
although even this was a minor contribution in comparison to Australia and New Zealand. - Meeting of Commonwealth 
Defence Ministers from 21 to 26 June 1951 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy: The Middle East 31 July 1951 A5954 
box 1799 LAC
11 Memorandum by the Prime Minister 'Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future' 29 September 1961 CAB 134/1929
UKNA
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to  those  changes  by the  Commonwealth,  and especially  by Australia,  Canada,  South  Africa,  New
Zealand, and the UK are identified here. Armed with a knowledge of those issues an explanation is
offered as to how these changes affected defence cooperation amongst the Commonwealth. This is a
two-fold  explanation,  one  that  points  to  the  advent  of  a  distinct  replacement  for  Commonwealth
defence cooperation that starts in 1981, and also the continuation of the pre-1971 form of defence
cooperation amongst key Commonwealth countries.
Historiography
How the British Empire and the Commonwealth reacted and adapted to changes has been the
subject of considerable study by historians over the years.13 The historiography of the development of
military cooperation amongst the Commonwealth during World War One, and World War Two, has
received  significant  treatment.  Yet  how the  Commonwealth  reacted  to,  and  prompted  changes  in,
military cooperation amongst key Commonwealth members after 1945 is seriously underdeveloped.
Although an understandable consequence of the focus on new states arising through the decolonisation
process coupled with a sensitivity to the shift in power from the UK to the US in the post-war period, it
has nevertheless caused a gap in the literature. An extensive body of material on bilateral relations,
especially between certain members of the Commonwealth and the UK and the US over the course of
the Cold War, has been met by similarly well-developed historiography on what might be called “area
studies”. These are studies which focus on specific regions. South-East Asia, in particular, has seen
extensive and detailed treatment. The cumulative result of this detailed specific research has been a
deterioration  in  consideration  of  some of  the  broader  issues.  Policy-makers  in  the  UK and in  the
Commonwealth used individual regional focuses to help identify their  specific contributions in the
context of broader operations, especially in defence and foreign policy issues during the Cold War.
Planned force deployments to South-East Asia were conducted on the basis  of what would be left
available for other areas where British forces were needed. Similarly no foreign policy analysis could
12 Although they would very shortly thereafter be undermined. Indeed, as early as 1949 Canada was advocated for 
defensive arrangements to have a 'regional basis'. - Defence appreciation as a basis for military planning between 
Commonwealth Staffs – COS(49)49 9 February 1949  RG 25 Volume 222 File 1400/23 LAC
13 Perhaps of particular use and interest for an overview of imperial history is W.M. Louis & R. Winks, The Oxford History
of the British Empire: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). However, see the bibliography for a 
wider list of studies on the British Empire and Commonwealth and pages 5 – 12 for a more detailed treatment of the 
historiography over the years. It is also worth noting some of the key projects in the publication of documents 
surrounding various countries in the British Empire and Commonwealth, these include the A, B, and C series of the 
British Documents on the End of Empire Project, the Documents on Australian Foreign Policy project, and the 
Documents on Canadian External Relations project.
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have been conducted without acknowledgement of the likely reaction of the US. Analysing defence or
foreign policy issues without that broader context, while often necessary for very practical reasons,
gives rise to the possibility that key elements needed to explain the issues involved may be missed.
This study focuses on that broader picture, attempting to string together more detailed area and subject
specific analysis into a coherent whole.   
Other studies along similar lines have been conducted before. In the late 1940s with the dawn of
an  expanding  Commonwealth  Nicholas  Mansergh  wrote  extensively,  and  optimistically,  on  the
Commonwealth.14 This built on an equally favourable reading of the post-1918 Commonwealth by Sir
Keith Hancock.15 Mansergh's focus on the Commonwealth as an institution and the activities of the new
states that came into being during the post-war period has helped shape contemporary historiography.
The attention  given  to  these  new countries  and the  transformation  of  the  Commonwealth  into  an
international collective of moral authority suited both the prevailing political and cultural climate at the
time of Mansergh's writing. 
After Mansergh the historiography of the Commonwealth shifted as the reality of the changes to
the Commonwealth were made plain. Uncertainty regarding the future of the Commonwealth became
reflected in  a  growing uncertainty of  the value of  the Commonwealth.  Bruce Miller's  work in re-
evaluating  the  Commonwealth  throughout  the  1950s  and  into  the  1960s  expressed  a  degree  of
reservation  about  the  Commonwealth  that  was  not  to  be  found  in  the  more  optimistic  tones  of
Mansergh a decade earlier.16 Miller's reservations were reinforced in 1971 when Margaret Ball heralded
the Commonwealth as an international tool for consultation amongst a variety of countries.17 By the
late 1970s Bruce Miller and David McIntyre were moved to provide increasingly reserved opinions on
the development  of  the Commonwealth.18 The optimism of  earlier  years  had long since faded.The
14 For a full bibliography of the works of N. Mansergh see 'A Bibliography of the works of Nicholas Mansergh', Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 8 (1979) pp 187-190
15 W.K. Hancock Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1918-36 – Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937) &
Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1918-39 – Part 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942)
16 See, for example, J.D.B. Miller Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953-69 
(London: Oxford University Press 1974) and also his The Commonwealth in the World (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1965)
17 M. Ball The 'Open' Commonwealth (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971)
18 McIntyre has written extensively on the evolution of the Commonwealth, including on some of its military aspects. Of 
particular note in 1973 his The Commonwealth: Its Past, Present, and Future (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs, 1973) and The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and impact, 1869-1971 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1977).
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importance  of  the  Commonwealth  was  now  thought  to  have  been  in  establishing  non-political
relationships amongst its members, as both Margaret Ball and Bruce Miller had first pointed out.  This
view of the Commonwealth as a mere functional tool for cooperation of debatable value increasingly
held  sway  with  Denis  Judd  and  Peter  Slinn  both  concurring  that  the  role  and  function  of  the
Commonwealth was largely as a forum for cooperation.19 
By the mid-1980s a certain disappointment and criticism began to pervade the literature. Paul
Taylor remarked critically on the burden that the Commonwealth represented to the UK,20 and Dennis
Austin pointed to the sole definitive achievement of the organisation was that it,  in the main,  had
ensured a certain amiability of relations.21 The direction of the historiography had been well and truly
set  by  the  1990s  with  Margaret  Doxey's  study  on  the  Commonwealth  Secretariat  continuing  to
emphasise the practical rather than political benefits of Commonwealth membership.22 David McIntyre
further highlighted the significance of these practical connections amongst the Commonwealth and a
growing sense developed that the political value of the Commonwealth had been overestimated by the
UK and the Commonwealth had been received overly favourably during its initial expansion.23 
Although military cooperation amongst the Empire and Commonwealth before 1945 has been
explored in some detail,  there has been much less effort devoted to exploring military cooperation
amongst the members of the Commonwealth after 1945. There is a particular dearth of research on how
the UK's senior service, the Royal Navy, was affected by drastic changes to the political landscape and
the scope of its operations. The history of the Royal Navy has remained focused on what is essentially
an operational history of the Navy, and much of the historical analysis on it during the Cold War has
focused on the  inter-service  struggles  prompted  by cost-cutting  measures  in  the  UK.  Some work,
typically in the context of those inter-service struggles particularly between the Royal Navy and the
Royal Air Force, has addressed the development of the submarine-launched nuclear missile, and the
broader question of how the British nuclear deterrent would be deployed. Analysis of other branches of
the UK armed forces, and the armed forces of other Commonwealth countries, suffers from similar
19 D. Judd & P. Slinn, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth 1902-80 (London: Macmillan, 1982)
20 P. Taylor 'Prospects for the Commonwealth in the 1980s' in P. Taylor & A.J.R. Groom (eds) The Commonwealth in the 
1980s: Challenges and Opportunities (London: Macmillan, 1984)
21 D. Austin The Commonwealth and Britain (London: Chatham House 1988)
22 M. Doxey The Commonwealth Secretariat and the Contemporary Commonwealth (Houndsmill: Macmillan, 1989)
23 For a general overview of the progression of the historiography from 1950 to 1997 see D. McIntyre 'The 
Commonwealth' in W.M. Louis & R. Winks, The Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). See also the bibliography for a wider list of works.
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issues. Philip Darby's work on British defence policy east of the Suez remains a cornerstone of the
consideration given to the political implications of national defence policy on the Dominions and the
rest of the world.24 A more recent work by Malcolm Murfett has explored the pattern of naval retreat
from imperial  obligations after  the Second World War.25 Even this,  however,  builds only upon the
groundswell of study that has been done on South-East Asia and the Far East more generally. David
McIntyre, David Stevens, Hector Donohue, Karl Hack and Nicholas Tarling are some of those who
have  driven  the  exploration  of  the  political  and  military  implications  for  the  UK  and  Imperial-
Dominion  relations  prompted  by imperial  retreat,  technological  change,  and  the  expansion  of  the
Commonwealth in South-East Asia. Other areas have not received the same level of attention, partly on
account of archives remaining closed but also due to the cost and time involved in reaching those
archives.  Peter  Henshaw's  article  on the  transfer  of  Simonstown highlights  one  of  the  avenues  of
research  still  largely uncharted.26 John Singleton's  work on military procurement  by New Zealand
between 1950 and 1970 exposes an area of research that is clearly well documented in the archives, but
remains  entirely underappreciated.27 Questions  still  remain on,  for  example,  the suddenness  of  the
British departure from the Gulf States so shortly after the establishment of a Persian Gulf Joint Task
Force. These lines of enquiry could inform our understanding of how Imperial and Commonwealth
connections in political and military circles ended, or quite possibly were extended, in the light of the
withdrawal of the UK from its position as the key arms supplier to the Dominions.
More  recent  work  has  concentrated  on  the  involvement  of  specific  countries  within  the
Commonwealth.  There  has  been  a  growing  trend  to  nationalise  the  historiography  of  military
cooperation, especially amongst the British Commonwealth after 1945. Jeffrey Grey's doctoral thesis
on the Commonwealth armies during the Korean war in the late 1980s focused on the interaction and
points of conflict  and cooperation in  a joint  military structure in the Commonwealth.28 Even here,
however, there was a misplaced, if perhaps understandable, focus on Australian relations. P.J. Dennis is
similarly  specialised  in  an  Australian  outlook  on  the  military  involvement  of  Australia  in
Commonwealth  activities  after  the  Second World  War.  Ashley Jackson has  written  extensively on
24 P. Darby British Defence Policy East of Suez (London: Oxford University Press, 1973)
25 M. Murfett In Jeopardy: The Royal Navy and British Far Eastern Defence Policy, 1945-51 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1995)
26 P. J. Henshaw 'The Transfer of Simonstown: Afrikaner Nationalism, South African Strategic Dependence, and British 
Global Power' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 20 (1992) 
27 J. Singleton 'Vampires to Skyhawks: Military Aircraft and Frigate purchases by New Zealand 1950-70' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 42 (2002)
28 J. Grey The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988)
8
imperial warfare. Jackson's book Distant Drums on the role played by the colonies during the First and
Second World Wars highlights the broader nature of military cooperation between the UK and the rest
of  the  Empire  and  Commonwealth.29 Unfortunately  it  stops  short  of  providing  that  same  critical
analysis to the period after the Second World War. His The British Empire: A Very Short Introduction
recognises this gap by pointing out that Britain's withdrawal from the East of the Suez in the late 1960s
and early 1970s has not been met by a corresponding decline in military involvement in the region,
going so far as to claim that 'Britain has deployed more firepower in the region in the last twenty years
than it  did  even during  the  heyday of  empire.'30 These  are  the  sort  of  questions  which  should  be
addressed to establish a more complete understanding of the military history of the period.
The  study  of  Anglo-Dominion  relations  more  broadly  has  received  mixed  treatment  from
historians over the years. Significant work has been done on Anglo-Dominion relations before and
during the First and Second World Wars. This has dovetailed neatly with studies on migration and
identity  in  the  British  world  more  generally.  Kent  Federowich's  recent  work  on  Anglo-Canadian
relations  during  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  and  particularly  on  joint  Anglo-Dominion
migrations schemes, has highlighted how the Dominions exercised fundamental concepts of nation-
building  and  identity  in  a  way  that  acknowledged  the  imperial  connection.  These  bonds  were
cornerstones of what, as Federowich put it, 'dominion-hood meant in practice'.31 This thesis suggests
that these connections did not simply disappear or were put to one side as the Commonwealth grew, but
instead persisted despite change. This level of detailed analysis on Anglo-Dominion relations has not
been extended to the area of military history. Much military history has, for reasons perhaps specific to
its subject matter, a very national focus. Andrea Benvenuti's recent work on Australian policy towards
Britain's  end of  empire  in  South-East  Asia  exemplifies  the  current  nationally-focused trend in  the
historiography.32 While  it  takes  steps  to  contextualise  such  arrangements,  by  exploring  Australian
foreign and defense policies in relation to Malaysia and Singapore during the Cold War it stops short of
a  broader  analysis  that  is  needed  to  frame  the  explanation  of  why  cooperation  amongst  the
Commonwealth changed so dramatically. 
29 A. Jackson Distant drums: The role of Colonies in British Imperial Warfare (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2010)
30 A Jackson The British Empire: A very short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
31 K. Federowich 'Restocking the British world: Empire Migration and Anglo-Canadian Relations, 1919-30' Britain and 
the World 9 (2016)
32 A Benvenuti Cold War and Decolonisation: Australia's Policy towards Britain's End of Empire in South-East Asia 
(Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2017)
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In order to understand that framework it is useful to consider the broader historiography of
military cooperation amongst the Commonwealth, including the concept of 'Imperial defence'. Imperial
defence is a strategy of sorts in which one constituent element of the Empire would be defended by
contributions from another, a strategy which allowed Australian and New Zealand ground forces to
fight in the Middle East while the UK's Royal Navy defended Australia and New Zealand. The term
entered into parlance during the final decades of the late nineteenth century when it was applied to the
system of defence for the British Isles, the overseas territory held by the Empire, and – perhaps most
importantly – the strategic links required to maintain access between all of those points. Wilkinson and
Dilke's analysis of these issues highlighted, even as early as 1892, the paramount importance of those
links, and the absolute requirement of the primacy of the navy.33 An age-old concern with Imperial
defence, and one that existed right the way through to the Korean war and beyond. The historiography
on this particular problem is perhaps more developed with respect to Canadian operations, particularly
by D.C.  Gordon  and  Richard  Preston,  who  illustrated  the  problems  of  addressing  local  concerns
regarding security, specifically of Canada, to the broader scheme of Imperial defence.34 Jeffrey Grey's
work  also  speaks  to  the  political  headaches  such  deployments  caused  especially  with  regards  to
Australia.35 
One  very  interesting  study that  speaks  to  some  of  the  issues  on  Imperial  Defence  is  The
Cambridge History of the British Empire, written between 1930 and 1960. It was reflective of its time
and concentrated on the military history of the UK as a leading world power. The intricate nature of the
relations between the UK and the Dominions and the Empire was a secondary concern. The Oxford
History of the British Empire presented a more considered picture of those issues. The second half of
its excellent volume on the twentieth century is dominated by area studies. Anthony Clayton's chapter
on Imperial Defence addresses the issue directly, but only for the first half of the twentieth century.36 It
is  indicative  of  the  prevailing  attitude  to  the  study of  Commonwealth  military history that  the  1 st
Commonwealth Division in Korea is  relegated to half  a sentence and the discussion on Dominion
interest 'outside of their own geographic regions' is just as quickly dismissed. Where the Cambridge
33 C. W. Dilke & S. Wilkinson Imperial Defence (London: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
34 See C. Gordon The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965) & R. 
A. Preston Canada and Imperial Defence: A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defence Organisation, 
1867-1919 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967)
35 See, in particular, J. Grey The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1988), and also J. Grey A Military History of Australia (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36 see A. Clayton ' “Deceptive Might”: Imperial Defence and Security, 1900 – 68' in W.M. Louis & R. Winks, The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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History of the British Empire was, perhaps, too focused on the UK, the Oxford History appears to have
swung the other way.
 
It is worth reiterating that the essential point of Imperial Defence was the preservation of the
British Isles, the Empire, and the points in between. The nature of warfare changed dramatically during
the twentieth century, especially with the advent of nuclear weapons. Anthony Clayton is right to afford
such focus on cooperation between the US and the UK in terms of nuclear weapons technology and
strike plans, but misses the implications that the development of these new weapons had for Imperial
Defence more broadly. The retreat to their own geographical regions was not out of disinterest in wider
defence plans, but at least in part a practical recognition that to defend against such new threats more
localised forces would be required. This can be clearly seen – and is demonstrated later in this thesis –
where plans in the early 1950s to defend the Middle East with troops from Australia and New Zealand
were simply untenable. The conflict would be long finished by the time they eventually arrived.
It is important to recognise that Imperial Defence was a flexible concept. In part this is driven
by the fact that its natural corollary, some kind of Imperial Foreign Policy, did not exist. The notion of
an Imperial foreign policy had been effectively discarded after the First World War. D.C Watt noted, as
early as 1963, that this presented fundamental problems to the viability of a joint Imperial defence.37
This was reflected in the increased difficulty in deploying forces from the Empire, particularly from
India, to positions around the world. John Darwin argues that this prompted the UK to give greater
priority to local collaborators who could help maintain the Empire during the inter-war years and that
after the Second World War this global system of Imperial defence was steadily eroded. He suggests
that this decline was only reluctantly accepted in London where Whitehall and Westminster did not
equate the independence of constituent elements of the Empire with an end of the economic, political,
and strategic links between those territories and the UK.38 John Kent points to the greater focus applied
to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East after the Second World War by the UK,39 while Wm.
Roger  Louis  highlights  the  role  of  the  British  Empire  in  the  Middle  East.  Different  analyses  all
underscore the fundamental problem that the lack of a comparable foreign policy to the concept of
37 D. C. Watt Imperial Defence Policy and Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911-39 (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
1962)
38 J. Darwin Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (London: Penguin books, 2012) & also his The Empire 
Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
39 J. Kent 'Informal Empire and the Defence of the Middle East 1945-56' in R. Bridges (ed.) Imperialism and 
Decolonisation in Africa (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999)
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Imperial  defence  complicates  any analysis  of  combined Commonwealth  and UK military activity,
especially in a context where such cooperation has to change rapidly in response to new political and
technological developments.
 
On  a  more  practical  note  one  pivotal  development  in  the  historiography  that  needs  to  be
mentioned is  the change in the rules regarding access to  official  records in  the UK. The Wilson's
government change to a thirty year rule from the old fifty year rule provoked a flurry of publications on
Imperial defence issues. Starting in the early 1980s a plethora of documents have been released on the
fall  of  Singapore during  the Second World War,  and the implications  this  had on the region.  The
'official history' by S.W. Kirby on the event in the 1970s40 was complemented by further study a decade
later by Haggie, McIntyre, and Neidpath. Their efforts have framed the analysis of the period, and
when coupled with a reappraisal of the Allied effort during the Second World War by Wm. Roger
Louis, amongst others, has set a framework which has downplayed and underestimated the value and
effectiveness of the Commonwealth even as its military role continued after the Second World War.
This has generated a narrative of continued decline of British influence and involvement in South-East
Asia, spurred on by a fascination with the end of the Empire. 
This thesis helps illuminate the depth and continued military cooperation amongst key members
of the Commonwealth during the Cold War period. It takes a broad overview chronologically across a
number of countries on a very specific theme. It does so with the intention of providing key insights
into how, and why, Commonwealth military cooperation continued. This feeds into broader questions
regarding the British empire, the Commonwealth, and especially how the decline was managed and the
effects it had on the UK and the pre-1945 members of the Commonwealth. There is a key question to
be answered here: was the Commonwealth largely an irrelevance in the decline in military cooperation
amongst  the  Dominions  and  the  UK  or  was  it,  as  is  argued  here,  fundamental  to  key  defence
considerations by existing members of the Commonwealth?
Conceptual issues and nomenclature
The concept of Commonwealth defence cooperation for the purposes of this thesis encompasses
a wide range of activities in which Commonwealth countries conduct joint military operations and
40 S. W. Kirby Singapore: The Chain of Disaster (London: Macmillan, 1971)
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operate  joint  formations  with an aim to  secure the  defence  of  the Commonwealth  in  part  or  as  a
whole.41 This is similar to the notion of Imperial Defence. The idea that the defence of the British
Empire and the constituent members of the British Commonwealth would be achieved through the joint
action of Commonwealth forces had emerged in the years preceding the First  World War, and this
persisted through the First  and Second World Wars,  and was the basis for defence planning in the
1950s. The defence of countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and even the UK
was predicated upon effective military cooperation in Europe, the Middle East, and South-East Asia.
This approach emphasised the necessity to provide for the defence of themselves,  and their  allies,
through active engagement in overseas theatres: Australian and New Zealand contingents fighting in
the Middle East, Canadians in Europe, and the British around the globe. 
One of the complicating factors in exploring the underlying concept of Commonwealth defence
is  that  the  meaning  of  the  word  'Commonwealth'  became  divorced  from  its  membership  as  the
Commonwealth expanded. There is a question that must be asked when only a certain subset of the
membership of the Commonwealth is engaged in a particular task if such activity warrants the label of
'Commonwealth'.  This  is  a  particularly  pertinent  question  for  joint  military  forces  deployment
consisting of  some, but not all, Commonwealth members. The presence of some, or even a minority, of
Commonwealth interests in the early post-war period was seemingly more than sufficient to justify the
application of the title by those involved. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan at the
close of the war was a joint force commanded by an Australian officer with troops and materiel drawn
from Australia, India, the UK, and New Zealand.42 The absence of Canadian, South African, or other
Commonwealth countries gave rise to no complaints, concerns, or discussions related to the application
of  the  name Commonwealth  to  that  military formation.  Similarly the  1 st Commonwealth  Division
which served in Korea stuck with the Commonwealth title despite the absence of personnel from South
41 This interpretation is based on the intended approach of the UK, and by extension its Commonwealth, to pursue a war 
effort in the event of war after 1945. In order to 'allow the Commonwealth countries to fight successfully in the event of 
war' the British government stated that the Commonwealth would need to 'prepare common strategic objections and 
coordinated plans' and 'maintain cooperation between all members of the Commonwealth in all aspects of defence'. - 
Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff 'Commonwealth Defence Cooperation' Appendix to Memorandum by the UK 
Government 'The World Situation and its Defence Aspects' 23 September 1949 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 
PMM(49)1 LAC
42 Approximately 33% were Australian, 30% Indian, 20% British, and 17% were from New Zealand. This was all under a 
single Australian commander. For a more detailed treatment of the breakdown of the occupation force see J. Wood. The 
Forgotten Force: Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan 1945-52 (St. Leonards, New South 
Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1998). Also interesting to note in this context is that India was not a Commonwealth country at 
the time.
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Africa, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and only a token contribution from India. There are many other examples
of this throughout the period, including the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. The Reserve
consisted  solely  of  British,  Australian,  and  New  Zealand  military  personnel  and  served  a
Commonwealth purpose in only a very specific extent as it applied in South-East Asia.43 Furthermore
the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, similarly comprised of British, Australian, and New Zealand forces
only, continued to use the title of 'Commonwealth' until 1971. 
Indeed, it is not until the deployment of the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force in 1981
that there could be said to be a concrete political basis for the prefix 'Commonwealth' to be assigned to
any military formation in the post-war period. Although the Monitoring Force drew from a selection of
countries,  and certainly not  the  entirety of  the  Commonwealth,  it  had  the  complete  assent  of  the
Commonwealth  for  its  formation  and  deployment.44 The  explicit  recognition  of  those  forces  as
Commonwealth, even when not constituted entirely out of all Commonwealth countries, was a different
approach that had its roots in the Singapore Declaration of 1971. The Declaration was reflective of an
increasing formalisation of actions taken by the Commonwealth, on certain limited matters, and also
triggered the end of a hitherto more liberal application of the term. The Declaration led to the re-
designation of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to the 28th ANZUK brigade that same year. What is
curious about this re-designation is that neither the role nor intent of the 28 th Brigade changed after
1971.  Its  force  structure  and deployment  remained similarly unchanged.  It,  in  fact,  differed  in  no
material way except in name only. The change was made purely on political grounds, and was designed
to reflect the changes that had occurred in the Commonwealth since the formation's inception. Those
changes were the culmination of a rapid expansion of the Commonwealth's membership during the
1960s, an expansion which would affect Commonwealth military cooperation.
 
Perspective & other restrictions
The research for this  thesis  was a daunting task.  It  was based on a wide variety of source
material including multi-archival research, various political and legal texts, as well as engaging with
the historiography of several countries. It is inevitable that some specific elements will have received
more attention than others. This was a necessary compromise to the practicalities involved. Nationally-
43 Letter from McBride to Menzies 6 October 1954 A5952/23 Item 1428/44 NAA
44 Report of the Sub-Committee as Adopted by the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, 14 December 1979 
Commonwealth Secretariat C151/4/5. See also Chan S. & Mudhai O. 'Commonwealth Residualism and the 
Machinations of power in a turbulent Zimbabwe' Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 39 (2001), p 61
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focused historiography, which has dominated contemporary historical research,45 suffers far less from
these  issues  but  can  sometimes  miss  the  implications  of  certain  decisions  and  events  for  other
countries.46 Although there is something to be said with regards to a 'bottom-up' approach to an analysis
of British imperial  policy and how it  affected Commonwealth cooperative activities,47 it  would be
impossible to adequately cover the multitude of events and consequences on each of the main countries
under consideration over the time period without some narrowing of focus. A common approach in this
regard is to separate the periphery and the metropole, attempting to understand the actions of one in the
context of the other.48 
This  thesis  takes  a  broader  perspective  which  focuses  on  the  continuation,  decline,  and
transformation of military cooperation amongst key Commonwealth countries. This has been carefully
approached to avoid creating the illusion of a multi-state perspective where all such countries are of
one mind and united in their goals in Commonwealth defence cooperation. This is to avoid creating an
implication of a level of concerted action amongst the countries involved which simply did not exist.49
It has also sought to avoid excessive attribution of the political direction of any particular country to a
few select  individuals  by focusing  on states  as  collective  actors,  acknowledging  the  flaws  in  that
assumption but accepting them as a means of providing further insight into the broader story.
Further  difficulties  become clear  when looking at  the specifics  of  the  Commonwealth.  The
Commonwealth organisation after 1947 was radically different to the Commonwealth that fought in the
45 The prevailing view of imperial history being subordinated to national historiography has been held at least as early as 
the 1980s and much effort has been expended since then in subsuming what were once imperial views and history 
which, by definition, involved huge swathes of the world into parochial focuses of limited extent and confined analysis. 
- D. Fieldhouse, 'Can humpy-dumpty be put together again? Imperial History in the 1980s' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 12 (1984) p 17
46 Different models have been advocated for the analysis of imperial history at various points since the end of the 1980s, 
and almost all have been defined with the express intention of explaining the imperial process through the prism of the 
subject national viewpoint. Even in analysis for the spread of empire, both formal and informal, have taken on a hue of 
an analysis which did not exist at the time and arguably had no basis for existence in the period being studied. Such 
perspectives while flawed are both popular and comparatively easily undertaken given the ease of access and limited 
definition of source materials required for analysis. - R. Robinson, 'Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism 
after Empire' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12 (1984) p 17
47 B.R., Tomlinson, 'The Contraction of England: National Decline and Loss of Empire' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 11 (1982) p 69
48 D., Kennedy, 'Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 23 (1997) p 
358
49 See A.G. Hopkins, 'Viewpoint -  Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History' Past and Present 164 
(1999) p 198 and also note that the lack of substance to the Commonwealth had been oft-commented upon, with much 
international admiration expressed for the Commonwealth's 'admirable and efficient ad-hoc-ery'. D. McIntyre, 'The 
Admission of Small States to the Commonwealth' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24 (1996) p 245
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two World Wars.  The inclusion of India,  Pakistan,  and Ceylon introduced a range of issues to the
organisation. Indeed, between 1947 and 1971 the difficulties of using the Commonwealth as a central
perspective from which to view Commonwealth relations grows exponentially. The rapid influx of new
member states and the reorientation of 'Commonwealth' interests to other matters, particularly the issue
of racism,50 creates too much instability and change to form a reliable or useful perspective for the
purposes  of  Commonwealth  military  cooperation.  From  1971  onwards  the  Commonwealth  had
changed utterly and its role, focus, and intent differed so drastically from the 1947 Commonwealth that
offering any kind of perspective on developments during that period presents significant difficulties. 
Instead, this thesis pursues its argument by focusing on Australia, Canada, South Africa, New
Zealand,  and  the  UK.  Those  five  countries  were  key  to  military  cooperation  amongst  the
Commonwealth  prior  to  the  accession  of  India,  Pakistan,  and  Ceylon.  How  they  responded  to  a
changing  global  context  with  respect  to  the  degree,  role,  and  purpose  of  military  cooperation  is
considered  critical  to  understanding  why  Commonwealth  military  cooperation  changed  so
fundamentally.
While  the  pre-1947  Commonwealth  included  the  Irish  Free  State  and  the  Dominion  of
Newfoundland,  the  reasons  for  not  focusing  on  them in  this  study  should  be  obvious,  and  it  is
suggested that their absence is relatively minor and of limited consequence. The Irish Free State had
largely detached itself from Commonwealth affairs after 1932 following the election of Fianna Fáil and
the dismantling of many of the terms of the 1922 treaty provisions.51 Although the British abdication
crisis allowed for a more formalized distancing of relations it was not until the declaration of a republic
in 1949 by Fine Gael that the Free State left the Commonwealth.52 The Dominion of Newfoundland
also  'left'  the  Commonwealth  in  1949,  albeit  in  a  rather  different  way,  with its  incorporation  into
50 The issue of race relations was in part an issue created by the British themselves arising from their colonial practices. 
Extensive economic growth in the colonies had been known to lead to divisions based on racial and ethnic ties. One such
example can be seen in modern Southern Sudan where the exploitative practices of immigrant northern traders in 
modern Northern Sudan was a view held both with substance and shared by both British colonial administrators in the 
region and the southern Sudanese themselves. Such economic inequality and problems evolving along racial lines would
set the scene for the growth of such tensions over the coming decades. - J. Tosh, 'The Economy of Southern Sudan under
the British 1898-1955' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 9 (1981) p. 283
51 D. Keogh & M. McCarthy The Making of the Irish Constitution 1937 (Cork: Cork University Press, 2007)
52 D.W., Dean, 'Final exit? Britain, Eire, the Commonwealth and the Repeal of the External Relations Act 1945-49' Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 20 (1992) p 411
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Canada following a plebiscite.53
The nature of the development of the Commonwealth is such that it offers a significant range  of
potential start and end dates for any analysis. There is certainly an argument for analysis of the post-
war Commonwealth to begin from 1949 onwards, and it is quite tempting to start from the London
Declaration  of  28  April.  This  would  dovetail  nicely with  the  end  of  conscription  in  the  UK,  the
independence  of  Ireland,  and  the  incorporation  of  Newfoundland  into  Canada.  Instead  the
independence  and  partition  of  India  in  1947  is  offered  as  a  more  useful  demarcation  of  the
Commonwealth timeline. The ramifications that the expansion of the Commonwealth had on all facets
of Commonwealth activity was profound, especially for Commonwealth defence cooperation. Racial
issues adversely affected Commonwealth defence relations, complicating trade and cooperation with
South Africa in particular. Similarly the religious tensions between India and Pakistan resulting from its
partition54 demonstrated the difficulties that the decolonisation process presented, not only for the UK
generally but  also for  the development  of  Commonwealth defence cooperation as the organisation
grew. Furthermore, starting in 1947 makes it possible to highlight how the non-involvement of certain
Commonwealth countries provided no practical impediment to Commonwealth defence cooperation
more generally.
The end date of this study is, perhaps, less contentious. The deployment of the Commonwealth
Electoral  Monitoring  Force  in  Rhodesia  represents  a  clear  manifestation  of  a  new  type  of
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  based  on  the  collective  political  will  of  the  entirety  of  the
Commonwealth.  In  addition,  it  is  worth  venturing  a  little  beyond  1981  to  briefly  explore
Commonwealth military relations with respect to the Falklands war of 1982. These two events together
aptly illustrate how far Commonwealth defence cooperation had drifted from its original intent. The
former  was  the  manifestation  of  a  relatively new but  increasingly popular  and  respected  form of
international military cooperation. The latter was based on older principles that had been disavowed by
the post-1971 Commonwealth and was increasingly complicated to conduct, operate, and request even
amongst Commonwealth countries who were favourably inclined to such cooperation.
53 D. MacKenzie, Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland 1939-49 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1986) p192
54 This was at the heart of the 'two-nation theory' in which it was supposed that the partition of the British Raj between a 
Muslim and non-Muslim states would be best course of action. W.R. Louis,  A. Low, R. Winks & P. Marshall The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography (Oxford University Press, 1999) p 258
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Unexplored elements
Chief  amongst  the  topics  only  cursorily  examined  is  the  new  member  states  of  the
Commonwealth, and how civil servants, legislatures, and executives thought about – and decided upon
– the future direction of the Commonwealth. For the purposes of this study the reasons behind why the
new states  approached the  Commonwealth  in  the  manner  that  they did  are  less  relevant  than  the
subsequent reactions they prompted from key Commonwealth countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, South
Africa, New Zealand, and the UK). It is the consequences of those reactions by those countries which
had driven Commonwealth military cooperation that are at the centre of this study. This should not be
understood to imply that the history of the relationship of these new states with the Commonwealth is
comparatively less important to the development of the Commonwealth, indeed India and Pakistan's
relationship alone had such a deleterious outcome on post-war Commonwealth defence cooperation
that  it  merits  specific  attention in  its  own right,  but  sadly such attention cannot  be afforded here.
Similarly,  some  instances  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  such  as  the  Commonwealth's
approach to events in the Caribbean in the 1970s and 1980s, have received only scant attention. 55 This
is  especially  true  of  the  Commonwealth  reaction  to  events  in  Belize  and  Grenada.  All  of  these,
however, fall outside of the scope of this study.
Consideration of the activities of the intelligence services of different states, those belonging to
both the Old and New Commonwealths, has been deliberately omitted. This includes such things as the
intelligence cooperation amongst Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US and the UK (such as Five
Eyes). The issue of access to appropriate and reliable source material in sufficient quantity and quality
to  be  considered  useful  can  often  impede research,  and this  is  especially true  with  respect  to  the
intelligence services. For the purposes of this thesis there is a distinct line drawn between intelligence
cooperation and defence cooperation. Although the activities of the former informed the operations of
the  latter  they are  considered  to  be  sufficiently  distinct  that  they are  not  addressed  directly  here.
However, some cross-over is to be expected, especially on intelligence exchanges with respect to the
availability  of  nuclear  weapons  to  Commonwealth  countries  and  nuclear  strike  plans.56 There  is,
however,  much more that  can be said on the subject  in future years as  more archival  records are
released and new avenues of inquiry are opened for more thorough exploration. 
55 Comparatively more study has been done on Anglo-American relations with respect to the decolonisation process in the 
West Indies. In particular see G. Williams 'Keeping a line open: Britain and the 1979 coup in Grenada' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 39 (2011) p 480
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This thesis gives limited attention to any particular individual. While every effort has been made
to highlight some of the key personalities at different stages, the reality is that they are few and far
between. This thesis has a broad scope, not only chronologically but also thematically, and practical
concerns prevented the sort of in-depth analysis into the actions of any individual person that might
otherwise have been included. Practical considerations aside, the focus on official state actions and
responses has allowed a narrative to emerge that is defined by diplomatic conflicts driven by competing
national interests, and international relations more generally. This is a particularly useful perspective as
it showcases the interactions between states on a global stage at a time of immense geopolitical and
ideological struggle.  While this  approach has its limitations,  it  has the advantage of capturing that
interaction in a coherent and sensible manner that avoids over-emphasising personal contributions and
any potential misrepresentations of activity and actions that may have otherwise occurred.
Structure
The  structure  of  the  thesis  is  chronological  in  nature.  There  are  six  major  chapters,  each
separated by a shift in either policy or some political directive or consideration with respect to the trend
of  Commonwealth  military cooperation.  This  should  be  noted  as  being  distinct  from any specific
consequences  of  major  events  for  particular  actors.  The  distinction  is  particularly  important  with
respect to the Suez crisis of 1956. The crisis is addressed as a national issue for the UK, albeit one with
international  implications,  and  as  an  example  of  a  longer  running  issue  of  poor  Commonwealth
communication and growing divergence in Commonwealth political agendas. It fits into a prolonged
and uncertain period of uneasy Commonwealth defence relations throughout the 1950s and into the
1960s. It is in that vein that the six main chapters which follow address the four key phases of the
development of Commonwealth defence relations throughout the post-war period.
The  first  phase,  and  first  chapter,  concerns  itself  with  the  dramatic  change  in  the  British
strategic situation following the independence and partition of the British Raj in 1947. It explores the
56 Discussions between British officials and Australian service representatives in London in the early 1960s explored the 
likely employment of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional attack with the express purpose of using those 
weapons to force the enemy to pause its attack. It being considered that a retaliation on civilian populations as a 
response in this scenario to be 'not merely futile but dangerous'. Although this thinking was limited to Europe and 'only 
general consideration [had been given] to the particular problems of the use of nuclear weapons in the Far East. Broadly 
it was believed that the same principles applied...' - 'Note of a discussion between UK officials and Sir Reginald Pollar, 
Chief of the Australian Army Staff – in London'. 6 September 1961 DO 164/800/015 UKNA
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Middle  East  Defence  Conference  in  1951 which  outlined  the  Commonwealth's  plans  for  a  global
approach to Commonwealth deployments in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union.  This initial
post-war period still held much of the trappings of Commonwealth defence cooperation from past wars
through its  effective continuation of the Imperial  defence concept.  There were holdovers  from the
peace  treaties  at  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  which  also  served  to  further  Commonwealth
cooperative efforts, such as the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. This first phase
highlighted a relatively stable period in defence matters amongst the Commonwealth. However, there
were indications of problems even at this early stage, especially from Canada and South Africa. 
The second phase, and chapter, marks the beginning of a long process of transition in defence
relations amongst  Commonwealth member states.   There were some limited successes  in  ensuring
cooperation in the post-war period, most notably with the inclusion of an Indian contribution to the 1st
Commonwealth Division in Korea.57 Such early successes would be undermined by later developments.
New political realities and technological developments emerged in the 1950s which undermined the
potential that had been demonstrated in the Defence Conference of 1951 and in the 1st Commonwealth
Division. A focus on national priorities coupled with regional rather than globally based cooperative
efforts and organisations had now taken hold.58 This new approach ran counter to the form of previous
Commonwealth defence cooperation which had been predicated upon a global basis for its collective
defence.59 Developments later in the decade led to an increased, if at times more awkward, level of
cooperation between Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the UK in South-East Asia.
This marked the start of what proved to be one of the most fruitful defence relationships throughout the
Commonwealth since the Second World War.
The  third  phase,  and  arguably  the  most  complicated  and  intricate  of  the  four,  began  in
approximately  1960  and  lasted  until  1971.  No  fewer  than  three  chapters  are  concerned  with  this
57 P. Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea 1948-53, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) p 194
58 Specifically it was said that 'all like-minded governments should cooperate in building up collective security from 
another angle, that of regional security,' -Memorandum by the UK Government 'Meeting of Prime Ministers 'The  World 
Situation and its Defence Aspects' PMM(49)1 23 September 1949 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
59 Indeed there was an element of thought within the Commonwealth Relations Office that this new approach was not 
conducive to continued Commonwealth relationship, especially on defence matters. There were particular concerns that 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa may feel excluded given that they were not involved in NATO planning, and 
that this would be 'one of the considerations which the UK will have in mind' when considering expanding NATO. - 
Telegram No. 1214 From the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs 17 
May 1951. RG 25 Volume 5963 File 50227 50 Part I LAC
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particularly  unsettled  time  in  Commonwealth  affairs.  The  rapid  expansion  of  the  Commonwealth
during this period is certainly one of the driving causes behind this turbulent time. The first of the three
chapters,  chapter  three,  deals with Canada and South Africa.  The two countries  had very different
responses to the expansion of the Commonwealth.  Lester Pearson's suggestion that the UN should
create  a peace-keeping force set  in  motion a  relationship between Canada's  armed forces and UN
peace-keeping  initiatives  that  further  undermined  Canadian  interest  in  traditional  Commonwealth
defence  cooperation.  The  second half  of  chapter  three  concerns  South  Africa,  and particularly  its
effective expulsion from the Commonwealth. Chapter four addresses the Anglo-Australian and New
Zealand relationship which continued in South-East Asia and was,  eventually,  expanded to include
Malaysia and Singapore. Finally,  chapter five broaches the increased level of technical cooperation
amongst Commonwealth member states, not only in the field of conventional weapons and missiles but
also in the development of nuclear technology.  Although somewhat of a side-lined affair  with few
shared practical outcomes the sheer scale of effort involved in this endeavour, coupled with its political
significance, marked it as an important aspect of Commonwealth defence relations.60 It also highlights
one of the major aspects of defence relations: that the results of defence research and procurement
choices  lasted  long  after  political  agreement  on  such  matters  had  ceased.  Exchanges  on  nuclear
technology  between  Canada  and  India  is  an  example  of  this,  but  so  too  is  the  procurement  of
conventional hardware, especially warships which often served for decades after commissioning.61
The last  phase,  and final chapter,  covers the 'New Commonwealth'  from the Declaration of
Singapore until the Falklands War. This ten-year period very strongly illustrates the changes that had
happened to the Commonwealth, and highlights the implications those changes had for Commonwealth
defence relations. Insofar as defence cooperation was concerned the Commonwealth had started as an
organisation involved in the territorial  integrity of its fellow member states – the Imperial  defence
60 Review of the Joint Project Part 1 1960 DO 169 UKNA
61 Other commentators have divided this period differently focusing on key points in 1963 and again in 1967. The 
complicated nature of the 1960s, and its profound implications for the UK and indeed the Commonwealth, can 
encourage excessive compartmentalization as each event seems worthy of its own particular box. For the purposes of 
this study the withdrawal/ejection of South Africa and the British 'withdrawal' from the Far East mark distinct and 
appropriate bookends. Other divisions of the post-war British timeline can be found in many other studies notably D. 
Austin, 'The Transfer of Power: Why and How', in W. Morris-Jones & G. Fischer Decolonisation and After (Oxford: 
Frank Cass Ltd, 1980); J. Gallagher, The Decline. Revival and Fall of the British Empire (Oxford: Cambridge University
Press, 1982); J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (London: 
Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988). See also J. Darwin's, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Oxford: 
Basil Blacwell, 1991), A. Low, The Eclipse of Empire (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Also W. R. Louis., 
'The Dissolution of the British Empire', in W. M. Louis and J. Brown (eds.). The Oxford History of the British Empire: 
The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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theory.  It  developed  into  an  organisation  concerned  with  policing  its  own members  and  ensuring
acceptable domestic policies, even ostracising members as necessary and associating itself with the
deployment of military forces in the pursuit of that concern.62 However, it also became an organisation
that failed to concern itself with the safety and security of its fellow member states.63 How and why this
remarkable change occurred is the core question posed here. This thesis offers an explanation as to the
reasoning behind this radical development of the Commonwealth. 
Conclusion
That radical development, however, could not have been different to the prevailing military
plans  of  the Commonwealth in  the late  1940s.  Commonwealth military cooperation was relatively
strong in the post-war period, even if some cracks were evident. Stirrings of independent foreign and
defence  policies  in  Commonwealth  countries,  especially  in  Canada  and  South  Africa,  no  longer
inextricably tied the Dominions to the UK and were early indications of future difficulties that would
plague cooperation in later decades. The UK's financial difficulties, and across the Sterling area more
generally, further weakened cross-Commonwealth cooperation. Finally, the strength of the US and the
overarching political dynamic between the US and the USSR created a backdrop against which the
individual troubles amongst Commonwealth countries were viewed, with concerning implications for
continued Commonwealth defence cooperation. 
62 This was noted as being repeatedly insisted upon by the 'Afro-Asian members' while further noting that they were 
making this insistence despite it being well known that 'one other member regarded [the issue] as domestic to itself'. - 
Prime Ministers Conference May 1960 – Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 'The Future Commonwealth 
Relationship' A5954 box 1799 ANA
63 Although Margaret Thatcher would later comment that she felt that 'the Commonwealth, with particular exception of 
India, had been very supportive' (see M. Thatcher The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 
2012) p 182) the reality of that support was particular to the time that it was given, and in fact was rather less 
complimentary when viewed in relation to the support that the Commonwealth had provided when the UK had 
previously been in need of assistance during war.
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Chapter 1: The State of the Commonwealth, 1947-51
Introduction
This  chapter  outlines  the  military  and  political  circumstances  and  objectives  of  Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK from 1947 until 1951. It highlights the successes and
failures  of  cooperation amongst  those five countries  and identifies  how this  was considered to  be
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  even  though  it  often  did  not  involve  every  member  of  the
Commonwealth.  Finally  it  examines  the  implications  of  changes  in  military  technology  to
Commonwealth-wide strategy plans. In so doing it ties into the overall argument made in this thesis by
noting the relative stability of joint Commonwealth defence action in the period, as well as the warning
signs that were readily apparent to its  long-term continuation.  Furthermore,  it  points out that joint
Commonwealth defence plans actively responded to changes in military technology albeit slowly. This
is  presented in the chapter  with a breakdown of the post-war situation in the Commonwealth and
identifying the international pressures that affected the five aforementioned countries, including the
addition and loss of states in the Commonwealth. Successes and failures of Commonwealth defence
cooperation  are  highlighted  through  an  analysis  of  the  creation  of  and  contributions  to  the  1st
Commonwealth Division in the Korean War. The chapter explores some of the implications of the
development of nuclear weaponry by the USSR and how it might have affected military strategy and
cooperation. It finishes with an analysis of the changed membership of the Commonwealth. Before
delving  into  that,  however,  it  is  first  necessary  to  set  the  background  for  the  expansion  of  the
Commonwealth in the late 1940s.
In 1947 a significant step was made towards an ongoing process that would ultimately see the
introduction of a large number of territories into the Commonwealth. The independence of Pakistan and
India, 'within the Commonwealth' as the phrasing of the time went, illustrated a changing political
scene that foreshadowed a much broader series of changes that would fundamentally alter the character
of the Commonwealth as an organisation.1 Although arguably the inclusion of the Irish Free State into
the British Commonwealth in 1922 was the first such step, the fallout of independence of the Irish Free
State on the broader questions of military cooperation for the Commonwealth paled in comparison to
1 Yielding to the political ambitions of a colonial territory by granting it independence, while ensuring an agreeable 
outlook of its new political establishment, was pursued in the interests of preserving British influence. - J. Darwin, 
'British decolonisation since 1945: A pattern or a puzzle' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12 (1984) p 
193
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the profound implications of independence for India and Pakistan. Independence for India and Pakistan
came at a time when the existing members of the Commonwealth were still recovering from the effects
of the Second World War. Ongoing defence issues relating to the security of the British Empire and
occupied  territory  in  Germany  and  Japan  came  under  further  strain  resulting  from  the  uncertain
economic situation.2 These issues would have been problematic to address in a domestic context alone.
Global events further complicated matters given the increased international scrutiny of internal issues.
The  political  stand-off  between  the  US  and  the  USSR  involved  countries  on  both  sides  of  that
ideological  divide  which  responded to  defence  issues  and international  events  in  the  light  of  that
tension.3 Additionally,  agitation for political freedoms in territory previously controlled by imperial
powers both within the UK and outside of it was increasing.4 This surge in nationalist feeling was often
aggravated  by  different  actors  throughout  the  Cold  War.  This  resulted  in  an  extended  period  of
uncertainty and difficulty for the UK on an international level that complicated national difficulties,
with  consequences  for  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  The  recent  development  of  nuclear
weapons, and particularly the development of a nuclear weapon by the USSR, added to this instability
as this rapid technological progress threatened to utterly change the way warfare was conducted.
In this context it is suggested that Commonwealth defence cooperation was, initially at least,
largely unchanged by the independence of India and Pakistan. In fact, arguably the independence of
India and Pakistan demonstrated how Commonwealth defence cooperation could have continued over
the course of the next few decades. At this point, it is worth distinguishing between the UK's strategic
concerns and the realities of defence cooperation amongst the Commonwealth. It did not necessarily
follow that events which fundamentally affected the UK's strategic position harmed the prospect of
continued Commonwealth defence cooperation. The independence of India and Pakistan was a perfect
example of where this distinction can be useful. Although the implications for the UK with respect to
the loss of the British Raj were understandably profound, not only in terms of the change in control and
the threat to the order of the Commonwealth, no such negative implications existed for Commonwealth
defence  cooperation.  At  least,  not  in  the  short  term.  In  fact,  the  independence  of  India  and  its
2 J. Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO 1942-1949 (Kent: Kent State University 
Press, 1993), p 76
3 Indeed there were ongoing concerns in successive governments of both Australia and New Zealand that the increased 
tension between the US and the USSR would result in a recurrence of American isolationism. The foreign policies of 
both countries were thus directed not only at ensuring American support in the Far East but of endeavouring to prevent a
repeat of American interwar policy. - Minutes of 1st Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 3 June 1953 MG26L 
Volume 85 File 0-16-21 PMM(53) UKNA
4 R. Davis, British Decolonisation 1918-1984 (Oxford: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) p 7
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contribution to the 1st Commonwealth Division, for instance, was indicative of how new states to the
Commonwealth  might  engage  in  cooperative  defence  ventures.  This  was  marred,  somewhat,  by
Pakistan's lack of involvement but even here it is clear that their absence did not fundamentally affect
the fact that it was a 'Commonwealth' Division and such flexibility to nomenclature could continue to
be applied.5
The  prospects  for  future  defence  cooperation  amongst  the  Commonwealth  with  respect  to
Canada and South Africa,  however,  were less clear.  Indeed there was a degree of unease amongst
Canadian policy-makers in any coordination on defence issues which involved the UK unless it also
involved the US.6 This was not solely an issue with respect to a preference for coordination with the
US. Canadian anxiety was based on a history of perceived bias in Anglo-Canadian cooperation that
favoured the UK.7 Canadian deployments to a post-war British occupation force were not seen until
late 1951, when the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade was deployed as a constituent element of a division
of I Corps of the British Army on the Rhine. Although Canadian involvement in BAOR was to continue
until 1970 this was undertaken as the Canadian contribution to NATO rather than as part of a collective
Commonwealth  initiative.  This  issue  was  highlighted  clearly  in  June  1971  when  the  Canadian
detachment was redeployed to a US sector.8 
This clearly contrasted with the positions of the Australian & New Zealand governments as both
deployed forces which formed a significant element of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in
Japan. Although some attempts were made to pursue a joint Australian-Canadian policy a divergence of
5 There is some debate as to the extent of the effect that the independence of India and Pakistan had on British military 
strategy. Tinker remarks upon how little British strategy itself changed in the context of independence, while 
Goldsworthy comments that the British needed a stable colonial atmosphere and that anything which might affect that – 
amongst other things – was to be avoided. See H. Tinker, 'The Contraction of Empire in Asia 1945-48: The Military 
Dimension' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,16 (1988) p 230, and D. Goldsworthy, 'Keeping Change 
Within Bounds: Aspects of Colonial Policy during the Churchill and Eden governments 1951-57' Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 18 (1990) p 102
6 The post-war Canadian government had formed the view, in the dying stages of the Second World War, that 'if the US 
remains aloof and if consequently the UK is forced to rely principally upon alliances with European powers, Canada will
be less likely to participate in such arrangements'. - Canadian Defence Relations with the British Commonwealth 14 
December 1946 RG 25 Volume 5724 PHP44 LAC
7 There was also a general level of unease in the Canadian administration, both during the Second World War and after, 
that the preponderance of British representation on a joint committee was invariably weighted in favour of the British 
representatives. -Preliminary paper on Canada-UK Defence Relationship Part I 24 November 1944 RG 25 Volume 5724 
LAC
8 This was spurred on through a combination of a Canadian reorganisation of its armed forces. - G. Watson & R. Rinaldi, 
The British Army in Germany: An Organisational History 1947-2004 (Newport: Tiger Lily publications, 2005) p 26
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views – in addition to the difficulties posed by the geography – thwarted such arrangements.9 Similarly
the difficulties of securing South African support for Commonwealth issues rose exponentially once the
Second World War had ended. The issue of race and racial relations, coupled with the victory of the
National Party in 1948, complicated the deployment of South African military forces overseas.10 South
Africa's domestic difficulties with race and racial  relations came under scrutiny in an international
context as well, especially from new members of the Commonwealth. The focus from new countries on
these issues was considered to be, in part, driven by active interference from the USSR, an activity
which  was  thought  to  be fundamental  to  the  Soviet  ideology.11 Whether  true  or  not,  the  practical
implications  of  this  domestic  policy  change  and  international  focus  undermined  potential
Commonwealth defence cooperation in a state which was already known to be reticent with its support
for Commonwealth-wide defence issues. 
This era of rapid and energetic political  manoeuvring, both by the USSR and new political
actors,  was  complicated  by  the  development  of  new  technology,  particularly  nuclear  weapons
technology. The advent of the atomic bomb formed part of the technical impetus which presaged an end
to the centralised organisation of the defence of far-flung territories. However, existing military thought
and strategic doctrine from the Second World War continued until the early 1950s. It was not until the
dispersed deployment of nuclear weapons was sufficiently advanced that a re-examination of strategic
doctrine  was  undertaken.  This  gap  between  the  end  of  the  Second World  War  and the  change  in
strategic  doctrine effectively created a period in  which the strategic  concepts which had governed
Commonwealth  military thought  continued  to  remain  applicable  to  the  broad  principles  of  global
defence cooperation. The dying embers of long established imperially-based defensive coordination in
strategic matters12 would flare again briefly in 1951 with the Middle East Defence Conference. This
9 J.F. Hilliker, 'Distant Ally: Canadian Relations with Australia during the Second World War' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 13 (1984) p 63
10 N. Waddy, 'The fork in the road? British Reactions to the Election of an Apartheid Government in South Africa, May 
1948' Historia 55 (2010) p 78
11 The Canadian position at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1957 was that the Soviet ideology was 
such that their 'system and ideology prevent them' from following any other course of action. - Foreign Office brief for 
Cabinet: Committee on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference: Relation with the USSR 13 June 1957. The 
British were also concerned that Soviet ideology ran to that same effect. Annex to Telegram no. 1523 'Soviet Intentions 
in the Mideast – UK brief for Prime Minister's Meeting' 25 June 1957. Both can be found in:  RG 27 Volume 21577 File 
2-5020-2 LAC
12 Strategic matters had been a point of mass-consultation and coordination amongst the Commonwealth since the end of 
the First World War, and included even such agreements that, in reality, would influence only the UK directly, but would
have a significant trickle-down effect such as the Washington Naval treaties.  - P. Wigly, & N. Hillmer 'Defining the First
British Commonwealth: The Hankey Memoranda on the 1926 Imperial Conference' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 8 (1979) p 110
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Conference was one of the last attempts to organize the defence of vital regions of the  Commonwealth
on a global basis.  It  stood in sharp contrast  to the efforts of regional defence organisations which
developed after 1951. It was a suitably foreboding end for a near century-long tradition of defensive
organisation and cooperation amongst the various political entities within the British Empire and its
Commonwealth. 
The post-war Commonwealth
In  1947  the  UK  was  still  recovering  from  the  Second  World  War.  Wartime  conscription
continued until 1949, and effectively remained in operation under the National Service Act 1948 until
December 1960.13 The last conscripts were discharged a little more than two years later. The extended
period of National Service after the end of the Second World War was due to the unsettled nature of the
immediate post-war period. Many areas of the British Empire required permanent garrisons to ensure
political stability.14 The constant draw of labour to the armed forces further complicated a precarious
economic situation and undermined a return to peace-time industrial capability. The start of the Cold
War,  the  spread  of  Communism and  increased  political  agitation,  internally  and  externally,  for  a
withdrawal from a variety of imperial territories created circumstances in which military cooperation
amongst the Commonwealth could continue.  Such cooperation could be used as an opportunity to
preserve British influence and prestige through the Commonwealth. Indeed, some efforts in that respect
developed  directly  out  of  post-war  structures.  The  framework for  the  1st Commonwealth  Division
which would see service in Korea in 1951, for instance,  was based on the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force Japan structure. 
In  general,  however,  the  underlying  British  endeavour  to  preserve  influence  and  prestige
through  the  Commonwealth15 would  never  amount  to  anything  significant.  Despite  British  aims
regarding the Commonwealth, and widespread assumption outside the Commonwealth, in reality little
opportunity existed for the UK to influence the new organisation as it expanded. In that respect, British
13 For a detailed analysis on the limited differences between conscription and National Service see Vinen R. National 
Service: A Generation in Uniform (London: Penguin UK) 2014.
14 D. French, Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy 1945-1971 (Oxford University Press, 
2012) p 6
15 The effects of this manifest throughout the period, and are especially apparent in Anglo-American relations. One such 
example was at an early meeting of the ABC (American, British, and Canadian army) planners in April 1948. The 
British representatives committed forces not only from the UK, but also from throughout the Commonwealth. When 
questioned, however, they confessed that they had not spoke directly with the various members of the Commonwealth 
regarding their specific contributions. - Chiefs of Staff CTE 23 February 1949 RG25 Volume 222 File 1400/23
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efforts at influencing other countries in the period paled in comparison to both the US and the USSR.
Both  the  US  and  the  USSR  were  implementing  much  broader,  more  comprehensive  efforts  of
cooperation  in  their  respective  spheres  of  influence  than  the  UK  managed  through  the
Commonwealth.16 The  consequences  of  decolonisation  and  the  growth  of  American  and  Russian
influence around the globe profoundly undermined the possibility of the UK building on its efforts to
use the Commonwealth as a vehicle for the preservation of prestige and global influence.
It was undoubtedly detrimental to the prospects of Commonwealth defence cooperation that
there were early signs that existing Dominions within the Commonwealth were shifting away from
cooperative Commonwealth defence efforts. Canadian foreign policy, in particular, demonstrated an
eager desire to pursue its government's own goals. The difficulties involved in the Dominions operating
independent foreign and military policies surfaced in two key ways. First, the growth of US influence
in implementing military policy. The Canadians were caught by their geographical position between the
US and the USSR. Indeed efforts at American-Canadian military cooperation had been ongoing since
the beginning of the Second World War.17 Although not always without tension, these were usually
amicably  resolved.18 It  was  not,  however,  until  the  development  of  nuclear  weapons  that  this
cooperation  became  an  imperative  for  the  defence  of  the  US.  The  deployment  of  Soviet  nuclear
weapons,  ballistic  missiles,  and  strategic  aircraft  which,  given  rapid  advancements  in  various
underlying technologies, could fly non-stop from the USSR to the US had attracted significant attention
and concern.19 Early efforts at safeguarding this northerly approach from the USSR to the US were,
largely,  unsuccessful.  The  Pinetree  Line  and  the  Mid-Canada  Line  were  casualties  of  the  rapid
development  in  aircraft  and  weapons  technology.  Such  rapid  advancement  necessitated  extensive
cooperation between Canada and the US. That level of persistent cooperative effort in the interest of
national survival further cultivated their close defence relationship. It became a relationship solidly
built on mutual defence issues in a way which was no longer shared to the same degree by Canada and
16 The tensions between, and within, the two major political blocs are outlined thoroughly in M. Heiss & S. Papacosma 
(eds.), NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent: Kent State University Press) 2005, viii - xv.
17 Appendix to Chiefs of Staff Committee Memorandum: Meeting of Prime Ministers Commonwealth Defence 
Cooperation – Canadian position 5 October 1948 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC 
18 Prime Minister's Conference: Second Meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for Canada, 
Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
19 The first Russian intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead was believed to have been 
successfully tested in 1957, although this would not be deployed operationally until 1959. - Weekly Intelligence 
Summary No. 29/57 General Staff Intelligence Committee 88/INT/138/3 Russian Guided Weapons 5 August 1957 MV 
208/151 SANDFA. Indeed by 1962 it was expected that the Russians would be able to reach even the southern states of 
the US, if re-fuelled mid-flight, with their strategic aircraft. - Summary of Main Factors MV 208/151 SANDFA
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the UK, much less so between Canada and more distant countries of the Commonwealth.20 
Secondly there was a fundamental shift in the domestic political atmosphere in Canada. There
was a new perspective on the new dichotomy between the US and the USSR that placed Canada firmly
in the position of what it described as a 'Middle Power'.21 This analysis  failed to account for their
involvement with the UK, let alone the Commonwealth, when it came to joint military cooperation.
This  new  political-military  thought  eventually  culminated  in  significant  interest  in  peacekeeping
operations and contributions to such efforts through the UN. Indeed Canadian peacekeepers were a
major  element  of  the  first  UN peacekeeping  force  –  the  UN Emergency Force  (UNEF)  –  in  the
aftermath of the Suez crisis.22 Both of these shifts – the growing importance of defence cooperation
with the US, and the political desire to pursue independent military objectives – were actively counter-
productive to the development and continuation of existing Commonwealth defence cooperation. 
The  Anglo-Australian/New  Zealand  relationship  was  rather  different.  The  Antipodean
Dominions contribution to British, and nominally Commonwealth, defence structures remained active
and involved.  Australian and New Zealand involvement  in  the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force in Japan continued a long-standing tradition of Australian and New Zealand forces serving in
distinctly British, and later Commonwealth, force structures.
Much like the UK both Australia and New Zealand operated a form of conscription in the post-
war period.  Unlike the British model,  personnel  inducted into the armed forces through either  the
Australian National Service or New Zealand's Compulsory Military Training were not to be deployed
outside  of  their  respective  islands  after  the  end  of  the  war.23 Conscription  in  both  countries  did,
however, effectively free their voluntary professional forces to deploy on joint endeavours throughout
20 Additionally there was a growing basis for the relationship on an economic level. The massive growth in American 
economic interests in Canada were such that by 1956 they had outstripped comparable British interests in the country. - 
Mr. Diefenbarker's remarks at the Prime Ministers Conference eighth meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High 
Commissioner for Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 
21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
21 H. Herstien, L. J. Hughes, & R.C. Kirbyson Challenge & Survival: The History of Canada (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 
1970) p 411
22 This would include the appointment of a Canadian Major General to command the force in the field. - General Assembly
Resolution 5 November 1956 A/RES/1000(ES-I)
23 See National Service Act 1951 (Australia). Section 26 outlines how these National Servicemen were not be deployed 
outside of Australia, and similarly the Military Training Act 1949 for New Zealand.
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South-East Asia.24 Both Australia and New Zealand also responded with contributions to the British
forces in the Malayan Emergency in 1950. Initially the response to this request was limited to a handful
of aircraft (specifically Dakota transport aircraft from both Australia and New Zealand, and Lincoln
Bombers from Australia).25 Australia and New Zealand expanded these contributions throughout the
decade. In an early indication of the importance of nomenclature the command formation under which
these aircraft were attached to was renamed following the Australian and New Zealand deployments. In
1946 it  was  renamed  to  the  RAF Air  Command  Far  East.  In  1949  following  the  introduction  of
Australian and New Zealand squadrons it was re-designated the Far East Air Force.26 
There is a stark difference in the approach taken to cooperative endeavours of a military nature
between Canada and the two Antipodean Dominions. Although the internal politics may have differed
greatly  between  these  Dominions,  their  respective  geographical  positions  also  presented  different
viable options. By circumstance of geography the Canadian position was such that involvement in the
US sphere of influence was an inevitability. The same was not true for either Australia or New Zealand.
Both Australia and New Zealand were separated by thousands of miles of sea from both the US and the
UK. Australian and New Zealand policy-makers were very much aware of the distance involved and
much of the defence and foreign policies of Australia and New Zealand were directed at ensuring the
continuity of US and UK interests in South-East Asia.27
By contrast South Africa did not fit neatly into this categorisation of geography alone due to the
extent and publicity regarding its internal troubles. Like Australia and New Zealand it was separated
from the direct and immediate interest of both the US or the USSR.28 However, its internal politics
prevented the deployment of any South African force outside of its home territory. While Ian Smuts had
24 In a minute from the South African Embassy in Australian to the South Africa Minister for Foreign Affairs in Pretoria 
the introduction of selective military conscription in Australia was outlined as a method of ensuring that Australia's 
defence would rest on a defensive perimeter away from Australian territory proper. - Annex to Minute No. S.36/0 19 
November 1964 MV103/1 Australiese-Aangeleenthede SANDFA
25 Telegram no. 352 Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner 20 April 1950 FO 371/84602 UKNA
26 This should not to be confused with the US command that had the same name.
27 This was at the heart of the Forward Defence aspect of Australian and New Zealand Defence Policy. - A. Smith, South-
East Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations (Victoria: Victoria University Press, 2005)    
p 95
28 Although there was an ongoing American concern for the security of South Africa, particularly South Africa's uranium 
mines, this does not seem to have translated into active cooperation or technical exchange on military matters. South 
Africa was, for instance, rebuffed even in requests for air search radars that would be specifically deployed to defend its 
key industrial areas – which included its uranium mines. - Air Defence Scheme Letter from Minister of Defence (South 
Africa) F.C. Erasmus to Mr. H.A. Byroade, American Ambassador to South Africa 9 April 1957 MV 204/149 SANDFA
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led the United National South African Party into supporting the Commonwealth war effort following
the resignation of Barry Hertzog in 1939, local support for aligning with the UK remained mixed
throughout the war.29 That view persisted after the war ended. This reluctance to involvement in the
Commonwealth never fully dissipated. It was not until the end of Smut's tenure as Prime Minister and
the ascendancy of the National Party that there started a definite drift away from the Commonwealth.
The  policy  of  racial  segregation  which  had  been  espoused  by  the  National  Party  provoked  an
international outcry. South Africa's continued membership of the Commonwealth subsequently proved
increasingly problematic. 
Concerns in the South African government as to the growing unrest amongst the local black
population,  amongst  other  more  general  post-war  concerns,  contributed  to  a  general  reluctance  to
deploy troops outside of South Africa. Indeed, a policy was set a few years later in 1956 that prevented
the deployment of ground forces of the Union Defence Force (from 1957 the South African Defence
Force)  anywhere  outside  of  South  Africa.30 This  reluctance  resulted  in  South  African  involvement
during the Korean War being limited to a single air squadron (2 Squadron SAAF).31 There was no
Commonwealth formation for air forces during that war. Instead command of the air forces which were
sent  to Korea were organized under  the US Fifth  Air  Force.32 Despite  this  involvement  the South
African record of engagement and cooperation in the post-war period remained exceptionally limited.
South Africa's involvement and cooperation with the Commonwealth would cease entirely following
their withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961.33 
The  culmination  of  these  issues  in  all  five  countries  prevented  the  immediate  post-war
framework that had been established from developing into more meaningful cooperation amongst the
Commonwealth. A further complication existed during these post-war years that while the UK was still
29 N. Stultz, Afrikaner Politics in South Africa (Oakland: University of California Press, 1974), p 64
30 Letter from High Commissioner Jordan to Secretary of External Affairs 13 August 1956 PS 28/8 MV 200 Verdediging 
van Afrika SANDFA
31 Minute for Prime Minister 'Korea' 18 December 1952 MV 128/4 Boesoek Ran Die Verre Ooste: Koerant en Ander 
Verslae SANDFA
32 R.F. Futrell, L.S. Moseley, & A.F. Simpson. The US Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 (Whitefish: Literary Licensing LLC, 
2012), p 28
33 According to the final communique issued by the Commonwealth at the Prime Ministers' Meeting of March 1961 it was 
made clear that the South African government had withdrawn its application for continued membership in the 
Commonwealth 'in the light of the views expressed [by the other members of the Commonwealth] and the indications of 
their future intentions regarding the racial policy of the Union government.' - Commonwealth Conference Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers 8-17 March 1961 Final Communique Annex II RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 
LAC
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the  glue  that  held  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  together  allowing  other  Commonwealth
countries  to  take  the  lead  on  a  regional  basis  was  acknowledged  even  at  this  early  stage.34 A
combination of stretched British forces35 and strident national desires in Australia to cement its position
in the Far East had already resulted in the widespread deployment of Australian and New Zealand
forces in the occupying force of Japan.36 The groundwork had been laid and noted, but the full potential
of this was never realised.37  It is indicative of the nature of Commonwealth defence relations that it
was  not  until  the  1980s  that  there  existed  a  formal  system  of  defence  cooperation  amongst  the
Commonwealth which did not involve the UK.38 
The turbulent political scene affected all countries in the Commonwealth, and remained a cause
of concern for the prospect of continued Commonwealth cooperation. South Africa's involvement had
gone from conflicted to effectively non-existent following Smuts'  defeat at the polls. Any potential
Canadian interest increasingly struggled for attention against the more immediate concern of its own
safety and its position on the world stage. The situation, however, was not entirely bleak. Indeed there
were a number of examples of cooperation that hinted at the direction of things to come. Australian and
New  Zealand  cooperation  with  British  forces  in  the  Far  East  continued  strongly,  and  if  it  never
developed into its full potential this could not necessarily have been known in the late 1940s. The
independence  of  India  was  not  met  with  the  withdrawal  of  India  from  Commonwealth  defence
considerations. Even if the Indian contribution bordered on the inconsequential in comparison to its
available  forces  its  involvement  with  the  1st Commonwealth  Division  challenged  the  idea  that  a
34 The British government had noted that 'Australia was able, however, to make progress after the end of the war [the 
Second World War] on taking the lead in Commonwealth defence arrangements in the Pacific and in South-East Asia.' 
specifically it was further recognised that the creation of plans for the defence of the ANZAM region rested with the 
'ANZAM planning machinery [which] was located in Melbourne.' - Historical Note on attempts to achieve Combined 
Strategic Planning by Britain, US, Australia and New Zealand DO 164 52/77/11 UKNA
35 Even important port cities, such as Hong Kong, were recognised in 1952 as having garrisons so small as to be ineffectual
even in the pursuit of maintaining public order, let alone holding their ground for a sufficient length of time for a force to
be raised. - M. Chi-Kwan, 'Defence of Decolonisation? Britain, the US, and the Hong Kong Question in 1957' Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 33 (2005),  p 67
36 It has been suggested that a combination of Australian ambitions and British encouragement forged a path towards heavy
Australian involvement in South-East Asia until 1971. - G. Pemberton, All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987) p 55
37 There were significant and lengthy discussions in the British Cabinet in 1964 regarding the possible contribution of ever 
greater Commonwealth support, especially in the Far East. This would go on to suggest that the Royal Navy need merely
make a 'contribution' to the defence East of the Suez. Unfortunately much of the content of these discussions have been 
redacted or destroyed prior to full release. The remnants indicating only that discussions took place, and brief snippets as
to the form of the British 'contribution'. The file also contains mentions of the possibility of a 'Commonwealth Chiefs of 
Staff' to be based out of the Ministry of Defence in London. - PREM 11/4731 DO(64)59 UKNA
38 This would take the form of a Regional Security Agreement amongst a number of Caribbean islands. This was an 
initiative which was directed at internal security cooperation as well as securing against the same threat externally.
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growing Commonwealth that consisted of increasingly independent and divergent views could not find
sufficient common ground for joint military operations.
The international context
It is impossible to speak of any cooperative effort during the Cold War without mentioning the
prevailing political atmosphere of uncertainty and competing national interests – even amongst allies.
Increased tensions between the US and the USSR rapidly dominated the political scene in an era of
ailing imperial  powers and growing independence movements.  In this regard the USSR was better
positioned than the US. The USSR offered a particularly populist and compelling ideological view of
the world to the new states both far more attractive than the Western alternative, and associated with
imperialism. There was considerable effort expended, particularly in the UK, to ensure that new states
were not led by governments that had pro-Communist leanings. In that, successive US administrations
supported the UK. Their support, however, was rarely wholehearted or overly generous.39 Also, their
support was often undermined by competition between the UK and the US in specific areas – especially
in relation to trade.40 While US administrations were keen to retain the UK, and the newly independent
states that emerged from the British empire, within a Western sphere of influence British imperial rule
was a  major  political  sticking point.41 Ultimately through a mix of financial  pressure and growing
internal and external objections the British Empire was dismantled at an increasing pace in a process of
decolonisation that had only intermittent successes in the creation of viable states.42 This steady release
of new states provided a vast battleground for conflict between the US and the USSR, and occasionally
39 This is particularly true of their persistent and consistent drive in favour of forcing the convertibility of the pound 
Sterling and obliging the British Sterling area to be opened up in favour of foreign, effectively American, involvement in
those markets. -  A. Hinds, 'Sterling and Imperial Policy 1945-51' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15 
(1987), p 149
40 Mr. Havenga of South Africa was moved to comment at the Prime Minister's conference of 1953 that the US while 
'anxious for us to move towards multilateralism [in trade] but it was not helping to achieve it.' which prompted a follow-
on comment by Mr. Holland of New Zealand who complained that the powerful agricultural lobby in the US had 
prompted the implementation of protective tariffs on dried milk that resulted in the cheaper to produce and ship New 
Zealand version from competing in the American market. - MG26L Volume 85 File 0-16-21 PMM(53) Minutes of 5th 
Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 9 June 1953 LAC. Also see D. McCourt, 'Reassessing the Withdrawal,' 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 20 (2009) p 462
41 Although there was certainly a reluctance to further prop up the British empire any more than strictly necessary, and 
successive American administrations were keen to enforce their preferred economic policies insofar as they did not 
result in the total collapse of British economic they handled diplomatic disagreements much less bullishly, and failed 
cooperative endeavours and differences of opinion, such as in the Far East and in India, were typically resolved if not 
amicably then at least through mutual ignorance. - H.W. Brands 'India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning 
1947-54: the Commonwealth as a Collaborator' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15 (1986) p 51
42 W.R. Louis, & R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonisation' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22 
(1994) p 493
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the imperial powers themselves too.43 Amongst the efforts undertaken to ensure that these new states
were both viable entities and were inclined to a Western viewpoint was a concentration on federal
structures44 and regional organisations. The growth of regional efforts, amongst the imperial powers in
Europe and throughout the world, demonstrated conflicting objectives. For example, while the primary
goal was to prevent the rise of governments in new states which adhered to a Communist ideology US
administrations were keen to ensure that former imperial territory was opened to US influence and
economic interests.45 
This was also true of US economic support to the UK. Here financial support offered by the US
to the UK came with the price tag of the steady dissolution of economic policies that favoured the
Commonwealth and the Sterling economic bloc. This included the convertibility of the pound Sterling
and similar measures.46 It was only the sheer scale of the catastrophe that resulted from implementing
the convertibility of Sterling that forced the US to accept that the British financial system simply could
not cope with this scale of change in such a short time-frame.47 This difficulty was well understood as a
distinct possibility at the time the request was made.48 
43 This was especially true of ongoing French difficulties in its colonies. Although some were caused by Soviet and 
Communist agitation, others were the result of mismanaged expectations in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Even Algeria suffered significantly from local unrest and caused severe disruption to the armed forces and political 
establishment of France. - J-C, Jauffret, 'The Origins of the Algerian War: The Reaction of France and its Army to the 
Two Emergencies of 8 May 1945 and 1 November 1954' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21 (1993) p 
19
44 There are much too many federations to go into sufficient detail of all of them. One of the earliest, and perhaps one of 
the most relevant to the post-war scenario outside of South-East Asia, was the potential East African Dominion that 
would have been formed through a federation of extant territories in the region. It was particularly promising because 
the basis of the federation rested in wartime efforts of cooperation and coordination in the region. The difficulty here, as 
elsewhere in Africa, were the problems posed by racial tensions. A variety of possibilities were advanced, including 
several which segregated white settlers and the black population into different administrative groups within the 
federation, but all proved unworkable both practically and when confronted by ideological preferences from the British 
labour party. - N.J. Westcott, 'Closer Union and the Future of East Africa 1939-48: A Case Study in the Official Mind of 
Imperialism' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 10 (1982) p 75. Also it had been hoped that such 
federations would provide a relatively quick and easy method of ensuring a transfer of power, the inevitably of which 
had been accepted (though the timescale would still come as quite a shock), to a successor state that would be 
favourably inclined to the West and the imperial parent country. - L.J. Butler, 'Britain, the United States, and the Demise 
of the Central African Federation 1959-63' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28 (2000) p 147
45 A. Knight, 'Latin America' in W.R. Louis & J. Brown, The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV: The 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
46 S. Newston, 'Britain, the Sterling Area, and European Integration' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 13 
(1985) p 178
47 A. Sutton, The Political Economy of Imperial Relations: Britain, the Sterling Area, and Malaya 1945-1960 (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) p 65
48 Memorandum from the Foreign Secretary 19 October 1949 T230/177 UKNA
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It is clear that while the US was keen to ensure that it could engage the USSR on ideological
terms in these new states, it also sought to restrict influence from other sources as well.  The US had
much greater success in restricting the rise in third-party influence in new member states than it had in
competing for their ideological viewpoint.49 The hurried and harried process of decolonisation, which
sought to maintain British influence through a relatively orderly transfer of power to the appropriate
local people, coupled with an increasingly open market for US interests, failed to have the desired
effect of shutting out Communist ideology.50 It was in this precarious situation that Commonwealth
defence cooperation endeavoured to continue. 
The UK also had a more local concern of its own: Europe. There had been calls for a unified
Europe from  before the nineteenth century. The British position had traditionally been to avoid, and
indeed actively act against, any potential union of European states in favour of ensuring a balance of
power within Europe.51 After 1945 the British stance changed dramatically. Support for the creation of
a 'kind of United States of Europe' as it was put by Winston Churchill in 1946 was representative of the
new thinking to be found in political circles in London.52 British involvement in the European project
can be seen at an early stage in 1948 with the UK's membership of the Western European Union.
Meanwhile further political involvement would come shortly after with the creation of the Council of
Europe following the Treaty of London in 1949.53 Although it was some time before an economic or
political  union of  any sort  was established the numerous endeavours towards  the creation of pan-
European political bodies was representative of the growth of regional concerns and activities. The
involvement of the UK, and its historic shift in European policy, was indicative of the all-encompassing
revision of British foreign policy in light of the changed international context. Although Europe was
not of immediate concern to the Commonwealth these countries sought – and received – assurances
regarding the continuation of preferential tariffs on Commonwealth goods – especially in relation to
49 At least one British government had considered their ideological opposition merely a tool with which the Russians could
use to extend their own 'imperialist control'. - Prime Ministers Conference Fourth Meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 
from High Commissioner for Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 
Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
50 It is interesting in this regard to note that the new member states of the Commonwealth, with the sole exception of 
Pakistan, were much more receptive to the USSR which, in the words of the Prime Minister of  Ghana, had erred only in
its 'use of force'. - Prime Minister's Conference First Meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for 
Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 
LAC
51 E. Goldstein & B. McKercher, 'Introduction' Diplomacy and Statecraft 14 (2003) p 1
52 Transcript of Winston Churchill speaking at the University of Zurich 19 September 1946
53 Statute of the Council of Europe London 5.V.1949 – European Treaty Series No. 1/6/7/8/11
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foodstuffs.54 
It seems fair to say that all members of the Commonwealth, in the immediate post-war period,
were increasingly focused on their  own regional  interests.  Unlike  other  Commonwealth  countries,
however,  the UK retained a  global  role due to  its  extensive imperial  possessions.  This global role
continued to require British attention – and Commonwealth support – throughout the 1940s and into
the 1950s. If anything, the early interest expressed by the UK, and the Commonwealth more generally,
in  regional  structures  was  an  early  sign  of  the  potential  problems  that  faced  pan-Commonwealth
defence cooperation in the years ahead.
Successes in Commonwealth defence cooperation
Although the relatively small number of crises during the 1940s and 1950s provided limited
opportunities for Commonwealth defence cooperation, several of them during the period would go on
to  have  significant  repercussions.  The  continuing  deterioration  of  the  situation  in  the  Mandate  of
Palestine and the eventual withdrawal of the UK from the Mandate in May 1948 should also be noted.55
Commonwealth involvement in Palestine from 1947 was complicated by the prevailing British attitude
that the partition of Palestine required by the UN was unworkable.56 Furthermore the demands the
Mandate required to be met was primarily a British rather than Commonwealth affair. The decision to
withdraw from the Mandate had largely been a foregone conclusion by 1947. Although there has been
some debate as to whether the British had failed the Jews or the Palestinians as a result of the UN
proposal,57 it seems abundantly apparent that they had certainly further complicated their own situation
– a failing by any standard. The Middle East, especially after the independence of India, remained an
important element in British military thought and further involvement in Palestine was hindering, rather
than helping, British activities in the region. The Mandate was a particularly British endeavour, and an
altogether unsuccessful one at that. 
54 Exchange between Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Thorneycroft Prime Minister's Conference Ninth meeting Annex to 
Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 
June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
55 W.M. Louis, 'Sir Alan Cunningham and the End of British Rule in Palestine' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 16 (1988) p 140
56 Indeed ongoing illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine created a recipe for disaster in the region. Such immigration 
was extraordinarily difficult to detect and prevent, not least because of the potential for a negative reaction from the US 
at a critical time for the post-war British empire. - S. Cohen, 'Imperial Policing against Illegal Immigration: the Royal 
Navy and Palestine 1945-48' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (1994) p 286
57 E. Ravndal, 'Exit Britain: British Withdrawal from the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War 1947-1948' Diplomacy 
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Other  crises  worked  out  rather  better,  especially  in  the  context  of  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation. The Malayan Emergency in the summer of 1948 is perhaps one of the most important for
the purposes of detailing joint military endeavours across the Commonwealth during the period.58 The
Emergency provided a prime opportunity for the use of Commonwealth forces.  A key British and
Commonwealth interest was readily threatened and fundamentally aligned with previous British and
Commonwealth military cooperation: the retention of an imperial territory from an external force.59
There  were no external  pressures  that  prompted any particular  approach or  otherwise complicated
matters. Although Commonwealth ground forces would not arrive until the early 1950s, air squadrons
and airlift capabilities were rapidly deployed from Australia and New Zealand. Even the limited self-
governing colony of Rhodesia committed a special forces squadron which had been initially earmarked
for deployment in Korea. It may be a stretch to label these efforts, which were extremely limited in the
context of the whole Commonwealth, as a significant multinational Commonwealth contribution to a
distinctly  Commonwealth  problem.  It  does,  however,  highlight  a  key  example  of  successful  pan-
Commonwealth operational cooperation continuing even in changing political conditions. Furthermore
the willingness of Australia and New Zealand to allow their  forces to be deployed in this  manner
following a request from the UK speaks more broadly to an underlying desire for, or at least acceptance
of, continued cooperation. The Australian and New Zealand contribution bolstered the limited number
of air transport squadrons available, transport squadrons which were key to the effort. The Rhodesian
contribution, although only of 100 men filled a gap the British had in their available numbers of special
forces. In the context of a conflict that involved approximately 350,000 Commonwealth forces, the
presence or absence of 100 men and a handful of planes may seem inconsequential. However, their
significance  was  in  the  ability  of  Commonwealth  forces,  even  small  ones  such as  the  Rhodesian
deployment,  to  fill  gaps  in  the  British  order  of  battle.  This  was  an  important  aspect  to  post-war
Commonwealth defence cooperation that resurfaced in later years. 
58 It is worth considering the context of the start of the Malayan Emergency, and particularly the lack of certainty around 
whether it was a Communist plot as opposed to a period of enhanced local unrest caused by extant domestic issues 
within the territory itself. The Communist aspect, whether real or imagined, was given more attention than the evidence 
on which such an assertion could be based in an effort to ensure a strong British response (and as it turned out a strong 
Commonwealth response). - A.J. Stockwell, 'A Widespread and Long-concocted Plot to Overthrow Government in 
Malaya'? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21 (1993) p 82
59 Concerns that formerly British territory would fall under the influence of Communism was an ever-present fear, and one 
that was felt particularly keenly in South-East Asia by both the Commonwealth and the US. - Letter from the Prime 
Minister of the UK to the High Commissioner (Australia) to the UK re: Discussion with US Authority on Defence in 
South-East Asia 25 April 1955 – Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference London 1956 – Defence Brief A1209 box 
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Dawn of the New Commonwealth
The changes  to  Commonwealth membership did not disturb extant  Commonwealth defence
cooperation, and the balance between those who contributed to Commonwealth defence cooperation
and those who did not was steadily tipped in favour of the latter. Whatever successes can be claimed for
Commonwealth defence cooperation during the period must surely be balanced against the fact that
existing  Commonwealth  members,  and  new Commonwealth  members,  were  loath  to  expand  their
strategic  interests  too  far  away  from  their  shores.60 This  was  particularly  concerning  for  the
Commonwealth, given that it was so widely spread across the globe. Canadian involvement in Malaya,
for  example,  was  limited  to  materiel  aid  and  their  contribution  to  Korea  was  fraught  with
complications.61 Australian and New Zealand contributions to the defence of Canada or the UK against
the USSR threat were effectively non-existent. There are two key elements here. The first is that the
presence or absence of other members of the Commonwealth from any specific instance of defence
cooperation did not stop such instances being considered 'Commonwealth' in the context of the time.
The second is that despite the limited engagement in those regions, worldwide defence and research
demands presented numerous opportunities for Commonwealth defence cooperation.
The fluidity of the membership of the Commonwealth during the 1940s deserves some attention
at this stage, as a key development which increased the number of Commonwealth countries which did
not engage in Commonwealth defence cooperation was the increased membership of the organisation.
There was some fluctuation in the membership of the Commonwealth between 1947 and 1951. The
dissolution of Newfoundland and the departure of the Irish Free State from the Commonwealth reduced
the  number  of  states  in  the  Commonwealth  and  introduced the  possibility  that  the  growth of  the
Commonwealth was not guaranteed. 
The  dissolution  of  Newfoundland  had,  in  some  ways,  been  some  time  in  the  offing.  The
dominion had ceased governing itself and had been ruled directly from London since 1934 through the
60 Even major advances in the military capabilities of the constituent members of the Commonwealth could not be counted 
upon to support a broader Commonwealth effort. Even a Dominion which, according to Canadian service personnel had 
'always liked the idea of the conception of Commonwealth defence', Australia, could not assure the Commonwealth that 
the future acquisition of two major aircraft carriers would 'leave Australia in a very early stage [to defend the 
Commonwealth elsewhere] if war broke out'. - Letter regarding Canadian Joint Liaison Officers to Brigadier JDB Smith,
Ottawa 19 May 1949 RG 25 volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
61 J. Grey The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean war: An Alliance Study (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1988) 'p 34
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Commission of Government. The declaration of the Republic of Ireland in April 1949 severed ties with
the Commonwealth a mere ten days before the London Declaration permitted Commonwealth states to
remain  in  the  Commonwealth  as  republics.  What  evolved somewhat  abruptly in  1949 was a  very
different Commonwealth to the one which existed before the war. Ireland became the first state to leave
the Commonwealth. Newfoundland was the first state to voluntarily end its existence and reincorporate
into  an  existing  Commonwealth  state.  India  had  established  a  precedent  that  a  member  of  the
Commonwealth  need  not  be  tied  to  fellow states  in  the  Commonwealth  through royal  titles.  The
political setting for the Commonwealth in the late 1940s was thus quite active and volatile. Aside from
the Republic of Ireland the Commonwealth was steadfast in ensuring that former colonial states were
introduced and involved in the Commonwealth as an organisation. India, for instance, remained very
much involved in the Commonwealth, and participated in a variety of Commonwealth initiatives. In the
late 1940s there was no prevailing idea that the Commonwealth would be effectively ignored in the
post-war era. There was, however, a growing sense of a need for change. The different approaches
taken by the various member states of the Commonwealth between 1947 and 1949 foreshadowed the
changes to the Commonwealth that would arise throughout the 1960s. During the intervening years,
and certainly between 1947 and 1950, the constituent states of the Commonwealth were very much
alive to the prospect of continued Commonwealth relations, which included defence cooperation.
The independence of  India and Pakistan was crucial  of the changes to  the structure of the
Commonwealth during the 1940s. The independence of those two states directly affected the possibility
of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  that  involved  more  member  states  and  highlighted  the
difficulties  that  would  be  encountered  in  subsequent  expansions  of  the  Commonwealth.  The
background to the independence movement and the need for partition are far too complicated to be
adequately dealt with in the brief explanation and overview that can be provided here. However, for the
purposes of Commonwealth defence cooperation it is necessary to recognise the implications that their
independence had on the UK. The British Indian Army, numbering some 2.5 million soldiers by the end
of the war, had been invaluable to the British war effort.62 The relatively quick transfer of power to
Indian and Pakistan governments has been recognised as the best of a bad situation. Specifically it was
considered that if it was not possible to avoid partition of the British Raj during the decolonisation
process then every effort should be made to leave with as much haste as possible to reduce British
62 P. Barua, 'Strategies and Doctrines of Imperial Defence: Britain and India 1919-1945' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 25 (1996) p 259
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losses from the inevitable fallout of partition.63 With respect to Commonwealth defence relations, the
ramifications of the shift from the British Raj to the Dominion of India (and very shortly thereafter in
1949 to the Republics of India and Pakistan) cannot be underestimated. British involvement in much of
the area surrounding India and Pakistan, including the Middle East and South-East Asia was largely
rationalised on the desire to secure the Indian subcontinent and ensuring the safety of shipping lanes
throughout the Indian Ocean.64 
Once  India  became  independent  the  involvement  of  the  UK  in  those  territories  was  of
increasingly  questionable  value  and  of  diminished importance  to  wider  British  strategic  concerns.
Although the need to secure India and safe shipping lines held true, especially for trade, the value of
what was being protected and the capability of the UK to protect it had been reduced considerably. 65
Similarly the rationale for defending the Middle East and South-East Asia originally from the Ottomans
and the Japanese, and now the Soviets and the Chinese respectively, was no longer clear. This did not
immediately manifest  itself  in British military thought,66 and it  would be some time before it  was
recognised that widespread and radical  adjustments to the UK's defence obligations were not only
necessary but essential. Instead plans and preparations, such as the Middle East Defence Conference,
continued to be made that ignored the implications of technological and political developments in the
pursuit  of  a  military  imperative  that  no  longer  existed.  With  respect  to  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation this persistence had a positive effect in that it encouraged a joint Commonwealth response
to the defence of the Middle East. 
The dissolution of the Dominion of Newfoundland foreshadowed problems that would resurface
in  later  decades.  The dissolution  process  highlighted  two key concerns:  the  first  that  there  was  a
political desire to encourage the Dominions and the Commonwealth to shoulder more of the burden of
63 W.R. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonisation (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) p 403
64 Meeting of Commonwealth Defence Ministers from 21 to 26 June 1951 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy: The 
Middle East 31 July 1951 A5954 box 1799 ANA
65 Ibid. Specifically it was highlighted at the meeting that 'The UK itself cannot afford all the forces required for the 
Middle East in addition to those required to defend herself and Western Europe. Additional forces must therefore be 
found from other parts of the Commonwealth and from the US.' It was still maintained, even acknowledging this, that 
'the defence of the Middle East had always been... of critical importance.'
66 It was not until 1960 that it became apparent that the UK believed that its interests, especially east of the Suez, now lay 
with self-governing countries. Thus less interest and consideration was made available for the maintenance of existing 
logistic routes – these routes themselves having already been compromised. - Prime Ministers Conference May 1960 – 
Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 'The Future Commonwealth Relationship' A5954 box 1799 LAC
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their own defence; the second that the UK desired continued access to military, especially naval and air,
bases.  Both had implications for Commonwealth defence cooperation. The demonstration of a political
desire in the UK, under Prime Minister Attlee's government, for the continued redistribution of imperial
territory to other governments highlighted the uncertain nature of British presence in many parts of the
world.67 What possible argument could be made to convince other Commonwealth governments to
contribute to British manpower requirements across the globe when it would appear increasingly likely
that the British themselves would be withdrawing from that region in the near future? Control of Goose
Bay, a British naval base in Newfoundland, was a major sticking point in negotiations between the UK
and  the  Dominion  of  Canada  regarding  the  potential  transfer  of  Newfoundland.68 The  British
government of the day was keen to see Newfoundland incorporated into Canada and equally keen to
avoid the loss of access to Goose Bay in that reincorporation. The situation in Newfoundland was
resolved  following  a  Canadian  government  threat  that  future  war  aid  to  the  UK  would  not  be
forthcoming should a 99 year lease of the airbase at Goose Bay not be included in the particulars of the
arrangement. In the event the Canadians got their lease, and the UK received war aid and a loan at a
generous interest rate of two per cent.69 
This Anglo-Canadian dispute was representative of other, similar, issues that resurfaced in later
decades. British governments were conscious of the increased political sensitivities in respect of basing
rights in foreign countries and constantly sought out alternatives and/or attempted to maintain existing
facilities for as long as possible.70 This sort of issue arose often during negotiations in decolonisation
processes. Local, often Commonwealth, desires to further their own regional agenda came at a price.
That price was a reduction in the certainty of British military operations around the world. As the UK
largely  held  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  together  this  uncertainty  had  the  effect  of
undermining Commonwealth defence cooperation more generally. Although the issue at Goose Bay is a
small one, it was indicative of future issues and a clear warning sign of things to come.
67 Cabinet Conclusions 83rd Meeting 7 December 1954 CAB 128/27 UKNA
68 G. Malone, Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders (Toronto: Alfred Knopf, 2012) p 14 The document cited by Malone talks 
about the importance of Newfoundland as an 'important bargaining chip' in its role as a part of the operation of 'trans-
Atlantic services'. This is explained to include the air facilities in Newfoundland, including Goose Bay.
69 G. Malone, Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders p 73
70 Even in South-East Asia concerns as to the viability of British bases were apparent at an early stage. Alternatives to the 
bases in Singapore and Malaysia – the political security of which was not assured – were explored in the form of North 
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Meanwhile Ireland declared itself a Republic in late 1949. A secession from the links with the
British Empire and the Commonwealth which had largely already been achieved over the course of the
preceding two decades was announced on the eve of a change which would have allowed a Republic in
the Commonwealth. Naval bases across Ireland had been an issue in the first half of the twentieth
century but had long since been put to rest.71 Ireland typified a common reaction to Commonwealth
military activities that would become dominant amongst the member states of the Commonwealth from
the 1950s onwards. In short, they refused or withdrew themselves from involvement in such operations.
Although Ireland's relationship with the UK was particularly troubled it  was hardly unique in that
respect.72 Much can be learned about  the British relationship to  the Commonwealth from Ireland's
withdrawal in 1949. The possibility of the Irish government revoking the remaining elements of the
External Relations Act, which had been the basis for continuing links between Ireland and the UK, had
been the subject of much speculation domestically. When it was announced that the External Relations
Act would be revoked, and Ireland would withdraw from the Commonwealth, the British reaction was
resoundingly negative.73 The fear that India might follow Ireland or insist on some sort of associate
membership with the Commonwealth which could threaten British influence and prestige was foremost
in the minds of the British government. Plans to appeal directly to the Irish population, rather than to
the  parliament  in  Dublin,  to  prevent  a  withdrawal  from the  Commonwealth  were  considered  but
ultimately dropped.74 The episode marks ongoing fears that the Commonwealth might not succeed in
providing support for the British position on the world stage. However, it highlighted the resilience and
attractiveness of the Commonwealth in that neither India nor Pakistan followed in Ireland's footsteps as
the governments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all feared.
In  fact,  between  1947  and  1951  the  overall  progress  of  ensuring  that  Commonwealth
cooperation  continued  despite  changes  to  the  Commonwealth  would  seem  to  have  been  quite
successful.  The  majority  of  pre-1947  members  of  the  Commonwealth  –  Canada,  Australia,  New
71 British-Irish tripartite agreement on Trade, Finance, and Defence (P. No. 3104) London 25 April 1938
72 See K. Kenny, Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); S. Howe, Ireland and Empire: 
Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); as well as more recent work 
by R. Toye,. 'Phrases make History here: Churchill, Ireland, and the rhetoric of empire' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 38 (2010) pp 549-570
73 F.J. McEvoy, 'Canada, Ireland, and the Commonwealth: The Declaration of the Irish Republic 1948-49' Irish Historical 
Studies 24 (1985) p 506
74 I. McCabe, The Formulation and Consequences of the Republic of Ireland Act 1948-49 (unpublished PhD thesis at the 
London School of Economics, 1990) p 249
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Zealand,  South  Africa,  and  Newfoundland  –  remained  interested  and  involved  in  Commonwealth
affairs. Issues which caused problems over the coming decades such as peacekeeping initiatives, local
defence concerns, and domestic troubles had not yet surfaced. Disagreements regarding the Sterling
area and the Sterling balances were ever present.75 These did not become a problem until the mid-1950s
when India drew down on its Sterling balances at a rapid rate.76 The Dominion of Newfoundland had
decided to incorporate into a larger state within the Commonwealth. Two new member states, India and
Pakistan, attained Commonwealth membership in spite of fears that the entire thing might come apart
at the seams. It was far from an unblemished success story, but hardly a failure either. In 1950 it was
not unreasonable to look at the state of the Commonwealth and be optimistic about its future. 
Inter-Commonwealth relations between 1947 and 1951 revealed serious historical and cultural
issues that pointed to future problems that undermined future Commonwealth relations. Although the
issue  of  Irish  naval  bases  had  long  since  been  resolved,  Northern  Ireland  remained  a  point  of
contention. In parliamentary debates in 1949 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sean MacBride, cited the
partition of the island of Ireland as an impediment to Irish involvement in the 'proposed Atlantic pact'
(NATO).77 Pakistan  was  in  a  similar  position.  It  declined  further  involvement  in  Commonwealth
military endeavours, including deployments to the Middle East and Korea. Pakistan cited a 'hostile
neighbour', India, as the primary impediment to their involvement.78 The difficulties of decolonisation
presented  problems  that  made  engaging  in  defence  cooperation  with  other  members  of  the
Commonwealth a non-trivial affair. This was a problem that had been recognised and highlighted even
during the Second World War within the Colonial Office and had prompted a reconsideration of the
role and purpose of the Colonial Office.79 
Further to the role of the Colonial Office in the post-war period it had become clear that pre-war
75 D. Lee, 'Australian, the British Commonwealth, and the US 1950-53' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
20 (2008) p 462
76 The Pakistan government protested quite sharply at a Commonwealth meeting that if India was free to draw on its 
Sterling balances so rapidly then Pakistan might well do the same, and cause further economic problems  for the entire 
Sterling area. - Prime Minister's Conference Eighth Meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for 
Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 
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77 Dail Eireann Debates Volume 114 No. 12 'Ceisteanna: Oral Answers – The North Atlantic Treaty' Tuesday 29 March 
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78 M. Ali, Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p 365
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timetables for the retention of colonial holdings were no longer valid, and that the new political climate
on this  issue was recognised by all  of the major political  parties in the UK.80 Immediate post-war
studies of colonial territory divided the British Empire up into tiers of potentially independent states
that  might  emerge  from the  dissolution,  with  timelines  that  had  estimates  revised  down from the
twenty-first century to the end of the twentieth century in the case of certain African territories, and by
1950 would suggest a date as early as 1970.81 Some, like India, consisted of substantial territory and
were generally viable states. Others, like Malaysia, would need to be a combination of culturally and
ethnically distinct entities in order to become economically viable.82 The remaining territories were not
envisaged to be ready for independence for the foreseeable future. This included much of Africa in
addition to less populated British territory like the Falklands.83 
A review of imperial possessions had profound implications for contemporary studies and for
defence policy in how it affected planning for future defence requirements. One of the key elements of
these defence-related reviews of the remaining elements of the British Empire was that it would be
possible for Africa to take on the role that the British Raj had played in the British empire for the past
two centuries.84 The level of development of the region was recognised as a complicating factor and
plans  for  new naval  and air  bases  along  the  east  coast  of  Africa  would  have  required  a  massive
investment  in  infrastructure.  Given its  weak economic situation this  was not  a  demand that  could
realistically be met by the UK.85 Nevertheless, military efforts in attempting to ensure the continuation
80 Although there was a limit as to how far this could be pushed amongst the Conservative party, in general terms there was
an acceptance that concessions, at least, would have to be made and in many places even wide scale withdrawal would 
be necessary. - D. Goldsworthy, 'Conservatives and Decolonisation: A Note on the Interpretation by Dan Horowitz' 
African Affairs 69 (1970) p 278
81 W.R. Louis, & R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonisation' in J. D. le Sueur (ed), The Decolonisation Reader 
(London: Routledge, 2003) p 49
82 The ethnic mix of Malaysia would pose significant problems for its development throughout the period, even after 
Singapore was made an independent state. It was reported in 1971 that there had been a 'polarization of the races but 
strains have developed in the Malay community as a result of differences of opinion as to how the special position of the
Malays should be safeguarded.' Although it was not expected to take on a similar character as apartheid in South Africa, 
it was considered that even a multiracial representation in government would only work if it had a strong pro-Malay bias
and an emphasis on the protection of Malay rights. That a country as comparably successful and stable as Malaysia 
suffered from such ongoing internal tensions speaks volumes as to the difficulty of the decolonisation process. - Review 
of Defence Cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore JS Report no. 56/59 A1838 Item 696/1/13 ANA
83 F. Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-63 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002) p 101
84 D. McIntyre, Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p 31
85 Indeed that sort of capital expenditure was well and truly fanciful given that British bases were being scaled down in 
response to budget cuts throughout the 1950s. Ceylon and Gibraltar were to be reduced to a 'storage base and 
communication centre'. Hong Kong was to 'close altogether'. Singapore and Malta were to see reductions of 'every kind 
[of facility] to the minimum required for a small detachment of ships'. - Memorandum by the Admiralty points 25 and 26
AIR 19 Defence Expenditure – 1956 UKNA
44
of British involvement in the Indian Ocean continued quite actively even after the loss of India and
remained an integral element of British strategic planning. 
New military technology and strategy
This military planning acknowledged the consequences of new technological developments in
the  field.  The  potential  use  of  nuclear  weapons  against  key  military  installations  prompted  the
dispersion of military assets and bases. The era of significant bodies of manpower being deployed in a
very concentrated area, such as at the Suez, was over.86 The dominance of military base planning on a
dispersed pattern had well and truly taken hold.87 Although nuclear weapons had yet to see widespread
deployment remaining British and Commonwealth base planning was cognizant of the changes that
these new weapons would have on the strategic landscape in the following decades. 
Outside of this long-term planning there was little impetus to address the issue in anything but a
theoretical context until the USSR developed a working nuclear weapon in August 1949. Even with the
advent of a Soviet nuclear weapon the practical implications of nuclear weapons on the battlefield were
gradual  at  least  until  Soviet  nuclear  weapons,  particularly tactical  nuclear  weapons,  became more
widely available to Soviet forces during the 1950s and 1960s.88 The delay in the development and
deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons provided for the continued existence of a traditional approach to
Commonwealth military cooperation in spite of major technological change. The wars of the last fifty
years had been fought on the basis that forces based beyond the immediate combat theatre could, given
time, be redeployed. Australian and New Zealand troops had fought half  a world away in Europe
during the Second World War, while troops from India fought throughout the Middle East and Asia.
British navy vessels and aircraft operated throughout the world. All of these were hallmarks of the type
86 There were approximately eighty thousand British troops at the Suez canal. Efforts in the early 1950s to reduce that 
through a phased withdrawal that would leave only seven thousand troops were objected to by General Neguib. - 
Minutes of 3rd Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 5 June 1953 MG26L Volume 85 File 0-16-21 PMM(53) 
LAC. Also see M. Mason, 'The Decisive Volley: the Battle of Ismailia and the Decline of British Influence in Egypt 
January-July 1952' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 19 (1991) p 45
87 In particular see a comment by General Lyman Lamnitzer, the representative by the US Joints Chiefs of Staff '...at the 
divisional level in the American Army, plans for both the dispersal and concentration [of its forces] were now 
sufficiently advanced.' Although he would go on to note that this was not always a possibility for the logistical side of 
operations due to the 'need for economical deployment in peacetime'. Record of Meeting between H. Watkinson, and R. 
McNamara, 1 May 1962 DEFE7 UKNA
88 By 1962 the British government believed that there were 'thousands of these weapons [tactical nuclear weapons], and 
their total capacity amounts to scores of megatons' in Europe. So many, in fact, that 'if they were used in action, the scale
of destruction would be comparable to that from a strategic strike. The idea that the Armies in Europe could fight a 
tactical battle with nuclear weapons of this destructive power seems to me to be wholly unrealistic.' - Telegram no. 
T384/62 from the Prime Minister to President Kennedy January 1962 PREM11 PMUK991/3 UKNA
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of global spread of cooperation and coordination that existed before the advent of nuclear weapons.
This style of cooperation was also, notably, amenable to the geographic situation of the British Empire
and  the  Commonwealth.  The  joint  defence  of  the  Commonwealth  from multiple  members  of  the
Commonwealth only functioned in a context where deployments from two oceans away could arrive in
time to make a difference. 
Between 1947 and 1950 this  remained possible only on account of the limited numbers of
nuclear weapons deployed, although arguably the practicalities involved made even the deployment of
nuclear weapons sufficient to threaten London enough to render such strategies ineffective. In time the
variety and availability of nuclear weapons was expanded, by both the US and the USSR, in such a way
that eventually resulted in the possibility of a massive destructive capability in the hands of even a
small force. That change offered the opportunity for a conflict in any particular territory to be resolved
far more quickly than troops could arrive from across any significant distance.89 So although the speed
with which armed forces were capable of reinforcing their lines remained largely unchanged, the speed
of destruction was significantly improved. What use would Australian or Canadian reinforcements to
the Middle East be to the UK several months into a conflict when a barrage of nuclear weapons would
settle the conflict in Europe within a few weeks? For Commonwealth military cooperation, this would
not become a practical reality worthy of consideration until the mid-1950s. In the interim strategic
doctrine remained steadfastly rooted in the concepts of the previous fifty years. The recognition of the
eventual need for a switch in perspectives to account for the new technology had not yet translated into
any positive action.
Although the strategic concepts that were implemented had not yet changed, there were ongoing
developments in military theory. Some of this theory explored how existing military strategy could
adapt with few changes to the new technology. One such theory was the concept of 'Broken Backed
Warfare'. This theory explored the potential capabilities and usefulness of conventional military forces
continuing  a  conflict  following  a  nuclear  exchange.  Significant  importance  was  attached  to  the
capability and importance of the navy in any such situation – particularly in the realm of maintaining
communications. Broken Backed Warfare was advanced in the 1952 Global Strategy Paper in the UK
89 The potential for this had been noted in Cabinet minutes in late 1957 and formed the basis of the proposed nuclear-based
British military force which would see extraordinarily limited forward deployment. - Cabinet Conclusions 2nd August 
1957  CAB 131/18 D(57)7 UKNA
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and demonstrated the known problems and issues involved in the sort of long-range redeployments that
had been common to Commonwealth and Imperial strategy in the event of a widespread nuclear war.90
It  was  rejected  as  a  viable  approach  by  both  the  US  and  the  USSR  by  the  mid-1950s,  and
Commonwealth cooperation had also drifted away from such thinking by this time.91 Nevertheless, it
was an active attempt to adapt the existing Commonwealth defence cooperation approach into the new
paradigm and was indicative of a form of military cooperation that was very much alive and responsive
to developments – even if it could not provide any solutions to those developments.
The United Nations, decolonisation, and inter-Commonwealth relations
The creation of a new international body, the United Nations, with its own goals and agenda
also needs  to  be considered  in  the post-war political  developments  that  affected  potential  military
cooperation amongst the Commonwealth. The UN played a small but vital role in shaping the direction
of Commonwealth defence cooperation, and members of the Commonwealth contributed forces to its
operations.  Although the  vast  majority of  UN operations  were undertaken after  the  Cold War,  the
operations it undertook during the Cold War were often in response to a problematic decolonisation
and/or nationalisation process that was not amicably resolved. There were few calls for the UN to act in
the final years of the 1940s. A UN force which deployed for the defence of the Free City of Trieste was
drawn entirely from existing American and British forces, with the notable exception of a section of
territory that was to be administered by Yugoslavia.92 There were two, more relevant, active monitoring
missions  undertaken.  The  first  to  the  Mandate  of  Palestine,  from which  the  British  subsequently
withdrew to allow for  the  creation  of  a  Jewish state.  The second to  the  disputed  border  between
Pakistan and India. The UN force deployed to Pakistan would be one of the longest operations by the
UN, as the difficulties along the disputed Pakistan/Indian border continued.93 Both deployments were
90 This would be temporarily built upon in the 1954 White Paper which would subsequently claim that 'a period of broken-
backed warfare would follow'. Cmnd 9075 Statement on Defence 1954 UKNA
91 It had, of course, never been fully accepted by the Commonwealth – or even the United Kingdom – either. The 
possibility of offensive action with modern forces in that situation on any manageable scale or to any reasonable purpose
was simply unlikely. Although the 1952 Paper did make a concession that this sort of engagement was more likely on 
sea than on land or in the air. It has been argued, however, that this was merely a concession to placate the the First Sea 
Lord and ensure his agreement to the rest of the paper. - J. Baylis and A. Macmillan, 'The British Global Strategy Paper 
of 1952' Journal of Strategic Studies 16 (1993) p 212
92 UN – Treaty Series Volume 235 No. 3297 Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of Italy, the UK, 
the US of American, and Yugoslavia regarding the Free Territory of Trieste. - London 5 October 1954
93 Authorization for the first deployment of a UN sanctioned force (if only of five men) to Kashmir came in 1948. Only the
Truce Supervision Organisation to monitor the Arab-Israeli ceasefire was formed around that time. - Security Council 
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multinational efforts. US and Belgian observers were deployed to Palestine initially, while the observer
mission  to  the  Pakistani-Indian  border  had  contributions  from around  the  globe,  although  it  was
consistently too under-strength to realistically carry out its declared purpose. Joint military endeavours
relating to issues of decolonisation and the withdrawal of imperial powers were becoming increasingly
common and regularly falling under the aegis of the UN.94 In the absence of inter-Commonwealth
issues this could easily have proven a significant path forward for Commonwealth military operations
in the post-war period. However, the deep-seated conflict based on religion and territory in Pakistan
and India, in what amounted to a repeat of the issues that plagued the evolution of the Irish Free State,
prevented  that  possibility.  The  token  effort  from the  UN  demonstrated  a  willingness  of  the  new
international political scene to engage on these issues, but even this tacitly accepted that no resolution
was  likely  to  be  found,  and  the  effort  expended  was  correspondingly  weak.  The  small  numbers
deployed by the UN were such that it is debatable as to how successful the deployment to the region
could be even in terms of merely monitoring the conflict along the border. 
Further complications in Commonwealth relations stemmed from the traditional reluctance to
comment  on  the  internal  affairs  of  other  Commonwealth  countries.  There  was  a  principle  of
engagement in the Commonwealth which discouraged involvement in and comment on the internal
affairs of other Commonwealth countries. There were certainly historical issues at work in how that
approach became the default, but it was also reflective of an institutional inertia that permeated the
political  structure of the Commonwealth.  It was not an inertia which lasted long in the face of an
expanding Commonwealth.  It  does,  however,  serve as an important  reminder  of the very different
nature of the Commonwealth organisation in the immediate post-war period. Whereas in 1947 the focus
was on the external defence of the Commonwealth from external threats with a broad latitude allowed
for  different  internal  policies,  as  the  Commonwealth  grew more  focus  was  placed on the  internal
policies of Commonwealth countries, and less focus on contributing to the external defence of those
countries. 
It is important to recognise that the difficulties of a number of constituent states within the
94 This was, in fact, often on the foot of the UN General Assembly seeking to pass comment on those countries which 
continued to possess colonial territory. This was a point of discussion for the Commonwealth more generally, with an 
appropriately varied response ranging from such calls being 'unrealistic and irresponsible' to the declaration that the UN 
offered small nations the 'right to free expression' in a way that had previously been significantly more difficult for them 
to acquire. -  Prime Minister's Conference: Seventh Meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for 
Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 File 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
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Commonwealth did not reflect the broader picture. Cross-Commonwealth cooperation was still strong,
and did not always involve Commonwealth forces slotting into British strategy and force structures.
British deployments were often adjusted to account  for a particular lack of skills  or equipment in
Commonwealth countries. For example, from 1948 onwards both Australia and Canada benefited from
the deployment of a  British Royal  Navy submarine squadron that remained in place until  the late
1960s. In Australia the 4th Submarine Squadron was supplemented by a depot ship, HMS Adamant.95
Although a Royal Navy submarine squadron was not stationed in Canada (specifically Nova Scotia)
until 1955, the Royal Canadian Navy had taken the option of leasing British submarines from the late
1940s. Both the Royal Navy detachment and the leased submarines to the Royal Canadian Navy had
been made available by removing them from deployments elsewhere. The 4th squadron had come from
Trincomalee in Ceylon, and the submarines leased to Canada for training purposes were redeployed
from the Far East.96 This was a recurring feature of  Commonwealth defence cooperation over  the
coming  decades.  Much  Commonwealth  cooperation  undertaken  was  based  on  one,  or  multiple,
Commonwealth states providing a specialist deployment which might be in use elsewhere. This sort of
technical  exchange  on  military  hardware,  training,  and  specialisation,  was  at  the  heart  of  what
Commonwealth  cooperation  could  easily  provide.97 Training  bases  in  Canada,  rocket  research  and
testing facilities in Australia, inter-Commonwealth cooperation on nuclear development amongst other
forms and instances  of  engagement  was demonstrative  of  the ongoing exchange of  specialisations
amongst the Commonwealth countries as a continued feature of Commonwealth military cooperation
throughout the Cold War. 
Conclusion
The period between 1947 and 1951 was a  relatively stable  time in  Commonwealth affairs.
Although significant  changes  were  afoot  in  the  organisation,  there  was  little  cause  for  immediate
concern. The first indication of a potential shift to the structure and organisation of the Commonwealth
95 A. Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006) p 304
96 M. Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) p 206
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of a more permanent nature during these four years had its roots in the independence of the British Raj
and its partition between India and Pakistan. It was a subtle start to the major changes that struck at the
very heart of the substance of Commonwealth military cooperation. The relatively minor adjustments
to the Commonwealth formula during this period foreshadowed the end of Commonwealth cooperation
as it had previously been understood.
The partition of the Indian subcontinent, and its subsequent division between India and Pakistan
was reminiscent of the earlier partition of Ireland. It had eerily similar circumstances and unfortunately
similar results: the refusal of a Commonwealth member to participate in military endeavours on a joint
basis. Ireland's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1949 was more unusual and a relatively minor
blip in what was an otherwise positive development of the Commonwealth. The rapid enlargement of
the Commonwealth which followed in the 1950s and 1960 brought with it a correspondingly large
number of diverse issues that built  upon existing problems. Furthermore,  the international political
scene  was  not  interested  in  the  complications  arising  from the  widespread  encouragement  of  the
decolonisation process. The creation of new independent states consisting of vast territory under the
rule of one particular people or another, whether the infrastructural, regional, or international political
support for such change was in place or not, resulted in serious problems. Those problems affected both
the  new  states  themselves  and  the  prospect  of  the  continuation  of  the  cohesion  of  the  existing
Commonwealth. Even where such a transition was based on relatively stable background of political
development, as in Ireland, this was no indicator of success – insofar as the continuation of the pre-
existing military Commonwealth relationship would be concerned.
The  situation  across  the  Commonwealth  was  increasingly dominated  by local  and regional
concerns.98 Senior members of the Commonwealth, specifically Canada and Australia, had their own
agenda  and  goals  that  did  not  necessarily  favour  joint  endeavours  with  other  Commonwealth
countries.99 Canadian policy-makers were extremely reluctant to involve themselves outside the North
98 For Australia and New Zealand this was, in part, a reflection of the fact that they were not only exposed in relation to the
distance between them and the US and the UK, but also on account of the fact that their 'relatively small population... 
can never hope to match the armed forces of populous countries such as Indonesia.' - Minute for Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs 'Australia's New Three-Year Defence Programme' 9 November 1962 MV103/1 Australiese-
Aangeleenthede SANDFA
99 This was also true of economic matters, and indeed much more effort has been involved in analysing the cooperation in 
this regard than it has on military aspects. - F. McKenzie, 'Renegotiating a Special Relationship: The Commonwealth 
and Anglo-American Economic Discussions September-December 1945' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 26  (1998) p 90
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Atlantic and at  any rate focused on cooperation with the US rather than with the Commonwealth.
Australian participation outside South-East Asia continued in the Middle East until the mid-1950s but
there was a rising interest in the defence of their own borders. Australia's interests eventually withdrew
into a localised, regionally-based, defensive attitude that had little room for the type of global effort
that had been demonstrated in the first half of the twentieth century. New Zealand's foreign and defence
policy, given its geographic location and particular circumstances, was fundamentally tied to following
Australia's lead in such matters. Domestic issues in South Africa necessitated an internal focus with
clear implications for the prospect of South African involvement in cooperative endeavours with the
Commonwealth. 
It  was these changes in the Commonwealth that fundamentally altered how Commonwealth
defence cooperation directly manifested in later years. The UK had considered that the Commonwealth
could serve as a vehicle for the preservation of post-war British influence. It was a useful tool for
British policy-makers to retain, if not for the preservation of the empire then at least to preserve a
modicum  of  the  influence  that  had  accompanied  it.  Unfortunately  for  British  politicians  the
Commonwealth could not be used for that purpose without simultaneously admitting that there had
been a significant reduction in the influence of the UK itself. This admission that the UK's influence
over its old empire (now the new Commonwealth) had declined would have served to highlight that the
UK could not count on these new Commonwealth states as had been widely believed by both the US
and the USSR. The introduction of new states accompanied by a shift  in how the Commonwealth
conducted  its  affairs  thus  could not  be  stopped by British influence.  This  was so even where  the
expanded Commonwealth sought to introduce systems that were entirely contrary to its previously-held
concepts and principles. The preservation of British influence was, paradoxically, dependent on that
influence not being used directly. This was the same issue that plagued the other bastion of British
influence in the modern era: nuclear weapons.100 Their capacity to influence is dependent on their non-
use. Both the Commonwealth and nuclear weapons were recognised as providing limited influence to
Anglo-American relations, where it was most needed.101
100 Cabinet Conclusions D(58)33 17th July 1958 CAB 131/20 UKNA
101 Minutes of 3rd Meeting BND(56)61, 18th December 1961Air 19/998. This was the Australian view of strategic nuclear 
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This effectively paralysed any response to the changes prompted by the changing membership
of the Commonwealth. British governments, conscious of the need to ensure their influence through the
Commonwealth refrained from asking too much of the Commonwealth. More importantly the British
government refrained from challenging the Commonwealth on substantive matters of policy which
radically departed from the Commonwealth's  established norms.  This  refusal  to engage or prevent
change  to  the  Commonwealth  structure  in  the  pursuit  of  influence  culminated  in  the  change  to
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  that  is  seen  after  1971.  However,  in  1947 the  extent  of  this
problem was not yet fully felt and indeed some clear successes could be seen during the waning years
of the 1940s. Furthermore, the immediate need to secure the Middle East still provided some level of
involvement amongst the Commonwealth on a broad basis. Yet the warning signs even on this beacon
of positive engagement are clear given the absence of Canada.102 The absence of India, Pakistan, and
Ceylon should also be noted.103 Canada's position is more curious than the others, especially in light of
the  Canadian  Chief  of  General  Staff's  view that  even  if  Canadian  interests  were  not  immediately
present in the Middle East it would be beneficial to attend regardless.104 
Effectively the retention of British influence in the Commonwealth, on the basis that it was not,
or could not, be used in anything other than circumstances in line with the individual desires of the
particular Commonwealth country had the effect of diminishing the prospects of cooperation amongst
the Commonwealth. This reinforced the view that contemporary military thought favoured a more local
focus,  and only advanced to other theatres when there was a belief  that  adequate forces had been
102 However, it should be noted that the Canadians did receive copies of the outcome of the Conference, and were present at
discussions in 'an observer capacity'. - Brief for Canadian delegation 'Commonwealth Defence Conference of Middle 
East' CSC 5-2-3 21 May 1951 RG 25 Volume 5963 File 50227 50 Part I. The specific reason Canada gave for non-
attendance was that the Canadian government did not consider the Middle East to be central to its interests. This is in 
spite of the fact that the proposed agenda for the Conference was actually rather more wide-ranging than the Middle East
itself. It included a general review of global strategy, a discussion on the ANZAM area, and a variety of related topics 
relating to improving liaison arrangements between the UK and other members of the Commonwealth, and the 
interchange of personnel amongst training facilities for standardization purposes. - Memorandum for Mr. Robertson 
Annex to Proposed Commonwealth Defence Conference 'Proposed Agenda for Commonwealth Defence Ministers' 20 
February 1951 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
103 The absence of the Asian dominions can be attributed to a mixture of their broader political views and their immediate 
local concerns. Specifically past Indian comments regarding their desire to 'retain independence of action in the event of 
war', and later clarified by Mr. Nehru that India held an 'essentially neutral position between East and West'. Meanwhile 
Mr. Ali of Pakistan made it clear that 'he could not take part in any defence discussions... until the Kashmir question was
settled.' Memorandum for Mr. Wershof – Defence Liaison Division 21 May 1951 RG 25 Volume 5963 File 50227 50 
Part I LAC
104 He was of the view that it would be beneficial to '[learn] all [that] we can everywhere providing it implies no 
commitment to send forces.' This was on the basis that 'if anyone had suggested Canadian Army Officers should study 
operational conditions in Sicily or Italy [prior to 1936] they would have been laughed to scorn.' - Letter to Secretary 
Chiefs of Staff from Chief of General Staff 17 April 1951 Appendix A to CDS 5-2-3 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
52
allocated  for  their  defence.105 Clearly  what  the  successful  growth  of  Commonwealth  strategic
cooperation required was growing global interest from Commonwealth countries other than the UK.
That did not emerge.
At the turn of the 1950s, however, the situation could have been significantly worse.  While
certainly the process of decolonisation was troublesome, ongoing cooperative Commonwealth efforts,
while reduced in comparison to the Second World War were still very much present.106 Even between
1947 and 1951, which had very few noteworthy instances of Commonwealth defence cooperation,
there was an emphasis on the supply and exchange of personnel, specialised equipment, and other
materiel. The Australian-command British Commonwealth Occupation Force Japan pointed to extant
Commonwealth defence cooperation structures, structures that were used a few years later to form the
basis for British Commonwealth Forces Korea, and from there the 1st Commonwealth Division.  The
Middle  East  loomed  large  in  post-war  British  strategic  planning,  and  the  Middle  East  Defence
Conference  marked one of  the last  endeavours  of  Commonwealth  military cooperation that  would
involve multiple Commonwealth countries in what might be described as a global, rather than regional,
defence cooperation.107
This chapter has outlined the military and political circumstances and objectives of Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK from 1947 until 1951. It has also noted the successes,
and failures, of Commonwealth defence cooperation during the period, and pointed out the reaction to
105 The Canadian representative in London considered that this was the position held by the Australians and New 
Zealanders even prior to the Middle East Defence Conference. Specifically to the effect that '[their] commitments to this 
vital area will naturally depend upon their being satisfied that adequate forces will be available to defend the Pacific.' - 
Telegram no. 1239 from High Commission for Canada, London, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 21 
May 1951 RG 25 Volume 5963 File 50227 50 Part I LAC
106 See Report no. 75 'Military Cooperation within the Commonwealth 1939-1945' 20 November 1956 RG 24 Volume 6927 
LAC for more detail on cooperation in the Second World War. Note, however, that Commonwealth defence cooperation 
was conducted during the Second World War through a mixture of ad-hoc arrangements and legislation. Each Dominion 
implemented their own version of legislation, most of it based around a combination of the British 'Visiting Forces 
(British Commonwealth) Act 1933, and the South African 'Defence Act (Amendment) and Dominion Forces Act 1932' 
(alternatively described as Act No. 32 of 1932). However, Australian and New Zealand legislation on this matter differed
slightly in that it 'restricted the penalty that could be imposed upon a member of these forces, to the penalty that could be
made by the law of either country for a similar offence. - Report no. 72 'Canadian Participation in the Korean War Part 
II: 1 April 1952-31 July 1953  RG 24 Volume 6927 LAC
107 Indeed there had been a suggestion for the permanent establishment of a joint Commonwealth force in the region since 
the early 1950s. These were acknowledged solely a potential token force, more to gain experience 'in an area where 
operations would certainly be conducted in war' and as a means of galvanizing local opinion, as it was believed the 
deployment of forces to South-East Asia had done. - Meeting of Commonwealth Defence Ministers 21 to 26 June 1951 
'Token Forces for the Middle East in Peacetime' 31 July 1951 A5954 box 1799 ANA
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changes in military technology. It has argued that the relative stability of joint Commonwealth defence
cooperation in the period demonstrated that the Commonwealth was handling new issues as they arose
and sought ways to involve new Commonwealth countries in joint military activity. Furthermore, it has
pointed to some of the early warning signs that the long-term continuation of Commonwealth defence
cooperation was not guaranteed while noting that these had not yet had time to fully mature into serious
implications.  This suggests that this period was the calm before the storm and argues that the next
period  in  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation,  between  1951  and  1960,  saw  further  changes  to
Commonwealth defence cooperation that started a long process of transformation.
54
Chapter two: The Commonwealth reacts to the global situation, 1951 to 1960
Introduction
This  chapter  explores  the  successes  and  challenges  to  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation
between  1951  to  1960.  It  points  to  the  continued  relative  success  of  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation. It notes the changing structure of the Commonwealth and the growth in external pressures
that  undermined  existing  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  Finally  it  examines  how  British
strategic doctrine shifted as a result  of these,  and other,  changes which contributed to the reduced
prospects for continued joint Commonwealth operations by 1960. In this respect it ties into the thesis's
overall  argument  by  indicating  some  of  the  key underlying  causes  that  hindered  Commonwealth
defence cooperation. In doing so it effectively marked the beginning of a long process of transition in
defence  relations  amongst  Commonwealth  countries.  Furthermore,  it  points  to  the  groundwork
established during the period for a continuation of pre-1971 Commonwealth defence cooperation after
1971 amongst  a  select  subset  of the Commonwealth.  This argument  is  explored in  the chapter  by
examining the Commonwealth's contribution to the Korean War,  as well  as the particulars of their
involvement with the 1st Commonwealth Division. It explores the rapidly changing military context
which favoured the development of regional defence organisations when considering joint operations,
as  well  as  the  implications  of  changes  in  British  strategic  doctrine  for  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation  more  generally.  Finally  it  concludes  by  highlighting  the  threat  the   expansion  of  the
Commonwealth posed to the status quo.
In 1950 the Middle East Defence Conference established the groundwork for the development
of Commonwealth military relations during the first  half  of the 1950s.1 The Conference ensured a
continuation  of  coordination  amongst  the  Commonwealth  countries  after  the  Second  World  War
through the establishment of an agreed strategic plan for the defence of the British Empire and the
Commonwealth.2 The mentality that dominated in the Middle East Defence Conference reflected the
few changes in military thought since 1945 and that a global strategy, not dissimilar from that which
had  been  employed  by the  British  Empire  and  across  the  Commonwealth  over  the  course  of  the
1 Telegram no. 1296 from High Commission for Canada in London to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 26 
May 1951. RG 25 Vol. 5903 File 50227-40 Part 1 LAC
2 Meeting of Commonwealth Defence Ministers, London, 21 to 26 June 1951 A5954 box 1799 ANA
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preceding fifty years, remained perfectly viable.3 Minor adjustments of content and phrasing to the
document  paid  lip  service  to  the  growing  interest  in  a  regionally-based  defensive  posture  but  it
remained  fundamentally  attached  to  the  unified  defence  of  specific  regions  through  a  traditional,
global,  approach  to  defence  questions.4 When  viewed  together  with  the  creation  of  the  1st
Commonwealth Division during the Korean War, the early 1950s can be seen as a particularly strong
period of overt pan-Commonwealth defence cooperation. 
The 1st Commonwealth Division established in mid-1951 for deployment in the Korean War
may, perhaps, be the only unqualified success of Commonwealth defence cooperation after 1947. The
creation of the Division was considered by many senior politicians, especially those who were known
to  favour  enhanced  cooperation  amongst  the  Commonwealth,  as  one  of  the  earliest  tests  of  the
Commonwealth relationship since the Second World War.5 The Division was a multinational formation
consisting of soldiers from every Dominion of the Commonwealth, with the exception of South Africa
and Pakistan. Notably it even included a detachment from the recently formed Republic of India. In
many ways the 1st Division represents the epitome of Commonwealth defence cooperation.  Although
the hesitation in commitment, the economic issues involved, and the absence of certain members of the
Commonwealth did not bode well  for the future,  it  nonetheless demonstrated the capability of the
Commonwealth to create joint military formations even as the Commonwealth itself was changing.
Although  less  iconic  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation,  the  development  of  regional
defence  arrangements  had increasingly been heralded as  a  key element  of  overall  Commonwealth
strategy in the Middle East Defence Conference. This was certainly a response to a series of events
happening  concurrently  throughout  the  world  in  response  to  global  pressures  and  the  geopolitical
situation, and not a forward-thinking step by policy-makers across the Commonwealth. That should not
detract from the fact that the Commonwealth of 1951 remained a very adaptable organisation. The shift
3 For example New Zealand pledging an infantry division and five air force squadrons to arrive in the Middle East some 
three months after a request had been received. - McKenzie, F. 'In the National Interest: Dominions' Support for Britain 
and the Commonwealth after the Second World War' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Volume 34 Issue 4
p 567
4 Although the Middle East Defence Conference ultimately recognised the necessity of regional arrangements, the path 
pursued in practice at this point in the early 1950s, was such that these regional arrangements were organized on a global
basis. The defence of the Middle East, for instance, was planned for with the deployment of Australian and New Zealand
troops, and until rejected by Canada, had intended to integrate them as well.
5 Cabinet report on Australian participation in Cold War Operations in Korea December 1950 Prime Ministers' Conference
London A5954 File 1682-2 ANA
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to  regional  defence  arrangements  on  a  national  and global  level  was,  as  outlined  in  the  previous
chapter, mirrored in the Middle East Defence Conference which emphasised the importance of regional
defence structures as a means through which US support could be attracted.6 These arrangements met
with mixed success over the course of the decade. Some failed miserably following a period of fits and
starts such as the Middle East Treaty Organisation which formally disbanded by 1979 having attracted
little support. It had been difficult to maintain interest amongst key participants of the Middle East
Treaty  Organisation,  and  was  more  generally  troublesome  to  its  signatories.7 Despite  a  clear
Commonwealth commitment  and interest  in  the region little  local  support  was found amongst  the
Commonwealth. In the absence of a strong Commonwealth presence in the Middle East it  is little
wonder that it failed to develop in the expected fashion. These failures were specific to its particular
circumstances. A similar regionally-based organisation was developed in South-East Asia which had
much greater success. The South-East Asian Treaty Organisation, SEATO, ultimately formed a key
structure for the defence of the region.8 Parallel to the development of SEATO was the start of one of
the long-running success stories of Commonwealth defence cooperation: the interest expressed by the
UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia in the defence of the region.9 The development
of  Commonwealth-specific  defence  arrangements  saw enduring  success  in  the  form of  the  Anglo-
Malayan  Defence  Agreement.  This  eventually  developed  into  the  Anglo-Malaysian  Defence
Agreement, finally transforming into the 1972 Five Power Defence Arrangements.10 Despite the mixed
6 Indeed it had been noted in the aftermath of the Suez crisis, that the independent capability of the UK to act on the 
political stage was questionable, and even a collective, Commonwealth-based, effort was dubious. - Annex 2 
COS(57)1917 16th December 1957 DEFE 11/192 UKNA
7 Letter from High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, 10 May 1956 
RG25 Volume 1 50225-40 Part 2 LAC
8 It was through the SEATO planning structure that the employment of British and American nuclear weapons in the 
region, should they be required, would have been implemented. - Note for the Prime Minister by Chief of Defence Staff 
'Nuclear Planning in SEATO' 21 March 1962  PREM11 UKNA. It is interesting to note that an existing Commonwealth 
defence organisation in the region, ANZAM, was to be used in support of SEATO operations. - 'Discussions regarding 
the Future of ANZAM' 16th November 1957  DEFE 11/192 COS 1917 UKNA
9 Interestingly there were concerns in Washington that such a formation would be seen as too Commonwealth in nature, 
although British and Commonwealth thought on the matter ran was that this was an objection as to 'perception rather 
than substance'. - Report on the Attitude of Australia at ANZAM, Annex A, 12th June 1956 DEFE 11/274  UKNA
10 The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement was signed in 1957 to provide for the security of the recently independent 
Federation of Malaya. This agreement carried over with effectively a simple name change in 1963 to the Anglo-
Malaysian Defence Agreement, following the incorporation of Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak into Malaysia. 
Both of these Agreements were bilateral defence arrangements between Malaya/Malaysia and the UK. They were 
designed to allow the UK to aid Malaya/Malaysia in its defence both in general terms, and specifically against 
Indonesia. The Anglo-Malaysian Agreement was superseded by the Five Power Defence Arrangements in 1971 
(expanded to a multilateral treaty involving the UK, Australian, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia) which reduced 
the level of security offered by the previous treaty to an obligation for all five to consult each other in event of an 
external attack, or threat of attack, solely against the Malay peninsula or Singapore. The evolution of this treaty is 
something which will be examined in more detail at a later stage. Also see C. Thayer, 'The Five Power Defence 
Arrangements: the Quiet Achiever' Security Challenges Journal 3 (2007) p 79
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success  of  regional  defence  organisations,  and  the  trouble  they  often  caused  even  in  successful
organisations,  these  forms  of  regional  defence  arrangements  continued  to  form  the  basis  for  the
majority of defence cooperation amongst Western-aligned countries in the following decades. For the
Commonwealth  their  more  particular  and  Commonwealth-specific  organisations  would  come  to
epitomise future cross-Commonwealth strategic interests and cooperation. 
In spite of this strong showing of cooperation in the early years of the decade, internal tensions
and problems within the Commonwealth, both structurally and between its individuals members, came
to  the  fore  later  in  the  decade.11 Although  the  Middle  East  Defence  Conference  and  the  1st
Commonwealth Division were not without their share of problems, it was not until the Suez Crisis of
1956 that the uncertainty of the Commonwealth military relationship became more readily apparent.
The importance of the Suez canal and the Middle East to the Commonwealth as had been recognised at
the Middle East Defence Conference was sidelined by British politicians in London when preparing a
response to Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.12 Instead it was clear that the UK
government  was  more  concerned  with  the  immediate  economic  ramifications  of  Nasser's
nationalisation.13 Additionally the lack of forewarning to the Commonwealth as a whole by the British
government  undoubtedly  strained  diplomatic  relationships  and  undermined  the  principle  of
Commonwealth cooperation on military matters. It also implicitly questioned the value and application
of the Middle East Defence Conference's plan to defend the Middle East with Commonwealth forces. If
the Middle East Defence Conference had outlined its priority and the plan of action necessary for the
Commonwealth to take for its defence during a global war, the Suez crisis  clearly highlighted the
limited time-frame in which the Conference was relevant and applicable.14 The questions that British
11 These would also become the subject of numerous editorial commentary across the Commonwealth, particularly in 
relation to the apparent lack of cohesion, as well as the fallout of some the politically embarrassing events occurring in 
Commonwealth territory – such as the Kashmir crisis and South Africa's 'apartheid excesses'. - Despatch no. 338 from 
High Commissioners for Canada, Australia, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 27 June 1957 RG 27 
Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
12 Although this should be readily apparent it was noted by the General Staff of South Africa that the deterioration of the 
Suez Canal between 1956 and 1957 reduced the maximum draught of ships capable of using the canal to 33 feet, down 
from 35 feet 6 inches, would impact on existing shipping. - General Staff Intelligence Committee Summary no. 31/57 6 
September 1957 MV 208/151 SANDFA
13 R. Tignor, 'The Suez Crisis of 1956 and Egypt's Foreign Private Sector' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
20 (1992) p 294
14 Indeed by 1961 British military expenditure in the Far East would be double that spent in the Middle East (£55.1 million
compared to £23.9 million in the Middle East). - Annex to Memorandum by the Prime Minister 'Our foreign and defence
policy for the future' Part 1 29 September 1961 PREM11 UKNA. Also, after the Middle East Defence Conference only 
British forces allocated to NATO were considered in relation to specifically address the outbreak of a global war. - 
Annexure 1 to Appendix B to Annex of COS(60)276 1st April 1961 DEFE 7/2232 UKNA
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action  in  the  Suez  raised,  and  the  strain  this  placed  on  Commonwealth  relations,  was  further
complicated by subsequent developments in the UK, as well as in British overseas territories, which led
to the rapid expansion of the Commonwealth at the end of the decade. 
Indeed  the  aftermath  of  the  crisis  informed  and  altered  the  understanding  of  defence
arrangements  in  the  UK.  This  naturally  had  implications  for  the  direction  and  progress  of
Commonwealth military cooperation, which until 1956 had seen some successes. The UK's action over
the canal not only highlighted the limited applicability of the strategies that arose out of the Middle
East Defence Conference, but also pointed to the limited consideration given by the UK to an area
which had been, only a few years earlier, declared of interest to Commonwealth military operations as
a whole. More to the point it was not only a failed instance of military cooperation but advanced the
idea that Commonwealth political support could no longer be counted upon to be favourable or remain
silent. Making a virtue out of the change Prime Minister Macmillan of the UK commented that “the
strength of the Commonwealth association was shown in the way in which the various members had
been able to take part in a reasoned and objective discussion of the important issues at stake in the
Mideast”.15
Further  to the issue of changes within the Commonwealth the impending decolonisation of
imperial territory, especially in Africa after Macmillan’s 'Winds of Change' speech, initially only had a
subtle and indirect influence on Commonwealth defence cooperation. Despite a slow low-impact start
the  long-term implications  of  the  decolonisation  of  Africa  were  quite  severe  on  the  prospects  for
Commonwealth defence cooperation. The decolonisation of Africa disturbed the strategic position and
priorities of the UK in such a manner that Commonwealth defence plans and assumptions made in the
early 1950s became increasingly irrelevant. The result was that not only did political developments as a
result  of  the  decolonisation  process  affect  the  Commonwealth  but  it  altered  the  requirements  and
obligations of the UK so drastically that the raison d'etre for cooperation was fundamentally shaken.
This in turn threatened the very existence of Commonwealth military cooperation.
The  overarching  interpretation  of  events  presented  in  this  thesis  to  explain  the  course  of
15 Prime Minister's Conference Third and Fourth Meetings Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for 
Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 
LAC
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Commonwealth defence cooperation over the post-war period is  fundamentally a  simple one.  It  is
essentially argued that Commonwealth defence cooperation continued apace, despite being plagued
with various issues, in the immediate post-war period. The rapid expansion of the Commonwealth in
the early to mid-1960s exacerbated existing problems with the very concept of the Commonwealth and
specifically of Commonwealth defence cooperation. New countries to the Commonwealth fuelled a
vociferous desire for formalised Commonwealth institutions which undermined existing, and largely
informal, arrangements. Increased membership of the Commonwealth, particularly by new states which
did not predominantly identify themselves as British and who in the main were not privy to levels of
bilateral cooperation with the original member states of the Commonwealth.16 This contributed to a
growing  inability  to  reach  consensus.17 This  lack  of  consensus  created  problems  of  official
nomenclature for the Commonwealth.18 This manifested in the realm of defence cooperation in a wide
variety of fields, including defence research.19 
Regional military cooperation
 Although the initiatives and endeavours the Commonwealth undertook between the late 1940s
and mid-1950s were often strained this was, nevertheless, a time which saw the execution of the broad
outlines of what might be seen as a defence policy aimed at defending Commonwealth territory using
resources from throughout the Commonwealth. Although the extent to which such a Commonwealth
defence policy existed is debatable, there was certainly an attempt to formulate one in the early 1950s.
16 This was especially true on matters of defence India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, for instance were not invited to participate in
the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science (and curiously the US was invited to attend, if on an 
informal basis). - Memorandum for Mr. Robertson 'Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science' 15 
September 1948 RG 25 Box 2892 Volume 1 File 220-A-5 LAC
17 The entirety of new member states to the Commonwealth were recently decolonized imperial British territory. The 
cultural ties which had previously existed between Commonwealth members, simply did not exist in any significant 
faction in the political or cultural make-up of these new states. There was also no long-standing tradition of political 
engagement which could be drawn from. The result Commonwealth expansion was an increasing difficulty in reaching 
consensus on any particular issues, and the introduction of problems in cooperation, particularly in matters of defence, 
which are of a particularly sensitive nature.
18 This is a recurring issue following the expansion of the Commonwealth. Whereas previously consensus in the 
Commonwealth was either achieved, ignored, or assumed, there begins a shift following the expansion of the 
Commonwealth towards the non-use of the adjective Commonwealth to describe joint military actions, an issue aptly 
displayed in the changing nomenclature of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to the 28th ANZUK Brigade, with absolutely
no other change whatsoever.
19 The difficulties in defence research were particularly concerning to the Canadian government. They were quite insistent,
following discussions with the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Chairman of the Working Party [of the 
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science] that the 'Defence Research meeting... should not be described
as the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science and that consideration should be given to changing the 
title.' and specifically there 'need be no use of the word 'Commonwealth'.' - Telegram no. 1813 from High Commissioner
for Canada in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs 16 October 1948  RG 25 Box 2892 Volume 1 File 
220-A-5 LAC
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The Middle East Defence Conference, and much of the defence cooperation undertaken in the early
1950s, suggested that some level of progress had been made in the direction of formalising and acting
upon  Commonwealth-wide  strategic  goals.  This  post-war  inter-Commonwealth  cooperation  and
strategic alignment did not, and arguably with the expansion of the Commonwealth could not, last
forever. The deployment of the 1st Commonwealth Division marked a pinnacle in the area of broad
cross-Commonwealth defence relations that was never reattained after 1951. 
It has long been held in the historiography of the British Empire that the Suez crisis was one of
the  key  turning  points  in  the  decolonisation  period  of  the  British  empire.20 In  this  context  the
consequences of the Suez crisis not only had an immediate effect on the UK but also influenced the
development of the Commonwealth. This is especially true with respect to the various military forces
of the Commonwealth and their capability and desire to operate in conjunction with each other under
the  Commonwealth  title.  This  was  not  a  direct  nor  immediate  outcome  but  rather  an  eventual
development. This was a development which was influenced by the unsettled political circumstances,
both domestically across the Commonwealth and internationally outside of it.
Some  of  the  finer  connecting  points  between  the  outcomes  of  the  Middle  East  Defence
Conference  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  War,  particularly  regarding  the  formation  of  the  1 st
Commonwealth  Division  during  that  war,  merit  further  consideration.  Overt  cross-Commonwealth
defence  cooperation  was  not  universally  accepted  at  the  Middle  East  Defence  Conference.  Even
amongst those countries which had previously engaged in defence cooperation were far from united at
the Conference. South African and Canadian objections to various issues on different grounds were
illustrative of the fragile nature of Commonwealth defence cooperation during the period.
South African objections to the continuation of wartime liaisons in peacetime were ultimately
understood as relating to how these wartime liaisons would be described rather than their purpose. 21
20 J. Black, The British Empire: A History and a Debate (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2015) p 193
21 This would not be the last time that South Africa would raise issues regarding the title, rather than the substance, of 
matters. In the Agreement over the Simonstown naval base, for instance, objections were raised to the use of the 'the 
South Atlantic Strategic Zone' when describing the bodies of water on either side of South Africa. They preferred the 
Southern Africa Strategic Zone. Such debates surrounding the nomenclature of such organisational activities reveal the 
growing level of self-interest across the Commonwealth. - 'Proposals of the South African Members concerning 
arrangements as an alternative to UK Proposals in paragraphs 35 to 41' June 1955 MV 190 Simonstad SANDFA
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These objections had been ongoing since 1949.22 At least initially the concerns of the South African
government were in the realm of presentation rather than substance. This was undoubtedly part of the
ongoing domestic unease at the continuation of the Commonwealth military link in South Africa. As
Commonwealth attitudes to South Africa's domestic policies hardened in later years so too would South
Africa's government, and particularly the National Party, become increasingly disillusioned with the
Commonwealth. The discomfort South Africa felt in the Commonwealth was reciprocated throughout
the Commonwealth in later decades. This ultimately resulted in the ejection of South Africa from the
Commonwealth. With respect to Commonwealth defence cooperation during the 1950s, however, it
was  clear  that  there  were  underlying  issues  already present  in  South  Africa  that  were  frustrating
Commonwealth defence cooperation.
Perhaps the most striking display of disunity amongst the Commonwealth at the Conference
came not from South Africa but rather from Canada, the oft-called 'Senior Dominion'.  The lack of
Canadian  involvement  in  the  Middle  East  Defence  Conference  on  strategic  grounds23 was  a  stark
indication  that  defence  cooperation  would  not  continue  in  its  existing  form indefinitely.  Canadian
military involvement  with  the  Commonwealth  was  by no means  ended,  but  it  was  threatened  by
Canada's  new approach to  its  strategic  interests.  Canadian  objections  to  the  Middle  East  Defence
Conference  were  reflective  of  that  shift  in  strategic  priorities  from a  global  strategy to  one  more
regionally-based.24 This was not a shift which was confined to Canada: the strategic priorities of the
various Commonwealth countries became dominated by regional concerns as they entered into an era
which placed a premium on regional rather than global defence. The outbreak of the Korean War, and
specifically  the  formation  of  the  1st Commonwealth  Division,  interrupted  this  before  it  was  fully
realised. The Korean War marked the pinnacle of the pre-1971 Commonwealth defence cooperation
style at a time when alternative arrangements were being explored but not yet implemented.
22 Telegram no. 1083 from High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, 4 
May 1949 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
23 Memorandum for Mr. Pearson (Minister of External Affairs, Canada) 21 May 1951 RG25 Vol. 5963 File 50227-40 Part 
1 LAC
24 Memorandum for the Minister 'Middle East Defence Conference', with attachments, 28 May 1951 RG25 Vol. 5963 File 
50227-40 Part 1 LAC. Note: Particular emphasis was placed upon rectifying the apparent misunderstanding by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office in London that there had been a suggestion from Canada to expand the terms of the 
Middle East Defence Conference to include the Pacific. They sought to clarify that if the terms were expanded to include
the Pacific then they would review the question, the implication being that they would be more fully involved in the 
Conference, but not that they were asking for the terms to be extended.
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The Korean War
The Korean War aptly demonstrated the ability of the Commonwealth to operate a multinational
force  in  pursuit  of  like-minded  objectives  amongst  the  involved nations.  The formation  of  the  1st
Commonwealth Division and the successes of the Commonwealth operating a fully functional and
relatively unified fighting force in an active theatre during a time of war was no mean feat. Although
the Division during the war was not without its detractors nor its share of problems, it illustrated what
could be achieved. The circumstances of its formation were not straight-forward, nor even indicative of
a Commonwealth that  was united.  It  was constituted in  such a manner  that  it  did not include the
entirety of the Commonwealth but was seen as, and considered, a Commonwealth endeavour. This
continued a  tradition  of  approach to  Commonwealth defence cooperation  that  underscored a  basic
principle that unanimity of action was not required for Commonwealth defence cooperation.
Which Commonwealth states provided forces, materiel, or financial support to the Division, and
how that cooperation was received at the time is crucially important. The 1st Commonwealth Division
is one of the most distinctive features of Commonwealth defence cooperation in the latter half of the
twentieth  century.  The  contributions  that  comprised  the  Division  speak  to  the  potential  future
development  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  in  the  post-war  era.  The most  notable  initial
aspect of the formation of the Division was that it was not met with widespread enthusiasm amongst
the Commonwealth governments. It was, in fact, as much encouraged by overburdened US command
staff as it was by any intrinsic belief that a multitude of Commonwealth forces could be combined into
a single entity.25 This was reflective of the uncertain basis for Commonwealth defence cooperation that
was encountered, and overcome, by a variety of Commonwealth countries in the pursuit of a common
military objective.  It  was by no means certain that the defence cooperation displayed amongst the
Commonwealth during the Second World War could be repeated in the post-war period,  especially
given the new desires of the Dominions, and the introduction of new states into the Commonwealth. 
The development of the Division exposed some of the ongoing issues and challenges faced by
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  in  the  early 1950s.  There  are  three  key factors  which  are  of
immediate concern with respect to the overall progress of Commonwealth defence cooperation and the
varying levels of enthusiasm in each of the participating countries. These are 1) the initial framework
25 Cabinet Report on Proposal for Formation of a British Commonwealth Division in Korea 16 November 1950 Prime 
Ministers' Conference London A5954-1682-2 ANA
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for the Division, 2) the use of the 'Commonwealth' adjective in spite of the non-participation of certain
Commonwealth countries, and 3) the comparative ease of cooperation relative to the difficulties other
multinational formations had during the Korean War.
The framework for Commonwealth forces in Korea was the British Commonwealth Forces in
Korea (BCFK, a designation which categorised all army, naval and air units of the Commonwealth in
Korea).  This  was  initially  constituted  out  of  the  formations  previously  posted  to  the  British
Commonwealth Occupying Forces in Japan (BCOJ).26 Interestingly the BCFK was commanded by an
Australian army officer,27 while concurrently the 1st Commonwealth Division was consistently led by
British Army officers.
Secondly the constituent members of the Division and the terminology considered appropriate
to its designation is a particularly important factor to consider. Despite the absence of South African
and Pakistan soldiers, and the inclusion of Indian personnel from the Republic of India, the retention of
the word “Commonwealth” in the formation's title highlighted how post-war defence cooperation had
adapted to the new Commonwealth. The adaptability of the Commonwealth in the face of adverse
political developments was already well established, and the changes in the late 1940s, initially at least,
betrayed no fundamental change to Commonwealth defence cooperation. Indeed the deployment of
forces  under  the  Commonwealth  banner,  without  the  consent  or  involvement  of  the  entire
Commonwealth, had long been established as noted in the previous chapter. The 1 st Commonwealth
Division demonstrated how an active combat formation could continue with that approach even with
the introduction (and removal) of a number of states to the Commonwealth. Between 1945 and 1951
the Commonwealth gained two members states, the Republic of India and the Republic of Pakistan,
and lost two member states, the Irish Free State and the Dominion of Newfoundland. The initial effect
of those changes on the broad strokes of Commonwealth defence cooperation, as it existed at the turn
of the 1950s, was effectively nil. Indeed, there was no reason to think – in 1951 – that Commonwealth
military cooperation would be unduly affected by changes occurring within the Commonwealth more
26 Cabinet Report on Australian participation in Cold War Operations in Korea, Australian Forces placed at the disposal of 
the UN, 15 December 1950 Prime Ministers' Conference London A5954-1682-2 ANA
27 This arrangement had been accepted by the British government at the request of the Australians as it related to the non-
operational control and general administration of the force. However, this was only to continue until the Canadian views 
on such an arrangement were made clear. - Cabinet Report on Australian participation in Cold War Operations in Korea, 




Finally it  is worth mentioning the international dimension of the war, and the problems the
multitude of formations from different doctrinal backgrounds and languages created for Allied forces in
Korea. This made the mix of Commonwealth forces into a single cohesive formation a comparatively
easy  task  given  the  similarity  of  their  doctrines,  equipment,  and  language.  Insofar  as  Australian
strategic  priorities  were  concerned,  especially  in  light  of  the  growth of  regional  endeavours,  their
commitment to the Far East in the BCOJ was hardly surprising.28 Similarly, outside of the UK, the
constituent members  of the Division were all  drawn on a regional basis.  The Australian and New
Zealand  contributions  are  most  obvious  in  this  regard.  Although  Canadian  participation  is  hardly
surprising either it was perhaps a little more suspect given their attitude to events in the Middle East at
that time. The Indian government's interest  in the Far East was well known.29 Although the Indian
contribution was more symbolic than anything else, it was a potent symbol of the possibilities that
could still be said to exist for future Commonwealth defence cooperation in the early 1950s.
Although the Middle East  did not  lose its  position as the jointly agreed theatre  of primary
importance for the Commonwealth as a whole until the mid-1950s, the indications of a switch to a
more regional basis of defence in the Commonwealth that had been present, as previously documented
in the last  chapter.30 The acceptance of an Australian commander  for all  Commonwealth forces in
Korea reflected the relative ease with which the Commonwealth was able to field a multinational force.
It also reflected an acceptance, at least in some measure of non-operational control, of the need to
provide more senior positions for those 'local' Commonwealth forces in regional deployments. 
This denotes a broader point in Commonwealth defence cooperation: who was to command? It
was understandable when contributing to a multinational military formation under the Commonwealth
28 Report on Machinery Established for Cooperation in British Commonwealth Defence December 1950 A5954-1798-10 
LAC
29 Indeed the Indian government had often acted on the behalf of new states in the Far East, even when doing so was 
impractical or embarrassing to the Commonwealth or the US. This is especially true of their policy on China, which Mr. 
Nehru was keen to emphasise must be admitted into the UN. - Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference Fifth 
Meeting Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for Canada, Australia to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
30 It had, however, been a potential point of contention for some time prior see Telegram no. 1239 from the High 
Commissioner for Canada, London, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 21 May 1951. RG 25 Vol. 5693 
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banner that it would be led by officers of the government which was generally considered the head of
the Commonwealth and contributed the lion's share of the maintenance of the Division. It seems more
unusual to find acceptance of that same level of leadership being exercised by another member of the
Commonwealth,  in  this  case  Australia,  especially  when  their  contribution  to  the  effort  was
overshadowed by deployments from other Commonwealth countries. This was the case for Canada
which, despite contributing more to the 1st Commonwealth Division than Australia, found itself in the
unusual position of operational control of its forces falling under a Australian officer in a nominally
superior placement as commander of the BCFK.31 Although this must be tempered by the fact that
command of the 1st Commonwealth Division remained in the hands of British officers, and that the
individual  contributions  to  the  Division  were  ultimately  responsible  to  their  respective  national
governments. Notwithstanding the complications of such organisational leap-frogging, that approach
certainly served a unique purpose in smoothing out any tensions. That was not a panacea for all ills
and the appointment of an Australian to command BCFK caused consternation amongst British officers
commanding  the  1st Commonwealth  Division,  particularly  when  it  came  to  representing
Commonwealth activities in Korea to the US.32 
It is worth noting that the relative contributions of the members involved in the Division varied
widely.  India's  contribution,  for  instance,  with  respect  to  its  population  and  capabilities  paled  in
comparison to what other members of the Commonwealth provided. Furthermore, many of the existing
problems with Commonwealth defence cooperation continued into the coming decades. In particular
the domestic problems of new member states, a shifting international and Commonwealth perspective
on military affairs, and the difficulty in breaking into the existing clique-like relationship maintained
amongst the older members of the Commonwealth all  hindered such efforts.33 The inclusion of an
Indian contribution masked some of these issues. The symbolism of their participation in the Division
31 Cabinet Report on Commonwealth participation in Cold War Operations in Korea 16 December 1950 Prime Ministers' 
Conference London A5954 File 1682-2 ANA
32 There is an interesting crossing point between the command of British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan (led 
by Australian commanders) and British Commonwealth Forces in Korea where there were British objections to the 
BCOJ commander representing the UK Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of UN forces in Korea. See Cabinet 
Report on Organisation of British Commonwealth Forces in Korea, Directive to Commander-in-Chief, British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force, 17 December 1950 Prime Ministers' Conference London A5954 File 1682-2 ANA
33 Even where efforts were made to include new member states into defence matters, such as the invitations offered, and 
refused, by India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to the Middle East Defence Conference there seems that  little consideration was
given to this as it would 'not detract from any likely support that may be forthcoming in the event of war'. Telegram no. 
1239 from the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 21 May 1951.
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is not to be underestimated. It hinted at the possibility of an expanded Commonwealth that was open to
the prospect of defence cooperation. The underlying basis of Commonwealth defence cooperation was
strong.  Although  there  were  problems  and  difficulties  with  the  1st Commonwealth  Division,  its
successes came at a time when the Middle East Defence Conference remained relevant and, at worst,
hid  the  cracks  in  the  edifice  of  cooperation  and,  at  best,  genuinely  pointed  to  the  potential  the
Commonwealth had for continued cooperation in defence matters in 1950. 
One of those cracks which marred the 1st Commonwealth Division was the refusal of the South
African  government  to  provide  ground  forces  to  Korea.  It  stands  to  the  good  nature  of  the
Commonwealth in relation to the obligations of member states that little was made of South Africa's
non-involvement.  The loose  structure  of  the  Commonwealth  allowed for  non-participation  without
reproach. This helped prevent a fracturing of the Commonwealth over these sorts of issues. This loose
structure was certainly an advantage in ensuring the continuation of the Commonwealth in the first
instance, and also in catering for its potential expansion. Nevertheless it was a structural failing with
respect to military cooperation.  The uncertain foundation of coordination and involvement made it
susceptible to attempts to formalize its structures in a manner that failed to preserve its original intent.
This was precisely what happened to the Commonwealth in time. The flexible structure which had
operated in the Commonwealth in almost all matters was in effect overcome by a more rigid form of
engagement that dominated Commonwealth proceedings from the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is
equally important to note that this informal structure, particularly in the realm of military cooperation,
persisted until 1971.
Indeed it was this formalisation of institutions and practice which was one of the most obvious
transformative processes in the Commonwealth as it grew. The replacement of relatively close inter-
Commonwealth meetings with a Secretariat and formal conferences had been slowly making ground
over the preceding half-century. The steady shift towards the formalisation of relations similar to the
relations  maintained  amongst  other  sovereign  states  became  a  catalyst  behind  increased  distance
between Commonwealth countries. Ultimately, as the Commonwealth expanded, pre-existing informal
ties  were  swept  away  and  replaced  with  more  formal  arrangements.  The  loose  requirements  of
Commonwealth participation which accepted South African non-engagement in Commonwealth forces
in  Korea,  is  just  as  important  in  highlighting  the  shift  to  regional  strategic  priorities  as  it  is  in
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identifying  a  structural  failing  in  the  Commonwealth.  The  loose  structure  of  Commonwealth
cooperation undermined the prospect of expanded defence cooperation amongst the Commonwealth as
it grew larger. Not all of this can be laid at the feet of the expansion of the Commonwealth. There had
been a growing desire amongst the older members of the Commonwealth themselves for more formal
arrangements as well.34 What the situation in Korea demonstrated was two-fold. First it indicated the
potential for new members to cooperate in defence matters within pre-existing defence arrangements
and relationships, and second it revealed the lack of drive amongst Commonwealth countries for a
defence cooperation.
The  lack  of  a  driving  force  was  demonstrated  in  the  formation  of  the  1st Commonwealth
Division. The formation of the Division itself was not driven by Commonwealth preferences but rather
by US desires  to  reduce  their  own difficulties  in  coordinating  such  a  diverse  international  effort.
Although the initial conception of the Division may have been urged by a foreign power, the practical
implementation of this cooperation was such that, despite the occasional bickering over Dominion and
British officers, Commonwealth defence cooperation performed as a coherent formation rather well.35
While the Korean War may have highlighted clear strategic structural failings of the Commonwealth as
a whole,  it  also demonstrated the significant  success the Commonwealth could enjoy even if  as a
collective they were not particularly enthused by the idea.
There was no great relief, or acceptance, amongst the various senior military officers of the
Commonwealth that this multinational Division would succeed. The contingents from Australia, New
Zealand, and the UK were more closely involved with each other than amongst any combination of the
other  participants.  This  was  undoubtedly  aided  by  the  fact  that  the  Australian  and  New  Zealand
contributions  of  battalions  and  companies  respectively  were  fully  integrated  with  larger  British
formations.  Meanwhile  Indian,  and  even  Canadian,  involvement  remained  circumspect  and  under
constant  review.36 It  is  illustrative  of  Canadian  involvement  in  the  whole  affair  that  their  primary
contribution of a full brigade to the Division was, in effect, a fully coherent element (with the exception
of a brief period between December 1950 and July 1951 when the Canadian contribution was still
34 Letter from High Commissioner for New Zealand, Canberra, to Minister for External Affairs, Canberra, 7 June 1955, 
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1988) p 187
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being brought up to strength).37 There were strong Canadian objections to the 'dispatch of a company of
the  25th [Canadian]  Infantry  brigade  to  Koje  Island  without  prior  consultation  with  the  Canadian
government.' Although it was acknowledged that there were immediate military necessitates regarding
the security of prisoners of war which required this action it was urged that the company should 're-
unite... with the rest of the Canadian brigade as soon as possible.'38
Similarly,  the Indian contribution to the Division came in the form of a self-contained field
unit.39 Furthermore, and this perhaps raised more questions as to the unified nature of the Division, the
Indian government did not engage with the higher command machinery provided for the formation, nor
were they particularly interested in its affairs more generally. The involvement of the Republic of India
in the 1st Commonwealth Division was certainly a symbolic indication of potential future cooperation,
or at least a recognition that new member states might also contribute to such endeavours. In reality the
limited nature of their contribution, coupled with their reservations regarding the machinery established
in Australia for the management for the Division, undermined the value of their  involvement.  The
reservations surrounding Canadian and Indian involvement is important as it correlates directly to their
absence from subsequent  cooperation  amongst  the British,  Australians  and New Zealanders  which
arose  directly  from  this  Division.40 It  is  notable  that  the  cooperation  that  led  from  the  1st
Commonwealth Division amongst Australia, New Zealand, and the UK was regionally-based in South-
East Asia.  It is that regional interest which ultimately struck at the heart of Commonwealth problems
in ensuring a continuation of defence cooperation from the 1950s onwards. Although this interest in a
regional approach to matters of defence was not a trend directed by any one factor, the net result was
ultimately a strain on cross-Commonwealth strategic priorities, even at the highest political levels.41
This strain was exacerbated by the rapid expansion of the Commonwealth over the course of the next
two  decades. Ongoing  endeavours  in  Commonwealth  cooperation,  especially  with  the  1st
Commonwealth Division, must be weighed against such developments. The Division may have been
undermined and restricted by the issues set out above but it left a long-lasting legacy amongst some of
37 Manpower issues would plague the Canadian military establishment for the duration of the conflict, with much interest 
and effort expended in ascertaining the exact nature of the problem and how it might be best fixed at the highest level of 
Canadian Army. - RG 24 Vol 6927 Report no. 72 'Canadian participation in the Korean War Part II: 1 April 1952-31 July
1953 LAC
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the  participants.  Canadian  and  Indian  forces  did  not  build  on  the  existing  structure.  All  of  their
respective  military  personnel  departed  in  mid-1953  and  were  not  replaced.  In  contrast,  British,
Australian and New Zealand forces, largely the remnants of the 1st Commonwealth Division, continued
as the 28th Commonwealth brigade. This brigade saw service throughout South-East Asia and lasted, in
a variety of different forms, until the mid-1970s.
The  accomplishments  achieved  by  Commonwealth  forces  during  the  Korean  War  were
impressive. The Commonwealth had formed a multinational formation comprised of both existing and
new members of the Commonwealth in a time of war. Although it may be too far to suggest that this
force was raised to defend their joint interests in the Far East, it nevertheless worked remarkably well
in the pursuit of that goal. Despite the problems that it encountered, and its relatively short existence,
the fact that the Commonwealth managed to form a working Division at all speaks volumes as to the
state  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  at  the  turn  of  the  1950s.  The  shift  towards  regional
arrangements,  and  the  creation  of  the  Division,  further  demonstrated  the  possibility  of  future
cooperation with the various members of the Commonwealth, irrespective of when they joined or the
changes to their respective national interests. It was not a definite advance in this direction but rather
ensured it as a future option, including if not interest then at least acceptance of the possibility of such
cooperation. In addition this was undertaken in the form of a full, visible and conventional Division
which  saw  active  combat  in  wartime.42 This  was  an  example  of  the  possible  continuation  of
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  in  an  era  following  two  major  wars  that  required  different
technological and political approaches. 
Regional defence organisations
The  growth  of  regional  defence  arrangements  was  precisely  the  kind  of  development  that
41 The pattern of business discussed, and indeed the commentary recorded, in the 1953 Prime Minister's meetings 
highlighted the attention being directed towards Asia and South-East Asia and with a comparative lack of discussion 
surrounding Europe. This caused some concern to the Australian Prime Minister Menzies, who had initially raised the 
matter at the outset of proceedings. Although he found some support from the Indian Prime Minister Nehru in that the 
matter and it was appended to the final day of discussions its initial absence, and brief treatment, highlighted its lack of 
priority in the Commonwealth. Additionally, despite the willingness to hear the views of other Commonwealth members,
India was unwilling to adopt any final communique which threatened its policy of non-alignment, which included even 
an expression of hope that the European Defence Community be established at the earliest possible date. The result, as 
proposed by Sir Winston Churchill, was that 'it would be better to say nothing on Western Europe than to show that there
was no unanimity of opinion.' - Minutes of 4th Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 8 June 1953 MG26L Vol 85 
File 0-16-21 PMM(53) LAC
42 Notwithstanding the fact that the UN labelled the conflict as a 'police action'.
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dominated  national  strategic  planning  in  the  1950s.  This  was  one  of  the  key  elements  which
undermined the continuation of Commonwealth defence in its existing form. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation  (NATO)  established  in  1949  was  quickly  mirrored  by similar,  though  generally  less
successful,  regional  defence  arrangements  elsewhere.  This  included  the  South-East  Asian  Treaty
Organisation (SEATO) in 1954.43 A new organisation which was quickly followed by the Central Treaty
Organisation (CENTO) in the Middle East in 1955.44 Until the creation of these regional organisations
outside of the North Atlantic the Commonwealth's acknowledged structure of global Commonwealth
defence,  such  as  it  existed,  remained  the  accepted  practice  for  the  various  members  of  the
Commonwealth. This global approach to defence planning encouraged contributions from all members
of the Commonwealth.  It  effectively sought  to  establish the idea that  the most  important  strategic
interest  of  the  members,  as  a  whole,  took  priority  over  the  immediate  defence  of  any individual
member. These new regional organisations presented a different approach, one reliant on the individual
member states doing their utmost to defend their immediate surroundings rather than attempting to plan
for and execute a broader  global strategy.
Nowhere  was  the  old  style  of  strategic  implementation  of  defence  planning  across  the
Commonwealth clearer  than in  the Middle East  Defence Conference and in  plans to  reinforce the
Middle East with troops from throughout the Commonwealth in the event of conflict. It is notable that
the type of conflict played an important role in dictating the relative priorities of the different areas to
which the Commonwealth considered sending troops. The Middle East in the event of a global conflict
was, at least until the early 1960s, considered the key area of operations. Detailed timetables for the
deployment of troops from across the Commonwealth were considered and distributed.45 These plans
were largely incompatible with the changes in warfare since the development of the atomic bomb.
Deployments of weeks to months were simply not relevant when a potential conflict could be settled in
days or weeks with the use of these new weapons. This is particularly true of the preferred USSR
approach to nuclear weapons which saw an emphasis on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons
43 Basic Documents Volumes I and II: American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 'South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
(Manila Pact)' 8 September 1954 p 912-915
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alongside conventional armies.46 Interestingly the Commonwealth viewed tactical nuclear weapons in
much the same light as the USSR.47  These views were at odds with the US approach to such weapons,
which had considered tactical nuclear weapons as an 'uneconomical sideshow'.48
This global style of defence was ultimately and entirely made obsolete by such technological
advancements. The speed with which a conflict could start, develop and be won or lost threatened the
viability of long-distance deployments.  Throughout  the 1950s the Russian nuclear arsenal,  and the
nuclear threat in general, was not so significant as to cause an immediate reconsideration of military
preparations but it became an increasing concern into the 1960s.49 Consequently the switch to regional
defences, from a strategic standpoint, looked increasingly attractive and coupled with ongoing political
difficulties in the Middle East pushed the Commonwealth away from a 'traditional' approach to their
joint defence. As this changed it proved especially problematic for the continuation of Commonwealth
defence cooperation. The physical distance between the members of the Commonwealth was such that
they were not  in  a  position  to  support  each other  with any significant  speed.50 Neither  were they
universally in possession of a capability to rapidly deploy forces overseas to different theatres. In fact,
this  was arguably a capability which could not be possessed in the 1950s given the limitations of
military technology of the period.
46 This was largely considered to be the result of a stagnant Soviet military doctrine. Between 1947 and 1955 it was 
believed that persistent 'Stalinist rigidity' that permitted no reassessment of Stalin's five factors of war kept Soviet views 
on nuclear weapons fixed on their use in a broad assault across Europe. Detailed Soviet plans regarding the initial 
invasion of Europe '[contrasted] sharply with the vagueness and generality of treatment of the strategic nuclear 
exchange'. This was further reflected in their force composition which was believed to encompass approximately 1,200 
separate delivery systems for weapons in Europe '510 MRBMs, 56 IRBMs, and 700 medium bombers, compared to the 
195 heavy bombers and approximately 70 ICBMs it possessed which were capable of striking at the US. - Special 
Reports Section 64/63 Attitudes to Deterrence D13/112 DEFE 7 25 June 1963 UKNA
47 This was also the view of the UK, who had formed the opinion that tactical nuclear weapons could be used with more 
frequency and in more situations than could be achieved by strategic nuclear weapons. Appendix B to JP(60)16 28 June 
1960 DEFE 7/2231 UKNA. Australian views on the value of tactical nuclear weapons were very similar to this as well. 
Australian service personnel had formed the view that it would be impossible to defend against a conventional invasion 
without these weapons. A position, much like the US experience, that was reflective of their own particular 
circumstances and really indicative of the uncertainty of doctrine surrounding their employment. - Attitudes to 
Deterrence Annex to Attached Note SRS. 64/63 25 June 1963 DEFE 7/2396 UKNA
48 The US had grown increasingly disillusioned with the value of tactical nuclear weapons from the 1960s, and both their 
weaponry and strike plans were predicated on a strategic strike plan rather than as a force multiplier for conventional 
forces. - Attached note to Letter to Direction J.I.B. (MoD) from R.J. Reid, 25 June 1963  DEFE 7/2246 UKNA 
49 The Soviet nuclear programme in the 1950s was in its nascent stages. It was not until 'the late 1960s' that it was believed
that the Soviets would possess sufficient capability to render 'US “overkill” capacity irrelevant'. - Special Reports 
Section 64/63 Attitudes to Deterrence D13/112 25 June 1963 DEFE 7 UKNA
50 The Prime Minister of New Zealand was moved to comment on this very subject in early 1951 when he said that 'in 
view of its [New Zealand's] geographical isolation, New Zealand could easily adopt an isolationist policy'. - Prime 
Minister's Conference: Third and Fourth Meetings Annex to Despatch No. 339 from High Commissioner for Canada, 
Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
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Although a global defence plan continued to focus on the Middle East and remained paramount
for  some  time,  the  growth  of  and  interest  in  regional  defence  organisations  was  undeniable  and,
apparently, irresistible. There were many different causes for this including 1) the need to ensure US
support, 2) the deployment of forces in a manner which would fit into expected US deployments,51 3)
US and Soviet  preferences  for  conflicts  to  remain 'local',52 and 4)  the increase in the number and
applicability  of  nuclear  weapons,  particularly  those  which  could  be  used  tactically.53 Whichever
combination of factors resulted in this doctrinal shift in any particular military establishment all pointed
to a single overriding problem: if Commonwealth defence cooperation was to continue it would have to
fit into this new pattern of multinational regional defence. Some effort was made towards this end with
the creation of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement in 1957.54
The growth, interest and involvement of the different members of the Commonwealth in these
regional defence organisations and how they affected the development of a unified Commonwealth
defence more generally is the pertinent point here. There are two basic concepts that form the basis for
the development of the growth of these organisations over the course of the 1950s. Firstly, the global
strategic  picture emphasised the need to  obtain and maintain US support for any defensive effort.
Secondly, the global political situation required an approach which avoided the creation of a 'white
man's club' or an impression that such efforts had the intent of propping up imperial powers. Avoiding
those characterizations was considered to be vital to attract US support, and these concerns altered the
shape and direction of Commonwealth defence efforts.55 The success, failure, and existence of these
51 The Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: View of the Minister of Defence on the Action taken 9 June 1955 TS682/22 Part 
2 UKNA
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Reports Section of the British Joint Intelligence Bureau, as a result 'the US need of overseas bases diminishes... both the 
US and the Soviet Union might then be interested in keeping war in Europe “local”, though not necessarily non-nuclear.'
- Special Reports Section 64/63 Attitudes to Deterrence D13/112 25 June 1963 DEFE 7 UKNA
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regional  arrangements  also  had  a  serious  and  long-lasting  effect  on  the  developments  in
Commonwealth defence cooperation in the following decades.
Although regional defence arrangements were tried in a variety of different places they were
most  successful  in  the  North  Atlantic  and in  South-East  Asia.  The former  was  not  dominated  by
Commonwealth interests in even the broadest of interpretations. British and Canadian involvement was
consistently tempered by US dominance in the organisation and the primacy of concerns of NATO
rested on the European continent, which had limited interest for Commonwealth member states outside
of the UK itself.
Contrast  this  limited  level  of  involvement  amongst  the  Commonwealth  in  the  continent  of
Europe with Commonwealth involvement  in  South-East  Asia.  This  was a region which featured a
mixture  of  Commonwealth  and  local  self-interest  that  immediately  included  a  dominant
Commonwealth amalgamation of interests. An amalgamation of interests  which included Australia,
New Zealand and, at least until 1972 and even arguably thereafter, the UK. Also there were two new
states in the region, Malaysia and Singapore, which were both new members of the Commonwealth.
These five Commonwealth powers, each disposed to working with their Commonwealth neighbours
created a set of circumstances in South-East Asia which were far more favourable to the expression of
Commonwealth strategic interests in an organized fashion than existed in any other region.
It  would  be  remiss  not  to  mention  the  failed  attempts  at  creating  regional  Commonwealth
structures in the Middle East. After all, the Commonwealth had devoted a significant amount of time
and planning throughout the 1950s to its defence in the event of war with the USSR. Although attempts
to create  stable defence arrangements  in the region amongst  local powers failed to materialise  the
reality that attempts were made in the hopes of replicating the success the Commonwealth found in
South-East Asia is, in itself, significant. Although regional defence arrangements were certainly not the
be-all  and  end-all  of  Commonwealth  defence  thought  they  presented  a  viable  alternative  to  prior
practice that was more in-keeping with the changing political atmosphere and technological capabilities
of the day. The Commonwealth's ability to adapt to particular circumstances had long been known in
other theatres. Indeed there is a similar demonstration of the elasticity of Commonwealth 'policy' (to
the extent that it  can even be considered a coherent policy)  in their  approach to the new regional
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breakdown of defence planning and the growth of localised national interests. 
The changing political atmosphere not only necessitated a new outlook to defence planning but
also undermined the possibility of a  successful shift  to  a  regional defence structure that would be
conducive to the long-term deployment of Commonwealth military forces in a unified manner. The
growing interest  in  national  priorities  could  certainly be  considered  a  key factor.  Furthermore  the
explicit requirement for US support to make these support structures viable was a reflection of the
geopolitical situation and the inability of the UK to maintain its position relative to changing strategic
issues. This was plagued with uncertainty and, ultimately, failure.56 US interest in global defence on a
regional basis was, particularly in the early 1950s in South-East Asia, lukewarm at best following their
reversal in China. This was openly admitted by the US in frank discussions with the UK in mid-1950.57
By contrast British policy in South-East Asia had been relatively successful.58 Indeed, it was largely
considered agreeable by the majority of the Commonwealth.59 To ensure that would continue securing
US support was considered one of the core principles of UK defence policy. It was an approach that
resonated across the Commonwealth both individually and collectively, and had done so for quite some
time.60 US involvement, whatever strings may have been attached to such engagement, was invariably
preferable to their non-involvement.
This affected the development of Commonwealth defence cooperation in two key ways. First, it
demonstrated a continuance in shared strategic thought amongst the Commonwealth. It may have been
driven by a variety of different factors, circumstances and the wider geopolitical situation but the end
result was that the key Commonwealth governments were generally of the same mind when it came to
the  importance  of  US  support.  Second,  US  support  and  leadership  was  not  always  beneficial  to
56 The Indian administration under Prime Minister Nehru had formed the opinion that the US had 'followed a wrong 
policy'. The result being that 'at the end of the war [the Second World War] no country had been so popular in China as 
the US and now it was the most hated'. - Minutes of 2nd Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 4 June 1953 
MG26L Vol 85 File 0-16-21 PMM(53) LAC
57 Specifically it was said that 'The defence of Malaya is an obligation falling primarily upon the British Commonwealth'. -
Letter from the Prime Minister of the UK to the High Commissioner (Australia) to the UK re: Discussion with US 
Authority on Defence in South-East Asia 25 April 1955 – Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference London 1956 – 
Defence Brief A1209 box 446 ANA
58 P. Hughes, 'Division and Discord: British Policy, Indochina, and the Origins of the Vietnam War 1954-56' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 28 (2000) p 100
59 Australia confessed a desire for a solution short of recognition, but it was alone in this regard. - Prime Ministers 
Conference May 1960 – Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 'The Future Commonwealth Relationship' 
A5954 box 1799 ANA
60 Report on Strategic Position of the British Commonwealth January 1950 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
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Commonwealth  strategic  planning  as  a  whole  even  where  it  might  have  been  perfectly  suited  to
regional strategic planning by individual Dominions.61 This second point was not apparent until after
the  US had been convinced  to  engage  with  Commonwealth  endeavours.  Although  the  rest  of  the
Commonwealth may have had little to say on the ANZUS treaty the subsequent British outcry at their
exclusion were indicative of the problems US involvement posed to Commonwealth strategic planning.
Policy complications that arose as a result of attempting to secure US support were not limited to issues
of inclusion, and divergent policies between the US and key Commonwealth countries – especially the
UK – were problematic.62
The formation of both CENTO and SEATO as regional defence initiatives supported by the
Commonwealth are worthy of further comment. It is important to note that, leaving aside the problems
US involvement caused, these arrangements were examples of the manifestation of the shift to regional
defence.63 The manner in which they were undertaken through the mix of Commonwealth and non-
Commonwealth countries was both a blessing and a curse. In a sense that approach allowed for the
regional arrangement to happen in the first instance, which was obviously vital to the whole concept.
However, their outcomes were less than stellar, and more worryingly these efforts undermined previous
work  by  diluting  the  coherency  and  primacy  of  cross-Commonwealth  cooperation  in  matters  of
defence.64 
61 This would become a sticking point, for all members of the Commonwealth, during their cooperation with the US. The 
British reaction to the ANZUS treaty, specifically their non-involvement in it, is but one example. British agreement 
with American representatives that nuclear strategic planning for South-East Asia did not need to be extended to include 
Australia or New Zealand, is another example of the sort of disengagement that occurred amongst the Commonwealth 
when involving non-Commonwealth states in the regional defence of either individual Dominions or broader strategic 
policy.
62 Some indication of the difficulties that existed for both Australia and New Zealand in South-East Asia would come to 
light over how to approach the Chinese. This was most clearly seen in the 1954/55 crisis which highlighted, for New 
Zealand, the difficulty and necessity of reconciling the two divergent policies their closest allies followed. - S. Kaufman,
'Operation Oracle: the US, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crisis of 1954-55' Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 32 (2004) p 120
63 CENTO, originally known as the Baghdad Pact, was initially formed in an effort to 'develop Iraq's treaty relations to 
meet the threat of Communist aggression... from the north'. This was to be done 'in harmony with Article 51 of the UN 
Charter', and subsequently used as a means of obtaining and subsequently assuring British and American assistance in 
the defence of the region which 'have traditionally relied on Western support'. - Baghdad Conference Reference Division
Report no.3782 'Origin of the Baghdad Pact' December 1957 MV 196 SANDFA
64 In the preceding half-century Commonwealth defence cooperation, possibly more aptly described as Imperial defence 
organisation, focused on a global, rather than regional, approach. Colonial and Commonwealth troops were deployed 
throughout the Empire were needed, with little thought extended to the regional matters that might arise from their 
departure. The most infamous example of this, of course, is the loss of Singapore in 1942, an important port in South-
East Asia defended by British troops while regionally drawn troops from Australia and New Zealand were deployed to 
fight in the Middle East.
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The Suez Crisis
The global changes aside, the Suez crisis in 1956 showcased the change in inter-Commonwealth
defence relations. The crisis severely damaged Commonwealth relations and given its nature this posed
serious questions as to the nature of military relations amongst the Commonwealth as well. The UK's
decisions in the lead-up to the crisis were all quite curious. This is particularly true in relation to the
inception of the plan and the failure to consult the Commonwealth, even on a limited basis, on a matter
of Middle East defence little more than half a decade after the Middle East Defence Conference. It was
hardly five years previously when the strategic importance of the region to the Commonwealth as a
whole was recognized. It had already been accepted across the Commonwealth, and in military and
political circles in the UK, that there was an absolute need to coordinate a combined defensive effort
with allies to safeguard their overlapping strategic interests. It would not be such a leap to imagine that
events  in  the  early  1950s  suggested  the  development  of  a  much  more  inclusive  and  combined
Commonwealth defence effort that might become increasingly dominant in Commonwealth relations. 
Not only was the Commonwealth uninvolved, but such was the reaction to the crisis by the
Commonwealth that it moved Prime Minister Pearson of Canada to comment that it could undermine
the very existence of the Commonwealth.65 The justifications that may have been made for that are of
less importance than the fact that the Commonwealth was not involved in any way prior to the event
taking  place.  The  very  basis  for  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  had  failed  miserably  when
presented with the clear possibility of operating a distinct military initiative in a region which was
decidedly within an area of joint strategic interest to key countries in the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth reaction, in this context, is rather enlightening as to the overall shift in
strategic  priorities  amongst  the  Commonwealth  members  from the  early-  to  mid-1950s.  Whatever
coherence the Commonwealth may have had in terms of strategic planning before the Crisis it was
thoroughly lost in the varied reactions they expressed. There was neither a singular point of objection
as  to  how  the  British  Prime  Minister  Anthony  Eden  handled  the  crisis  nor  anything  remotely
resembling  general  agreement  on  the  basis  on  which  any  of  their  objections  could  be  founded.
Although  there  was  some  consistency amongst  some  Dominions,  the  initial  cross-Commonwealth
reaction  ran  the  gamut.  Indeed  there  were  some  notable  inconsistencies  amongst  various
65 K. Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline, and Future of the British Commonwealth (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p 38
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Commonwealth members. A similar sympathetic reaction to the crisis was shared by Australia and New
Zealand.66 This  contrasted sharply with  the less  amenable  views held by both  India and Ceylon.67
However, that should certainly not be given to imply that there was a uniform reaction amongst the
older Commonwealth members. South Africa's utter disinterest in the affair was as notable as Canada's
comparatively hostile reaction.68 The disunited position of key Commonwealth countries revealed the
fragile  state  of  cross-Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  This  is  especially  important  when
considering  the  cohesion  of  political  will  in  the  Commonwealth  on  a  global  scale  regarding  key
defence issues. The inability of the Commonwealth to cooperate on a single matter in an area which
had  been  previously  recognised  as  a  core  strategic  interest  of  the  Commonwealth  was  a  clear
demonstration of the unreliability of the Commonwealth connection in defence matters.  Further,  it
illustrated the gap that had developed between the realities that the Commonwealth faced in the post-
war era,  internally as well  as externally,  with the strategies that were advanced in Commonwealth
meetings during the early 1950s.
The  outcome  of  the  Suez  crisis  resonated  throughout  British  politics.  The  replacement  of
Anthony Eden by Harold Macmillan was accompanied by a change in thinking with regards to the
developing international situation. Specifically there was a re-evaluation of the British empire and the
accelerated release of overseas British territory in the form of new states, though perhaps not of nations
in the strictly understood meaning of the term.69 Their immediate introduction into the Commonwealth
added unstable and uncertain elements into an international organisation under the guise of securing
them from Communist influences. This was also considered in London to somehow provide for the
66 The Australian reaction, in this regard, was more favourable to the UK than the New Zealand response. Menzies' views, 
as he gave to the Australian parliament prompted a strong retort by the Evatt, then leader of the opposition. See R. 
Menzies, Afternoon Light (Sydney: Cassel, 1967) pp 173-176. The New Zealand reaction, by contrast, although 
politically sympathetic to the British cause, was undermined somewhat by an insistence that the RNZNS ship in the 
region would not be used in support of operations. - Letter from S.G. Holland to Eden 1 November 1956 ADM 114/6097
UKNA
67 Report of the High Commissioner on a conversation with Nehru 31 October 1956 FO 371/12785 UKNA
68 For Canada see M. Fry, 'Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the UN' p 312 in W.R. Louis & R. Owen Suez 1956: 
The Crisis and its Consequences (London: Clarendon Press, 1991). South Africa had washed its hands of the whole 
affair, with the Prime Minister of South Africa J. Stridjom declaring that it would not involve itself in a domestic affair. 
See The Star (Johannesburg) 31 July 1956 (and a subsequent clarification issued the following day in the same paper 1 
August 1956).
69 The majority of imperial British territory was not released under any form of national identity with respect to the people 
involved. In many cases federations were preferred, in the Caribbean, West Africa, and even South-East Asia the release 
of imperial territory was done under a basis of how economically viable these new states would be, and how stable a 
political system could exist in such circumstances. Ultimately, the majority of these federations would fail, but 
regardless, the 'nation' was not the primary tool of division for the release of imperial territory during the decolonisation 
process.
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maintenance of the British sphere of influence in those countries.
UK strategic doctrine
The third primary element of this chapter addresses the changed strategic priorities in the UK.
This change was accompanied by a reduction in military spending and capabilities.70 This included a
short-lived,  and unsuccessful,  attempt  to  rely primarily  on  the  influence  and power  of  the  British
nuclear arsenal in the late 1950s to early 1960s with a corresponding reduction in the number and
location of deployments by the British armed forces overseas.71
This was in spite of a recognition that the primary draw on military resources at the time was
conventional in nature, and that a 'disproportionate effort' was being expended in the pursuit of these
nuclear  weapons.  The UK, while  subjected to  such a  huge draw on its  military forces  voluntarily
undertook a massive expenditure in the pursuit of ensuring that there were 'further concrete examples
of interdependence' with the US.72 Cuts to the conventional sections of the UK's armed forces were
already in motion and the reductions it was subjected to were given more energy by the Suez crisis,
rather than being a directly attributable outcome of it.73 Indeed there were serious and ongoing concerns
about the capability of the Royal Navy to continue to perform its function even before the Suez Crisis.74
In the aftermath of Suez with the proposed £325 million budget of the Royal Navy it was thought to
70 Report on Defence Expenditure 1956, Memorandum by the Admiralty December 1956 AIR 19 Box 34
71 In actuality the British armed forces found that, in order to ensure the safety of deployed tactical weapons more 
conventional support was required, not less. - COS(60)175 Annex C 11th January 1961 DEFE 7/2231 UKNA. It was 
noted that approximately '100 megaton weapons for strategic use and at least 1,500 tactical weapons for defensive 
purposes.' This was considered purely aspirational given the uncertainty of developing a British nuclear weapon, and 
indeed ensuring adequate fissile material for said development. The attraction and potential of these weapons to perform 
that function, however, was established. - CAB 131 'Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet: Fissile Material for Nuclear 
Weapons – Defence Committee 30 May. It should be noted that the 100 megaton weapons at the time of this note was in 
reference to the Skybolt which the British Minister of Defence (Watkinson) would later outline to his American 
counterpart (McNamara) in 1962 that the final figure would number 'over 100'. - Record of Meeting between H. 
Watkinson, and R. McNamara, 1 May 1962 DEFE7 UKNA. Indeed there were ongoing concerns that the UK would be 
unable to respond convincingly to more than one active limited war scenario at a time. - Annex to COS(63)384 DO 
169/269 UKNA.
72 Specifically 'In discussion [at this meeting] there was general support for collaboration with the US on these lines 
[referring to cooperation in nuclear weapons development – and with immediate reference to Blue Streak and Thor] 
which would constitute a further concrete example of interdependence.' It goes on to comment that '...a detailed 
assessment should be made of the financial savings which could be obtained if Blue Streak was not developed as an 
operational weapon, taking account of the cancellation charges' with the implication given throughout that although the 
need for the weapon was relatively minor operationally under current demands it was a necessary tool to possess, and 
that possession should be independent but if possible offset through direct cooperation or purchase with or from the US. 
- Cabinet Conclusions CAB 131 D(58)15 UKNA
73 The British had explained that the cuts were necessary as 'if the forces were not reduced, the defence expenditure would 
have risen steeply, particularly in the view of the sharp increase in the cost of new weapons.' As such, while the Suez 
crisis may have highlighted the issues involved it did not create them. - General Staff Intelligence Committee no. 42/57 
Part IV 22 November 1957  MV208 SANDFA
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seriously endanger its core functions.75 This move towards a reduction of British military capability and
a strategic shift did not bode well for Commonwealth defence cooperation. It limited its conventional
forces to such a degree that any cooperation could pose additional untenable commitments.
This period of uncertainty and transition in UK defence policy influenced the development of
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  The  two  aforementioned  developments  alone  would  have  a
profound and lasting effect on Commonwealth relations. Indeed, this ultimately laid the foundation for
the split in the style and manner of defence cooperation undertaken amongst the Commonwealth in the
decades thereafter. The particulars of this period of transition merit some consideration. The abortive
endeavours  to  reorient  the UK's armed forces to  a  nuclear  basis  were mostly driven by economic
concerns.76 This  economic impetus  to  favour  the development  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons to  the
detriment to the conventional forces was used as a bargaining tactic in debates over the allocation of
defence expenditure in the UK.77 The reduction and consolidation of British deployments at a global
strategic level continued throughout the mid- to  late-1950s.  This was not  the same at the regional
strategic level where the development of nuclear weapons had long since threatened the continuation of
central  and heavily fortified bases.  The effect  was a  consolidated  global  approach with individual
74 There were even concerns that, with this level of reduction, it would not be possible to perform the supposedly intended 
function of the Fleet during the Cold War, which was to fight 'Limited Wars' as defined by COS(56)219 in June 1956 
following a subsequent review of the Suez Crisis in late 1956.  - 1956 Memorandum by the Admiralty Point 31 AIR 19 
UKNA. It was noted that 'Musketeer [British codename for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt] has now given us a 
yardstick by which to measure our forces.' and the post COS(56)280 proposals would result in a Fleet which would be 
found sorely wanting in any similar future engagement.
75 Cuts had been considered by the Admiralty even prior to the Suez crisis, with COS(56)280 in late July establishing the 
need for the Royal Navy to reduce itself to an order of four carriers, eight cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers, forty-nine 
frigates, and thirty-nine submarines. After the Suez crisis these were reduced even further, to three carriers, three 
cruisers, twenty-four destroyers, thirty-seven frigates, and twenty-six submarines. The reaction from the First Sea Lord 
in a letter to the Minister of Defence regarding these cuts was predictable and in the aftermath of the Suez quite blunt. In
it he said that 'it is interesting to note that … in an operation against a fifth rate power, we [the Royal Navy] had to 
deploy three operational carriers... and three non-operational carriers for use as fast transports'. The implication was 
clear: the government needed to reverse its cuts, or be faced with a situation where it would no longer be able to mount 
such operations even in conjunction with the an allied power, like the French. - Letter from Louis Mountbatten [First Sea
Lord 1955-59] to Sir Walter Monckton [Minister of Defence 1955-56] Point IV December 1956 AIR 19 UKNA
76 The Chancellor of the Exchequer had sought the reduction of £100 million in the 1964-65 year, with an immediate halt 
to discussions regarding the construction of 'another carrier' and 'work/services' at Aden. He also cited that 'we have long
ago decided that in war we should fight with Allies or not at all' as the basis for the reductions and that there was a 
discrepancy between what was being calculated for in the estimates and not the commitments 'implicit in the political 
assumption [of Government that] … we shall not require to maintain bases in Aden and Singapore, or mount assault 
operations single-handed East of Suez and that the defence budget in that year will not be allowed to exceed 7 per cent 
of the GNP'. - Minute for the Prime Minister 'Future Defence Policy D(63) 23 & 24' 9 July 1963 PREM11 UKNA
77 See specifically commentary that the 'successive Defence White Papers … [the] Americans and Canadians'  had 
indicated 'the need to build up, under present day strategy, a substantial contribution to the nuclear deterrent of the West 
at the expense of conventional forces' - Policy Review: Paper by the Admiralty 1956 AIR 19 UKNA
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concentrations subject to region-wide dispersal of defence efforts.
By  the  turn  of  the  decade  the  UK  had,  in  effect,  retreated  to  three  cores  in  which  they
concentrated the majority of their armed forces. Their primary theatre included Europe and was focused
on the British Isles and British forces deployed to Germany, particularly the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR). In discussions with the US it was made clear that their ongoing contribution here could only
be  seen  in  relation  to  the  British  contribution  to  'the  defence  of  the  Free  World  East  of  Aden'. 78
Commonwealth involvement here was limited, and even then conducted largely under the auspices of
the US and NATO. A second primary theatre covered the volatile Middle East, and was built around a
number of bases scattered throughout the region. The most important of these was Cyprus,  which
included storage depots for nuclear weapons. By the mid-1950s the Middle East was no longer even
notionally  supported  by  the  promise  of  Commonwealth  reinforcements.  Finally  South-East  Asia
featured prominently in overall defence planning which, despite the distance and supposed primacy of
the Middle East  in any global conflict  saw the largest deployment  of British troops and advanced
weaponry  outside  of  Europe.79 It  was  also  the  recipient  of  major  airfield  upgrade  works  of
approximately 3 million pounds Sterling at RAF Tengah.80 This amount was allocated in order for it to
be  expanded  to  store  nuclear  weapons  and  allow  Vulcan  bombers  to  take-off  and  land  there.81
Undoubtedly the tensions in South-East Asia were a contributing factor to this development but there
remained the underlying issue that despite the advanced strategic plans of the Commonwealth for the
Middle  East  in  the  early  1950s,  events  and  circumstances  would  conspire  to  see  successful
Commonwealth  military  initiatives  in  South-East  Asia,  and  British  deployments  were  altered
accordingly.
78 Record of Meeting between H. Watkinson, and R. McNamara, point 2 1 May 1962 DEFE7 UKNA
79 It should be noted that South-East Asia was not immune to defence cuts and force reductions. However, in South-East 
Asia during the 1960s these would most often take the form of consolidation of existing forces with battalions and 
companies being exchanged within the region and only superfluous headquarters and signal squadrons being disbanded 
or returning to the UK. - Annexure 1 to Appendix B to Annex of COS(60)276 1st April 1961 DEFE 7/2232 UKNA. Also 
see Annex C to COS(60)276 1st April 1961 DEFE 7/2232 UKNA
80 This would also include the deployment of the Bloodhound MkII air defence system, which was designed to protect the 
airfield from the latest Soviet bombers. -Annex C to COS(60)276 1st April 1961 DEFE 7/2232 UKNA
81 Questions were raised regarding the political objections to a British nuclear bomb store at RAF Tengah and the 
possibility of British nuclear weapons in the region being based out of their remaining aircraft carrier(s) instead. These 
objections and alternatives were eventually overcome.  Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the 
Defence Committee: The deployment of V bombers with nuclear capabilities in the Far East 19 February 1958 CAB 131
UKNA To accommodate the Vulcan bombers the runway had to be expanded to 9,000 feet and a 'special nuclear bomb 
store' had to be built. Memorandum by the Minister of Defence for the Defence Committee: The Deployment of V 
Bombers with Nuclear Capabilities in the Far East 14 February 1958 CAB 131 UKNA
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There are two key points regarding British Commonwealth defence cooperation in these three
centres of importance that are worthy of consideration. The first is that British strategic doctrine sought
to consolidate strategic capabilities on a regional basis. Additionally, anything that might arguably be
considered a 'Commonwealth military initiative', was built around these regional structures. The second
is that as the strategic basis of British deployments and strategies shifted to this regional basis, the
disinterest between Commonwealth countries and any particular region grew. This was already seen in
the early 1950s with the reluctance of the Canadian government to involve itself in the Middle East
Defence  Conference  on  the  basis  that  it  was  not  of  strategic  interest  to  Canada.  Herein  lies  the
important  point  of  this  selective  and  restrictive  process  of  self-confinement  of  strategic  priorities
amongst the Commonwealth after 1947: a distant regional endeavour held little to no interest  to a
comparatively weak power on the other side of the world. However, a regional endeavour which did
meet such regional prerequisites was much more likely to be viewed with interest. Although this did
not guarantee support it resulted in a steady growth of political will towards localized/regional defence.
The pull towards this growth was felt in the UK as well. Although it would take until 1972 to manifest
fully the steady withdrawal from a global basis of deployment to a much more restricted and localized
effort had well and truly begun by 1957.
The strategic reorientation from a global to a regional perspective across the Commonwealth
both  led  and followed by the  UK left  the  Commonwealth  in  a  particularly good position  to  take
advantage of any new countries granted independence from the British Empire. It established a ready
framework of strategic interest into which new states could find natural positions and roles. Indeed, this
is precisely what happened in South-East Asia with respect to Malaysia.82
Harold  Macmillan's  speech  in  South  Africa  in  1960  marked  a  crucial  turning  point  in  the
development of Commonwealth affairs. His speech referred to the 'Winds of Change' and a new British
policy in favour of the relatively rapid and peaceful release of territory from the British Empire to new
independent states under the aegis of the Commonwealth.  The measured withdrawal from imperial
territory on reasonably agreeable terms, in order to avoid a forced ejection, was perhaps one of the
most  iconic  moments  in  British  decolonisation.  Although  certain  upsets  and  failures  were  all  but
82 South-East Asia is the only region which involved new members of the Commonwealth in Commonwealth defence 
cooperation, first through the two forms of the AMDA, and subsequently through the expanded membership, albeit with 
more limited terms of reference, of the FPDA.
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inevitable the general success of the implementation of the British decolonisation “plan” was not met
with the same level of success in terms of the UK's goals for the Commonwealth, and certainly did
nothing to encourage or facilitate Commonwealth defence cooperation. 
The structure of the Commonwealth
The informal power-structure and organisation of the Commonwealth was not a system which
held up particularly well to the expansion of its membership. Although suggestions of formalisation of
relations in the Commonwealth had been aired before they had met with little success. The largely
homogeneous  culture,  similar  decision-making  systems  and  practices  had  established  the
Commonwealth as a reasonably well-organized international community with understood mores and
procedures. The Commonwealth was tied together through cooperation in civil, scientific, and military
matters starting as early as the turn of the century and kept largely so through a continued cross-
pollination of people. The dominance of the UK in the Commonwealth structure had been accepted and
questioned in equal measure.  The inconsistencies in that relationship were not,  in the main,  found
uncomfortable.  The understanding reached at  the Middle East  Defence Conference and during the
Korean  War  with  respect  to  the  1st Commonwealth  Division  were  highlights,  though  far  from
unblemished, of the continuation of prior cooperation. It was a close and engaged community that had
not yet grown to the point where any official sort of organisation, outside of the most very basic, was
necessary.
It  was  this  simple  structure  that  was  strained  by expansion.  That  expansion  prompted  the
Commonwealth to adopt a different organisational method. Such an informal and collegiate approach
to an international organisation was only possible in the circumstances in which the Commonwealth
was originally established. If  the organisation was to  do anything of substance with so many new
members it needed to be reformed. Indeed such reform had been advocated for, and rejected, in the
past. The demands that the policy behind the Winds of Change speech made and the circumstances of
the time obliged a short time scale in which to complete the release of territory from the British Empire
than had originally been envisaged.83 The resulting rapid growth of the Commonwealth manifested a
83 In 1947 the time for independence, if it were possible, of Central and East Africa was considered to be measured in 
'generations' rather than 'years'. Some commentary has suggested that this is due to the background of the people who, 
having served in a 'different type of Africa' were now in senior positions throughout the Colonial Office. -  Cell J., 'On 
the Eve of Decolonisation: The Colonial Office's plans for the Transfer of Power in Africa 1947' Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History Issue 8 Volume 3 p 254
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significantly different style of organisation that was, in almost every respect, at odds with the previous
iteration. The prospect of a repeat of the Middle East Defence Conference from the 1960s onwards,
which  would  have  been  reasonable  given  the  drastic  changes  in  the  geopolitical  landscape  in
subsequent decades and the shifts in military thought globally, were remote.
In some aspects the developments of  the particulars  of this  new Commonwealth are  rather
obvious. Although the launch of a Secretariat did not happen for some time there was a clear desire
amongst the new members to reorganize a system of communication amongst the Commonwealth.
Prior Commonwealth discussions had arrived at the conclusion that institutions like a Secretariat were
not needed and might even be counter-productive.84 The change in the Commonwealth's membership
struck down that argument at a fundamental level. Indeed, the composition of the Commonwealth as it
grew larger  brought  about  a  significantly different  political  outlook.  That  outlook was focused on
internal development, and organisation and the progress of its members, rather than primarily existing
as a convenient political vehicle of cooperation and solidarity.
The problems that this posed for the original Commonwealth members do not appear to have
been immediately clear to their respective political and civil establishments. If they were, then they
were pointedly ignored or dismissed. The introduction of new members of the Commonwealth, coupled
with the global, rather than regional, nature of its membership flew in the face of prior Commonwealth
defence cooperation. The global perspective and defensive arrangements that were a hallmark of early
1950s planning had, by the early 1960s, transformed into regional clusters of interest. Any proposed
return to a more global perspective was complicated by contemporary military thought and the series of
technological developments, especially in strategic weapon systems favoured by the UK and the US. A
repeat of the 1st Commonwealth Division, or a similar Commonwealth formation, was not well suited
to the environment in the 1960s either.85 A lack of compelling local reasons for the creation of such a
84 B. Vivekanandan 'The Commonwealth Secretariat' International Studies 9 (1967) p 302
85 Even in the field of regionally-based cooperation there were underlying tensions in the Commonwealth with respect to 
defence cooperation. A particularly unproductive meeting between South African and British representatives in 1957 
regarding the joint defence of the High Commission territories and the Union of South Africa demonstrated the fragile 
nature of Commonwealth defence cooperation even prior to South Africa's break with the Commonwealth in 1961. The 
UK, having declined to allow the transfer of the High Commission territories to the Union subsequently declined to 
involve the Union in the defence of the territories because 'the security of the territories [was] vested exclusively with 
the UK government'. A position which caused 'surprise and regret' on the South African side of the table. - 'Minutes of 
the Discussion between the Minister of Defence of the Union of South Africa and the High Commissioner for the UK at 
Pretoria 28 October 1957 MV 207/151 Samesprekings Minister en Sir P. Liesching SANDFA
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formation, in conjunction with international circumstances, largely prevented any such project from
arising, even if it had been desired.
Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech, and the implementation of the policy which followed,
heralded the beginning of the end of Commonwealth defence cooperation as it had been envisaged and
acted  upon  for  the  past  half-century.  The  expansion  of  the  Commonwealth  complicated  intra-
Commonwealth relations, and the original members of the Commonwealth were not exempt from these
shock waves. Although it affected Canada and South Africa more so than the Australia, New Zealand,
or the UK the circumstances under which this expansion was carried out hindered the continuation and
inclusion of the new Commonwealth states  in  matters of defence.  Such cooperation did not  cease
immediately and in one case continued until 1972.86 Although the expansion of the Commonwealth was
not a single event but one which continued over several years with the majority in the early to mid
1960s the situation in the Commonwealth before and after the period of expansion caused irrevocable
change. This change was not amenable to a continuation of defence cooperation in the Commonwealth
structure.  This change ultimately had a dramatic effect on the development of the Commonwealth,
although  one  lacking  the  immediate  force  of  the  Suez  crisis.  It  caused  a  divergence  in  the  trend
established in the preceding years regarding how multinational defence arrangements were organized.
Conclusion
Starting from a high point of cooperation in 1951 the Commonwealth was not in a position to
replicate such ventures by the end of the 1950s. It was a task which was not to become any easier over
the  course  of  the  next  decade.  The  ever-present  and  increasingly  irresistible,  if  sometimes  fluid,
international  circumstances  were  ultimately  compounded  by  the  Commonwealth's  response  to
international events and, in particular, to the British handling of the Suez crisis. The shift from global to
regional strategic thinking, both in the Commonwealth and elsewhere, was difficult to express in terms
of pan-Commonwealth defence  cooperation.  The combination  of  these factors  were catalysed  in  a
speech in South Africa by Harold Macmillan that set in motion a train of events and a policy which
forever  altered  the  fundamental  make-up  of  the  Commonwealth.  This  altered  composition  of  the
Commonwealth proved not to be conducive to the continuation of a tradition of, in the main, well-
86 Despite a number of name changes and adjustments, a joint Anglo-Australian-New Zealand existed right through until 
1972. First in the form of the 1st Commonwealth Division, then the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, before finally being 
renamed to the 28th ANZUK Brigade, with no real change in procedure. It was essentially the exact same thing, just with 
a name change. See the following chapters for more detail.
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received Commonwealth military cooperation. 
There are three key elements in this declining cohesion amongst the Commonwealth that are
important to future developments and, certainly, integral to the over-arching argument made in this
thesis. First, it must be recognized that the early 1950s demonstrated key successes in Commonwealth
defence cooperation, particularly with the 1st Commonwealth Division in Korea, but also in the effort to
ensure  that  the  Commonwealth  continued  to  perform  some  measure  of  common  strategic  effort.
Second,  the  period  demonstrated  the  structural  weakness  in  the  Commonwealth  system  as  an
international body and its unsuitability in ensuring that military cooperation could continue through it
after expansion. Finally, British strategic policies, both military and those related to the maintenance of
its Empire, created a maelstrom of uncertainty that undermined potential future defence cooperation. It
signalled an approach to the expansion of the Commonwealth and the dissolution of the Empire that did
not account for how Commonwealth defence cooperation might continue during and after expansion. 
Indeed the clear and organized structure which the Commonwealth sought to implement during
its expansion was not a process which was replicated in military affairs. Instead such endeavours were
left unregulated and were adopted in specific regions in specific circumstances without much thought
as to the possibility of the broader inclusion of the Commonwealth more generally. The specifics of this
will be addressed in due course, but the absence of any method to cater for the continuation of military
cooperation alongside the political and economic cooperative endeavours during the 1950s is especially
notable.  As  such,  this  chapter  argues  that  the  key  underlying  causes  that  hindered  future
Commonwealth defence cooperation were hinted at even in the earliest stages of the the process of
expanding the Commonwealth.
These  three  points  outline  the  situation  which  the  Commonwealth,  particularly the  original
Dominions, found itself at the beginning of the 1960s. The change that occurred in the Commonwealth
between 1950 and 1961 was quite profound. Early demonstrations of a continuing capability to adapt
and organize had fallen flat following political mishandling and an increasingly difficult geopolitical
situation  that  left  little  in  the  way of  support  for  the  continuation  of  pan-Commonwealth  defence
cooperation.  The  effect  of  this  expansion  was  not  limited  to  the  reduced  possibility  of  defence
cooperation.  Underlying  issues  which  had  originally  been  previously  ignored  or  deemed  counter-
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productive (such as the Secretariat) by the Commonwealth were brought under increasing scrutiny with
its expansion and this presented serious consequences for the Commonwealth as these new institutions
became shaped in a volatile environment.
Ultimately  what  developed  over  the  course  of  the  1950s  was  a  growing  acceptance  and
preference for regional defence arrangements that were significantly different to previously established
joint  Commonwealth  military  thought  and  strategy.  This  shift  flourished  into  a  series  of  regional
multilateral arrangements in which the Commonwealth held a subsidiary role specifically engineered to
incorporate new members and help ensure US assistance. A mishandling of international politics by the
UK in the Middle East, an area which was recognized as a key Commonwealth region in 1950, during
the Suez Crisis not only undermined the Commonwealth connection at a particularly vulnerable time
but also prompted a nationally-based British retreat  and consolidation in a manner which was not
conducive to greater Commonwealth defence cooperation. 
Although  these  changes  altered  how  each  of  the  existing  members  interacted  with  the
Commonwealth as  a  whole,  it  had far  more  specific  and significant  consequences  individually on
Canada and South Africa. Two very different outcomes to the changing Commonwealth situation in the
1960s could not have been better  expressed than in the changes we see in the role that these two
Dominions play in Commonwealth affairs more generally.
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Chapter three: Canada and South Africa in the Commonwealth, 1960-1971
Introduction
This  chapter  analyses  the  reluctance  in  Canada  and  South  Africa  to  be  involved  in
Commonwealth defence cooperation. It points to the growing interest in peacekeeping operations in the
Canadian  political  establishment,  as  well  increased  cooperation  with  the  US.  It  examines  the
Commonwealth reaction to South Africa's racial policies, particularly as it affected issues of defence
cooperation. Finally it explores the dawn of the new larger Commonwealth and the implications that it
held  for  the  structure  of  the  Commonwealth.  It  frames  these  developments  in  the  context  of  an
increasingly unstable Commonwealth defence cooperation. It argues that Canadian and South African
involvement in Commonwealth defence cooperation was influenced by the international context and
their own internal desires – and that even these were the product of prevailing international thought on
how  defence  cooperation  should  function.  Furthermore,  it  points  to  a  significant  change  in  the
functioning  of  the  Commonwealth  in  that  it  became  a  vehicle  for  internal  censure  and  that  this
effectively established the basis for the future manifestation of Commonwealth defence cooperation
through the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force deployed to Rhodesia in 1981. This argument
is  explored  in  the  chapter  through  an  examination  of  Canadian  military  policies,  objectives,  and
thoughts on cooperation with the Commonwealth and the US. It delves into the Commonwealth and
UN response to  South Africa's  apartheid policy,  and particularly the reaction and effect  it  had on
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  –  with  corresponding implications  for  South  Africa's  defence
industry. Finally, the chapter concludes by noting the changes to the procedures and methods of the
Commonwealth as a result of its expanded membership. 
The difficulties in analysing the period between 1960 and 1972 with respect to Commonwealth
cooperation, even when limited to key countries of the Commonwealth, are compounded by a number
of wide-ranging issues that were largely not significantly present in earlier decades. The growth of the
Commonwealth  over  such  a  short  period  of  time  and  the  increase  in  the  number  of  factors  and
circumstances which must be considered is also problematic. This chapter details the rise of the New
Commonwealth and the challenges this posed to Canada and South Africa. The split between the two
sides has been made here to distinguish between a clear and distinct departure from past trends, as we
see  in  Canada  and  South  Africa,  and  what  effectively  amounts  to  a  continuation  of  pre-existing
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structures and strategies amongst Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. In essence although this chapter
and the following one deal with the same time period and the same subject matter – the implications of
the rise of the New Commonwealth on defence cooperation – the division is drawn between the two on
the basis of outcome. Whereas for South Africa and Canada that outcome was to see a turn away from
further Commonwealth interaction on a multilateral military basis the same was not true for Australia,
New Zealand and the UK. The introduction of new members to the Commonwealth was not the sole
reason for this break but contributed to the impetus for an already growing divergence. 
The increasingly hostile reaction to the apartheid policies in South Africa by the National Party
government  fundamentally  undermined  South  Africa's  relationship  with  other  members  of  the
Commonwealth. In Canada the pursuit of its own interests did not always coincide with that of the
other members of the Commonwealth. Although Australia, New Zealand, and the UK were far from
unaffected by these developments such rapid change in the Commonwealth built on already uncertain
views held by South African and Canadian policy-makers on value and purpose of Commonwealth
membership. The striking withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1960 and
the realignment  of  Canadian  military interests  away from previously held  Commonwealth defence
interests throughout the 1960s are particularly distinctive. Neither Canada nor South Africa managed to
retain much, if any, semblance of previous Commonwealth commitments as a result of these changes.
This  decade  marked a  crucial  point  in  the  overall  development  in  Commonwealth  military
cooperation.  New  members  to  the  organisation  were  continually  added  after  1957,  resulting  in  a
substantial growth of the Commonwealth during the 1960s. Central to the course of developments is
the concept that the changing nature of the Commonwealth – brought on by the rapid expansion of its
membership – limited the ability of the Commonwealth to continue its pre-existing style of military
cooperation.  Although  it  was  subsequently  transformed  into  something  quite  different  it  was  the
immediate effect of the expansion of the Commonwealth during the 1960s had on Canada and South
Africa that must be addressed. Once the dust had settled at the end of the decade these two countries
were  placed  in  significantly  different  political  positions  with  respect  to  Commonwealth  military
cooperation. South Africa was almost invariably at odds with any kind of Commonwealth endeavour,
and often the subject of the ire of many new Commonwealth countries. Although some links continued
throughout the decade, particularly in the realm of military cooperation with the UK, any lingering
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possibility of a continuation of South Africa - Commonwealth defence cooperation more generally –
irrespective  of  what  form  such  cooperation  would  take  –  was  ended  by  1961.  Canada  fared
significantly better. It may not have been at odds with the new states but its interests became more
insular and focused on the pursuit of its own objectives independent of the Commonwealth. It is worth
noting  that  Canadian  policy  distinguished  between  the  opportunity  that  the  expansion  of  the
Commonwealth  presented,  and the  risk  posed to  that  opportunity by the  existing  members  of  the
Commonwealth. This distinction was effectively overtaken by events, as the UN and Canadian interest
in peace-keeping and global cooperation had became of interest to Canadian policy-makers from 1957.1
Indeed,  such  activity  dominated  Canadian  strategic  interests  throughout  the  1960s.  Crucially  it
advanced its interests in that field with limited regard to its existing Commonwealth connections.
If  the  cause  of  the  divergent  directions  these  two  countries  took  during  this  period  were
relatively similar,  their  ultimate expression was quite different.  Canadian views on military affairs,
particularly multinational ones, must always be assessed in relation to US strategic interests. Further,
the growth in non-conflict military activities saw strong Canadian participation and interest throughout
this decade and resulted in significant growth thereafter. The South African situation stood in stark
contrast  to  the  greater  focus  placed  on  multinational  initiatives  taken  by Canada.  The  increasing
difficulties South Africa faced in, and after 1961 from, the Commonwealth resulted in an estrangement
from Commonwealth military cooperation. As membership of the Commonwealth grew (largely as the
result  of  the  introduction  of  new African  and  Asian  states),  and  South  Africa's  domestic  policies
became  the  subject  of  heightened  international  attention,  there  was  a  corresponding  surge  in  the
development  of  a  local,  distinctive,  and successful  domestic  arms  industry in  South  Africa  which
included research and development of many technologies.2 Although the particulars of this  will  be
covered in far greater detail elsewhere it is this unintended consequence of South Africa's pariah-like
status in the international community, and its ejection from the Commonwealth, that form much of the
crucial points of interest in South Africa's history in military cooperation with the Commonwealth. The
continuation of Commonwealth military activity which involved South Africa, although significantly
reduced, created a scenario where Commonwealth military relations attracted political condemnation
1 For more detail on Canadian attitudes to the expansion of the Commonwealth see H. MacKenzie, 'An Old Dominion and
the New Commonwealth: Canadian Policy on the Question of India's Membership 1947-49' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 27 (1999) p 104
2 P. Batchelor, 'South Africa's Arms Industry: Prospects for Conversion' p 98 in J. Cock & P. McKenzie From Defence to 
Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa (Claremont: David Phillip Publishers, 1998)
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from within the Commonwealth.
This condemnation was conducted hand-in-hand with a root and branch reform of the political
structure of the Commonwealth. The existing Commonwealth political system had a troublesome time
adjusting to the influx of new members, and was subject to a number of major changes throughout the
decade. These changes were not only conducted in older structures such as the Colonial and Dominion
Offices  in  the  UK,  but  included  structural  and  political  changes  within  the  Commonwealth
organisation. These changes were not always permanent but specific to discussions on an ad-hoc basis
that characterised the uncertainty and elastic nature of Commonwealth procedures during the period.3
Such significant  change in  the  Commonwealth  is  as  notable  as  the  distinct  absence  of  change  in
comparable military circles. The growth of internal Commonwealth institutions, the expansion of the
membership of the Commonwealth, and the relatively static membership of Commonwealth military
activities was quite a departure from the displays of military cooperation that occurred in the previous
decade when the Commonwealth had last expanded. 
Crucial  to  events  and  developments  throughout  the  1960s  are  three  key  aspects:  first  a
politically developing Commonwealth, second the growth of peace-keeping style operations and US-
influence in joint military initiatives, and third the continuation of Commonwealth military cooperation
that did not generally involve the new Commonwealth countries. Together these can form a triad of
elements through which developments in Canada and South Africa can be considered.
The overarching story in the development of Commonwealth defence relations hinges on the
events  and  circumstances  that  emerged  from the  changing  membership  of  the  Commonwealth,  in
particular the style of interaction that dominated relations amongst those members between 1960 and
1971. The position of Commonwealth military cooperation in 1960 was not particularly good. Despite
initial successes at the start of the 1950s there were a series of serious setbacks by the middle of the
1950s as discussed in the previous chapter. By 1959 any hope that there might be some growth of
3 These difficulties came to a fore in May 1960. The Australian Secretary of External Affairs wrote a personal note 
detailing some of the oddities and novel introductions that were being introduced into the Commonwealth relationship 
and its discussions. In it he notes how discussions were facilitated 'outside the Conference in a nearby room (upstairs at 
No. 10 [Downing St.]) in order to discuss apartheid with him [Mr. Louw].' This was conducted without officials and 
restricted solely to Prime Ministers and other heads of government. It's indicative of not only the sensitive nature of 
discussions but also the effort that was expended in ensuring that discussion – where it needed to occur – did in spite of 
growing difficulties and divergence of views within the Commonwealth. - Prime Ministers Conference May 1960 – 
Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 'The Future Commonwealth Relationship' A5954 box 1799 ANA
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Commonwealth military cooperation was exceptionally optimistic. The limited efforts that succeeded
throughout the 1960s were quashed by the Singapore Declaration in 1971. Subsequent developments
almost a decade later altered that position and allowed for such cooperation to exist, albeit in a very
different form. One of the critical factors which remained at the heart of such uncertainty throughout
the 1960s was the expanding membership of the Commonwealth. This chapter deals extensively with
the various changes in circumstances, specific to the affected countries, internationally,  and indeed
specific  to  the  Commonwealth,  that  influenced  the  progress  of  Commonwealth  military  relations
between 1960 and 1972. 
The issues faced by Canada and South Africa during the 1960s represent an obvious point at
which it could be said that the military connection between them and the rest of the Commonwealth
came under stress. However, both countries had issues with Commonwealth defence cooperation that
predated  these  new  developments.  It  is  important  to  note  that  enthusiasm  for  Commonwealth
cooperation was quite limited in South Africa and Canada. Indeed Canada had held itself apart from
any particularly Commonwealth  defence  agreement  or  arrangement  since 1959.  Furthermore,  local
strategic  concerns  in  the  North  Atlantic  and  Pacific  and  southern  Africa  did  not  have  the  same
concentration of Commonwealth interests as were found in South-East Asia. Although both the North
Atlantic  and southern  Africa  were of  importance  to  the  UK there  were few other  Commonwealth
interests in either area. The bilateral engagement that can be seen in southern Africa between the UK
and South Africa was mirrored in multinational arrangements that involved both the UK and Canada in
the North Atlantic. Given this lack of regional concentration of Commonwealth-specific interests it is
understandable that there was no comparable development of Commonwealth defence arrangements to
that which would occur in South-East Asia. In effect the retreat to a regional basis of organisation in the
1960s produced a situation where the relationship amongst the five Commonwealth members which
had originally held together in a strong military relationship since the turn of the century was being
steadily eroded – and ultimately ended with respect to South Africa.
Canada and peacekeeping operations
The details of the approach Canada took to Commonwealth military activity over the previous
twenty years and in the preceding decade are worthy of comment. Although the Canadian government
recognised the need and importance of a conference on defence regarding the Middle East they were
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equally clear that, irrespective of the participating Commonwealth members, they would refrain from
engaging in such endeavours that committed them to a region that lacked a clear Canadian interest.4
The Canadian approach to military affairs between 1960 and 1972 followed a largely coherent trend in
Canadian defence policy that had been slowly developed from the immediate post-war period. The new
strategic situation which saw the US at odds with the USSR placed Canada immediately between the
two in a strategically critical  location. This folded neatly into an ongoing defence relationship that
blossomed during the late 1940s and continued, largely unabated,  thereafter.  There also existed an
increasing Canadian interest in international peace-keeping activities that developed in parallel to this
American-Canadian defence relationship. This new expression of military might, led in many respects
by Canadians, in conjunction with an established trend of Canada pushing for structural reform in the
Commonwealth placed Canada in a prime position to take advantage of the new political landscape. It
is  important  to  note  that  although  there  had  been  a  general  trend  of  discomfort  with  the  Old
Commonwealth,  particularly  with  respect  to  its  military  activities,  there  was  a  continuation  of
involvement.  From 1960 onwards this  discomfort had evolved and spread.5 The previously normal
interaction amongst the Commonwealth in military activities was not extended to the vast majority of
new Commonwealth countries. Instead such cooperation and coordination would now predominantly
take  the  form  of  sharing  non-military  scientific  and  technological  research,  in  conjunction  with
technical aid.6
The circumstances particular to Canada's situation forced a certain degree of split identity in
Canadian military policy during the period. Certainly Canada's geopolitical situation placed it between
two competing global powers, the US and the USSR. This had an understandable effect on Canadian
strategic  priorities  and  further  reinforced  the  desire  to  acquire  US  support  through  cooperation,
particularly in matters of defence. Their non-involvement at the 1951 Conference noted the Pacific as a
key area of interest to Canada while the Arctic and the North Atlantic were clearly both of apparent
4 Memorandum for Mr. Robertson Annex to Proposed Commonwealth Defence Conference 'Proposed Agenda for 
Commonwealth Defence Ministers' 20 February 1951 RG 25 Volume 247 File D-19-15 LAC
5 Perhaps this could even extend back as far 1956, although this would imply some form of connection between the 
Canadian commitment to the shift away from the Commonwealth and the failure of the British and their allies at Suez. It
is more likely, it has been contended here and throughout, that the immediate effects of the Suez crisis has been over-
estimated and, in fact, that its full force was not wholly felt across the Commonwealth, including the Canadian reaction, 
until 1960 whereupon the UK began a more rapid decolonisation programme than had previously been envisioned.
6 Notably much of this aid would take the form of ongoing work in the Colonial Office, which included a variety of more 
mundane statistics and national planning, although the extent to which these would be followed-up was limited. - Ittman 
K 'The Colonial Office and the Population Question in the British Empire 1918-62' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History Issue 27 (1999) Volume 3 p 74
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concern. Neither of these were of interest to the rest of the Commonwealth with the exception of the
UK, and both countries were involved in US-led regional arrangements: NATO in the North Atlantic
and  a  series  of  Arctic  air  defence  warning  systems  in  the  Arctic.  The  reorientation  from a  pan-
Commonwealth strategic interest to a much more localized one must hardly have been unexpected.
What is perhaps more noteworthy is that Canada was quite clearly and obviously the first amongst the
Old Commonwealth to prioritize its own local defence on a regional basis by several years. This early
prioritization resulted in a quickly completed effective retreat from around the globe. Canadian support
during the Confrontation in Malaysia and later conflicts was decidedly light.7 There was a persistent
and enduring refusal to engage in overt Commonwealth military matters that were restricted to the Old
Commonwealth. To some degree this can be explained by their more perilous geopolitical situation in
which they acted, effectively, as a de facto buffer state between the US and the USSR. The shift away
from the Commonwealth cannot be entirely explained by this strategic reorientation, or even by the
increased level of US influence in Canadian military affairs. Some analysis is required of Canadian
military  interests  outside  of  traditional  military  endeavours.  Peace-keeping  operations  had  grown
rapidly from the Suez crisis onwards, with Canadian deployments to the Congo in 1960, West New
Guinea in 1962, Cyprus in 1964, and several more after 1971.8 There had developed in the highest
levels of political office in Canada a belief that the Canadian military should involve itself in peace-
keeping affairs. Such activities would necessarily involve, by virtue of increased demands if nothing
else, a reduction in the availability, interest, and capability of cooperative efforts outside of that field. 
These peace-keeping missions, or peace support operations in contemporary terminology, were
key to the development of the Canadian military throughout the post-war period. Canadian involvement
with  peace-keeping  operations  started  with  the  very  first  UN  deployment  and  saw  consistent
deployments in conjunction with the UN.9 Lester B. Pearson (who later became Prime Minister of
Canada) was largely responsible for the first armed deployment of peace-keepers as part of the UN
7 For example the comparative lack of Canadian involvement in the Falklands war or with the Regional Security 
Agreement in the Caribbean in the early 1980s.
8 For a history of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War see P. Wood & D. Sorenson (eds) The Politics of 
Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Frank Cass, 2005), and for more specialised treatment of Canada's 
role in such operations M. Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the UN Emergency Force 1956-67 (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2009) & K. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping 1960-64 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2009) are useful.
9 Report no. 78 'Some Impressions of UNEF 1957-58' 2 January 1959 RG24 Vol. 6927 This file in particular highlights 
some of the Canadian views on the other peace-keeping nations which were not altogether favourable. There is an 
especially disparaging paragraph related to the conduct of Finnish soldiers allowed which included the practice of 
baiting sharks in the Red Sea and shooting them as they approached the shore.
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mandate following the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Pearson was honoured for his work in ensuring the
success of the peace-keeping operation with a Nobel Peace Prize the following year. The effort put
forward by Canada, on both an individual level and in terms of its enacted policy, was demonstrative of
how instrumental Canada became in both the operation, and initial design and organisation of such
operations.10 These operations often ran contrary to declared Commonwealth interests  and were of
unknown effectiveness.11 It is problematic to assume that Canadian involvement in peace-keeping was
a demonstration of Canadian ill-will towards the older members of the Commonwealth. However, its
actions expressed a  de facto opposition to specific Commonwealth interests that did not lend itself
towards a continuation of defence cooperation into the 1960s. 
The particulars of the Canadian deployment to West New Guinea and Cyprus are especially
interesting  given the  Commonwealth  connection.  Although peace-keeping operations  in  West  New
Guinea  were  deployed  on  account  of  the  Dutch-Indonesian  conflict  in  that  region  the  resulting
Canadian  deployment  to  South-East  Asia  contrasted  sharply  with  the  Canadian  reaction  to
Commonwealth calls for assistance in the same area.12 The lack of a positive Canadian response to joint
Australian,  British,  and  New  Zealand  operations  in  Malaya  regarding  the  Malaysian-Indonesian
Confrontation is illuminating.13 The Canadian contribution to a military effort in a non-Commonwealth
country while a neighbouring Commonwealth state was in need of assistance speaks volumes as to
Canadian priorities.  Although the Canadian deployment to West New Guinea consisted solely of a
small handful of personnel and aircraft operating in conjunction with a US squadron the significance of
their contribution far outweighed its size.14 In many ways it was not dissimilar to the involvement of
the Indian Field Ambulance in the 1st Commonwealth Division almost a decade earlier.  The act of
deployment itself spoke rather more as to their involvement than the size of the contribution itself.
10 Ibid. The visiting officer, Captain JA Swottenham, to the UNEF notices that the current commander of the UNEF, 
although a Canadian, was wearing a 'UN uniform believed to be of his own design as opposed to a Canadian uniform' 
and that this was reflective of his 'impartiality' towards all constituent contingents of the force.
11 Indeed the Canadians had noted that the UN Emergency Force had been 'condemned in some quarters as ineffectual'. - 
Telegram no. 1599 from Prime Ministers Conference to Department of External Affairs 28 June 1957 RG 27 Volume 
21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
12 J. Conrad, Scarce Heard Amid the guns: An Inside Look at Canadian Peacekeeping (Ottawa: Library and Archives 
Canada, 2011) p 86
13 This is an especially poignant point when viewed in relation to the reservations that both Australia and New Zealand had
with taking a hard line against Indonesia in support of the new Federation. Here, although concerned, they do eventually 
commit to the British position. - Telegram no 482 from Washington to Foreign Office 13 February 1963 PREM11 
UKNA
14 J. Larsen & J. Wirtz, Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations: Stability from the Sea (London: Routledge, 
2008) p 182
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Of  greater  importance  than  Canadian  operations  in  West  New  Guinea  was  the  Canadian
contribution to Cyprus. This was the largest Canadian deployment since the Suez crisis.15 Canadian
participation was so extensive that every Canadian battalion eventually served in Cyprus. The political
will for the deployment of troops to Cyprus was evident from the outset, with Prime Minister Pearson
amongst the first to declare forces for the UN operation. Notably the first deployment to Cyprus was
commanded by an Indian general. There was some overlap in strategic priorities here between Canada
and India that is worthy of comment,16 especially as it highlights Canada's broader position with respect
to  what  would  come  to  be  known  as  the  'New  Commonwealth'.  Peace-keeping  operations  were
prioritized by both countries, and both focused their efforts on providing support to newly established
countries such as the Congo, West New Guinea and Cyprus. More often than not they declined to
support British operations prior to the deployment of UN forces. The ideological leanings of successive
Canadian administrations went beyond a mere interest in peacekeeping. It was more inclined to, if not
outright hostility to previous imperial powers, then at least an increased distancing of military relations.
This lended itself to a favourable attitude from the aforementioned New Commonwealth.
Shifting Canadian priorities
This new set of priorities in the 1960s is an important point to consider with respect to Canada-
Commonwealth relations, military and otherwise. The expansion of the New Commonwealth and the
attitude of those new Commonwealth members to the organisation as a whole shaped the way the
Commonwealth developed. This was prompted by a new political dynamic that emerged on the global
stage. Canadian peace-keeping operations, combined with their reluctance to be seen operating in more
conventional military activity, especially in conjunction with nations that might be ill-received by the
growing multitude of new states, and certainly helped place it in an enviable position. Furthermore,
since the earliest days of the Commonwealth Canada had assumed a leading role in advocating for the
change and adaptation of  the Commonwealth to suit  current  circumstances.17 Canadian politicians,
whether by deliberate choice or unintended consequence, found themselves with split interests when it
15 J. Hilliker, & D. Barry, Canada's Department of External Affairs Volume 2: Coming of Age 1946-1968 (Institute of 
Public Administration of Canada, 1995) p 282
16 Both Canada and India had sought to position themselves as the natural leader of the bloc of countries that constituted 
the New Commonwealth. - Waters, Christopher 'Australia and the Non-Aligned Movement in Asia, 1954-1955,' 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 12 Issue 2 p 155
17 Even if, at times, it had been upstaged by the Irish Free State. See M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset: Dream of Commonwealth
1921-1942 (Macmillan, 1985) p 99
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came to the Commonwealth.  On one hand they retained access to the older, rather more informal,
corridors  of  communication  amongst  the  Commonwealth.  On  the  other  hand  they  were  making
decisions  which  suited  their  interests  to  push  for  radical  change  of  the  traditional  organisational
structure  of  the  Commonwealth.  This  came  at  the  price  of  Commonwealth  military  cooperation.
Additionally, the impetus for such cooperation, as a result of the technological and political change in
the past decade had been greatly lessened. Unlike the position adopted by Australia, New Zealand, and
the UK which endeavoured to maintain a joint effort Canadian political goals were clearly quite willing
to sacrifice such cooperation as and when necessary. 
Although  this  served  Canadian  interests  particularly  well,  it  was  a  self-serving  goal  that
contributed to the overall decline of broadly-based military cooperation amongst the Commonwealth. It
was an approach that could not be replicated by the other key members of the Old Commonwealth and
cemented  the  distance  between  Canada  and  Australia,  South  Africa,  New  Zealand,  and  the  UK.
Circumstances  in  the  UK,  for  instance,  made such a  quasi-abandonment  of  imperial  obligations  a
distinct impossibility. Whatever might be said about the speed of decolonisation, the UK managed to
avoid alienating new states as well  as could be expected.  It  certainly weathered the storm of new
political expression at the Commonwealth with far greater ease than France or the Netherlands did with
their respective colonies and international post-colonial organisations.18 The specific circumstances of
South Africa effectively put to rest any such notion that it could position itself in a similar manner to
the Canadians.  It  could be argued that  both Australia  and New Zealand could have replicated the
Canadian approach had they avoided their involvement in Commonwealth activities in South-East Asia
in support of the UK and took a more favourable view to the New Commonwealth. Such an activity
might not even be all that suspect, given that both Australia and New Zealand had clamoured for the
political restructuring of the Commonwealth in the form of a Secretariat in previous years. However,
their specific circumstances in South-East Asia – and in Australia's case at least the personality of the
leading politicians involved – effectively ruled out such action. Rather to the contrary of the Canadian
position there was a redoubling of Australian and New Zealand efforts over the 1960s and into the early
1970s  in  pursuit  of  the  maintenance  of  the  pro-British  military  connection  that  the  Canadian
18 See K. Robinson, 'Colonialism French Style 1945-55: A Backward Glance' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 12 (1984) pp 37-38 for further information on the French decolonisation process, and see H.L. Wesseling, 'The 
giant that was a dwarf, of the strange history of Dutch Imperialism' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 16 
(1988) p 69, and P. Groen, 'Militant Response: The Dutch use of Military Force and the Fecolonisation of the Dutch East
Indies 1945-50' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21 (1993) p 41 for further information on the Dutch 
experience.
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government was all too eager to cast aside. 
A note should be made of the relatively precarious position of both Australia and New Zealand.
Successive Australian and New Zealand governments  spent  most  of  the 1950s and into the 1960s
attempting to preserve the involvement of the UK and the US in South-East Asia.19 Neither Australia
nor New Zealand could have afforded a break in military relations without the absolute guarantee that
such action would not undermine their territorial security. The US desire to secure their version of
Australia's 'Near North'  placed the Canadians in a far more secure position than Australia or New
Zealand could ever have hoped to achieve given the technological and logistical  limitations of the
1960s. Of the five key Commonwealth countries considered here only Canada was properly situated in
a geopolitical sense to safely and directly act in the manner it did to secure its interests in such a way
that left it well positioned to engage with the new Commonwealth countries. Whether this particular
Canadian action had more to do with any special desire to act as a 'middle power' of consequence in the
post-imperial world, or an active desire to withdraw from the Old Commonwealth community, or both,
the long-lasting effect of their policy during these nebulous times effectively ended the possibility that
had briefly been raised in 1951 of a widespread continuation of the original styling of Commonwealth
military cooperation.
The  start  of  significant  and  serious  peace-keeping  operations  involving  Canada  from 1960
onwards became one of the defining points in Canada-Commonwealth relations, especially in the realm
of military cooperation. Any return to multi-national Commonwealth defence cooperation similar to the
early 1950s which may have been envisioned in Canada or by politicians or military staff elsewhere
had  effectively  ended.  The  focus  on  peace-keeping  operations  coupled  with  the  inability  of  the
remainder  of  the  Old  Commonwealth  to  match  Canada's  approach  brought  it  out  of  the  Old
Commonwealth and into a 'no man's land' between Old and New. Whilst this changed the state of play
with respect to the Canada-Commonwealth relationship it is important to consider that this may not, in
any significant way, be a new development. It could quite easily have been a continuation of Canada's
pre-war position with respect to cooperation amongst the Commonwealth. Such analysis is outside the
19 This ranged from diplomatic endeavours in attempting to secure a commitment from the US and/or the UK to the region,
to imploring for the deployment of nuclear weapons and advanced air defences in Australia and the surrounding area in 
response to 'Russian bombers [which] had been supplied to Indonesia' and which there were concerns amongst 'high-
ranking Australian service officer, and Defence officials that... the whole north coast was wide open.' - Report of 
Meeting with Professor Tritterton 19 July 1961 DO 164/12/17  UKNA
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scope of this thesis but it is important to note, for context, that Canada's position as senior Dominion of
the Commonwealth had long been established. It is difficult to see the difference between the lead
Canada took in the early days of the Commonwealth and the action they took here, during the first
major and significant expansion of the Commonwealth. What can be noted with confidence is that the
period between 1960 and 1972 saw a shift in Canada's political position to ensure that it remained well
placed  to  take  advantage  of  the  changes  that  were  happening  both  inside  and  outside  the
Commonwealth. The fact that doing so left Canada removed from Commonwealth military operations
was a by-product of such activities. Indeed the Canadian cabinet was well aware of the potential for the
Old Commonwealth to be seen as a closed club and that it would be beneficial for Canada if it were not
to be associated with anything of that nature.20
South Africa and the Commonwealth                                                                                                           
Whereas Canada went to great lengths to keep the Old Commonwealth at arms length in an
effort to help ingratiate itself with the new members of the Commonwealth, developments in South
Africa took a very different turn. South African views of the Old Commonwealth, in the immediate
post-war period,  were more favourably disposed to military cooperation across the Commonwealth
than was the case in Canada even if there were concerns expressed about how such cooperation would
be received in  South Africa.  Further to those internal considerations,  South African restrictions on
overseas deployment arose as a result of difficult domestic circumstances. There was also an ongoing
need to mollify a significant minority view held amongst some in the National Party on the value of
continued  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  It  may  go  too  far  to  suggest  that  there  was  an
ideological alternative or active desire to sever the Commonwealth military connection. More so than
any other factor, South African-Commonwealth, and particularly Anglo-South African, relations were
in the main complicated by the changing international situation with respect to South Africa's internal
policies. Such tension came to the fore in 1961, with the ultimate result of South Africa's withdrawal
(though effectively an expulsion) from the Commonwealth entirely. Issues relating to the continuation
of military relations proved a cause for concern for both South Africa and the UK throughout the
decade. 
There  were  two  methods  in  which  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  on  South  Africa  by  the
20 S. Brawley, The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigrations to Australasia and North America (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 1995) p 281
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international community: 1) The overarching international condemnation by the UN which started in
1963, and 2) condemnation from inside the Commonwealth. Both of these expressed themselves in
ways  which  made  military  cooperation  exceedingly  difficult  if  not  outright  impossible.  Pressure
brought  on  by Commonwealth  member  states,  in  particular,  made the  growing discordance  in  the
Commonwealth on military matters abundantly evident. The 1961 Prime Ministers' Conference was
perhaps one of the earliest, and most overt, manifestations of such internal tension. 
South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth was complicated by international interest in
its  apartheid  policy.  The  Canadian  government  was,  unsurprisingly,  the  only  government  which
deviated  from the  reaction  of  the  other  governments  of  the  Old  Commonwealth.  The  Canadians
supported  the  new  Commonwealth  countries  which,  unanimously,  indicated  that  they  would  vote
against South Africa's application.21 This shifting and disruptive nature of the disagreement regarding
developments  that  were  occurring  throughout  the  Commonwealth  was  indicative  of  the  problems
surrounding any potential unified agreement – especially on an issue as onerous as external defence.
The continuation of bilateral arms agreements and geostrategic concerns shared by the UK and South
Africa,  especially  over  the  sea  route  around  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  was  devastating  to  the
Commonwealth's potential for collaborative endeavours. This could not have come at a worse time for
South African-Commonwealth military relations. The tenuous connection that had held in place from
the 1950s onwards through a combination of research and procurement arrangements, and base treaties,
was now seriously threatened. All  of these arrangements also came under strain as a result of UN
sanctions.  Stronger  wording of  resolutions,  and more demanding obligations  on UN states  against
South Africa became the norm.22 The international reaction to South Africa's internal policies was a
major  factor  in  disturbing  the  overall  progression  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  The
international  reaction  to  South  Africa's  domestic  policies  undermined  and  hampered  any  existing
enduring Commonwealth military connection. This, in turn, further destabilized the cohesiveness of
Commonwealth military activities by eroding the opinion of the new Commonwealth of South Africa.
21 Cabinet Conclusions 11 February 1961 RG 25 volume 6176 file 50085-J-40 LAC. Also see conclusions of 25 February 
and 5 March of the same file. Although Canada would ultimately decide in favour of declining South African re-
admittance this was far from an easy decision.
22 General Assembly Resolution 1762 6 November 1962 A/RES/1761(XVII) called for a voluntary embargo and boycott, 
especially of arms. This would be followed a a series of Security Council resolutions. Specifically Security Council 
Resolution 191 18 June 1964 S/RES/190 (1964), would be followed by Security Council Resolution 282 23 July 1970 
S/RES/282 (1970) which reiterated its arms embargo after concerns were raised over ongoing violations.
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Although the rapid expansion of the Commonwealth did not get fully under way until the early
to mid-1960s the circumstances which led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth
had been put in motion from as early as 1957. Ghana was admitted instantly into the Commonwealth in
that year, making it the first African state to join the Commonwealth outside of South Africa itself.
Nigeria joined later in October 1960.23 Sierra Leone became independent earlier  that same year in
April.24 In that regard it is important to note that the majority of African states which were admitted
over the course of the 1960s exerted no direct pressure on South Africa that led to its withdrawal.
Instead,  the  states  which  indicated  that  they  would  not  approve  of  South  Africa's  renewed  entry
(following its conversion to a republic – itself a topic of discussion that is far too involved to be dealt
with here) consisted of the Asian member states and, of course, Canada.25
Crucial to this development is the shift in what was considered the moral, if perhaps not legal,
competencies of the Commonwealth as a whole. In that respect the reasons behind the indications that
were made to South Africa regarding its renewed membership of the Commonwealth was illustrative of
the type of criteria that the Commonwealth countries were now beginning to apply on an ad-hoc basis
to current and prospective members. The mere fact that the internal policies of another member state
were  considered  legitimate  grounds  for  objection  was  a  monumental  step  forward  in  what  would
become a set of principles that were espoused by the Commonwealth in written form in later years.
Prior to the de facto ejection of South Africa in 1961, the internal workings or actions of another state
had not been a serious block on membership, even where such activities were objectionable.26 In fact
the Commonwealth as an organisation had shown a remarkable willingness, both before and after, to
23 It should be pointed out that the rapid expansion of the Commonwealth, particularly in these earlier years were built on 
long-standing, if ultimately flawed and poor, attempts at drafting an internal political process. In Nigeria especially 
attempts to handle Nigerian nationalism so that it was funnelled towards political ends had been in process since 1935. 
The multitude of failed and constantly amended constitutions from both the UK and those arising from popular 
consultation in Nigeria reflected the difficulty involved in ensuring a stable and reliable progression from dependent 
territory to self-government or independence. - R.D. Pearce, 'Governors, Nationalists, and Constitutions in Nigeria 1935-
51' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 9 (1981) p 304
24 The independence of Sierra Leone had, however, been known and discussed during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference of 1960. - Commonwealth Conference Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 8-17 March 1961 Final 
Communique Annex II RG 27 Volume 21577 File 2-5020-2 LAC
25 It is interesting to note that Canada had offered a reassurance that South Africa was a welcome member of the 
Commonwealth earlier in May 1960. Canada, as well as the UK, Australia and New Zealand had offered that assurance. 
The Canadian position, however, was already indicated to be more complicated than a blanket acceptance even at that 
stage. Mr. Diefenbaker outlined that he would not 'be party to a decision [offering a reassurance that South Africa would 
be a welcome member of the Commonwealth should it reform its government into a republic] which would affect the 
mind of the South African voter on an internal matter'. In fact the Conference as a whole, declined to offer South Africa 
the assurance it requested. - Prime Ministers Conference May 1960 – Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 
'The Future Commonwealth Relationship' A5954 box 1799 ANA
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either adapt or ignore a whole variety of fundamentally repulsive elements on that basis. Religious
strife  during  and  following  the  partition  of  the  British  Raj  never  received  much  attention  nor
consideration for the inclusion of its respective successor states into the Commonwealth.27 Violence and
discrimination relating to cultural and ethnic divisions in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Malaysia, and Nigeria
were also never seriously considered as grounds for non-admittance.28
The introduction of a concept which allowed for the judgement of a member state by the rest of
the Commonwealth for the purposes of admission was firmly established after 1961.29 What could, and
could not, be overlooked based on any such individual or collective vested interests laid the foundation
for a more discerning Commonwealth. It is ironic that the protections which had been created by the
Commonwealth in terms of limiting the potential for interference by a member state (notably the UK)
into the internal affairs of other member states throughout the first half of the twentieth century were
discarded and such potential interference reintroduced by its newer members (if only on a selective
basis that favoured themselves).30 Although this must be seen in the light of increasingly pervasive
international pressure it is nevertheless indicative of the start of the conversion of the Commonwealth
into an international  body with more interest  in  selective morality than in  the activities  that  same
organisation  had  conducted  in  previous  decades.31 The  repercussions  that  this  process  had  for
26 Indeed it had been the convention in the Commonwealth 'not to discuss matters that were in dispute between members of
the Commonwealth.'  - Prime Ministers Conference May 1960 – Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 'The 
Future Commonwealth Relationship' A5954 box 1799 ANA
27 This was hardly an issue of which the British were unaware either, with serious concerns relating to the division in the 
Raj on a religious basis being known for decades prior to independence. Furthermore, actions taken to ensure more 
involved participation by the British Raj during the war resulted in British actions which actively promoted this division.
Although the intent was almost certainly not to further complicate the religious divide and post-war difficulties its net 
effect was precisely that. - G. Rizvi, 'Transfer of Power in India: A Restatement of an Alternative Approach' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12 (1984) p 141
28 Significant difficulties persisted in Nigeria relating to its constitution and extraordinary difference between the north and
south of the country. - M. Lynn, 'The Nigerian Self-Government Crisis of 1953 and the Colonial Office' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 34 (2006) p 256
29 This was, Macmillan believed, a symptom of these new countries being 'very young and very inexperienced' in that they 
had 'an itch to interfere not only with the affairs of the older countries but with each others.' - Letter from Macmillan to 
Menzies 8 February 1962 PREM 11 T51/62 UKNA
30 Menzies' observations of the degradation of the political structures of new member states found agreement with his 
British counterpart. In Menzies reply to Macmillan he described Ghana as 'a ruthless dictatorship, with no rule of law... 
with not one shred of the historical British institutional sense [remaining], while 'Ceylon seems to be a mess of neo-
Marxist pottage'. -Letter from Menzies to Macmillan 18 April 1962 PREM11 T211A/62 UKNA
31 Indeed it was regarded that the Commonwealth was 'becoming a sort of miniature UN, with various groups; the Afro-
Asian strength strongly organized, and the older members not knowing quite how to handle it.' - Letter from Macmillan 
to Menzies 8 February 1962 PREM 11 T51/62 UKNA. Although this was couched in a letter filled with racist tones 
(even going so far as to consider the 'barbarism' of Germany the result of a the failure of the Romans to cross the Elbe) it
nevertheless highlights the way in which the older members of the Commonwealth (though notably not Canada who 
'would not agree' with such thoughts) thought of the new direction of the Commonwealth.
102
Commonwealth defence cooperation were drastic, and the first shots of this transformation had been
fired with the withdrawal of South Africa on 31 May 1961. 
Although  the  withdrawal  of  South  Africa  certainly  complicated  matters  previously  agreed
defence arrangements,  particularly with respect to  the naval base at  Simonstown, were not unduly
affected.32 The continued use of port facilities throughout the 1960s, arms sales, and the cooperative
approach to the defence of the sea route between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean remained
stable.  The  perseverance  of  normal  operations  with  respect  to  joint  Anglo-South  African  defence
cooperation  in  this  matter  was  one  of  the  earliest  examples  of  how  previously  established
Commonwealth defence cooperation survived the transformation process of the Commonwealth more
generally.33 The overall development of the more limited version of such cooperative efforts is broadly
in line with joint Commonwealth operations elsewhere. 
More  troubling  to  the  Commonwealth  connection  was  that  South  Africa  had been  steadily
reducing its contribution to anything remotely resembling a Commonwealth endeavour following the
end of the Second World War. Indeed, outside of the defence of its sea lanes and holdover procurement
agreements with the UK it had by 1961 almost entirely extricated itself. What remained was far from
the exemplary level and style of coordination and cooperation that had previously been undertaken.34
By 1961 South African military engagement with the Commonwealth had been reduced to the point
where it was effectively non-existent. Some of this decline can be attributed to the hostile political
situation in South Africa itself. Interest in the Commonwealth, even the UK, in the sale of new ships
32 'Exchanges of Letters on Defence matters between Governments of the Union of South Africa and the UK June 1955' 
Part I MV 190 Simonstad SANDFA
33 It would be incorrect, however, to assume that it did so completely unscathed. Aside from the obvious difficulties there 
were concerns expressed repeatedly over the language to be used in the document, particularly in relation to the different
arrangements that would apply to the naval base when at war. The final report of the joint working party surrounding the
agreement made it clear that 'war' as it was used in the final agreement was only to apply to a conflict 'in which the 
Union is involved.' In essence the possibility of a return to a British-led organisation of the defence of the waters 
surrounding South Africa was only possible in a case where both the UK and the Union of South Africa were co-
belligerents. Gone was the blanket reassurance of access to the base that the British had previously enjoyed when they 
were managing the base directly. - 'Report of the Joint Working Part on RN/SAN cooperation' 18 June 1955 MV 190 
Simonstad SANDFA
34 This was, in fact, one of the reasons why there was such little upset in South Africa following its departure from the 
Commonwealth. South African interest in Commonwealth members outside of the UK had dwindled to nought where it 
had ever existed, and there was a reasonably expectation that the UK's economic ties would continue for as long as was 
possible given the situation at the UN regardless of whether South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth or not. - 
R. Hyam, 'The Parting of Ways: Britain and South Africa's Departure from the Commonwealth 1951-61' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 26 (1988) p 172
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and aircraft  to  South Africa fell,  and as  a  result  encouraged the growth of a  domestic  armaments
industry that threatened future sales. Furthermore, local concerns that did not more broadly interest the
majority of the members of the Commonwealth, from a military perspective, began to come to the fore.
The South African border wars held little or no interest for the Commonwealth and were not something
which were considered of strategic interest to the Commonwealth. Although arguably the protection of
the South African state  itself  was of interest  to  the Commonwealth,  the protection of  the external
borders of the state had since the late 1950s moved towards a regional, rather than a global, perspective
which was not conducive to shared Commonwealth defensive interests.35 Throughout the decade the
UK undertook significant  deployments  to  South-East  Asia  and faced  an  increasingly difficult  and
hostile  transit  route  through  the  Suez.  Here,  however,  we  see  a  limit  of  cooperation  with  the
Commonwealth restricted to those nations which took an interest in South Africa's immediate interests,
and even this would eventually cave under the extraordinary weight of international pressure being
brought against the South African state.36 
Although the South African border war was not representative of either the existing style of
Commonwealth cooperative engagements nor indicative of any new potential developments the war is
noteworthy for its operation in conjunction with a local imperial power that was more significantly
attached to the development of its holdings than most others, Portugal, and the lack of  Commonwealth
involvement.37 One of the key outcomes of that war was that  the South African military-industrial
complex was obliged to place an increased reliance on domestic resources and materiel. As the decade
wore  on  South  African  involvement  with  Portugal  became  formalized,  eventually  even  including
Rhodesia  in  the  Alcora  agreement  of  1970.38 In  effect  this  was  a  variant  on  the  regional  defence
arrangement similar in purpose to other regional defence initiatives that had seen patchy participation
35 Note though that the UK still retained interest itself in the territorial integrity of South Africa, especially as they related 
to the sealanes around the Cape of Good Hope.
36 A. Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999) 
p 119
37 See – J. Darwin, 'Diplomacy and Decolonisation' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28 (2000) p 20. 
Although the end result was much the same, the decline of Portugal's empire was significantly slower and these 
lingering elements of imperial strength were the basis on which South African-Portuguese cooperation were developed. 
It is worth noting that Portugal was far from well-liked by the new members of the Commonwealth, and indeed had a 
particularly frosty relationship with both the UK and the US when it came to discussing its imperial policies. - G. Stone, 
'Britain and the Angolan Revolt of 1961' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27 (1999) p 132
38 There had been earlier attempts to form a pan-African defensive arrangement including the UK, South Africa, Portugal, 
and France which would be under a single authority much like NATO or SEATO. However, they were ultimately 
discarded as impractical given the size of the region and that problems particular to one area were 'different from that in 
the remainder of the Region.' - Report of the Naval Representatives at the Conference held at Cape Town 5 September 
1958 MV 128/11 NAVO Maneuvers SANDFA
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amongst the Commonwealth. The Alcora Agreement was a South African-led arrangement supported
by  Rhodesia  in  which  it  operated  for  the  benefit  of  regional  strategic  goals  in  conjunction  with
immediate  local  powers.  It  was  an  arguably successful  demonstration  of  regionally-based  defence
relationships in what could be seen to effectively amount to a Commonwealth context.
Indeed there is a greater correlation in the style, form, and purpose of Commonwealth defence
cooperation before 1960 with the Alcora Agreement than there is between Commonwealth defence
cooperation before 1960 and what eventually manifested for the Commonwealth in 1981. That the
basis of the cooperative effort between South Africa and Rhodesia was not dissimilar to the form and
style of older Commonwealth initiatives is as apparent as the fact that this arrangement was not a
declared  Commonwealth  endeavour.  The  extensive  use  of  a  larger  power  for  arms,  technological
cooperation and the pursuit of common strategic interests in securing immediate regional military goals
are all  hallmarks of the kind of activity undertaken by the Commonwealth throughout  most  of its
existence  prior  to  1960.  In  many  ways  what  developed  in  Southern  Africa  in  the  absence  of  a
Commonwealth title for such activities represented an intriguing possibility as to the potential that
remained for  Commonwealth military initiatives. 
South Africa and the UN
Before returning to the developments across the Commonwealth over the 1960s it is worthwhile
to note the broader international reaction to South Africa's apartheid policy. Although the expansion of
the Commonwealth, even before 1960, had already made its mark felt on South Africa there is another
area in which the connection to other Commonwealth member states was undermined. South Africa
had traditionally, like the vast majority of other Commonwealth countries until the late 1960s/early
1970s,  relied  extensively  on  British  and/or  other  Commonwealth  arms  suppliers,  research
developments,  and technology.39 However,  with  the  advent  of  a  series  of  UN resolutions  on  non-
mandatory (and  subsequently mandatory)  arms  embargo  against  South  Africa  that  connection  and
uniformity of weapons between South Africa and the rest of the Commonwealth was broken.40
The primary driving factors behind the arms embargo were quite clear. The international ire that
apartheid had evoked ultimately saw the imposition of the first arms embargo against South Africa in
39 General Meeting of the Federal Executive Committee of the Navy League of South Africa'. 19 October 1962 MV 203 
Die Vlootbond van Suid-Afrika SANDFA
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1963.41 In total almost a dozen resolutions were passed against South Africa in the UN between 1960
and 1971 all directly attributable to their apartheid policy. The arms embargo covered an increasing
number  of  military  goods  eventually  before  culminating  in  a  mandatory  arms  embargo  in  1977.
Although this may suggest a possible continuation of arms arrangements between South Africa and the
UK until  1977 that  was not  the  case.42 International  and Commonwealth  pressure  had made such
arrangements difficult. The effect of these 'voluntary' arms embargoes was most notably seen in that by
1977 the South African arms industry was rather well-developed. The voluntary embargoes were so
effective that it  is debatable whether the mandatory embargo put any additional pressure on South
Africa.43 As South Africa could no longer acquire their military equipment from existing sources, which
were invariably British, there was an increased divergence in the ordnance and equipment utilised by
South  Africa  which  continued  from  1960  onwards.44 Notable  in  particular  was  the  domestic
40 Interestingly there seemed some debate in the UK over whether they would continue to supply South Africa with 
military stores. A report issued to the South African Secretary for External Affairs declared that it received various 
different responses depending on which Department in the UK it approached. The Defence Department was 'happy to 
sell anything which South Africa wished to buy', as was The Trade department (presumably a shorthand for the Board of 
Trade). The Admiralty informally expressed its view that every application for purchase of arms was treated on its 
individual merits. Meanwhile the Commonwealth Relations Office responded, albeit under a condition that the official in
question was not quoted on the matter, that a request to purchase more armoured vehicles would greatly embarrass the 
British government. - Report for the Secretary of External Affairs: Supply of Military Equipment to South Africa 14 
December 1960 MV 132 Aankoop van Wapentuig SANDFA
41 The embargo against South Africa was met with negative reaction in some quarters of the Commonwealth. Australia's 
delegation to the UN, for instance, voted against the proposed embargo in its earliest stages in late 1962. - 'Continuation 
of Minute for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs 21 November 1962' – 30 November 1962  MV103/1 Australiese-
Aangeleenthede MV/EF 125 SANDFA
42 It is notable, however, that the Simonstown Agreement included detailed provisions to ensure that the provision of local 
employment at the naval base would not bar recruitment of non-Europeans, nor offer lower pay, discriminate on that 
basis in terms of recruitment, and they would have the same security of tenure in their employment as others of 
comparable role as a European would enjoy. Although it was clear that apartheid and international condemnation would 
not dissuade the UK from seeking to secure its strategic position the particulars of its arrangements with respect to South
Africa did take such concerns into account. -'Exchanges of Letters on Defence matters between Governments of the 
Union of South Africa and the UK June 1955' Enclosure to Letter from Selwyn Lloyd to Erasmus Minister of Defence 
30 June 1955 MV 190 Simonstad SANDFA
43 Indeed even before the voluntary arms embargoes trade with South Africa had been in decline, resulting in the 
development of an unfavourable balance of payments. The Canadian government suspected that the primary cause 
behind this was the hike in British interest rates to four and a half percent in 1954, but went on to note that 'the 
government's constitutional legislation [regarding voting practices] also played a small but important part in the 
outflow'. - Memorandum by Evans (Canadian Trade Commissioner in Cape Town) for Gill, Canadian High 
Commissioner to South Africa, 23 February 1954 RG 25 Volume 3558 File 1039 A-40 LAC
44 The level of South African dependence on the UK for the supply of its ships and accompanying elements required to 
maintain a fleet was expressed in no uncertain terms by Sir Herbert Packer, who had served as Commander-in-Chief 
South Atlantic Station until his retirement 1953 and subsequently retired to Cape Town, South Africa. In an address to 
the Navy League of South Africa he outlined how continued cooperation between the UK and South Africa was 'vital', 
pointing to 'the new ships of the South African Navy are being built in the UK, [and] it is from there she gets her naval 
weapons, ammunition and specialised stores. Above all, South African officers... are instructed in British Naval Schools'.
'General Meeting of the Federal Executive Committee of the Navy League of South Africa'. 19 October 1962 MV 203 
Die Vlootbond van Suid-Afrika SANDFA
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development of and modifications to existing British tanks. The various trade restrictions to South
Africa had, both from a technical and strategic standpoint, significantly informed matters that occurred
thereafter.  As such, it  may prove beneficial at this stage to explore the developments that the new
members of the Commonwealth had on the organisation of the Commonwealth as a whole and how this
negatively affected the possibility and potential of Commonwealth military cooperation, of any sort,
after 1961. 
Structural change in the Commonwealth
The volatile international situation,  in part  spurred on by the relatively rapid decolonisation
programme and the resultant expansion of the Commonwealth, was not met with an equally vigorous
and  dynamic  readjustment  in  the  system  of  organisation  within  the  Commonwealth  prior  to  its
expansion. The effort to pre-empt problems in the various territories and colonies of the British empire
through decolonisation was, largely, not extended to include dealing with the potential problems that
emerged after their admission into the Commonwealth. There had been a reasonably well-established
belief that the Commonwealth would serve as a continuation of British influence yet little action was
taken  to  ensure  that  this  would  be  the  case.45 The  arrangements  for  decolonisation  in  the  main
attempted to assure the inclusion of new states to the Commonwealth rather than provide any direction
for what might happen after they were admitted.46 Whether this was intentional or not the net effect was
that there was no comparable concerted effort to ensure the stability nor continuation of the style and
form of the Commonwealth following the influx of new states.
The changes that transformed the Commonwealth have their origin in that first early intake of
new states in the early 1960s. The particulars of this transformation were not clear until the mid-1960s,
and specifically from 1964. The Commonwealth as an international organisation adapted itself to the
new situation, leaving little room for a continuation of how affairs had been conducted previously.
Perhaps most alarmingly for those who desired a continuation of Commonwealth cooperation as it had
previously  been  implemented,  these  changes  and  adjustments  to  the  Commonwealth's  political
45 Part of this might be attributable to the issue that, by the time the Commonwealth was expanding, the concept of the use 
of the Commonwealth as a vehicle for the preservation of British influence had been much maligned. - A.F. Madden, 
'Not for export: The Westminster Model of Government and British Colonial Practice' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 8 (1979) p. 23
46 This argument would be carried over into considerations relating to the inclusion of small states into the 
Commonwealth. See Report: The Constitutional Development of the Commonwealth 23 June 1960 CAB 133/200 
UKNA
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structure were driven by the new states.47 This often resulted in a general reluctance amongst the older
members of the Commonwealth to readily agree to such new structures despite the clear and obvious
need for some new method of organisation. Even in this, what should have been a relatively benign
aspect  of the growth of  the Commonwealth developed into a  divide between the older  and newer
countries which was not conducive to the pursuit of joint activities, particularly of a military nature,
which  the  Commonwealth  had  previously  undertaken.  Despite  these  internal  arguments  progress
continued by sheer weight of interest and numbers. By the turn of the decade the expansion of the
Commonwealth was largely complete, as were the structural changes to the Commonwealth. The result
was that it would be another decade before a fresh joint military operation was undertaken under a
Commonwealth flag. It was clear that internal Commonwealth developments were spearheaded by new
member states,  agreed to  by the older  member states with reluctance,  and such was the course of
developments that they crippled any potential deployment of a Commonwealth military operation in
the style that had seen reasonably frequent use and been relatively successful in earlier decades.
These internal Commonwealth developments, and internal developments in the British Empire
with respect to the impending independence of African, Asian and other states, territories and colonies,
were enacted,  unsurprisingly,  in response to domestic and international pressure across the various
member  states  and  their  subordinate  territories.  A general  trend  of  growing  nationalist  fervour  of
debatable application to vast swathes of imperial territory, coupled with increasing unrest, uncertain
finances, potential Communist infiltration and global aversion to anything that could be labelled as
imperial, left the UK in a particularly precarious position.48 The Winds of Change speech noted a key
turning  point  in  the  internal  timetables  the  British  Colonial  Office  had  established  for  eventual
independence.49 The use of the Commonwealth as a means of preserving British influence was an oft-
stated  goal,  although  how,  precisely,  this  was  intended  to  be  effected  never  seems  to  have  been
47 Indeed many of the changes sought by the New Commonwealth had been actively rejected by the older members of the 
Commonwealth as they saw this as a potential organ of a resumption of centralised control of their affairs. Canada, 
South Africa, and the Irish Free State, for instance, all objected to proposals for a Secretariat between 1931 and 1947 on 
this basis. JDB. Miller, The Commonwealth and the World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) p 43 & p 79
48 Whitehall, and particularly the Colonial Office, struggled to address these issues on their usual basis which in turn 
prompted internal reform of the Colonial Office as it related to security and intelligence issues. See R. Cormac, 'A 
Whitehall showdown? Colonial Office-Joint Intelligence Committee Relations in the mid 1950s' Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 39 (2011) p 250
49 At the Commonwealth Conference of 1960 the Colonial Secretary of the UK described 'tersely, confidently, and without 
nostalgia the hurried programme for turning the African colonies loose in the world'. It was clear, not only to the UK but 
also made clear to the rest of the Commonwealth, that there was a rush being put on the transfer of power in territories. - 
Prime Ministers Conference May 1960 – Personal Note by Secretary of External Affairs 'The Future Commonwealth 
Relationship' A5954 box 1799 ANA
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considered or implemented in any detail.
Regardless, the Commonwealth at  the turn of the 1960s was not an organisation fit  for the
purpose of managing, organising, and directing a multinational military effort on any significant scale.
There was no internal secretary, and both the position and accompanying staff had been previously
considered and rejected.50 There was no coordinated means of cooperation outside of a few technical
organisations and points of contact for professional and service liaisons. It was, notwithstanding these
limitations,  directly responsible  for  the preservation of British influence in  new states  which were
previously administered as British territories and colonies. Leaving aside the dubious political gains to
be made by such ventures and instead focusing on the military aspects of such goals it must be said that
there was substantial British success. New member states typically permitted the deployment of British
ground forces, ships and planes as required at military facilities that had previously housed similar
British forces.51 The increased number of these temporary bases compared to the availability of bases
which were not under similar restrictions caused difficulties in the coordination and organisation of
British forces overseas. Extravagant plans to deal with this, including an expanded airbase at RAF Gan
to secure a new air route from the UK towards the Far East, and full-fledged bases in north-western
Australia  and in  Kenya,  emphasised two crucial  elements.52 First,  that  there was still  a  significant
interest in the use and establishment of overseas bases. Second, that the integrity of these bases, with
respect to national vetoes and non-interference with British operations, was fundamentally unsound.53
The  series  of  complications  at  British  and  Australian  bases  in  Malaysia  are  key examples  in  the
inability to avoid these kinds of problems even in a region where such cooperative efforts were active
and, comparatively, successful.54 As such, the relinquishment of such huge swathes of territory from the
British Empire generated a great deal of doubt with respect to future military potential and supply
zones that remained uncertain for the remainder of the decade.
50 Minute by Chadwick 9 January 1957 DO 35/5001 UKNA
51 The list of applicable treaties that demonstrate this is too long to be usefully included here. It is more practical to refer to
the British policy which advocated that the retention of military bases was essential for British global strategy. - 
COS(54)332 9 July 1953 & COS(54)336 11 July 1953 both are in DEFE 5/47 UKNA
52 D. Percox, Britain, Kenya, and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security, and Decolonisation (London: Taurus 
Academic Studies, 2004) p 185
53 Such difficulties would become increasingly apparent in Kenya from 1952 onward with the declaration of the Kenya 
Emergency in response to the Mau Mau rebellion and a persistent inability to forcibly end such unrest. The long-terms 
prospects for a major military establishment created in that context were far from ideal. -  F.Furedi, 'Creating a Breathing
Space: The Political Management of Colonial Emergencies' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21 (1993) 
p 103
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In the absence of any internal defence organisation and planning in the Commonwealth it is
unsurprising  that  those  who  created  this  infrastructure  influenced  the  type  and  style  of  such
organisations that eventually developed. Throughout the 1960s there was a flurry of activity as new
countries  of  the  Commonwealth  flexed  their  newfound  diplomatic  powers  to  create  or  redesign,
Commonwealth-centric,  developmental  aid  and  support  organisations  and  programmes.  Several  of
these  organisations  had their  roots  in  pre-war  development  and  cooperation  schemes,  such as  the
Universities  Bureau  of  the  British  Empire,  which  was  later  re-branded  and  expanded  into  the
Association  of  Commonwealth  Universities  in  1963.  Although  initial  progress  was  slow,  such
endeavours coalesced into the formation of a systemic structure that was quite different to the pre-
1960s Commonwealth.55 
Two of the more significant structural organisations that were to develop in the 1960s were the
Commonwealth Foundation and the Commonwealth Secretariat. The expansion of the Commonwealth
with the associated political issues that this provoked drove support for the Secretariat in the early
1960s before being proposed by Ghana, Uganda, and Trinidad.56 It is important to note that the duties
of the Secretariat itself were not, entirely, new. Most of the organisational work with respect to the
organisation of meetings and so on had been carried out by the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO)
in the UK. The removal of the powers of the CRO over the Commonwealth established an independent
Commonwealth based and operated organisational body that would ultimately be responsible as the
primary means of intergovernmental organisation and communication within the Commonwealth.57 By
contrast  the Commonwealth Foundation,  an idea proposed by the UK, focused on more traditional
avenues  of  Commonwealth  cooperation  –  advocating  the  organisation  and communication  of  arts,
scientific and technological progress and the spread of ideas throughout the Commonwealth.58 Insofar
as  British efforts  at  reorganizing the  Commonwealth during  this  period  are concerned they would
54 Issues had plagued Commonwealth cooperation in the region even from the start of the whole endeavour. Early 
indications that the issues raised by the Malayans regarding the wording of the document being a way to mollify internal
political opinion of the arrangement and that it would have no bearing on the substance of the arrangement were shown 
to be entirely incorrect. Although this would not end the endeavour it did weaken its final form and oblige a level of 
political interaction regarding military manoeuvres in the region that were not expected. - Prime Ministers Conference 
Supplement No. 1 to Defence Brief Working Party on Malayan Defence Agreement 18 June 1956 A5954 box 1799 ANA
55 D. McIntyre, 'Britain and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 28 (2000) p 154
56 D. McIntyre, 'The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences 1933-59: Precursors of the Tri-Sector 
Commonwealth' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36 (2008) p 608
57 Further detail on the specifics of the development of the Secretariat can be found in M. Doxey, The Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Contemporary Commonwealth (New York: Springer Ltd, 1989)
58 Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 1962 – Final Communique PREM 11/3652 UKNA
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appear difficult to reconcile with their stated aims. The establishment of the Secretariat directly reduced
the UK's influence over the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Foundation was a particularly weak
substitute. That the older members of the Commonwealth had sought a Secretariat was well known,
and it is notable in that regard that the first Secretary-General was a Canadian.59 However, by the time
the  Secretariat  was  established  the  prevailing  possibilities  for  military  cooperation  within  the
Commonwealth were problematic given the variety of internal and international issues that had arisen
since  1947.  In  essence,  even  though  the  Secretary  had  been  a  position  that  members  of  the
Commonwealth, Old and New, had desired, the political outlook had changed drastically and skewed
its subsequent direction in a way that may not have been possible had such a position existed prior to
the expansion of the Commonwealth.
The position the Commonwealth, particularly its new members, found themselves in at the turn
of the decade was an enviable one. They had gained their independence, were key members of a large
international  organisation  that  they  had  helped  design,  an  organisation  which  included  its  own
independent  staff  and  supporting  infrastructure.  They  had  demonstrated  their  ability  to  dictate
Commonwealth policy and had established that the internal policies of a Commonwealth country were
open to scrutiny. 
Militarily the implication of the changed nature of the Commonwealth was that it was largely
ignored. This was in spite of the serious problems decolonisation posed for the UK's armed forces. The
process not only added to the increased draw on limited resources, but destabilised the basing rights
and logistical support on which the UK would have otherwise enjoyed globally. Indeed, the logistic
situation had deteriorated to such a point that the withdrawal of the UK from South-East Asia in 1972
was hardly surprising.60 Leaving aside domestic issues and financial difficulties the changing face of
the  international  political  situation  left  the  UK  largely  unable  to  provide  the  necessary  basic
infrastructure to which it was accustomed. The establishment of 'Commonwealth' military formations
and initiatives became increasingly complicated. The expansion of the Commonwealth increased the
reluctance  of  the  Commonwealth  as  a  collective  whole  to  engage  in  such cooperative  operations.
59 D. McIntyre, 'Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat 1965' International Journal 53 (1998) p 769
60 This is especially true for the UK, which became obsessed with attempts to predict the state of affairs in 1970 in the 
early 1960s. It was foremost in the minds of the government in 1961 and resulted in a series of plans for various 
eventualities that were drawn up by both service personnel, political figures, and civil servants. - Memorandum by the 
Prime Minister 'Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future' 29 September 1961 PREM11 UKNA
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Furthermore  the  establishment  of  a  Secretariat  and  an  increasingly  formalised  Commonwealth
organisation necessarily obliged a more cautious approach to the public use of the Commonwealth title
in the nomenclature of military forces. There were few difficulties using the term 'Commonwealth'
when the organisation lacked a centralised structure which could object. There was an almost cavalier
attitude taken to the use of the Commonwealth name until 1972. It should hardly be surprising that,
during the expansion of the Commonwealth, that greater interest was expressed in organisations which
bore its name. The justification for assigning the title of 'Commonwealth' to a military formation if it
only involved a mere fraction of the actual Commonwealth and was not granted sanction by the central
administration of that that organisation. The practical expression of this can be seen in the name change
from the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group to the 28th ANZUK Brigade in 1971. This was a
change in nomenclature only. The 'new' Brigade performed, in a very real sense, exactly the same as it
did before the change until it was disbanded in 1974.
Conclusion
In some respects, it was the changes to the Commonwealth during these years, and particularly
the  reaction  to  those  changes  by  Canada  and  South  Africa,  that  underscore  the  instability  of
Commonwealth defence cooperation. The Canadian position in the Commonwealth was dominated by
attempts  to  ensure  its  ongoing  role  as  'senior  Dominion'.  An  ideological  switch  to  peace-keeping
operations  instead  of  combat  operations  by  Canadian  military  personnel  also  left  it  ill-suited  to
continued  cooperation  but  extremely  well-placed  to  take  advantage  of  the  changing  international
situation. This ideological alteration to the Canadian perspective was perhaps most clearly seen in the
extreme reorganisation of its armed forces in 1968. Its traditional organisation was swept away to make
way for a new wholly unified armed force that prompted a wholesale clearance of numerous senior
Canadian  military officials.  Whereas  the  Canadian  approach suggested  a  viable  outlet  for  military
endeavours for the Commonwealth, South Africa's domestic legislation was a catalyst  for this new
Commonwealth.  It  laid  the  foundation  for  a  Commonwealth  built  on  selective  moral  standing  as
defined by its new membership. 
It is also important to consider that these developments struck at the heart of the integrity of the
Old Commonwealth organisational and cooperative structures. The Commonwealth had changed in
function so drastically that it was now a vehicle for internal censure. This was a complete volte-face in
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the  aims  and  intent  of  the  Commonwealth,  but  it  was  one  which  laid  the  basis  for  future
Commonwealth defence cooperation in the form of the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force.
The reaction in Canada, South Africa, and the New Commonwealth to changed circumstances
in the Commonwealth is but half the story. The following chapter details the rather different experience
that  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  UK  encountered  over  the  period.  The  28 th Brigade
(Commonwealth & ANZAC) will, of course, be revisited. The Canadian and South Africa experiences
while  so  vastly  different  to  one  another  resulted  in  a  remarkably  similar  withdrawal  from
Commonwealth military activity.  That  these two states were driven by the political  changes in  an
international  sense,  especially  with  respect  to  the  new member  states  of  the  Commonwealth,  was
readily  apparent.  The  Canadian  political  establishment's  fascination  with  peace-keeping  and  on
ensuring its role as senior Dominion in the Commonwealth, in practice if not in name, necessarily
obliged its hesitancy in undertaking future Commonwealth military commitments that might threaten
its position on either front. The issues South Africa faced speak for themselves and the strategic priority
of its sea lanes to the UK seemed unable to counter the weight of international and domestic pressure in
the UK for very long. Indeed British basing rights in Simonstown were to end in 197561 and by the time
they might be of some use, in the Falklands war in 1981, South Africa denied the UK access to the port.
In effect the slow and steady withdrawal from Commonwealth military commitments that had been
happening in the previous decade as a result of a reorientation to a more regional approach was further
sundered by the growth of problematic international pressure and domestic peculiarities in both Canada
and South Africa. 
This is the prism through which the events of the next chapter will be considered. The UK and
the Antipodean Dominions responded very differently to the challenges posed on the international and
Commonwealth stages during the 1960s. What effort was expended in ensuring a limited success and
growth of a more broadly based cooperative effort to Commonwealth military activity highlighted the
clear potential for such operations that were ultimately undermined by a combination of regional re-
orientations and a split in the Old Commonwealth only partly attributable to that reorientation and
much more to internal Commonwealth machinations. The journey from that position to what eventually
became the remnants of this older style of joint Commonwealth military cooperation were made all the
61 P.J. Henshaw, 'The Transfer of Simonstown: Afrikaner Nationalism, South African Strategic Dependence, and British 
Global Power' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 3 (1992) p 440
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more curious by the eventual re-introduction of 'official' Commonwealth military cooperation in the
1980s in very different circumstances from the problems and directions faced by South Africa and
Canada in the 1960s. 
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Chapter four: Australia, New Zealand, and UK defence cooperation, 1960-71
Introduction
This chapter details how Australia, New Zealand, and the UK responded to the impediments
placed on Commonwealth defence cooperation throughout the 1960s. It examines the importance of
securing US participation in defence matters, especially for Australia and New Zealand, and presents
how  such  participation  became  an  increasingly  important  and  more  viable  alternative  to
Commonwealth defence cooperation. It highlights how New Zealand pursued a similar peace-keeping
strategy  to  Canada  but  that  its  operations  were  more  focused  on  what  might  be  considered
'Commonwealth' interests. Finally it notes the reduced – both relative and absolute – capabilities of the
UK and the implications this had for Commonwealth defence cooperation generally. It addresses these
problems while  noting  the endurance of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation during the period.  It
argues that all three countries sought to maintain a strong defence relationship with the US, albeit to
varying degrees. It also suggests that Commonwealth interest in South-East Asia was significant, and it
was one of the only regions in which the Commonwealth defence relationship not only succeeded in its
basic aims but became a distinct pillar of Commonwealth engagement and activity during the period.
This  argument  is  explored in  the chapter  by detailing  key purchases  of  military hardware.  It  also
considers the changes to the regional strategic situation both as a result of increased local interest and a
reduced interest in the defence of far-flung territories by the UK and the US. It details the indecision
and unclear solutions to the UK's fundamental difficulties in maintaining remote military deployments
given  immediate  financial  and  political  problems.  It  highlights  the  implications  of  'Confrontation'
between the UK and Indonesia on future Commonwealth defence engagements in South-East Asia.
Finally it concludes by providing some context to the preservation of Commonwealth engagement in
South-East Asia,  and particularly the technological and political  limitations that contributed to that
development.
Whereas military cooperation amongst the Commonwealth, at least with respect to Canadian
and South African participation,  was dominated by the global  political  situation and domestic  and
regional  security  issues  respectively,  Australia,  New Zealand,  and the  UK developed  under  rather
different circumstances. They were subject to pressures that focused on their own regional cooperation
in South-East Asia and an all-pervasive desire to include the US in their military endeavours with the
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intended aim of lightening the burden placed on their armed forces and exchequers.1 A number of
distinct and seriously threatening challenges to ongoing Commonwealth defence cooperation emerged
to  between  1960  and  1971.  Although  it  survived  the  decade  intact  numerous  changes  within  the
Commonwealth, and individually in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK prompted change in how
Commonwealth defence cooperation was conducted. As pointed out in previous chapters joint defence
efforts  were an ongoing process that reacted to developments in  the global political  situation.  The
Middle East Defence Conference and the 1st Commonwealth Division were examples of a broader
response  to  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation,  and  in  many  ways  the  alterations  made  to
Commonwealth defence cooperation in South-East Asia continued that trend, albeit in a more localised
context. 
Perhaps the single largest contributing factor to change was the reduced attention paid to the
region by the UK and the US. There had been a steady reduction of UK forces overseas from 1963
onwards. This reached such a low point that it culminated in a declaration of withdrawal from 'East of
the Suez' (technically east of Aden, but a withdrawal from Aden had been already underway by the
time of the announcement) in November 1971. This caused grave concern amongst Britain's allies.2 In
addition to the UK withdrawal from South-East Asia some attention must be given to US activities in
the region. Australian and New Zealand foreign and defence policies had emphasised the necessity of
US support and of a “Forward Defence” for the Australian continent (and by extension the islands of
New Zealand) even prior to British withdrawal.3 In fact, the British withdrawal at the beginning of the
following decade took place in a context of a concerted and well  substantiated diplomatic push to
strengthen the US presence in the region. The irony, of course, was that the British withdrawal from
South-East Asia came on the foot of the US's reluctance to be involved in the region. A reluctance
which had been committed to policy following the announcement of its Guam doctrine in late July
1969. The combination of the two policy changes prompted a complete redesign of active military
cooperation in South-East Asia which, until the late 1960s, had been characterised by regional defence
arrangements actively supported by the UK. The withdrawal of the UK and the US was mirrored in
1 This often went so far as to reveal to the US their plans for the defence of South-East Asia for review 'in light of their 
[US] plans for counter action'. - Letter from the Prime Minister of the UK to the High Commissioner (Australia) to the 
UK re: Discussion with US Authority on Defence in South-East Asia 25 April 1955 – Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference London 1956 – Defence Brief A1209 box 446 ANA
2 This included the US administration which was both against the move and warned against a public backlash in the US 
should the UK seem to be shirking its duties. - D. Kunz, 'Somewhat Mixed Up Together: Anglo-American Defence and 
Financial Policy during the 1960s' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27 (1999) p 226
3 G. Woodard, Asian Alternatives (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2006), p 287
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Australia and New Zealand with their own withdrawals. This turn to their immediate and localized
defence had been building since the Middle East had been discarded as the focal point for the defence
of the Antipodean Dominions in the mid-1950s.4 In essence,  between 1960 and 1971 was the last
period of significant Commonwealth military cooperation on the scale and in the style as it had been
understood since the end of the Second World War. This was not, however, a complete severance of all
ties and military bonds of cooperation. Elements of cooperation persevered throughout the 1970s and
beyond,  although under  different  titles  and with fewer of  the structural  trappings  that  had defined
Commonwealth cooperation in the 1950s.
This chapter argues that the expansion of the Commonwealth had little negative effect on the
practicalities of Anglo-Australian-New Zealand cooperation. In fact, in South-East Asia specifically it
will  be  demonstrated  that  there  was  a  comparative  growth  of  such  cooperation  amongst  the
Commonwealth with the introduction of Malaysia and Singapore into the broader defence relationship.
However, it was clear that the political and military hierarchies in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK
were  aware  of  the  problems  that  the  expanded  Commonwealth  posed  to  the  continuation  of  this
cooperation.  It  is  suggested  that  the  action  taken  in  response  to  this  came  in  the  form  of  a
reconsideration of the styling and nomenclature of such operations rather than a fundamental redesign
of purpose and content. In other words, the enlarged Commonwealth forced a political adjustment to
reflect the new reality of the Commonwealth, but the substance behind the endeavour was essentially
unaffected.
It is a key argument of this thesis that what effectively amounted to Commonwealth defence
cooperation remained in operation long after any claim could be made for the use of such an all-
encompassing name. Whereas the weight of new developments in the Commonwealth seriously and
negatively affected South Africa and Canadian participation in Commonwealth military activities, the
same cannot be said of the UK, Australia, or New Zealand. The expansion of the Commonwealth, and
the growing political problems, both internationally and domestically, did not have a universal effect
across the 'Old Commonwealth'. In some respects, the individual circumstances of all concerned were
4 Indeed the Australian Chief of General Staff would comment in late 1959 that it 'was absolutely inconceivable... that any
Australian government could ever again contemplate sending troops to fight either in Europe or in the Middle East. The 
whole of the Australian effort would have to be concentrated in the neighbouring area of South-East Asia.' - Telegram 
no. 36/0 Officer of the High Commissioner (South Africa), Canberra to Secretary for External Affairs Pretoria 20 
December 1959 MV 103/1 SANDFA
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readily  apparent  –  internal  difficulties  in  South  Africa  prompted  additional  international  political
pressure, which was not as significant a factor for Australia, Canada, New Zealand or the UK. Although
each had their own internal troubles (Catholic riots in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998,5 the 1967
referendum and associated  unrest  amongst  Aborigines  in  Australia,6 a  Maori  cultural  and political
revival in New Zealand starting in the 1960s,7 and the Quiet Revolution for French Quebec in Canada
also beginning in the 1960s,8) none of these were subject to a comparable level of domestic unease or
international condemnation. Similarly, Canada both pursued its own course and followed the patterns
laid  out  for  regional  defence  that  increasingly  distanced  itself  from  any  coherent  collective
Commonwealth interest. Although it shared the joint belief that cooperation with the Americans was
vital to national and collective defence, Canada was in a position that allowed their government to take
greater  advantage of  US interests  than was possible  for Australia,  New Zealand,  or  even the UK.
Canadian success in this area, undoubtedly aided by sheer proximity, furthered their split from the rest
of the Commonwealth.
In one respect it is important to note that this chapter differs greatly from the preceding despite
dealing with the same time period. There is a much greater overlap of some of the issues that Australia,
New Zealand, and the UK faced than there was between Canada and South Africa. For instance, the
importance of US assistance and engagement was a shared and the paramount concern of all three. The
prevailing strategic paradigm which sought a regional approach to defence and strategic considerations,
as well as the growing number of treaties which attempted to deal with the security of their respective
member states on a regional basis, was also a shared interest.  These interest  were shared amongst
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK not only in a conceptual sense, but in the practicalities of acting
on those shared interests something which was often on a collaborative basis.
Throughout the period the manpower and financial  backing to pursue such objectives were
steadily eroded.9 The result was that the pursuit of these interests, in conjunction with the nature of the
arrangement, was met by introducing new countries into existing arrangements. Ultimately this placed
5 J. McEvoy, The Politics of Northern Ireland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008) p 1
6 Constitutional Amendments 1965 – Referendum A4940 C4257 ANA
7 E. Durr, 'Culture as Experience' in Belonging in Oceania: Movement, Place-Making, and Multiple Identifications 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2015) p 30
8 B. Young, & J. Dickinson, A short History of Quebec (Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008) p 305
9 R.F. Holland, 'The Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan 1945-63' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 12 (1984) p 181
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an exceptionally high demand on all participating countries, to the extent that they were only sustained
by either the introduction or continuation of conscription for years after the end of the Second World
War.  The commitments involved,  particularly for the UK which was involved in  multiple  regional
arrangements, were difficult to manage in such economically stringent and politically unsettled times.
In time, the fundamental basis on which cooperative military endeavours must take place, a global
deployment of personnel and equipment, proved too arduous and expensive a task to be continued
indefinitely by the UK, and its withdrawal left behind a shell of cooperation. The withdrawal of the UK
from  East  of  the  Suez  had  a  profound  effect  on  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  British
engagement  had  been  the  underpinning  of  Commonwealth  activities  since  its  inception,  and  their
withdrawal  coupled  with  the  changes  to  the  membership of  the  Commonwealth  severely curtailed
operations. 
Australian defence spending
Between 1960 and 1970 there was a substantial increase in Australian defence spending and a
corresponding growth in capabilities throughout the decade.10 This growth also started a trend in the
increased divergence of requirements between Australia and its usual supplier of military hardware, the
UK. Australian politicians and service personnel now also considered the US as a potential supplier of
some of its military equipment. US influence and engagement with Australia proved to be a point of
consternation for the UK following the ANZUS treaty. Although there still remained substantial ties
between  Australia  and  the  UK  there  were  a  number  of  comparatively  high  profile  purchases  by
Australia from the US that started in the 1960s. This reflected an ongoing issue, accepted in London as
well, that British companies alone were no longer capable of supplying all of the equipment to meet
military requirements at home and abroad. However, Australian decisions throughout the 1960s not
only acted on that basis but went a step further and considered alternatives even where a British option
to meet requirements was available.
The F-111 tactical strike aircraft is, perhaps, one of the most well known of these given its
troubled development history but it is far from the only such example. The selection of the American
10  On 22 May 1961 the Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies declared an increase of roughly 20% between 
1962/63 and 1963/64 with further expenditure over a six year period peaking at '£A320 million' in 66/67 but which 
would exclude 'any money which may be allocated later for a replacement for the Canberra bombers.' - No. 76 
Savingram from British High Commissioner in Australia 'Australia Fortnightly Summary Part 1' 23 May 1963 DO 164 
58 
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Charles F Adams class missile destroyer instead of the British designed and built County class missile
destroyer was partly on the basis of preference for the American Tartar missile system, and partly on
account of cost.11 
There were differences between the two missile destroyers that made it difficult to compare the
two ships.  One key distinction  was  that  the  Charles  F  Adams  class  utilised  a  single  steam-based
propulsion system, whereas the County class destroyers had a combined gas and steam propulsion
system. This was a major problem for the County class as far as the Royal Australian Navy were
concerned. Similarly, the County destroyers were also about two thousand tonnes heavier, and required
nearly double the crew to operate. The assigned role may have been the same – a missile destroyer –
but their technical specifications created a difference in their associated upkeep and maintenance in
terms  of  manpower,  technical  capacity,  and  the  shipyards  were  markedly  different.12 The  Royal
Australian Navy (RAN) enquired if it was possible to produce a steam-only variant, in a list of other
suggested changes. Although some of their requirements could be met, or were dropped by the RAN, a
steam-only variant was not pursued.13  The decision to purchase the US ship rather than the UK ship
was unsurprising, perhaps, given the gap between what the UK offered and Australian requirements,
but it was nonetheless a severe blow to defence relations as well as the UK shipbuilding industry,
which in the past also included a consideration of the potential work that could be generated in other
major seaports.14
Although the Charles F Adams class was certainly a major break for the Royal Australian Navy
many other Australian naval procurements around this time were all British. These included a number
of  destroyer  escorts,  submarines,  and  anti-submarine  helicopters:  the  River  (British  designation
Leander), Oberon, and Wessex classes respectively. As such, the Australian armed forces entered the
11 A. Cooper, 'At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations: 1945-1971' Journal of Military History 58 (1994) p 
708
12 It is interesting to note that Commonwealth considerations with respect to the employment of shipyards scattered around
the world, not only in the UK, but also in Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Malta, and Singapore were also considered in Royal 
Navy estimates. The political reaction that would result from insufficient work being made available to shipyards in 
those places was considered at both political and service levels. -  Memorandum by the Admiralty Point 13 AIR 19 
Defence Expenditure 1956
13 The Royal Australian Navy advocated for the steam-only option for 'simplicity of operation'. - N. Friedman, British 
Destroyers and Frigates: The Second World War and After (Seaforth publishing, 2012) p 195
14 Also interesting to note in this regard is the introduction of Australian modifications to British-designed ships during the 
period. The Type 12 frigate design submitted for construction was reworked to better suit Australian requirements while 
in construction in Australia. - Minute 'Type 12 Frigates' 5 August 1957 A 1049/6 5172/1/74
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1960s, and continued to operate into the early 1970s, with a high proportion of British hardware with
only a few elements sourced from other than their traditional supplier, even if some of those different
elements constituted large portions of the defence budget. Although it is quite clear that there was a
switch to greater consideration of foreign, especially US, designs and technology, the reality was that
very little changed in the 1960s. Australian armed forces were almost, though not exclusively, equipped
with British-designed, and typically built, hardware. Nevertheless, the door had been pushed open with
the  introduction  of  the  Charles  F  Adams  and  the  F-111;  and  throughout  the  1960s  there  was  an
increased recognition of the various procurement possibilities available to Canberra.15 
Australian strategic policy
In fact the consideration of possibilities outside of the UK was not limited solely to procurement
but  also  extended  to  the  different  elements  of  Australian  strategic  policy  during  the  1960s  and
ultimately formed part  of  the  basis  for  future  Australian  defence  policy.  The concept  of  'Forward
Defence' in which it was envisaged that the defence of Australia could be best guaranteed through a
focus on the security and stability of the South-East Asian region was a relatively straight-forward
development of the regional focus that had been gaining ground since 1947 and had dominated defence
policy since the mid-1950s. 
There were attempts to secure US interest in South-East Asia during the 1960s, but these failed
to generate  a  blanket  guarantee from the US despite  an increasing  level  of  inter-operability at  an
operational level, and engagement on a political level. This had been a much sought after replacement
of the implicit guarantee that the UK had extended to Australia before 1947 when the UK had enjoyed
a more favourable political and economic situation. The situation reached such a low that it led the
Australian Minister of Defence to take the relatively unusual step at the time to seek 'strategic guidance
from Washington', much to the chagrin of the Chief of Defence Staff in the UK. 16 The absence of any
15 Indeed there was significant commentary made of an effort to 'standardise as far as they [the Australian government] can
with the Americans' in terms of military hardware. However, in many instances where this standardisation happened it 
was met with similar British efforts of the same nature, making it a collective readjustment. Furthermore, in other 
scenarios, such as regards to the FN rifle, the Australians did not standardise with the US. So although the intention was 
expressed, the reality of the matter was quite different. - Minute for the Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria from the 
Office of the High Commissioner 'Australian Defence Policy' 17 April 1958 MV 103/1 Australiese-Aangeleenthede 
SANDFA
16 The language used by the Chief of Defence Staff was evocative, categorizing the explanation of Canberra's attempt to 
engage the US with telegram no.1032 as employing 'offensive terms'. This prompted the preparation of a 'historical note'
which covered recent Anglo-Australian-American-New Zealand relations. - Letter from S. Garner to Sir N. Pritchard 17 
October 1963 DEFE 7 52/77/11 UKNAA. The historical note is in the same file.
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similar level of US interest in the form of permanent bases or similar deployments was illustrative of
this comparative lack of commitment to Australia.
Australia's goal of enticing UK and/or US involvement in South-East Asia played a key role in
Australian defence policy. The conflicts in Malaysia and Vietnam over the course of the 1960s and
beyond saw Australian contributions to both countries.17 The ongoing uncertainty regarding the solidity
of the UK and US commitment  to  Australia's  defence in  the region effectively obliged Australian
involvement  in  UK  and  US  activities  in  the  region  in  the  interest  of  retaining  the  support.  The
deployment to Malaysia and Vietnam reflected the ongoing concerns at both a political and service
level in Australian circles. It also highlighted the multiple draws that were placed on the Australian
armed forces as a result of the government's desire to retain the support of the UK and/or the US, and
their inability to obtain the guarantee it desired.
The combination of UK withdrawal and the US Guam doctrine effectively ended all hope for
what Australian foreign and defence policy had endeavoured to create since the end of the Second
World War – a permanent security commitment of substance from either or both the UK and the US to
Australia,  and  by extension  New  Zealand.18 When  that  could  not  be  secured,  as  was  abundantly
apparent by 1971, it was unsurprising that Australian defence policy shifted to focus on the immediate
defence of the Australian Continent – a policy that became known as the Defence of Australia.19
It is important, in this context, to recognise that the Australian shift to the US in the form of
their diplomatic goals, hardware procurement, and other such matters was not at odds with the general
approach taken by the Commonwealth as a whole during the 1960s. In fact, important technological
17 Indeed the Australian Minister for External Affairs said to the Australian Parliament even as early as 1951 that the 
security of South-East Asia, and particularly Malaya but also Vietnam was vital to Australia's defence – a defence which 
if not mounted would have the result that 'Australia itself would be directly imperilled.' - P. Edwards & G. Pemberton, 
Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in South-East Asian Conflicts p 109. It
is hardly any wonder then that, in conjunction with the countries requesting assistance – the UK and the US – that 
Australia would render to both a contribution. 
18 This is perhaps an unfair view, but it was one believed to be 'currently accepted in Whitehall' that both the Australians 
and New Zealanders were 'rather slow to accept a larger defence burden' because they would 'like to see us [the UK] 
maintaining our forces in South-East Asia'. - Report 18 April 1963 DO 164 POL 498/10/1 UKNA
19 Although it was not published until 1987 the formulation of that policy and the actions upon which it was based were 
based on discussions and events that occurred throughout the 1970s in response to a decline in British and American 
activities. - K. Beazley, The Defence of Australia 1987
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advancements emphasised the need to obtain and ensure US support for military endeavours.20 The
problems  which  had  arisen  in  the  previous  decade  concerning  ANZUS  notwithstanding  the
fundamental concept of ensuring US support had not changed in the intervening years. If anything, the
Australian strategic shift at the start of the 1960s to focus closer to home rather than trying to establish
or plan for a contribution to a British wider effort coincided with US policies which advocated a local,
regional, defence initiative that could be supported.
It would be incorrect to assume that Australian defence strategy with its emphasis on securing
US support was so single-minded in that objective that it distanced itself from cooperation with the
UK, which during the 1960s still maintained an extensive, and sophisticated, military capability in the
region. It was a twist of events that placed both the UK and the US in two separate wars, in South-East
Asia, where neither the UK nor the US supported the other. The UK was involved in the Indonesian-
Malaysian Confrontation between 1962 and 1966, while the US was engaged in Vietnam. Australia
deployed its first forces to Vietnam in 1962.21 This was the start of a growth in Australian contributions
to both theatres throughout the 1960s. Establishing much beyond a superficial comparison would be
facile, but the chronological closeness of the two wars and the divergence between the UK and the US
on the issues surrounding these conflicts was demonstrative of the logical flaw in intending to win the
support of either or both in the region.22
The Australian contribution to the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was based around the
Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve on the Malayan peninsula itself.  It attracted neither the
numbers nor the attention drawn to the Australian deployment to Vietnam. This was perhaps influenced
by the uncertainty and suspicion with which the Australian Department of External Affairs viewed the
20 It is interesting to note that US support in terms of ships and planes was considered more likely to be given than ground 
troops. During discussions with the UK in mid-1955 the American President seemed to suggest a specific guarantee of 
ships and planes to the region in the event of a conflict. A qualified assurance still, but an indication of the likely level 
and manner of support that might be expected were support to be forthcoming. In the press release which followed US 
officials amended the agreed text to remove specific references to sea and air forces. - Letter from the Prime Minister of 
the UK to the High Commissioner (Australia) to the UK re: Discussion with US Authority on Defence in South-East 
Asia 25 April 1955 – Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference London 1956 – Defence Brief A1209 box 446 ANA
21 These first deployments were of Australian advisors. - R. Scigliano, 'Vietnam: A Country at War,' Asian Survey, 3 (1963) 
p 48
22 It is interesting to note, however, that the distinction between the two conflicts was the subject of some attention in 
London. - Annex I to COS(63)376 18th November 1963 DEFE 7/2389 UKNA. Also, there has been some consideration 
of how US involvement in the region was to the detriment of British interests, specifically regarding the growth of 
Indonesia, which had already been demonstrated with tacit US support for Indonesian expansion into previously Dutch-
held West New Guinea. - A.J. Stockwell, 'Malaysia: The Making of a Neo-colony' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 26 (1998) p 153
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creation of Malaysia. Malayasia was considered a 'rather transparent, intrinsically flimsy, and probably
impermanent  device'  for  solving  the  lingering  colonial  problems  in  Singapore  and  in  the  Borneo
territories.23
Regardless of any political caution the practical realities of cooperation between the Anglo-
Australian forces in Malaysia and American-Australian forces in Vietnam highlighted the strength of
connection which still existed between Australia and the UK, and was not present to the same degree in
the relationship between Australia and the US. The Australian contribution to the US effort was an
initial  deployment  of  a  small  team that  provided training  and  assistance  to  the  South  Vietnamese
forces.24 This ultimately coalesced into an independent brigade-sized deployment that comprised both
Australian  and  New  Zealand  troops.  Relations  –  while  cordial  –  were  often  complicated  by
disagreements on how to counter insurgency-style operations. The Strategic Hamlet Programme, for
instance,  was an issue of some debate.  By contrast,  Anglo-Australian operations in Malaysia  were
based on established forms and procedures with little practical disagreements. At a very basic level the
difference between the two experiences highlighted the compatibility between British and Australian
forces  that  continued  through  the  1960s.  Nevertheless,  this  was  a  transformative  period  for  the
Australian military generally; doctrinal shifts, national service, new technologies and a generally more
varied technological base all point to that very clearly.25 It was also transformative in the sense that
there was a growing, and practically based, non-UK-centric defence cooperation.
The 1960s was a transformative period for the Australian armed forces. It was quite unlike the
Canadian approach in that it was not conducted in any kind of holistic manner. It was a piecemeal
process  that  flirted  with  new  notions  as  they  arose  rather  than  wholly  committing  to  them.  The
Pentropic divisional organisation, for example, ceased in late 1964 following four years of half-hearted
experimentation.26 Although significant, these changes to the Australian Army's organisational structure
were  not  so  drastic  as  to  affect  the  ability  of  the  1st Australian  task  force  to  absorb  and become
23 Savingram no 5 'Australian attitude towards Malaysia' from British High Commissioner in Australia to Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations 19 March 1963 DO 164 UKNA
24 B. Davies, & G. McKay, The Men Who Persevered (Allen & Unwin, 2005) p 9
25 Indeed the Australian Minister of Defence would announce, on 26 November 1959, a new three-year programme on 
defence matters that would include the end of National Service, a 'major Army reorganisation... [and] an Army re-
equipment programme... the abolition of carriers and of the Fleet Air Arm' and a variety of other measures. - Telegram 
No. 36/0 Office of the High Commissioner (South Africa), Canberra, to Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria 20 
December 1959 MV 103 SANDFA
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interoperable with the New Zealand forces deployed to Vietnam.27 
Indeed, so much came under review and alteration in the Australian armed forces during the
1960s that it  would be all  too easy to assume that there was an attempt to completely rework the
various aspects of the defence forces, particularly in the Australian army, to make it more amenable to
US practices. This does not appear to have been the case. Indeed many of the changes which were
implemented did not fundamentally alter the armed forces for any substantive period of time. The core
elements of cooperation amongst Commonwealth forces were simply not threatened by these changes,
nor was there anything to suggest that these changes made the Army, or any of the other services, more
capable or compatible with non-Commonwealth forces.28 So while the series of changes undertaken by
the Australian armed forces during the 1960s were no doubt significant, the repercussions, in terms of
potential  cooperation  with  other  countries,  were  minimal.  The  Australian  armed  forces,  despite  a
growing non-Commonwealth  element  in  its  materiel  and an increase  in  independent  operations  in
conjunction with non-Commonwealth forces, remained very much coherent as a force inspired and
built around British concepts and doctrines. Given the importance attached to the interoperability of
forces,  initially  across  the  Commonwealth  and  subsequently  outside  of  it,  these  experiments  are
curiously counter-productive but perhaps that helps explain the half-hearted implementation.
In addition to experiments with military organisation within certain Commonwealth countries,
there were political developments taking place across the Commonwealth as well. While Australia was
generally sympathetic to the existing Commonwealth model this placed them in a rather uncomfortable
position.  Throughout  its  history  of  relations  with  the  Commonwealth  successive  Australian
governments and representatives had sought a more formal method of communication amongst the
countries  of  the  Commonwealth.  Although  this  eventually  happened  with  the  creation  of  the
26 The Pentropic organisation (a Division-level organisation consisting of 5 combined arms battle groups of an infantry 
battalion and supporting elements) was never even universally applied to the Australian Army with their contribution to 
Commonwealth forces in Malaya throughout the period retaining the old tropical organisation based on three. - J. Homs 
& W. Morris-Jones, Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship (Frank Cass Ltd, 2005) p 78
27 I. McGibbon, New Zealand's Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy (Exisle Publishing, 
2010) p 216
28 New Zealand's armed forces did not conduct these experiments, yet were easily incorporated into the 1st Australian Task 
Force in Vietnam. Had there been more substantial changes made then there would have been serious concern as to the 
potential of interoperability of forces between Australian and New Zealand. This had been demonstrated, acutely, during 
the Korean war. The possibility of the creation of a unified UN force for Korea was dismissed early on following an 
examination of international contributions. It would simply have taken too long to smooth down any differences in 
doctrine and training to make cooperation between formations with radically different doctrines a practical solution. - S. 
Pichat, A UN legion: Between Utopia and Reality (London: Frank Cass Ltd, 2004) p 55
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Secretariat, the circumstances in which it took place were very much at odds with Australia's intentions.
To the extent that it would be fair to comment that the Commonwealth was divided into New and Old
camps at the start of the 1960s, especially over South Africa and apartheid, Australia found itself rather
firmly planted in a grouping of countries in the Commonwealth which was generally not in favour of
enhanced formal cooperation.29 
This does raise the question of how Australian military cooperation with the Commonwealth
developed  in  light  of  these  new changes.  The  introspective  approach  taken  by South  Africa  was
dictated by internal and external pressures. The turn to the US that dominated Canadian policy was an
obvious development in reaction to the international situation. While the Australian approach initially
indicated a move similar to the Canadians there are crucial differences that set it apart. Although there
were numerous procurement and research options, not to mention the strong desire to secure political
and military backing in the South-East Asian region from the US, there continued to exist a far more
significant  British and what  might  be termed 'Commonwealth'  connection.  This  was,  undoubtedly,
aided  by  the  prior  Australian-New  Zealand  military  cooperation  which  had  been  built  upon  by
generations of politicians and military personnel on both sides of the Tasman sea. 
New Zealand and Commonwealth defence cooperation
Indeed,  it  was  the  close  military  relationship  between  Australia  and  New  Zealand  which
provided a core nucleus around which much Commonwealth military cooperation developed over the
decade.  New Zealand's  armed  forces  had been  a  constant,  if  small,  contribution  to  ongoing joint
Commonwealth activity. The 1960s marked a turning point in Anglo-New Zealand defence matters
much like it did for Australia. While both Australia and New Zealand shared similar strategic priorities,
New Zealand had not sought to replace or augment the UK with the US in the same manner or to the
same extent as Australia. 
New Zealand more closely followed Canada's example throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s
29 It is worthwhile noting here that this divide came at a time in which serious questions were being raised regarding the 
'sovereign equality' of nations. In the immediate post-war period the view of successive Australia, New Zealand, and 
British governments was more persuaded by the idea that this represented an area or areas in domestic policies in which 
foreign countries could not intrude. New member states, both those to the Commonwealth and those coming into being, 
took a very different view. That dividing line between sovereignty and involvement in domestic affairs goes to the heart 
of the trouble between the two sections of the Commonwealth. - J. Battersby, 'New Zealand, Domestic Jurisdiction, and 
Apartheid 1945-57' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 24 (1996) p 114
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with  a  focus  on  peace-keeping  operations.30 Like  the  UK New Zealand  suffered  a  decline  in  the
capabilities  of  its  armed services during this  decade as  well,  with a  wide-scale  reorganisation and
reduction of all three services. The size of New Zealand's armed forces, the scale of these reductions,
and the continued commitment of their military personnel and policy-makers to joint Commonwealth
activity was demonstrative of the value Wellington had put on the Commonwealth military connection. 
There was a consistency in the political position of New Zealand's governments throughout the
1960s where a view had formed that its security was fundamentally tied to its ability to attract the
interest  of other countries.  Ensuring the interest  of other powers required the involvement of New
Zealand troops in  regional  strategic  plans,  which  obliged deployment  of  its  forces  overseas.  Both
Australia  and New Zealand became involved in  both Malaysia  and Vietnam in their  endeavour to
support both the UK and the US in their respective conflicts. Early New Zealand peace-keeping efforts
were also notable for the situations where politicians in Wellington offered their support. In the early
years of the development of modern peace-keeping operations New Zealand had offered a contribution
to the peace-keeping force that would deploy to Egypt in 1956.31 This was ultimately rejected, as was
their renewed offer of support for the variety of operations proposed along the Indian-Pakistan border.
Interestingly New Zealand's  involvement,  or  offers  of  involvement,  in  peace-keeping actions  were
carefully directed at key Commonwealth disputes. New Zealand foreign policy during the 1960s was
very clear in spite of the many ongoing changes both within the Commonwealth and outside of it.
Successive New Zealand governments led by Holyoake between 1961 and 1970 maintained a policy of
limited involvement in the peace-keeping of non-Commonwealth matters.32
The contrasting efforts of both New Zealand and Australia offer insight into the varying levels
of the political rigidity that existed in their respective political spheres – and accompanying foreign
policies. Australia was coming out of a period in which the political sphere was dominated by, Sir
Robert Menzies, a staunch supporter of the UK and the Commonwealth.33 It left that phase following
30 J. O'Neill, & N. Rees, UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold war Era (London: Routledge, 2005) p 24
31 Although this had been tainted by the relatively pro-British view taken by New Zealand, despite their instructions to 
their UN delegate to keep their comments on the action as brief as possible. - R. Pfeiffer, 'New Zealand and the Suez 
Crisis of 1956' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21 (1993) p 142
32 This in itself was a continuation of the 1950s New Zealand foreign policy under McKinnon – J. Crawford, 'A political 
H-bomb: New Zealand and the British Thermonuclear Tests of 1957-58' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 26 (1998) p 145
33 D. Devereux, 'Britain, the Commonwealth and the Defence of the Middle East 1948-56' Journal of Contemporary 
History 24 (1987) p 333
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the accession of Harold Holt and a series of short-lived governments throughout the latter half of the
1960s. Meanwhile New Zealand had entered a period of political stability in foreign policy formerly
enjoyed  by  the  Australian  government.  That  stability  more  or  less  ended  with  the  departure  of
Holyoake in the middle of the 1970s. Nevertheless, there was a level of consistency in both Antipodean
Dominions politically, if at different times, that was not replicated in the UK, or Canada (and although
such stability can be seen in South Africa, it  was a stability established on an anti-Commonwealth
basis). It is perhaps unsurprising, in that context, that New Zealand managed a very consistent foreign
policy that was generally, if not always, supportive of the Commonwealth during this period.
The  relative  consistency  in  policy  must  be  seen  in  the  context  of  a  particularly  volatile
geopolitical setting.  In the 1960s New Zealand was called upon twice to provide troops for active
combat in two separate theatres. Firstly it was asked by the UK to support it and the newly formed
Federation of Malaya against Indonesia in a relatively low-intensity conflict between 1957 and 1963.34
Secondly, the US repeatedly asked New Zealand to make available forces for deployment in Vietnam.35
The deployment of New Zealand troops in 1965 following an earlier deployment of non-combatant
civilian forces was the first time New Zealand troops had been involved in a conflict that did not also
involve  the  UK.  New Zealand's  involvement  with  a  military  conflict  unrelated  to  the  UK or  the
Commonwealth was perhaps one of the most clearly indicative events that the times were changing.
The break, however, was largely symbolic. New Zealand's contribution amounted to the deployment of
a  single  company  for  operations  in  Vietnam,  while  the  1st Battalion  of  the  Royal  New  Zealand
Regiment remained committed to the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Malaya.36 What is noteworthy
here is that the Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia had effectively been resolved by 1966,
less than a year after the US sought New Zealand troops for deployment in Vietnam. So although it
was, by virtue of the deployment to Vietnam, a break with the traditional approach New Zealand had
taken to its defence policy it was not as ground-breaking as it may initially appear.  New Zealand
clearly remained significantly more interested and involved in their contributions to a joint military
formation with the UK and Australia than it was in providing support to US military operations. 
34 A.J. Stockwell, British Documents on the End of Empire Series B Volume 8 Malaysia  (London: The Stationary Office, 
2004) p 635
35 E. Keefer, & J. Glennon (eds) Foreign Relations of the US 1961-1963 Volume 2  (Washington: United States 
Government Publishing Office, 1990) pp 351, 378, 486
36 An earlier proposal to send a small number of men to join with Australia's AATV force of thirty men in 1962 was 
refused by New Zealand's Prime Minister, Holyoake. - Chiefs of Staff Committee 'Meeting with Assistance Secretary of 
Defence' 11 May 1962 PM 478/4/6 UKNA. Also see J. Rolfe, The Armed Forces of New Zealand (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1999) p 16 for a more detailed analysis of New Zealand forces in Malaya and Vietnam.
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In general New Zealand politicians had not been slow to volunteer the deployment of their
armed services to various regions of the world in support of their interests. Their relatively low level of
involvement in Vietnam, even with respect to the size of their armed forces, made it very clear that
New Zealand's support to the US in Vietnam was as much a flag-showing exercise in conjunction with
the ANZUS treaty as it was with an actual commitment to pursuing operations independently of the
UK.
Foreign policy amongst New Zealand's closest allies was undergoing relatively rapid changes
during this period and stood in stark contrast to the relative stability of New Zealand's foreign policy.
Australia had reorientated itself to focus on the 'Near North', meanwhile the UK was working towards
closer  economic  ties  with  the  European Economic  Community.37 The  US was rapidly assuming a
dominant position throughout the Far East even before the UK announced its withdrawal in 1969. By
contrast  New Zealand  took  a  far  more  conservative  view  of  foreign  policy.  Although  Holyoake's
support of the Commonwealth and in particular New Zealand's traditional ally, the UK, was quite clear
New Zealand forces (aside from the New Zealand Special Air Service, and some air assets) were not
committed to the conflict until the situation in Malaya had developed to the point where Indonesian
armed forces entered the Malayan peninsula. Indeed Indonesian soldiers had effectively engaged the
detachment  of  New Zealand  forces  stationed there  as  part  of  an  ongoing –  and unrelated  –  joint
Commonwealth formation before Holyoake instructed that they were to be authorized for operations in
Malaysia.38 Similarly, the New Zealand contribution to Vietnam was initially focused on a very small
civilian commitment  and when militarized was only increased very slightly.  New Zealand's  stance
across all Commonwealth meetings throughout the 1960s was similarly cconservative. It sided with
Australia, South Africa, and the UK when the issue of critiquing another country's internal policy was
raised. 
The 1960s was a time of political and military upheaval around the world, with a variety of new
organisations,  new  political  objectives,  military  technologies,  and  indeed  newly created  countries.
Against that background of turmoil, New Zealand under Holyoake's direction maintained a consistent,
37 This had been building on ever-increasing interest in economic entanglement with Europe since 1956. - C. Schenk, 
'Decolonisation and European Economic Integration: The Free Trade Area Negotiations 1956-58' Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 24 (1996) p 444
38 K. Chin, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p 30
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if perhaps cautious approach to developments around the world. The sticking point was that there was a
lingering perception, certainly in New Zealand, that Holyoake's support of the US effort in Vietnam
was more involved than was actually the case. So much more was made of New Zealand's break with
the UK, both domestically in New Zealand and abroad in the UK and the US, than can be supported by
the substance of New Zealand's actions.39 Unlike neighbouring Australia, which had a clear economic
and manpower commitment to the US in terms of placing orders for military equipment and their major
deployment to Vietnam, New Zealand was much more circumspect in answering US requests. New
Zealand's interest in any kind of cooperative military endeavour appeared to receive a much cooler
reception than it had over the previous two decades and even earlier. However, that reluctance was
applied generally, although with less reservations when it came to the UK and the Commonwealth
more broadly in particular areas such as peace-keeping. 
New Zealand's efforts in peace-keeping deserve some further attention. Much like Canada New
Zealand involved itself early on with peace-keeping activities. It was amongst the first to volunteer for
the UN mission following the Suez crisis of 1956. It also volunteered for a number of missions across
the Middle East, including a rejected proposal for a Commonwealth peace-keeping force in Kashmir
following the series of conflicts between two Commonwealth member states – India and Pakistan.40 
Despite that initial spurt of interest in peace-keeping New Zealand did not follow the same path
as  Canada.  Whereas  Canadian  interests  focused  on  peace-keeping  operations  in  addition  to  its
reorientation to a localized regional-based defence of its home territory New Zealand's approach to
peace-keeping was rather more partisan and reserved. Greatest interest was expressed in deployments
to areas which were fundamentally linked to New Zealand's foreign policy in one form or another. New
Zealand's  offer  to  contribute  to  the  UN Emergency Force,  for  instance,  supported  New Zealand's
relations with the UK.41 However, New Zealand's support of the UK during the Suez crisis was well-
known, and the use of the New Zealand peace-keepers was understandably declined. Shortly thereafter
an offer of a contribution to deploy to the Kashmir region following ongoing conflict between India
39 I. McGibbon, New Zealand's Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy (Auckland: Exisle 
publishing, 2010) p 537
40 The rejection of the New Zealand force was, in fact, an element of a broader rejection of any suggestion of potential 
British involvement, with both sides considering it neither impartial nor significantly partial enough. - J. Colman, 
'Britain and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: The Rann of Kutch and Kashmir 1965' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 37 (2009) p 473
41 M. Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the UN Emergency Force 1956-67 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) p 
67
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and Pakistan  in  the  mid-1960s  was  accepted.42 Given  their  track  record  of  preferential  interest  in
Commonwealth-orientated  peace-keeping  affairs  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  New  Zealand  forces
contributed a major element of the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force in 1980. Contrast this
level of involvement to their active peace-keeping deployments throughout the Middle East and even in
Cyprus. The proposed New Zealand contributions were minuscule in comparison to their willingness to
support more Commonwealth-centric peace-keeping and military endeavours. Whereas Canada under
Pearson took an unambiguous pro-peace-keeping line and committed itself broadly to that role New
Zealand  under  Holyoake  pursued  a  peace-keeping  policy  that  was  favourable  to  the  concept  of
supporting the Commonwealth. 
Such activity placed New Zealand in a rather unique position in that it was favourably disposed
to  the  Commonwealth  and  joint  Commonwealth  military  efforts,  and  made  an  effort  to  conduct
operations in line with those goals unimpeded by other concerns. Australia, clearly conscious of the
growth of the US and particularly US involvement in the Pacific became torn between the US and the
UK following Menzies' resignation in the early 1960s. Canada's interest in Commonwealth activities
had steadily waned as it became increasingly concerned with the broader international situation. South
Africa had as much turned its back on the Commonwealth as it had been forcibly removed from it. The
UK had already started to explore alternatives to its empire and the Commonwealth, which by this time
no longer resembled its original form nor offered the resources and support of the Empire and the
Dominions that it had replaced. It is remarkable that the smallest and least militarily capable nation of
these  five  countries  remained  the  most  interested  in  the  Commonwealth  as  a  tool  of  military
cooperation even when its usefulness was in serious doubt.
UK difficulties during the 1960s
The  UK,  the  lynchpin  in  joint  Commonwealth  military  endeavours,  suffered  a  number  of
reversals throughout the 1960s that impeded its ability to perform that role.43 The most obvious of these
was the number of territories carved out of the British Empire for the creation of new states. Some
twenty new territories became independent of the UK during this period, and a further two independent
42 J. Koops, N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, & P. Williams, (eds) The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) p 223
43 Indeed it was recognised that New Zealand would need to acquire a greater capacity to provide for the logistic support of
its own forces even if by continuing to cooperate with Australia, the UK, and the US. - Letter to Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Pretoria, from High Commissioner (South Africa) in Wellington 'New Zealand's Expenditure on Defence' 19 
June 1963 MV103/4 Verdedigingsbeleid New Zeeland SANDFA
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of Australia and New Zealand following a brief period of trusteeship. Although several of these states
were quite  small,  both  geographically  and in  terms  of  total  population,  it  consisted  of  almost  the
entirety of British territory in Africa. In addition to this swathe of territories being released the last of
the national servicemen finally ended their tours in the final months of 1963 which reduced the UK's
ability to project force overseas. These two events weighed heavily on UK military considerations.
Furthermore,  this  was  all  severely  complicated  by  events  following  the  creation  of  the
Federation of Malaya  in 1957.44 A confrontation with Indonesia arising over a territorial  boundary
dispute resulted in a series of low-intensity operations in Borneo and Sarawak lasting until 1966.45 This
limited engagement, although briefly expanded to operations on the mainland Malayan peninsula, was
countered by a seemingly excessive deployment of British forces. The sheer quantity of men and ships
despatched to secure the territorial borders of the new state was met by further decisions that prompted
the  deployment  of  the  latest  British  interceptors,  the  English  Electric  Lightning.  UK  overseas
deployment to South-East Asia was second only to  British forces in Germany.46 Such live combat
testing of its latest technologies must no doubt have been of immense help to the various branches of
the UK armed forces, but such regional troubles were only one half of the disturbed nature of the UK's
strategic  position.  The effective  loss  of  huge  swathes  of  territory in  Africa  and across  the  Indian
subcontinent fundamentally hindered UK defence capabilities. 
The reduction in the scale  and capability of the British armed forces had been an ongoing
process since the end of the war. It was not until the middle of the 1960s that there was an end to the
44 Although initially holding 'no objections to such a merger [Malaya, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo] Indonesian 
foreign policy changed abruptly in the autumn of 1962. Negative commentary from a former Indonesian Premier, Dr. Ali
Sastroamidjojo, was criticized by Tunku Abdul Rahman, resulting in a 'certain sections of influential Indonesian opinion'
to view the new federation with increasing distrust. This ultimately resulted in Confrontation and comments from the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, that 'if it [the Federation] is an American base for instance, we shall then 
arrange for a Soviet base in our part of Borneo'. - 'Recent Developments in Anglo-Indonesian Relations' p 2 DEFE 7 
UKNA
45 According to Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, the Indonesian stance on this issue went much further. 
Reporting on a frank discussion with the Australian ambassador to Jakarta (an 'amended copy' of which was forwarded 
on to the UK and found in its archives) Subandrio outlines how he believed that the proposed amalgamation could not 
and would not work, that Indonesia was 'not confronting Malaysia, it was confronting the British [of which] Malaysia 
was merely the front for British power', and posed the question 'Did anyone imagine that the Tunku was a bulwark of 
strength against China?'. Commentary by the Australian ambassador at the end of the report detailed just how 
'intransigent' Subandrio was at the meeting which he claimed 'reflects the fact that … [the Indonesian government] has 
been caught up … in its pretensions to grandeur.' - Amended Copy of Telegram no. 1143 from Mick Shann, Australian 
Embassy Jakarta to Foreign Office Canberra, 28 November 1963 DEFE 7 UKNA
46 Annex to Memorandum by the Prime Minister 'Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future' 29 September 1961 CAB
134/1929 UKNA
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kind of military capability that had given the UK the weight if needed to be used as a fulcrum for the
other Commonwealth powers.47 Multiple attempts, both within the armed services and in government
sought to further reduce the overall amount of money being spent on the military. Government-led
initiatives sought cuts in the budget through the introduction of new technologies.
The post-war global British strategy for the deployment of their conventional forces, which had
been  focused  on  a  defence  of  Germany  through  the  British  Army  on  the  Rhine,  and  a  joint
Commonwealth defence of the Middle East,  was in urgent need of an update.  Despite  the rapidly
changing strategic situation, and ongoing financial difficulties, there was no White Paper on defence
until 1966, almost ten years after the 1957 White Paper.48 During that intervening period developments
within the British armed services continued apace. Serious reductions were made on an ad-hoc basis in
an effort to keep defence expenditure down. These were usually taken from the front-line of each
service and were typically undertaken with reference to ensuring the continuation and effectiveness of
the nuclear deterrent.49 Major projects that were scrapped in the 1966 White Paper included the TSR 2
strategic  bomber,  designed  to  deliver  the  UK's  nuclear  weapons,  and  the  CVA-01  with  its
accompanying Type 82 destroyer escorts.
Despite these losses the Admiralty's success in ensuring that the Royal Navy maintained a class
of  ship capable of  operating aircraft  throughout  the 1960s and into  the  1980s,  in  spite  of  a  clear
instruction from successive governments over these two decades that there was no room in the budget
for an 'aircraft carrier', was something of a marvel. That process also highlighted some of the key issues
that faced the UK during this time.50 It was indicative of the steadily debilitating nature of the financial
restrictions placed on British forces which undermined its global capabilities. Any lingering notion that
the UK could continue to act as a lynchpin for significant joint Commonwealth military activity in the
47 Indeed there were drastic efforts to reduce the size of the British armed forces, particularly the army, during this period. 
This had serious implications for the traditional system of inter-Commonwealth alliances between regiments of the 
British Army and their Commonwealth counterparts. The Royal Artillery, for instance, was reduced by effectively 
nineteen regiments (eighteen declared and the nineteenth being a combination of smaller formations) by 1959, and with 
a further reduction planned to be in effect by 1962. This caused considerable concern in South Africa which requested a 
list of the timing of the reductions and what would happen to extant alliances that would now at a loose end following 
the British reorganisation. The UK replied that these alliances would have to become 'dormant'. - MV 148 
Amalgamation of Reduction of British Regiments 'Alliances of UDF Units with Regiments of the British Army' 16 July 
1958 and various annexed letters and enclosures SANDFA
48 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966: Part 1: The Defence Review, Cmnd 2901 UKNA
49 For example, the RAF reduced its front-line fighter squadrons from '480 to 280 by mid-1959' but it accepted that there 
was a military risk involved in such a reduction. - Memorandum by the Minister of Defence Fighter Aircraft CAB 131 
D(58)61 UKNA
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aftermath of the cuts throughout the 1950s was thoroughly put to rest in the 1966 White Paper.51 
Inter-service rivalries of this nature further exacerbated a shaky financial situation, and conflict
was often dictated by funding issues.52 The Royal Navy fought vigorously for the CVA-01 across a
number of  budgets.  The Royal  Navy and the Royal  Air  Force  engaged in  a  particularly long and
arduous debate over whether to pursue an island-based strategy or a carrier-based strategy for British
deployments.  The  Royal  Navy favoured  an  enduring  global  role  centred  on  the  construction  and
deployment of a carrier task force, at the heart of which would be a major fleet carrier: the CVA-01.
The Royal Air Force's 'Island Stance' approach was predicated on the continuing deployment of air
assets to the many British bases scattered around the world.53 The Admiralty 'had doubts about the
political  possibility of  retaining...  the  number  of  bases  required  by the  “Island Stance”  strategy'.54
Meanwhile the Royal Air Force pointed to the fact that even with three carrier groups, only two of them
could be counted upon at any one time and there was never any guarantee that those two would be in
the right place at the right time, a point conceded by the Admiralty.55 This debate formed the framework
which characterized much of the inter-service debates in the UK in the 1960s. Although the Royal
Navy lost out on its carrier-based approach with the cancellation of the CVA-01 in the 1966 White
Paper, the Royal Air Force's island-hopping failed to materialise in any concrete sense either. 
Part of the difficulty with the superficially viable 'Island Stance' was that even where it may
have been  possible  to  establish  such bases,  major  start-up  costs  were  involved.  The  most  limited
practical  implementation  of  the  plan  was  costed  with  extraordinarily  favourable  Royal  Air  Force
50 Specifically the growing rivalry between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy's constant 
endeavours to continue to update itself in spite of an acceptance by the combined Chiefs of Staff, including the First Sea 
Lord, that role of the Royal Navy was to '[deal] with situations short of global war' and, in the RAF's view, this did not 
include the commissioning of such things as guided weapons cruisers, aircraft carriers, sixty-something submarines, 
nearing on 200 minesweepers of various types, and ships powered with nuclear propulsion. - See COS(56)219 7 June 
1956, COS(56)280 25 July 1956, & The Policy Review: Paper by the Admiralty 1956 all in AIR 19. UKNA
51 Serious concerns had already been expressed that the 'reduced Fleet would be a diminution of British influence 
throughout the world: in the East as a whole but especially with Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, Hong Kong, and our 
other associates or dependencies'  1956 Memorandum by the Admiralty Point 31 AIR 19 Defence Expenditure UKNA
52 Conflict was also a regular occurrence between political and service heads of the different branches of the UK's armed 
forces. The Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for Air were caught in a particularly long-winded debate 
regarding whether to have 10 or 12 Lightning Mk.3 squadrons for air defence purposes. - Brief by the Ministry of 
Defence and Air Ministry D(60)32 Military strategy for circumstances short of global war, 1960-70 7 March 1961 DEFE
7 UKNA
53 Brief for Secretary of State 'The Island Stance' Part I 1 February 1963 AIR 19 76/8/L UKNA
54 'Report of Enquiry into Carrier Task Forces' NR(63)2 22 April 1963 AIR 19 UKNA
55 Cabinet Conclusions 26th July 1957 D(57)13 CAB 131/18 UKNA
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estimates of some  £42 million. This accounted for the development of bases at Masirah, Ascension,
Gan,  and  Aldabra.56 It  was  accepted  that  this  minimal  development  would  limit  deployment
possibilities. There were constraints as to how far the air  squadrons stationed at those bases could
reach, and even within that reach the maximum possible intervention with that level of investment was
a single battalion which would be sufficient for only ten and a half days before resupply by sea was
needed.
Although the RAF's 'Island Stance' approach  remained a possibility both during and after the
widespread release of British territory the fundamental issue regarding the political security of these
bases could not be assured.57 The Royal Air Force proposals countered arguments as to the security of
the bases with a somewhat flippant 'Why not?' attitude that flew in the face of mounting international
pressure regarding British deployment and continuing imperial presence.58
Although inter-service rivalry effectively further reduced British military potential there was no
question that the Royal Navy weathered it better than the other two services.59 In part this was down to
simple luck and in part the result of clever design. For example the Admiralty managed to mitigate the
loss of their fully-fledged carriers somewhat with the development of the 'through-deck' cruiser, an
aircraft  carrier  in  all  but  name.60 Similarly  the  1960s  saw  a  major  ship-building  effort  with  the
introduction  of  Leander  class  frigates,  County  class  destroyers,  and  the  first  nuclear-powered
submarine  in  the  form of  HMS Dreadnought.  Meanwhile  the  mishap over  Skybolt  had led to  the
introduction  of  Polaris  and  offered  more  to  catapult  the  importance  of  the  Royal  Navy  at  the
56 Brief for Secretary of State 'The Island Stance' Part II 1 February 1963 AIR 19 76/8/L UKNA
57 Although this point was expressly raised with relation to Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, the British government 
'felt it necessary to proceed with caution in the UN because that body was so unpredictable' and that there could be 
resolutions 'which included a call fro the withdrawal of British bases' put in for consideration given the political 
difficulties they were causing. - Telegram no. 1553 from UK Mission to the UN to Foreign Office 30 September 1963 
UKNA
58 One small paragraph is dedicated to the political difficulties relating to the security of these island bases (point 11 Part 
II). It suggested that it would not be possible for these bases to be 'construed as objectionable and provocative' despite 
their expansion and existence on the basis that they would not 'ordinarily have fighting troops nor air forces' stationed 
there. It claimed that these bases would have 'occasional visiting squadrons', with 'strategic stockpiles of military 
equipment', and 'fuel installations' permanently in place. - Brief for Secretary of State 'The Island Stance' Part II 1 
February 1963 AIR 19 76/8/L UKNA 
59 It is indicative of the bitterness and division within the UK's armed services that, while the Royal Air Force accepted the 
need for seaborne support and supplies, including amphibious landing ships, it was wholeheartedly set against the 
prospect of a fleet carrier for the Royal Navy. When specifically replying to the question 'Is there a possibility of 
compromise?' it was brutal in its assessment that there was not 'where the fleet carrier is concerned'. - Brief for Secretary
of State 'The Island Stance' Point 23 Part III 1 February 1963 AIR 19 76/8/L UKNA
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negotiating table than anything they could have ever possibly sought to argue or achieve through their
own endeavours, which  is  not  to  say that  they  did  not  make  such  attempts.61 In  some ways  this
furthered the cause of cooperation with other members of the Commonwealth.  The primacy of the
Royal Navy, and the corresponding lack of investment in the army and Royal Air Force, including the
end of National Service, created a situation which could be solved – or at least alleviated – by the
Commonwealth, principally by providing more ground forces.
The UK military overseas
It is ironic, then, that British military activity across the decade was characterized by two major
events  that  were  dominated  by  action  on  land.  The  Indonesian-Malaysian  Confrontation  saw  an
exceptionally  large  deployment  of  all  three  services,  each  no  doubt  eager  to  demonstrate  their
importance to the Treasury.62 Their large presence may also have been to offset concerns that the US
considered that the 'military struggle with Indonesia will prove too much for them [the UK] and for
60 Other examples exist and can be found in the plethora of documents relating to the cuts suffered by the various service 
branches of the UK throughout the Cold War period. When requested to furnish a complete order of battle for the Royal 
Navy for the 1960s the Admiralty declined to submit the details of afloat support required to maintain that order of 
battle. - Appendix A to Annex to COS(60)276 'Admiralty Study to complement the Study on Military Strategy for 
Circumstances Short of Global War' 17 October 1960 DEFE 7 UKNA. The decision to leave out afloat support was 
particularly bothersome given that it had been established that it would not be possible to rely on bases ashore (this was 
in reference to the possibility that Singapore, Malaysia, and other areas might not be viable bases during a conflict). - 
Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War JP(60)16 27 June 1960  DEFE 7 UKNA
61 Part of what made the Admiralty submarine-based approach more attractive than the Skybolt proposal, even before the 
US withdrew from the Skybolt concept, was a change in the requirements for the British  nuclear deterrent. Instead of 
seeking to destroy '50% of 40 [Russian] cities' which according to the Treasury 'could not be afforded' there was now 
growing interest in a figure of '65% of 20 [Russian] cities' which lined up more favourably with Admiralty proposals for 
a 'hunter/killer/Polaris' submarine' nuclear deterrent than the Royal Air Force projected it could achieve with 
V.C.10/Skybolt for a similar cost. - Minutes from BND(SG)61 4 Point 8 AIR 19 UKNA. It is also interesting to note that
the Polaris missile itself had been considered and found wanting by the UK on the basis that it had 'insufficient range to 
satisfy our requirements'. - CAB 131/18 D(58)47 UKNA. Another consideration against Polaris was that it was known to
require a 'much larger supply of fissile material' which was already in short supply than the equivalent force composed 
of either or both of V bombers and Blue Streak missiles. - Cabinet Conclusions Minute 3 point b CAB 131 D(58)24 
UKNA. Furthermore it had been viewed that the distribution of Polaris, on a national basis, could well lead to calls for 
further distribution to France, Italy, and potentially even Germany, which was all preferably avoided as far as senior 
American service personnel were concerned. Meeting of the Minister of Defence with the Chiefs of Staff and General 
Norstad: Extract from Minutes of MM/COS(60)8 27 July 1960 DO169 F108/12 UKNA. Also see K. Young, 'The Royal 
Navy's Polaris Lobby,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 25 (2002) p 65 for analysis on how such attempts were made.
62 Two brigade groups were initially deployed by the British Army, one deployed in Sarawak and the other in Brunei and 
Sabah with individual battalions being regularly rotated in and out of both the region for operations and for jungle 
warfare training in Malaysia. This number grew as the Confrontation continued, however, eventually reaching four 
brigades by 1965. - Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia Annex I to COS376/63 Points 48 and also see Appendix B 
DEFE 7. Meanwhile the Royal Navy, although noting the initially limited deployment of ships to the region, outlined a 
plan which would see 'the whole of the Far East Fleet, including at least one strike carrier' to be made available for 
operations. Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia Annex I to COS376/63 Appendix A Point 44 DEFE 7
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which we [the US] will have to shoulder the burden.'63 There were, in fact, more British assets deployed
to the region than what was required to defend against what British intelligence services suspected
Indonesia could realistically deploy on extended offensive operations.64 Furthermore it involved almost
every element of the British armed forces – including special  forces and support elements.  It  was
notable alone for the sheer number of warships dedicated to the patrol of the waters around Malaysia –
approximately 80 ships throughout the three year period – many of which were on prolonged duty.
Although the Indonesian navy was large, the number of comparable ships it could deploy reliably was
far fewer.65 There were a number of requests for assistance from the UK to its nearby Commonwealth
allies, Australia and New Zealand over the course of the conflict. The defence of Malaysia had even
become an Australian election issue. As a result requests were considered to need 'careful consideration
as to timing' undermining the coherence of any potential support.66 This support was forthcoming but
both  Australia  and  New  Zealand  fielded  relatively  small  contributions.  New  Zealand's  small
contribution only appeared in the form of the battalion already in position on the Malayan peninsula.
Although the Malaysian contribution was much larger all three were dwarfed by the deployment of
British troops. The British troops included the Gurkha battalions that had been retained following the
63 Further concerns were expressed, in addition to the concern regarding the inability of the UK to contain Indonesia, with 
respect to the future viability of the US bases in the Philippines, and the potential ramifications of a collapse of the 
Indonesian economy, should the US oppose Indonesia over this issue. - Minute for the Minister of Defence: American 
Policy Towards Indonesia FS/63/106 8 November 1963 DEFE 7 UKNA
64 The report was rather dismissive of the threat posed by the Indonesian Army. In fact a mere two paragraphs, both 
relatively small at a few sentences each, detail the Indonesian Army, despite the entire Annex numbering some fifteen 
pages. It claimed that 'the maximum force which the Indonesians could effectively deploy and maintain on major 
operations would be a brigade group by land or sea, and two or three battalions by air.' Indonesian Confrontation of 
Malaysia Annex I to COS376/63 Appendix A Point 3 and 4 DEFE 7 UKNA. Further reports on the amphibious 
capability of the Indonesian armed forces suggested that even this had been exaggerated with respect to their capacity to 
launch an amphibious assault. The limited number of landing craft available, most of which was of 'dubious 
serviceability' and at any rate 'dispersed throughout the Indonesian Archipelago' suggested that any such attack was in 
fact limited to a 'battalion group' with a 'brigade group' (the original estimate) only possible with a 'crash programme 
[lasting] three months'. The total combined strength, assuming it was all brought to bear, would amount to eight or nine 
battalions – control over which was believed would disintegrate to local commanders within 'a few days of launching the
operation'. - Annex to COS 388/63 Indonesian Military Capabilities against Eastern Malaysian up to April 1964 DEFE 7 
UKNA. Although there was some concern as to its relatively modern air force 'many of the airfields which the 
Indonesians would need for operations against the Borneo territories... lack the necessary infrastructure to support 
continuous operations lasting several weeks' - Appendix 3 to Annex to COS 388/63 The Indonesian Air Force April 1964
DEFE 7 UKNA
65 The Indonesian Navy was estimated to number '1 cruiser, 13 destroyers/escorts, 12 submarines, 29 coastal escorts, and 
26 fast patrol boats' and 26 support craft ranging from minesweepers to submarine tenders - Indonesian Confrontation of
Malaysia Annex I to COS376/63 Appendix A point 1 DEFE 7 UKNA. Incidentally, this number was in fact inflated as 
well with the 'majority of the larger ships of their surface fleet (1 cruiser, 7 destroyers, and 4 frigates)... [were] 
undergoing refits or extensive maintenance'. -Annex to COS 388/63 Indonesian Military Capabilities against Eastern 
Malaysian up to April 1964 DEFE 7 UKNA 
66 Annex to COS(63)63 'Matters for Discussion by the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee – Indonesia' 5 November 
1963 point e DEFE 7 UKNA
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independence  of  India  and  these  battalions  remained  a  source  of  difficulty  with  regards  to  their
deployment and the manpower ceilings imposed on the British Army.67 
British  indications  of  an  early  departure  from the  region,  from as  early  as  1965  with  the
Confrontation still ongoing, were met with a furious reaction from both Australia and the US. 68 The
UK's difficulty was, once again, financial – ironically this was undoubtedly compounded by the efforts
by the various armed services of the UK to prove to the Treasury that they needed all of the money in
the budget for defence, and probably more. The cost to maintain operations to contain the Indonesians,
with extremely limited support from the Commonwealth countries in the region and none from the US
was an extraordinarily high burden for the Treasury to bear. Operationally part of the difficulty with the
deployment was that the international political atmosphere hindered offensive action. This obliged the
UK, and its partners, to maintain such a deployment of forces effectively for as long as Indonesia's
government  saw  fit  to  continue  its  policy  of  Confrontation.  In  the  event  the  Confrontation  with
Indonesia was 'won' when Sukarno's government in Indonesia fell apart rather than as an outcome of
any British or Commonwealth action in the region.
Almost  contemporaneously with the Confrontation was the Aden Emergency in the Middle
East. The casualty rate and deployment level were significantly lower in Aden than they were in the
Confrontation despite the Aden Emergency lasting a year longer. The lack of interest in the pursuit of a
Commonwealth  commitment  to  Aden in  the  Middle  East,  which  had been the  traditional  area  for
support operations of Commonwealth members, stood in stark contrast to the support requested and
received by the UK in South-East Asia. This is perhaps one of the clearest indications of the shift in
strategic priorities in the Commonwealth from being centred on the Middle East to regional priorities.
Aden, now effectively a purely British interest with no local supportive populace or government, was
effectively ceded to its fate despite its clear strategic importance. Certainly the problems of maintaining
such  a  strategically  vital  post  were  apparent,  and  the  decision  must  be  considered  in  light  of  an
agreement for a joint US-UK naval base in Diego Garcia in late 1965. This provided, after a relocation
programme, a more secure naval base free of protests by any native inhabitants. British interests in the
region and indeed their  interests  outside of Europe were steadily reduced throughout  the post-war
67 Summary of Conclusions of the MM/SM(62)4th Meeting attended by the Minister of Defence, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State for Air, Point 7. 24 May 1962 AIR 19 UKNA
68 J. Subritzky, 'Britain, Konfrontasi, and the End of Empire in South-East Asia 1961-65' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 28 (2000) p 223
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decades. The effective withdrawal from between Cyprus and South-East Asia, characterized by both the
lack of interest by Commonwealth partners and the growth in difficulty in maintaining bases in the face
of newly independent territories, had more or less been completed with the withdrawal from Aden in
1967. 
There was far from a uniform or universally agreed acceptance of this withdrawal, even in the
UK. British plans for the construction of new bases were regularly suggested in spite of the precarious
political and financial situation throughout the 1960s.69 Such plans included detailed suggestions for the
construction of a new naval base in East Africa, specifically in Kilindi, Mombasa. This had previously
been used temporarily as a naval base for the British Far East Fleet during the Second World War, but
the  proposal  was  never  to  come  to  fruition.70 Increased  local  pressure,  and  a  readily  available
alternative at Diego Garcia that had US support made these plans unattractive. This was reflected in the
Defence White Paper of 1966 which reiterated the importance of cooperation with allies in the pursuit
of the UK's goals.
The main  focus  of  British  interests  during  the  1960s was in  managing a  withdrawal,  both
planned and in reaction to events, while simultaneously exploring further cooperation and involvement
with its allies. Those nations with which the UK sought such cooperation, however, steadily expanded
throughout  the  1960s  largely in  line  with  their  own narrowing focus  on  their  immediate  regional
concerns. The UK was also not above narrowing its strategic focus. In particular, British cooperation
with  nations  on  the  European  continent  was  the  subject  of  remarkable  growth  during  the  period.
Although the UK did not become a member of the EEC until 1973 the interest in membership arose
69 There are detailed drawings of naval bases and supply routes stretching from the UK to Australia and towards Hong 
Kong that highlighted the precarious nature of the sea and air routes from one end of British territory to the other. One 
route passes through Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus (which were all considered Class I bases in that they could supply 
everything required without further development). However, this route then needed to transfer through Turkey and 
Persia before moving to the Seychelles and the Maldives (both considered in need of further development) before 
drawing an line directly to Perth in Australia. The route from Gibraltar through to Cape Town and from there into the 
Indian Ocean was marked as being 'subject to further study'. What is clear, however, is that the spate of political 
developments had undermined the logistical supply route from the UK out to the Far East and that the alternatives 
available were ill-suited to requirements. -  Appendix A to Annex to JP(61)91 'Strategic Dispositions and Capability 
1970' 11 March 1961 PREM11 UKNA
70 It was considered 'most unlikely that we [the UK] should be able to use this base for any purpose of our own after Kenya
becomes independent.' -Minute for the Prime Minister 'Defence Policy' 9 October 1961  PREM11 UKNA. There has 
been some speculation that some of the difficulties encountered with some of the more reasonable aspects of the plan, 
such as a British naval base to be located in Australia, were the result of local desires to prevent, delay, or otherwise 
hinder any potential British withdrawal from the region. - A. Benvenuti, 'Australian Attempts to Forestall Britain's 
Military Disengagement from South-East Asia, 1965-1966' Diplomacy and Statecraft 20 (2009) p 95
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when the first application was lodged in 1961.71 Indeed there had been detailed discussions between the
UK and Australia with relation to the 'brass tacks' of 'the Common Market problem' as early as 1962.72
The announcement of a withdrawal from East of the Suez in 1969 in many ways highlighted the
difficulty with British involvement in South-East Asia. Commonwealth cooperation and strategy was
effectively based on the defence of the communication and support structures between the UK and
overseas territory. The theoretical establishment of Main Support Areas which were to sustain a British
war effort on a regional basis was a proposal fundamentally without substance.73 The Main Support
Area concept presupposed a level of local technical and industrial capacity comparable to that found in
the UK.74 That level of development and security of communication routes simply was not something
which could be assured outside of North America.75 During a time when the focus both nationally and
internationally was on the need for a national defence built on a regional rather than a global basis the
idea that support from the UK could be possible with an actively hostile Middle East and an indifferent
South Africa was never actionable. 
In contrast the armed forces of the US, by virtue of their country's geographic position, could
reach both the Far East and Europe without travelling through Africa or the Middle East. The UK
lacked not  only the  economic  power  to  achieve  such long-range influence  but  was  fundamentally
hampered by geography. The rationale behind Commonwealth cooperation, for the UK, had come to
71 Even at this early stage such interest in the EEC had raised alarm bells in Australia regarding the UK's commitment to 
the South-East Asia region. - A. Benvenuti, 'Australian Reactions to Britain's Declining Presence in South-East Asia 
1955-63' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34 (2006) p 420
72 Letter from Mr. Menzies to Mr. Macmillan 18 April 1962 PREM11 T211A/62 UKNA
73 These were 'areas which contain concentration of man-power, industrial potential or sources of food or raw material, 
such that they are essential to the war effort'. Specifically they included the UK, the American continent, Africa south of 
the Sahara, including East Africa, and Australia & New Zealand. India's absence was on account of the 'uncertainty as to 
her political future' and that it was 'more exposed to air attack than the other main support areas'. - Strategic Position of 
the British Commonwealth RG 25 Vol 247 File D-19-15 LAC
74 Indeed the Commonwealth Migration Council had long advocated that serious consideration be given to the possibility 
of the migration of industry, as well as people, from the UK to the various nations of the Commonwealth in an effort to 
ensure that, should war erupt, the Commonwealth would not be completely denuded of industrial capabilities in the early
stages of the war. -Letter from CL Heater to Dr. Erasmus South African Minister of Defence 22 June 1951  MV128/2 
Besoek aan Buiteland Minister en Geselskad 1951 SANDFA
75 Ibid. The maintenance of the routes of communication between the UK and the Main Support Areas required that a huge 
swathe of potential territory needed to be held to make them viable. Western Europe, including Scandinavia; North-East 
Africa and the Middle East; India; and South-East Asia all needed to be held in order to ensure that the lanes of 
communication and resupply remained open. While there was some possibility of a route between the UK and the US 
being held, the problems of the rest of the routes were all well-known. Furthermore, it was considered that 'under the 
circumstances it is doubtful whether the industrial potential of the UK could be maintained. … [there was] a grave risk 
that the UK would be reduced to a Malta-type existence.'
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rest  on  historic  and  cultural  ties.76 There  was  no  longer  a  pragmatic  basis  under  which  joint
Commonwealth  military  activity  could  be  conducted  without  subjecting  the  UK  to  a  logistical
nightmare scenario where its lines of supply were problematic even before any potential conflict had
erupted. This situation and the accompanying problems of resupply and tenuous logistical lines had
been apparent since the late 1950s. Specifically after 1957 the last direct route from RAF Khormaskar
in Aden was to be found through RAF Gan in the Maldives. 
With Aden's independence in 1967 there was a surge in the complications involved in reaching
RAF Gan. Despite intermittent subsequent activity RAF Gan ceased operations by 1971. All of the
possible alternative routes were problematic. The base at Cyprus still possessed active airfields, and
advancements in military technology afforded the Royal Air Force greater operational range than ever
before.77 Even still, it was problematic to maintain an air supply route from Cyprus to the Maldives
with the technology of the period.78 Such activity was subject to the whims of the local Arab powers,
either by virtue of them offering airbases and other facilities, or an offer of 'overflight rights'. 79 While
the latter was technically feasible to enforce if necessary without political agreement for some aircraft
the precariousness of such an arrangement made it untenable.80 The reality of the situation was that the
supply line to the Far East would become hostage to how those states viewed British policy. This was
unacceptable even if they were likely to receive approval which was far from assured considering the
legacy issues left  over from the Mandate of Palestine at  the start  of the Cold War and continuing
76 This manifested in a variety of ways, but cross-Commonwealth communication beyond Prime Ministerial and service 
meetings was quite significant. The Commonwealth Press Union, for example, provided a cheap means of cross-
Commonwealth communication. - D. Cryle, 'Cornerstone of the Commonwealth: The Press Union and the Preservation 
of the Penny Cable Rate 1941-67' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42 (2014) p 154
77 Indeed following 1957 it was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff that this sovereign base alone was sufficient for their needs. - 
E. Hatzivassilou, 'Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus Question March-December 1956' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 19 (1991) p 260
78 With a distance of some 3,366 miles between Cyprus to RAF Gan only the RAF's strategic bombers of its combat 
aircraft could make the trip without refuelling. Only a minority of its extant transport aircraft could make the trip 
unaided. The expansion of the RAF Transport Command to included the provision of transport aircraft such as the 
Vickers VC10, Shorts Belfast, and the Bristol Britannia allowed for a technical capacity to make the trip limited 
numbers of these aircraft were available. In effect Transport Command could only provide 'about a divisional lift' and 
this was likely to have been augmented by charter planes. - Record of Meeting between H. Watkinson, and R. 
McNamara, 1 May 1962 DEFE7 UKNA
79 There were some relatively friendly states in the region, Jordan specifically may still have been a possibility but 
probably not for extended and guaranteed access; which is what was required. - N. Ashton, 'A Special Relationship 
Sometimes in Spite of Ourselves: Britain and Jordan 1957-73' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 33 
(2005) p 239
80 Annex to Memorandum by the Prime Minister 'Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future' Part II 29 September 
1961 PREM11 UKNA
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objections to British policy in the Middle East.81 The route around South Africa was complicated not
only by the sheer distance involved but also due to ongoing upset surrounding South Africa's domestic
policies. Contributing to the new US base at Diego Garcia was ill-advised as it contained many of the
same problems as that  of RAF Gan.82 Similar  ideas,  such as the aforementioned possibility of the
creation of a British base on the coast of East Africa around Mombasa, also failed to suit British needs
and circumstances. There were, however, viable alternatives that significantly reduced the cost to the
Treasury and were less politically problematic. The Trucial States offered to pay the costs of continuing
to operate a base and station warships for their defence from 1968 onwards. The route from Cyprus to
the Trucial States was more technically feasible, the local situation clearly more favourable to British
deployments,  and  the  cost  to  the  Treasury  would  be  comparatively  minimal.  However,  how  the
international community, and particularly neighbouring Arab states, would react to a state in the region
paying for the British military to remain certainly made that an unattractive prospect. Indeed in the
preceding year the UK was largely considered by a majority of the neighbouring Arab countries to have
supported the Israelis in the 1967 war, with corresponding implications for UK relations.83
With UK basing possibilities along the two routes around Africa fundamentally compromised
and the next nearest base at best half an ocean away from either the Suez or the Cape it had effectively
become impossible for the UK to guarantee its lines of supply and support beyond Africa. So although
Commonwealth defence cooperation had, in effect, survived the 1960s and was more or less assured in
South-East Asia for some time into the future, it could not be reliably reached or supported from the
UK. The importance of maintaining the supply line to Australia and the Far East had been paramount in
both World Wars. With that line effectively cut the possibility of any enlargement of scale or scope of
Commonwealth cooperation in the last remaining region of the world where such a development could
possibly have existed, was extinguished. 
81 The UK was very aware, and commented publicly, on the fact that Palestine was proving an ongoing debilitating issue in
Anglo-Arab relations. The British Secretary of State would claim that a 'solution to the Palestine problem is important... 
because we [the UK] want to secure the unity of purpose of the countries of the Middle East.' Statement by the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs at Beirut 23 November 1955 MV 196 SANDFA
82 Much of the difficulty surrounding Diego Garcia as a potential site for a military base were resolved following 
discussions with the US which provided for a favourable (to the UK) share of the economic cost of such an endeavour. - 
C. Chen, 'A Diplomatic Tightrope: The Whitlam Government and the Diego Garcia Dilemma' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 42 (2014) p 533
83 W. M. Louis, 'The British Withdrawal from the Gulf 1967-71' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 31 (2003)
p 83
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Despite this tenuous connection South-East Asia received priority deployments from the UK
throughout the 1960s.84 This region was prioritized to such a degree that towards the end of the 1960s it
became very clear that there were, in effect, two columns of British power. One was based on the
British Isles and in Germany, and the other in Singapore and Malaysia. What disappeared during the
decade was the link between those two pillars.85 Attempts had been made to fill that link, first with the
Middle  East  Defence  Conference  in  the  previous  decade,  and  subsequently  by  organisations  like
CENTO. There was no clear solution to the ongoing objection to a continued British presence in the
Middle East. As a consequence there was no viable replacement of the surety that British bases at Aden
and Simonstown had previously offered.86 
Even where such objections to British deployments did not directly exist, the possibility of that
changing, or providing grounds for increased hostility from certain other countries in the region (such
as  Iran's  interest  in  Kuwait  on the  basis  of  a  supposed British influence  in  the  country in  1967),
remained a constant issue.87 These concerns were shared by the service branches themselves as well,
especially with regards to South-East Asia where the British Army was particularly concerned that it
might become involved in a land war and be dragged into a situation not unlike the French experienced
in Indochina and Algeria.88
Even though funds for maintaining such facilities in the region could potentially be found in the
84 This, however, is not to say that reductions were not also made to the deployments to the Far East. Far from it, between 
1957 and 1960 the intention had been to reduce the aircraft stationed there by approximately 35 planes. - The Policy 
Review: The RAF Programme 1957/58 and 1958/59 Note by the Air Ministry Point 9 section E in AIR 19 UKNA. 
Events in the region would supplant that intention, however, resulting in increased deployment. The after-effect of this 
being a higher priority for the region while it was still a major theatre of operations (i.e. until 1971). Similar distinctions 
exist for the Royal Navy in this regard. Early planning regarding the Far East, continuing into 1957 with the Chiefs of 
Staff meeting of 22 February 1957 suggested a naval deployment to Singapore of 'two frigates but with no naval base' 
with a 'show of frigates' in the Persian Gulf that was seen to be 'totally inadequate to carry out the role assigned to [the 
Royal Navy] in that document [COS(57)47. - Long Term Defence Review: The Royal Navy P5 March 1957 AIR 19. For
more detail see COS(60)276 including it annexes and appendices in DEFE 7/2232 UKNA.
85 This had been recognised as early as 1952 which recognised the importance of proper support and that, given the choice,
if reductions were to be made then they should come from the Middle East Theatre. - FO 371/102823/JE 1192/676 
'Middle East Policy' 11 December 1953 UKNA
86 The guaranteed future use of Simonstown was covered by mutual agreement following the British handover of the base 
to the South Africa government in 1955. - MV 190 Simonstad 'Exchanges of Letters on Defence matters between 
Governments of the Union of South Africa and the UK June 1955' Part II SANDFA
87 The Royal Air Force had even taken advantage of some of these 'reinforcement routes' to deploy some of their shorter 
ranged aircraft before the political situation in the countries they were flying over deteriorated further. This of course left
those squadrons if not stranded out there then at least stuck on deployment for the foreseeable future. - Brief by the 
Ministry of Defence and Air Ministry D(60)32 Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War, 1960-70 7 
March 1961 DEFE 7 UKNA
88 Letter from CEF Gough to General Sir George Cole 11 January 1961 DEFE 7 UKNA
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Treasury  the  difficulty  by  the  end  of  the  decade  was  that  this  was  simply  no  longer  a  priority
expenditure, of either economic or political capital, for the UK. Although one can certainly marvel at
the ingenuity of the Royal Navy by ensuring the acquisition of miniature carriers through wordplay it
highlights the inability of the Exchequer to provide the resources required to protect British possessions
and interests.
Conclusion
Although much of the focus here has been on the UK, that is solely to account for the fact that it
was  their  departure  from  South-East  Asia  that  significantly  reduced  the  level  of  Commonwealth
cooperation in the region. It was a departure brought on by problems in the Middle East, a fact which
had long been recognised in British military policy but for which no solution was ever found. The
defence of Australia, New Zealand, India, and much of the Far East rested upon the security and safety
of the supply lines from the UK through the Middle East or, prior to the construction of the Suez Canal,
around the Cape of Good Hope. When that was lost,  it  became irrelevant how many squadrons or
flotillas were in South-East Asia, or how many interested nations – even Commonwealth nations – in
that region were in continuing cooperative efforts. The defence of the UK itself was forever foremost in
British military thought – and the importance of a localized national defence increasingly advocated for
in political circles around the world throughout the Cold War – it was untenable to risk a divide of
British military strength, at a time when its comparative strength was decreasing with respect to other
major powers.
In many ways this was a bleak period for Commonwealth defence cooperation more generally.
Canada and South Africa contended with their own issues, as detailed in the previous chapter, and were
effectively removed from the equation insofar as any possibility of a continuation of Commonwealth
defence cooperation could be said to exist. Meanwhile, Australia was increasingly enticed by more
suitable US technology and after the retirement of Sir Robert Menzies had a political establishment
which was more interested in US engagement in South-East Asia. New Zealand was formulating a new,
if conservative, defence policy. The UK was left with a dying beacon of Commonwealth cooperation in
South-East  Asia,  but  one  which  was  increasingly  tricky  to  engage  with  and  support  due  to  the
complications in connecting the British Isles and the Far East.
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It  would  be  neater  to  suggest  that  this  amounted  to  the  end  of  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation. The argument that the reduction in British deployments worldwide led to the creation of
two pillars  of  power,  one in  Europe and the  other  in  South-East  Asia,  which were fundamentally
undermined and as a result finished following the collapse of the link between the two is a compelling
argument.  The  withdrawal  from  East  of  Suez  certainly  presented  challenges  for  continued
Commonwealth  cooperation,  as  indeed  did  the  changes  to  the  Commonwealth  structure  and  the
influence of other international actors as outlined in this and the previous chapter. However, while this
may have been an end of sorts there were a variety of mitigation measures taken by Australia, New
Zealand, and the UK in response to these developments. Indeed the story of the 28 th Commonwealth
Brigade was far from finished in 1970. It would persist until well into the mid-1970s. Furthermore,
South-East Asia remained a bedrock of Commonwealth military engagement with the creation of the
Five Power Defence Arrangements. Arrangements which took stock of all of these changes and adapted
themselves to continue in their existing role irrespective of developments. For Commonwealth defence
cooperation the 1960s saw the development of a wide variety of challenges that it effectively amounted
to an existential threat. It was not until the end of the following decade that it became clear that this
cooperation had not died but that it was reworked to better reflect the new international context. 
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Chapter five: Joint Commonwealth defence research
Introduction
This  chapter  examines  joint  Commonwealth  defence  research  between  1949  and  1981.  It
highlights  the  decreased  capacity  of  the  UK  to  continue  to  supply  the  Commonwealth  with
conventional weapons. It  points to how the Commonwealth began considering a greater variety of
options  to  meet  requirements.  It  explores  the  joint  nuclear  research  effort  conducted  amongst  the
Commonwealth,  and  the  unwitting  contributions  that  were  made  to  the  development  of  nuclear
weapons  programmes  in  South  Africa  and  India.  Finally,  it  examines  the  role  of  the  US  in
Commonwealth nuclear weapons development and research more generally. This chapter argues that
the Commonwealth as a whole, including the UK, began to consider alternative options to UK-supplied
military hardware. This was, in part,  driven by an increasingly competitive and varied selection of
hardware available from the US. It examines South Africa's different path and how its internal situation
and international response led to the development of its own armament industry.  This argument is
framed in the context of the long-term implications and process of defence procurement that had the
effect  of  continuing  cross-Commonwealth  interoperability  and  compatibility  of  equipment  for  far
longer than the political will to do so existed. This fits into the overall argument by providing further
evidence for a continuation of Commonwealth defence cooperation long after the basis for it had failed,
as well as pointing out key instances of Commonwealth defence cooperation that occurred during the
period. These issues are approached in three ways. First, the chapter details the increased competition
in conventional weapons research. Second, it explores the joint research efforts and the arms sales that
supported  defence  research  in  the  UK  specifically.  Finally  it  concludes  with  an  analysis  of  the
implications for Anglo-Australian nuclear research in the context of continued Commonwealth defence
cooperation and points to the mercenary-like approach pursued by successive British governments in
an effort to ensure that the UK retained a relevant independent nuclear deterrent.
Joint  Commonwealth  defence  research  is  a  complex  topic  to  consider  because  there  is  no
official  organisation that  coordinated this  activity on any substantive level.  That  no single archive
encompasses  all  the  material  needed to  examine the  broader  implications  is  a  serious  obstacle  to
analysis that greater ease of travel worldwide and digitisation has not yet fully overcome. This has
influenced  the  broader  historiography  by  skewing  the  analysis  towards  a  national  focus.  Where
international  comparisons  are  made they are often  too heavily weighted towards  bilateral  research
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agreements and rarely makes connections outside of the comparative. The vast bulk of research on UK
nuclear development and strategy,  for instance,  is written from the perspective of Anglo-American
strategic planning and cooperation.1 This is in spite of the fact that British nuclear technology in its
earliest stages was influenced by immediate Commonwealth considerations – both in terms of how
research was conducted and where weapons were deployed. Furthermore there is a dearth of analysis
on the implications of the delay between research and procurement on defence projects after 1947. This
is  particularly important  in  the context  of continuing Commonwealth military connections  and the
delay between the Dominions turning towards the US and other foreign suppliers and the resulting
consequences.  This  chapter  approaches  the  subject  cognisant  of  those  limitations,  even  as  it
acknowledges that the depth of detail that can be provided here will be less than that of an analysis
which focused specifically on the research and procurement programmes of any single country. 
One of the more notable aspects of Commonwealth cooperation in this area was the exchange of
personnel  and technology in  the  field of  nuclear  weapons development.  Both  Canada and the  US
helped India and South Africa respectively to develop nuclear technology.  Meanwhile there was a
similar joint effort between Australia and the UK. It was an ironic twist that the latter effort did not
result in a nuclear weapon for Australia, but provided both India and South Africa with the tools to
complete  their  own  nuclear  weapons  programmes.  Notwithstanding,  of  course,  Anthony  Eden's
promise in 1956 to supply Australia with nuclear weapons in event of a war, even if that had become a
somewhat more measured view a few years later.2
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  UK  was  at  the  heart  of  research  relations  amongst  the  Old
Commonwealth. Although there were cooperative research agreements on specific subjects between
Commonwealth members other than the UK, these were not usually defence-related research projects.
The decline in the UK's capabilities, however, was not significantly offset by a growth in other joint
Commonwealth defence research projects, even when it became clear during the 1960s that the UK
1 See, for instance, M. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic planning (London: Clarendon Press, 1991), I. Clark
& N. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy (Clarendon Press, 1989), S. Schrafstetter, and S. Twigge, 
Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the US and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-proliferation 1945-1970  (Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing, 2004)
2 Anthony Eden went so far as to declare that he foresaw no impediment to the employment of nuclear weapons aboard 
Australian aircraft during a conflict. Harold Macmillan held a slightly different view. - For Eden's reply see Telegram 
from Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, 9 July 1956 EG1/115, and for MacMillan see Telegram from Menzies to 
MacMillan, 29 June 1961  PREM 11/3202 UKNA
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could no longer sustain research projects on all aspects of defence technology.3 Despite recognising the
strain  that  was  on  the  UK's  weapons  research  establishment  there  was  little  thought  put  towards
reducing the number of research projects. The US Department of Defence forming the view that by
1962 the UK had turned into an unreliable research partner because it spread its efforts too thinly.4
The declining capacity of the UK defence research establishment and the increase in the number
of research programmes led to the emergence of the US as a key research partner on defence issues
throughout  the  1960s  for  the  Commonwealth,  especially  for  Canada  and  Australia.  There  was,
nevertheless, an endurance of compatibility of equipment amongst the Commonwealth long after the
closeness of their research and procurement decisions came to an end. This lingering similarity was not
to last forever. The speed at which Commonwealth countries branched out from British equipment and
research  differed  amongst  the  Commonwealth  driven  by  their  own  individual  and  particular
requirements. In the immediate post-war period the armed forces of all Commonwealth countries were
using  such  equipment  as  to  be  effectively  compatible  with  current  and  planned  British  military
equipment. Although the beginning of a major divergence can be seen at various points across different
key elements, the start of more widespread divergence generally occurred around the 1960s. It was
during that decade that the various members of the Commonwealth replaced some of their Second
World War weapons, ships, and other equipment and as part of that process there was an increased
interest of Commonwealth countries in military suppliers from outside the Commonwealth.
One  of  the  most  important  defence  research  considerations  during  the  1960s,  and  indeed
throughout much of the Cold War, was nuclear weapons research. The decision in 1946 by the US to
restrict information with regards to nuclear weapons ironically led to increased levels of cooperation
amongst the Commonwealth.5 This came in the form of Anglo-Australian research at Woomera.6 This
was not matched with cooperation involving Canada, South Africa, or New Zealand. It was almost ten
years later before the Anglo-Australian nuclear research was again undermined by a renewal of Anglo-
American  cooperation. The US – UK Agreement of 1957 fundamentally altered the value of the UK's
3 Cabinet Conclusions D(57)10 18th November 1957 CAB 131/18 UKNA
4 Visit by Director-General of Defence Research to Department of Defence (US) May 1962 DEFE 7/2386  UKNA
5 Such Commonwealth-based activity ran contrary to American desires for the UK to participate in 'a European MRBM 
project'. - Minute 'Polaris' Chief of the Air Staff 16 June 1960 DO169 F108/12 UKNA
6 This 'joint project' formed the basis of research for such proposed nuclear delivery systems as Blue Streak and would 
encounter significant debate and difficulties in Anglo-Australian relations regarding the cost of the project, the viability 
of its outcomes, and its subsequent closure. - Brief 'The Joint Project' Part 1 December 1960 DO 169 UKNA
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existing arrangement with Australia given the comparatively more useful access to US testing facilities
and research. The high costs involved in the Australian project had also raised serious questions about
its viability.7 Despite these concerns tests continued in a reduced but tangible way until they stopped in
their entirety in 1963.8  
When restrictions on nuclear proliferation in the US eased it was matched with a corresponding
increase  in  US assistance  to  other  nations  in  the  development  of  nuclear  technology for  peaceful
purposes.9 The naïveté of that programme became readily apparent in later years. Indeed the supply of
two nuclear reactors to South Africa from the US as part  of this  programme eventually led to the
development  of  military-grade  nuclear  weapons  in  South  Africa.  The  more  widespread  access  to
nuclear  technology,  in  part  spurred  on  by US activities,  led  to  the  widespread  growth  of  nuclear
technological proficiency in key Commonwealth countries that had not featured in UK participation.
Indeed there was some non-UK research cooperation amongst the Commonwealth with the operation
of Canadian-supplied nuclear reactors to India began in 1960. Much like US assistance to South Africa,
Canadian assistance to India also contributed to the knowledge base of the Indian nuclear weapons
programme.10
The delayed realisation of policy aims must also be considered. While the UK replaced and
upgraded its nuclear weapons stockpile with US designs, extant stockpiles of domestically-built nuclear
weapons, developed in conjunction with Australia, were kept maintained in bases in the UK and in
other  Commonwealth countries.  Although UK arrangements  with the  US in respect  of  the Polaris
system were agreed in late 1962 the first Polaris missile platform was not operationally deployed until
1968.11 Even then, the majority of the nuclear weapons maintained and operated by the UK until 1970
were Red Beard and Blue Danube.12 Both Red Beard and Blue Danube had been designed by the UK
based on testing  conducted  with  Australia.  Similarly,  the  outcome of  sharing  non-military nuclear
7 It was also widely considered that the US did not believe in the viability of national deterrent outside of the US and the 
USSR. - Annex 2 to Review of Australian Labour Party Nuclear Policy 31 July 1962 DO 164/39 UKNA
8 Telegram from CRO to High Commissioner Canberra, 11 April 1962 DO 164/17 UKNA
9 The basis for this was in Eisenhower's 'Atoms for peace' policy, the goal of which was to spread nuclear technology for 
civilian purposes and encourage a collective agreement that the military application of such technology was against 
everyone's interests. For an analysis of the Atoms for Peace policy see I. Chernus, Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace 
(Austin: Texas A&M University Press, 2002)
10 G. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2001) p 27
11 K. Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons 1964-1970 (London:
Macmillan, 2012) p 149
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technology in 1957 with other members of the Commonwealth did not result in a viable weapon until
the mid- to late-1970s.  India did not develop a functioning nuclear weapon until 1974.13 Meanwhile
South Africa only tested its device in 1977.14
There are three key dates here for Commonwealth nuclear weapons research; 1946, 1957, and
1970. These demarcate the growth, peak and decline of cross-Commonwealth cooperation on nuclear
research. Although a delay between policy and practical arrangements clearly existed, what was equally
clear was that by the start of the 1970s the last deployment of anything that could be considered a
“Commonwealth” nuclear weapon had been withdrawn from active service. By the late 1970s the only
stockpiles  of  nuclear  weapons  which  were  developed  and  manufactured  within  a  Commonwealth
country were in India.
Competition in conventional weapons research
Nuclear weapons research was only one element of a broader engagement of Commonwealth
cooperation in  defence research.  The development and procurement of conventional  weaponry and
other defence-related material had a much more obvious effect on the level of interoperability amongst
Commonwealth  armed forces.  The Commonwealth's  approach to  joint  research  projects  and intra-
Commonwealth weapon system procurement was haphazard at best. The lack of a central planning for
defence research was evident even inside the UK. Indeed recognition that the UK could no longer
afford  to  duplicate  military  research  did  not  gain  traction  until  1957.15 The  US  had  expressed  a
preference that the UK should avoid duplication as well, going so far as to suggest that they 'ought not
12 Given the yield of their respective warheads (between 10kt and 25kt) these were not particularly large weapons. British 
service personnel, however, considered anything under 10kt to be a tactical nuclear weapon, and was of the opinion that 
it was how the bombs were employed that counted rather than the yield of their warheads. - Untitled MM/SM(62)4 24 
May 1962 AIR 19/1084 UKNA. For more information on the classification of British nuclear warhead design and the 
particulars of tactical vs. strategic nuclear weapons as it applied to the UK see R. Moore, 'British nuclear warhead 
design, 1958-1966: How much American Help?' Defence Studies, 4 (2004) pp 209-210. The distinction is important for 
Anglo-American relations as Washington considered tactical nuclear weapons as an 'uneconomical sideshow'. - Letter to 
Directors JIB (MoD) from RJ Reid 25 June 1963 DEFE 7/2236 UKNA. This is likely attributable to their experience in 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia where high explosive tactical weapons (if conventional rather than nuclear) failed to 
change the course of the conflict. - See Annex to Letter in the same file.
13 G. Perkovich India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2001) p 170 – Note that Perkovich explains how written records of policy deliberations in the lead-up to the detonation 
of the device were not kept, and indeed the final decision to test the device came after the test had finished.
14 This was to be a 'cold test' using a depleted uranium core, as there was not enough enriched uranium available.  The 
amount of enriched uranium necessary would not be available until 1980. - O .Rabinotwiz, Bargaining on Nuclear 
Tests: Washington and its Cold War deals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p 113
15 Cabinet Conclusions D(57)10 18th November 1957 CAB 131/18 UKNA
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to take unilateral action on which items to be cut back in order to bring a balance between expenditure
and available funds but leave this for the joint [Anglo-American] review.'16
The surge in the availability and interest in the US as a supplier for military materials had mixed
success across the Commonwealth. Canada was most enthuasiastic, especially given their increasingly
close links to the US since 1947. Australia, and New Zealand were more hesitant at times, possibly
reluctant to avoid offending the UK. South Africa found it  increasingly difficult  to source military
equipment from third countries, including the US, as a result of ongoing international outcry over its
domestic policies. The UK, although willing and even enthusiastic about purchasing equipment off-the-
shelf from the US, was torn. The British government's desire was for the Commonwealth to favour UK
products even when suitable and cheaper US alternatives were available.17 The reality was that the UK
could no longer supply the Commonwealth with the exorbitantly expensive and technically advanced
equipment that was required.18 Although the UK did not agree to avoid the duplication of research on
account of costs until much later, the economic position of Australia, Canada, South Africa and New
Zealand never allowed for anything other than that approach. For Australia, Canada, South Africa and
New Zealand the need to obtain military equipment from another country was often the only realistic
option available. An interest expressed in UK or US military equipment during the design phase was
often key to ensuring that requirements were met and costs were kept low. 
The  TSR-2,  a  particularly  ill-fated  plane  capable  of  carrying  Red  Beard  tactical  nuclear
warheads, was one example of how a UK project was dropped due to rising costs in favour of a US
plane: the F-111. The F-111 was not a plane without its flaws, which included spiralling costs. More
worryingly for Australia, the export version of the F-111 was not as advanced an aircraft as the TSR-2 –
16 'Visit by JE Serby, Deputy Controller of Guided Weapons, and Dr. HM Wilson, Director-General Defence Research 
Staff, to A Robinson Assistant Director of Defence R&D, Department of Defence 16 May 1962 DEFE 7 UKNA – This 
report demonstrated a thorough exchange of ideas between the American and British R&D establishments and 
demonstrated the desire, on both sides, to avoid a duplication of research effort across the board. Although the emphasis 
was placed on the British effort not being spread 'too thinly' there was some discussion, if the research effort was more 
concentrated, of the American Department of Defence sourcing material from the UK. Despite these indications in 
practice this was never a realistic prospect. Although there were some attempts made such as the FN FAL (styled as the 
L1A1 in the Commonwealth), but these were not successful.
17 Telegram from CRO to MoD re: Meeting with Titterton, 31st July 1961 DO 164/17 UKNA
18 By the mid-1950s there were increasingly serious deficiencies in some members of the Commonwealth with respect to a 
wide variety of military stores, and it was considered that these deficiencies could not be rectified from existing sources 
(i.e. the UK). A suggestion that Australia be allowed access to US military assistance was refused as it 'would not meet 
eligibility requirements' but discussions to see what could be achieved were agreed. - Letter from the Prime Minister of 
the UK to the High Commissioner (Australia) to the UK re: Discussion with US Authority on Defence in South-East 
Asia 25 April 1955 – Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference London 1956 – Defence Brief A1209 box 446 ANA
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or even as advanced as the variant of the F-111 used by the US. The particular version sold to the
Australian government lacked the Mark II navigation/fire-control system, making it decidedly inferior
to the TSR-2.19 Although US projects became increasingly commonplace from the 1960s onwards, the
situation was much more fluid in this field than in nuclear weapons development, not least because of
the  substantially  greater  availability  of  weapon  systems  and  procurement  possibilities.  The  F-111
debacle was indicative of growing openness in Australia to defence hardware sourced from the US.
Although this shift was mirrored by the UK, Canadian and New Zealand procurement policies differed
somewhat in their approach. Canada had already adopted the widespread introduction of conventional
US equipment  for  its  armed  forces.  At  the  other  end of  the  scale,  New Zealand operated  British
equipment long after the 1960s. New Zealand aircraft and warships were designed and built in the UK
with only a few exceptions. Indeed the Royal New Zealand Navy did not operate a non-British warship
until 1989, although there were earlier exceptions in aircraft procurement, such as the US-built A4
Skyhawk.20 South Africa, meanwhile, faced very different problems. After the imposition of an arms
embargo the South African domestic arms industry grew considerably, and its primary effect was the
fine-tuning and refitting of existing British designs, especially the Oliphant tank – effectively a series
of heavily modified British-designed Centurion tanks.21
In the late 1950s with the cancellation of the TSR-2 it became clear that Australia’s interest in
certain projects was insufficient to ensure the continued funding of UK defence projects. Any influence
New Zealand may have had in this respect would certainly have fallen short of Australia's, if only on
the  basis  of  economics.  This  was  particularly  problematic  for  New  Zealand  which  was  heavily
dependent on external sources for its military equipment. It was unsurprising, then, that the RNZAF
was comprised almost entirely of British planes until the purchase of the US A-4 Skyhawks. This,
however, was not as significant a break from the UK on procurement issues as it may first appear. New
Zealand purchased UK BAC Strikemasters in 1972, and the specifics of the Skyhawk selection point to
a set of circumstances which indicated a mismatch of need and capabilities between New Zealand and
the UK.22 Significant time was provided to explore potential replacements for New Zealand's ageing
aircraft  in  the  lead  up  to  the  A-4  Skyhawk  purchase.  This  purchase  was  a  compromise  driven
19 15 Ministry of Defence Review, Equipment Working Group, Annex B, Section IV Air 19/1015 DRE/P(65) UKNA
20 J. Singleton, 'Vampires to Skyhawks: Military Aircraft and Frigate Purchases by New Zealand 1950-70' Australian 
Economic History Review 42 (2002) p 201
21 This was possible only due to the large number of Centurion tanks already in South Africa. - J. Moore, South Africa and 
Nuclear Proliferation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p 68
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predominately by economic issues. Indeed the Skyhawk had initially been reviewed and rejected as a
potential replacement for the RNZAF's Vampires. With a maximum expenditure available of NZ$25
million the preferred options – the Mirage IIoA (a French aircraft also operated by Australia), and the
F-4 Phantom or the F-5 Freedom Fighter (both US planes) – were too expensive per plane to form a
credible force within the available budget.23 The selection of the Skyhawk was therefore on the basis of
cost  and  logistical  support  which  was  readily  available  from  Australia  which  also  operated  the
Skyhawk. 
Another  particularly  interesting  aspect  of  conventional  weapons  development  was  the
introduction  of  a  new  battle  rifle  for  the  Commonwealth  during  the  1960s:  the  L1A1.  Notably,
Australia,  Canada,  New  Zealand  and  the  UK  all  continued  to  use  the  L1A1  (more  commonly
recognised  as  the  Commonwealth  variant  of  the  FN  FAL),  until  the  1970s  and  1980s. 24 The
implications of this are offset somewhat by the fact that the entirety of NATO was to use the FN FAL
while  the  US  preferred  the  US-developed  M14  which  had  a  larger  calibre  than  the  FN  FAL.
Nevertheless, events conspired that resulted in the continuation of the Commonwealth using the same
rifle in the post-war period, even when it had endeavoured to adapt to a US standard.
Joint Commonwealth research efforts
Defence research amongst the Commonwealth was not a process undertaken with equal vigour
and towards similar objectives on all sides. The usefulness of a joint Commonwealth defence research
project  was  as  often  driven  by  a  lack  of  options  as  much  as  any  commitment  to  a  specifically
Commonwealth effort.  This was true even when amongst the Commonwealth research endeavours.
That is not to say that they did not collaborate on defence research. The British identified that they
could no longer afford to have any ‘duplication of effort’ if it could be avoided.25 However, there was
not any attachment to a Commonwealth research project of any type. This is particularly important to
22 No British aircraft was considered purely because that there was no available British alternative. The RAF aircraft to 
serve in this role, the joint Anglo-French Jaguar, would not be available until the 1970s. - Combat aircraft for the 
RNZAF 2 December 1966 AAFD811, W3738 228/3/1 CP(66)996 ANZ. Also see G. Bentley, & M. Conley, Portrait of 
an Air Force (Wellington: Grantham House, 1987) p 193 for more detail on the purchase of the Strikemasters.
23 See J. Singleton, 'Vampires to Skyhawks: Military Aircraft and Frigate Purchases by New Zealand 1950-70' Australian 
Economic History Review 42 (2002) p 195 for the maximum available expenditure, and also Combat aircraft for the 
RNZAF 2 December 1966 AAFD811, W3738 228/3/1 CP(66)996 ANZ for options considered.
24 Memorandum on Expert Committee established in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 5773 2 November 1964 
MV-B 2/213 SANDFA
25   Cabinet Conclusions D(57)10 18th November 1957 CAB 131/18 UKNA
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consider in light of the end goal of defence research: procurement. It would be impossible to accurately
detail the importance of defence research without also looking at the equipment that was subsequently
purchased or manufactured at  the end of that research.  Although Australia,  Canada,  New Zealand,
South Africa and the UK were certainly far from unified on any point of defence research on defence
procurement  they  were  much  closer.  The  preference  for  UK military  equipment  remained  strong,
particularly in New Zealand, for many decades after the British decided to avoid the duplication of
defence research, but less so in other countries like South Africa and Canada.26 More problematically
other Commonwealth countries had not well-developed arms industries – with notable exception to
South Africa. If the key objective in procurement was to secure the cheapest best option available then
the Commonwealth was a poor place to start. Two key examples of this are the British TSR-2, and the
Anglo-Australian nuclear research project at Woomera. In the same way that the Old Commonwealth
sourced its  military equipment  off-the-shelf  from the UK, the UK was now undertaking a  similar
approach with respect to the US with significant implications for Commonwealth defence cooperation.
This change in British policy placed the Commonwealth in a very different position to pre-1947 when
it could reliably count on the UK to provide for its military needs.27
The UK was engaged in a number of joint Commonwealth research projects, particularly in the
field of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The project at Woomera was one of the most important
examples of this cooperation. It represented the very edge of scientific knowledge of the time and the
results factored into the development of nuclear weapons.28 The ill-fated TSR-2 was another and it was
indicative of the importance of defence procurement for the Commonwealth. Interest expressed in UK
defence projects by the Commonwealth certainly informed the viability of this research. Australia's
concerns over whether UK nuclear weapons would fit to RAAF planes, for instance, prompted a near-
exasperated  response  from Whitehall  officials  who  suggested  that  if  the  RAAF purchased  British
planes then this would not be an issue.29 There was certainly an element of truth to that but that view
must surely had as much to do with ensuring that the Commonwealth met their requirements with
purchases from the UK than anything else.
26   Meeting of Commonwealth Defence Ministers M.D.M. (51) 4th Meeting, 25 June 1951 MV 217/2 SANDFA
27 Review of Defence Relationship with the UK 1963; Part IV 'Supply of Military Equipment and Grant of Manufacturing 
Rights' MV 219/2 SANDFA
28 'Some Impressions gained from a recent Visit to Australia in connection with the Maralinga Experiment Project 1963  
DO 164/19 WDPC/P/539 HSC/31.23 UNKA
29 Specifically '...all they [Australian government] needed were the general dimensions and that a dummy war-head would 
give them all they needed.' - Telegram from CRO to MoD re: Meeting with Titterton, 31st July 1961 DO 164/17 UKNA
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The  approach  by the  UK to  defence  research  was,  perhaps,  clearer  in  the  field  of  nuclear
weapons research. Wayne Reynolds makes the argument that the UK used Australia to further its own
research in the field until such time as an opportunity arose to avail of US facilities and expertise.30 It is
argued here that this was part of a broader UK strategy in defence research, a strategy that was driven
by a need to cut costs. Projects for national prestige were explicitly ruled out.31 UK defence research,
joint or otherwise, became decidedly goal-orientated. If an alternative presented itself that offered the
same result but with cheaper costs, or a better result with similar costs, then taking that option would
surely be more  appropriate.  Nevertheless,  the  Commonwealth  offered  some clear  benefits  to  joint
defence  research  projects.  It  was  a  useful  source  of  sparsely  populated  and  varied  land,  skilled
personnel, relatable peoples whose governments generally offered a cordial reception,  and it  was a
receptive  market  to  anything  the  UK  developed  –  either  by  itself  or  in  conjunction  with  other
Commonwealth countries.32 The UK took a cold view on such sentimentality. If a better option came
along the Commonwealth link was not an insurmountable impediment, but the consequences this posed
to Commonwealth relations was something that the UK remained cognisant of during the period.33 
One of the most significant joint ‘Commonwealth’ projects in the field of nuclear research was
undertaken in Australia at Woomera and Maralinga. Such was the scale of cooperation in this field that
the USSR considered Australia to be a nuclear power.34 Australia consistently pressed for even greater
collaboration  between  themselves  and  the  British  throughout  the  course  of  the  project.35 It  was
something of a shock that the UK pulled out of the endeavour.36 A shock which Australia was keen to
express  in  its  disappointment  in  communications  with the UK.37 The friendly relationship  enjoyed
30   W. Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne University Press, 2000) p 3
31   Cabinet Conclusions D(57)10 19th November 1957 CAB 131/18 UKNA
32 For greater consideration of the basis of such connectivity in the Commonwealth see G. Magee & A. Thompson Empire 
and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods, and Capital in the British World, c 1850-1914 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010)
33   Cabinet Conclusions D(58)24 Minute 3 point e CAB 131 UKNA
34  Telegram no. 606 from Commonwealth Relations Office London to Canberra High Commissioner 3 July 1961 DO 
164/17 UKNA
35 'Some Impressions gained from a recent Visit to Australia in connection with the Maralinga Experimental Project, 24 
December 1963 DO 164/19 WDPC/P/539 HSC/31.23 UKNA
36   Cabinet Conclusions D(58)33 1 October 1958 CAB 131 UKNA
37 Although part of this was disappointment in general, there was also a sense that the Australians were more politically 
invested in the project and with its cessation there was little more that would be gained from the research and that 
research fell short of expectations. - Letter from High Commission Canberra to Commonwealth Relations Office 24 
December 1963 DO 164/19 UKNA
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between the UK and Australia was developed and maintained over the course of the project. It is also
important to note that the UK considered Menzies a stabilizing force in Australian politics when it
came to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Officials reporting on the Maralinga Experimental
Project considered that a 'Liberal-Country Party Coalition not led by Mr Menzies' was 'not unlikely' to
join the 'nuclear club', and if Australia developed a nuclear weapons programme in that context then the
UK would come under increased pressure to 'give Australia warhead information'.38
 Anglo-Australian  defence  research  was  not  always  a  cosy  affair.  The  ordinarily  genial
relationship was strained by Australian fears that the UK was not sharing all of the information it
gathered  from the  tests.39 Other  matters  were also less  cordial.  A series  of  misunderstandings  and
difficulties surrounding the negotiations for the Bloodhound missile further disturbed Anglo-Australian
relations. This was further complicated by the decision to abandon the TSR-2, the development of
which the Australians had supported with some interest, and obliged the Royal Australian Air Force to
acquire the inferior F-111. Furthermore, the switch from Woomera to the US test range in Nevada did
not help the Anglo-Australian relationship.40 This was an especially sore point given Australian interest
in nuclear weapons had been partly based on UK assurances regarding the implications of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.41 The cumulative effect was that the end of the project left the Australians feeling
badly treated. The breakdown of relationships were thought to be eventually resolved 'outside of one or
two  individuals',  but  the  incident  highlighted  the  strain  defence  research  cooperation  had  on  the
Commonwealth connection.42
Like  Australia,  New  Zealand  was  generally  agreeable  to  a  working  research  and  defence
38 'Some impressions gained from a recent Visit to Australia in connection with the Maralinga Experimental Project, 24 
December 1963 DO 164 WDPC/P/539 HSC/31.23 UKNA
39  This was almost certainly true in relation to some specific elements of the results in how they related to the manufacture 
of the explosive device itself. Concerns were held that 'to give this manufacturing data to Australia would have to be a 
secret act with the connivance of the Americans. If we [the British government] attempted to make an open exception of 
Australia the Russians would almost certainly do the same for Indonesia'. - Untitled Report 24 July 1961 DO 164/2NT 
37/3 UKNA
40 Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to High Commission, Canberra, 11 August 1962 DO 164/19 UKNA
41 The Australian government felt that, should they sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which was regarded by both 
Australia and the UK as 'impractical' to avoid) then the UK would be asked to either 'provide full manufacturing data for
operational weapons' or, 'supply ready made weapons to any  Australian government if it decided it was faced with 
foregoing circumstances.' - Telegram No. 606 to Commonwealth Relations Office from Canberra High Commission 30 
June 1961 DO 164/17 UKNA. Note that although the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed until 1968 agreement that 
such a treaty should exist had been signalled as early as 1961.
42 Cooperation with Australia in the development of New Weapons 19 July 1960 DO 164 SE(O)C/P(60)25 UKNA
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procurement relationship with the UK.43 Unlike Australia it lacked the necessary resources, skills and
technical development to contribute in any significant manner. Although the relationship was close it
was not on a par with the Anglo-Australian level of cooperation. In some senses it did not need to be
equal to derive much of the same benefits. The security of New Zealand was inherently complemented
with  the  enhanced  security  of  Australia.  This  was  a  simple  issue  of  geography and the  logistical
constraints that applied given the technology of the time.
Unlike Australia,  there was significantly less New Zealand involvement on the other  major
aspect  of  defence  collaboration,  nuclear  weapons  development.  New  Zealand’s  need  for  nuclear
weapons,  in  the  face  of  the  threat  from  South-East  Asia  and  the  Far  East  more  generally,  was
effectively covered by the same plans and operations devoted to Australia. The other side of this is that
the ability of New Zealand to contribute to nuclear weapons development was rather more limited. This
highlighted  a  key  point;  simply  because  New  Zealand  was  in  the  Commonwealth,  and  in  close
proximity to the likely deployment of nuclear weapons in defence of the Commonwealth, that did not
grant it  any particular say or inclusion in the development or deployment of nuclear weapons that
involved  two  other  members  of  the  Commonwealth  with  which  it  shared  close  ties.  The  non-
involvement of New Zealand did not make it any less of a Commonwealth project – as has been amply
demonstrated in previous chapters with respect to conventional force deployment – but the change to a
nuclear context altered the approach taken. One particularly poignant example of the more restrictive
nature of nuclear weapons research and deployment can be seen in the more distant approach by British
officials with respect to engagements with the US on joint nuclear strike plans in the region. In those
conversations, British officials told their American counterparts that neither Australia nor New Zealand
needed  to  be  included  in  those  plans.44 It  seems  clear  that  many  of  the  assumptions  related  to
conventional  force  deployment  and  expected  cooperation  in  the  defence  of  the  Commonwealth
generally were not extended to decisions regarding nuclear weapons. 
In  Canada the potential  prospects  for  joint  Commonwealth research projects  were typically
outweighed by the potential that US assistance and research offered. Even where Canada could not be
43 Indeed Mr. Holland of New Zealand was given to committing that 'New Zealand would procure as much equipment as 
she could afford from the UK' at a meeting held amongst the Old Commonwealth on 8 June 1953. -  Minutes of a 
meeting held at 10 Downing Street 3 June 1953 MG26L Volume 85 File 0-16-21 PMM(53) LAC. Note that this was 
held almost immediately after the conclusion of a larger pan-Commonwealth meeting on economic issues that had 
included India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.
44    Annex to COS(62)66 13 November 1962 DEFE 11/319 UKNA
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involved with defence research projects, it was invariably covered by the fruits of those labours on
account of their geographic location. It was impossible for the US, for instance, to consider the threat of
the USSR without also considering Canada, which included such things as regular arctic flights and
submarine patrols to Canada’s north.45 Just as Australia's defence of its northern territory protected New
Zealand by proxy, the same conclusion can be drawn between the US and Canada. However, unlike
New  Zealand  Canada  had  the  capacity  to  engage  with  the  US  in  research,  development  and
manufacturing. Moreover its geopolitical placement between the US and the USSR left it in a better
position for its engagement to be more of an issue than New Zealand’s location provided for with
respect to Australia and the UK. This helps explain how the most senior of the Dominions had almost
the least involvement with Commonwealth defence research.46 
Canada's circumstances were quite similar to the strategy the UK adopted for defence research,
and presented a fundamental question: why commit to a Commonwealth project when there was a
better  option  available?  There  was  no  compelling  argument  made  for  that  question  in  any  key
Commonwealth  country.  Unlike  matters  of  defence  cooperation  more  generally,  it  appeared  that
defence  research  and  procurement  was  propelled  by  self-interest  and  economics.  In  order  for
Commonwealth defence research to have succeeded it needed to seriously compete with the available
alternatives. It seems clear that it could not. 
South Africa's engagement in nuclear defence research was limited, as may be expected given
its particular circumstances as a near pariah on the international scene. Over the period concerned it
constructed its own nuclear reactors albeit with US rather than Commonwealth assistance. This enabled
it to develop nuclear weapons on its own before eventually dismantling them.
Arms sales
Although certainly the development of the technology was a key consideration, some attention
should be spared for the sale of that technology in its finished form. Whereas research was an issue
which affected all five key Commonwealth countries to varying degrees, all were thoroughly involved
in procurement processes. 
45 By 1962 between 25 and 44 Soviet ICBM, 97 ballistic missiles, and 155 heavy bombers could target the US by flying 
across the Arctic region. - T. Botti, Ace in the Hole: Why the US did not use Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) p 185
46 Meeting of Commonwealth defence ministers M.D.M. (51) 1st Meeting, 21 June 1951 MV 217/2 SANDFA
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Greater understanding of how Commonwealth defence research developed can be gleaned from
an analysis of the procurement strategies employed by Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand
and the UK when it came to conventional military equipment. In the early post-war years almost all
were effectively entirely supplied by British-manufactured (and largely designed as well) aircraft, ships
and other military hardware. UK designs fell out of favour in the 1960s as military hardware was
replaced and foreign competitors, particularly the US, were considered with greater interest than ever
before. This was partly on account of economic pressures in the UK, but also in the Dominions. The
UK  struggled  to  maintain  the  same  level  of  sophistication  and  economy  of  scale  in  the  new
technological  environment.  The  increased  variety  naturally  undermined  the  uniformity  of  the  Old
Commonwealth’s military equipment. Although New Zealand’s planes, ships and equipment may have
remained almost  entirely British until  well  into the 1980s,  the same cannot  be said of  Australian,
Canadian, and South African equipment. Australian concerns in the 1960s that British-built nuclear
weapons could not be carried by Australian-owned but US-designed planes and ships revealed some of
these  tensions.47 Canadian  and  South  African  concerns  were  far  less  prominent,  but  no  less
destabilising. Canada was able to more easily leverage its position with the US to good effect, while
South Africa was obliged as a result of an unfavourable diplomatic climate to forge ahead with its own
armaments industry. 
This resulted in the clear and steady degradation of anything resembling a coherent procurement
and research basis for Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and the UK. This was a stark
contrast to the situation in 1947 where much of the military equipment owned and operated by those
countries  was  British  in  origin.  Although  the  link  between  those  countries  and  British  military
equipment  was  maintained for  some time thereafter  the  economic  pressures  on the  UK obliged a
reduction in their capability to sustain research and development for all of the projects necessary to
maintain an entire arsenal of weapon types. This was especially problematic as all of these projects had
US competitors, and US research and design was urged on by a far better economic situation and
political climate which encouraged active defence research. The decision made by the British cabinet in
1957 to forgo the duplication of research effectively signalled the reduction in the Commonwealth’s
ability to equip its forces with Commonwealth-built and researched technology.48  As US technology
47 Telegram from CRO to MoD re: Meeting with Titterton, 31st July 1961 DO 164/17 UKNA
48   Cabinet Conclusions D(57)10 18th November 1957 CAB 131/18 UKNA
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replaced ageing British equipment it became increasingly difficult to see how cooperation in defence
research could be restarted.
Although there  was  universal  interest  in  US variants  the  process  of  replacing  existing  UK
designs with US versions was far from uniform. Even the UK decision to avoid duplication of research
does not provide a definitive cut-off point given the employment of British aircraft and ships elsewhere
in the Commonwealth until well into the 1980s. This highlighted the weakened role of the UK as the
primary supplier of military goods and equipment to the Commonwealth as a whole. Note that there
were ongoing efforts to secure arms sales to pay for defence research in the UK, even to South Africa.
The UK supplied South Africa with ships and other major elements of military hardware to secure their
external borders, rather than for internal defence, until 1964. This ended following the conclusion of
the  Simonstown  agreement  and  its  associated  contracts  which  provided  naval  warships  and  the
Buccaneer naval bomber for the South African Air Force had been finalised.49 The UK's interest in
South Africa’s ability to guard its coastal waters, since access to the Suez was now more complicated,
appear to have taken precedence over diplomatic concerns. Part of the agreement to return Simonstown
to  South  Africa  was  predicated  on  the  assurance  that  South  Africa  purchased  six  anti-submarine
frigates, ten coastal minesweepers and four seaward defence boats from the UK.50 This built on an
established pattern of South Africa purchase of Royal Navy ships since the end of the Second World
War.51 It was not until 1970 that South Africa obtained warships from a country other than the UK with
the purchase of three Daphne-class submarines from France.52
South African interest in joint Commonwealth military research was sporadic at best and, even
then,  often  problematic.  South  African  military  hardware  was,  more  often  than  not,  of  British
manufacture  and  design.  South  Africa’s  attitude  towards  Commonwealth  research  projects  was
hindered by the problems it faced from the New Commonwealth. Their attitude towards South Africa
was something that had a very tangible influence on South Africa and on those who may have been
inclined to assist South Africa for strategic reasons, like the UK.  
49 Note from Watkinson to Prime Minister 17 November 1964 MV-B 2/219 SANDFA
50 Simonstad 'Exchanges of Letters on Defence matters between Governments of the Union of South Africa and the UK 
June 1955' Annex Anglo-South Africa Defence Agreement MV 190 SANDFA
51 Memorandum on the Expansion of the South African Navy 11 February 1955 MV-B 2/219 SANDFA
52 Cabinet Memorandum 22 September 1965 MV-B 2/213 DC.2490/34 SANDFA
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Anglo-Australian nuclear research
The joint nuclear research programme between Australia and the UK, known as the Maralinga
Experimental Project, was pursued at Maralinga and Woomera between 1955 and 1963.53 This joint
project developed long-range missiles and tested nuclear warheads with the aim of introducing the
nuclear-armed, long-range missile Blue Streak. The programme has been covered in some detail in
other research and the Anglo-Australian connection given even more consideration in recent years.54
Anglo-Australian  cooperation  in  this  field  was  unique  in  comparison to  the  other  Commonwealth
nations and only surpassed by Anglo-American cooperation. Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand
did not enjoy the same level of exposure to nuclear technology that the UK shared with Australia.
Canada's relationship with the US was relatively superficial in terms of the development of nuclear
weapons. Although South Africa eventually developed its own nuclear weapon this was not on the back
of  Commonwealth  assistance.  Meanwhile  New  Zealand  had  little  nuclear  weapons  development
experience in any capacity.
Anglo-Australian cooperation in nuclear testing occurred well before the formal opening of the
project in 1955 with low-yield nuclear bombs tested on Monte Bello Island off the north-west coast of
Australia in 1952.55 A series of tests followed the formal establishment of the new testing grounds at
Woomera in 1955. More significant tests Operations Buffalo and Antler in 1956 and 1957 respectively
successfully trialled a series of low-yield atomic bombs. These tests assessed the effectiveness of non-
nuclear explosions on nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear technology, which included
advancements as new as neutron initiators, were carried out until 1963. A view formed in the UK
government by late 1958 following the successful test of thermonuclear warheads on Christmas Island
in the middle of the Pacific that the expense of nuclear research in Australia was too high. It made
increasingly less sense to use inferior Australian facilities given that the US was now willing to offer
the UK access to their test sites and data.56 The UK switched to the US reluctantly, and the effect that
the closure and cessation of nuclear research cooperation with the Australians had on Anglo-Australian
53 Some Impressions gained from a recent Visit to Australia in connection with the Maralinga Experimental Programme 
24th December 1963 DO 164/19 WDPC/P/539 HSC/31.23 UKNA
54 This has, in part, been driven by the Arts and Humanities Research Council funded UK Nuclear Weapons History 
project at the Mountbatten Centre. A combination of a reinvigorated scholarly research coupled with the opening of a 
great number of archival sources in the UK and elsewhere has resulted in a spike in British nuclear research, and 
particularly its international aspects as they relate to Australia and the US.
55 I. Badash. A Nuclear Winter's Tale (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2009) p 259
56 Cabinet Conclusions D(58)33 1 October 1958 CAB 131/19 UKNA
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relations was fully appreciated amongst UK officials.57
Comparisons of inter-Commonwealth defence research are made easier by the fact that few
amongst the Commonwealth cooperated with each other without UK involvement.  There was little
joint research between Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. In terms of defence research
and procurement, the hub and spoke model that symbolised Commonwealth defence cooperation did
not have a rim connecting those spokes.
US-Commonwealth nuclear developments
The  deployment  of  US  nuclear  weaponry  on  Canadian  soil  warrants  consideration  of  US-
Canadian military relations since 1947. In 1951 a series of joint US-Canadian early warning bases were
established north of the US-Canadian border: the Pinetree line. This was quickly overtaken by a series
of  Canadian  operated  warning  bases  half-way  between  the  American-Canadian  border  and  the
northernmost edge of Canadian territory in the Arctic Circle: the Mid-Canada line. In 1954 another
series of US-Canadian bases were manned at the northernmost edge of Canada along the Arctic Circle:
the  Distant  Early  Warning  line.58 These  developments  led  to  the  Canadian  government's  eventual
acceptance of the deployment of US nuclear weapons at Goose Bay, Canada in late 1963/early 1964.59
Previously the Canadian government had allowed the base at  Goose Bay to be used for refuelling
purposes only.  No nuclear weapons were to be stored,  assembled, nor attached to aircraft  or other
delivery systems stationed there. Unlike South Africa, Canada had little interest in developing nuclear
weapons. The weapons that were placed in Canada were attached to close-range ground-to-ground
launchers or for aerial  defence.  They were,  in essence,  tactical  nuclear weapons designed with the
purpose of destroying other nuclear weapons in flight or conventional forces seeking to capture the
base. Their offensive capabilities were significantly less than the Anglo-Australian Blue Streak missile
or the South African warheads which were placed upon bombers or a missile.
South African involvement with the Commonwealth in terms of nuclear weapons research, or
57 Cabinet Conclusions D(58)18 10 September 1958 CAB 131/19 UKNA
58 The Distant Early Warning Line was expected to require approximately one thousand people to keep it in operation, and 
for these purposes American and Canadian forces were pooled together. An American General was head of the integrated
operational command, and the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff was the deputy commander. - Weekly Intelligence 
Summary General Staff Intelligence Committee Summary no. 31/57 6 September 1957 MV 208/151. See also Canadian 
government white paper: Canada's Defence Programme 1956-57 (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1956)
59 J. Clearwater, US Nuclear Weapons in Canada (Toronto: Kirk Howard, 1999) p 132
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nuclear power research for that matter,  was effectively non-existent.  The earliest  efforts  to involve
South Africa in nuclear research in any way was US interest in imports of uranium from South African
mines.60 In 1958 the US provided assistance to South Africa with an agreement to deliver a functioning
nuclear research reactor, which eventually arrived in 1965 at Pelindaba (SAFARI-1). This was quickly
followed by a domestically built reactor in 1967 (SAFARI-2). South Africa subsequently ordered the
second  reactor  to  be  closed  in  1969  to  concentrate  its  limited  resources,  such  as  in  its  uranium
enrichment  programme.  This  culminated  in  South  African  participation  in  the  US  Ploughshare
programme from 1971.61 The goal of that programme was to focus South African nuclear expertise on
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions:  explosions  designed  to  create  harbours,  canals  and  other  major
infrastructure. Their application also covered the destruction of chemical weaponry, extinguishing fires
started in natural gas deposits and similar non-military purposes. It was unclear precisely when South
Africa ordered that the development of these bombs was to change from peaceful purposes to military
use. It would seem reasonable to suggest that some time between 1974 and 1977 a change was made
towards  the  creation  of  a  stockpile  of  nuclear  weapons  for  military  purposes  with  accompanying
delivery systems. Whatever the specific date what is clear is that Commonwealth engagement with
South Africa in  the development  of  nuclear  weapons was non-existent.  At  no point  did Australia,
Canada, New Zealand or the UK have any desire to develop South African nuclear expertise for any
purpose, peaceful or otherwise. Much of South Africa's initial nuclear expertise came from the US, and
their willingness to help South Africa develop nuclear devices for peaceful purposes led to the creation
of military grade nuclear weapons, a fact the US later recognised.62
The sale of British Buccaneer bomber aircraft to South Africa was an intriguing development in
that context. The Buccaneer was designed with a maritime strike role in mind, armed with missiles and
up to 4,000 lbs of ordnance. The South African Air Force received a number of these as part of the
agreement regarding the Simonstown naval base in early 1963.63 The Buccaneer was designed to act as
60 The importance of South Africa as a trading partner in this regard cannot be overstated. By 1954 South Africa was the 
world's single largest supplier of uranium. - Annex 'USA interests in South Africa' to Notes of a discussion at the State 
Department on 9 November 1955 between Minister of Defence Erasmus and Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South 
Asian, and Africa Affairs George Allen MV 128/8 Minister en Geselskap 1955 Beoek aan Italie, Engeland, VSA en 
Portugal SANDFA
61 J. Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions in the Context of 
Non-proliferation Policies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p 83
62 F.V. Pabian, 'South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme: Lessons for US Non-proliferation policy' The 
Nonproliferation Review 3 (1995) p 2
63  Letter from J. Maud to J. Fouche Minister of Defence relaying message from P. Thorneycroft 14 August 1962 MV-B 
2/217 SANDFA
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a maritime strike aircraft but also that it was to be able to act as a nuclear strike aircraft capable of
carrying  the  unguided  Red  Beard  or  WE.177  tactical  nuclear  weapons  in  its  bomb-bay.  The  vast
majority, if not the entirety, of bombers developed by the UK between 1950 and 1970 such as the
planned TSR-2, the English Electric Canberra, the Buccaneer, and many others were all designed to be
capable of carrying nuclear bombs of some calibre.64 It should also be considered that the UK, in the
mid-1950s, did not believe that South Africa was one of the countries capable of developing nuclear
weapons in the foreseeable future.65 The South African nuclear programme did not develop with a
viable nuclear weapon until the 1980s, by which time the Buccaneers would have well passed their
prime. In effect, the South Africans possessed the capability to deliver nuclear warheads, but had not
acquired the bombs themselves – even if they were rapidly increasing their capability in that regard
through cooperation with the US. In many ways,  this  places  South Africa in a similar  position to
Australia. The UK had, in 1956, reassured Australia that it could not foresee a situation in a global war
where the UK would not supply Australia with nuclear weapons.66 No such assurances were given to
South Africa and the strategic and political  considerations  made it  unlikely that the UK would go
through with a transfer of nuclear weapons to South Africa in any context.
This also prompts a question about the intended purpose for military-applicable research and
procurement  versus  the  actual  purpose  for  which  that  technology  was  used.  In  the  case  of  the
Buccaneer, the intended purpose of the aircraft was as a maritime strike craft with a nuclear capability
while its actual purpose related solely to its primary role as a maritime strike aircraft. US assistance in
developing South  Africa’s  potential  to  generate  nuclear  power  was  similar.  Although the  intended
purpose for that research was civilian in nature, the actual purpose for which that technology was used
had a more military inclination.  US cooperation with Commonwealth countries in  military matters
warrants some consideration. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand eventually switched their primary
research and procurement partner from the UK to the US. Curiously, South Africa was the only one of
the five who engaged in substantially more diversification of its supply base, no doubt necessitated by
its difficult internal political situation and this negatively affected its ability to reliably source material
64 See Appendix 1 in Holdstock D., & Barnaby F. The British nuclear weapons programme 1952-2002 (London: Frank 
Cass, 2005) p 145
65 Untitled Report BND (SG)(59)19 31 December 1959 PREM 11/2945 UKNA
66 In fact Eden went even further and declared to the American Administration that '… the same criteria [regarding nuclear 
proliferation] could not be applied to Australia as to other non-Commonwealth countries on the question of atomic 
cooperation'. Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, 9 July 1956 EG1/115 UKNA
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from any one country.67 It is ironic that US cooperation with South Africa led to the development of
nuclear weapons in that country while the same cooperation was refused to Australia who, given their
cooperation with the UK, were further along that path. Instead of ensuring the support and development
of nuclear weapons in one politically safe territory which the USSR largely regarded as a nuclear
power already.68 US assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear research allowed a different
country, one not politically safe nor recognised by the USSR as a nuclear power, to develop nuclear
weapons. 
This was not the only instance where this occurred. Canadian nuclear reactors were sold to
India which  commenced operation in  1960.  While  these were designed for  peaceful  purposes  and
research it led to the eventual creation of a weapons-grade device in 1974. This was field-tested as a
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion ‘Smiling Buddha’.69 The same criticism that could be levelled against US-
South African assistance works for Canada-India and strikes rather closer to home. 
Conclusion
It is impossible to talk about Commonwealth cooperation in research and procurement without
also addressing the involvement of the US. Increasingly after 1945 British military equipment included
models that were of US design and manufacture. This had a detrimental affect on the ability of the
other Commonwealth nations to maintain a cohesive, Commonwealth focused military research and
procurement  operation.  There  are  two  aspects  to  this;  US-driven  nuclear  weapons  research  and
procurement, and US competition in conventional weapons procurement. The former relates more so to
the Anglo-Australian-American relationship than to any other combination, with particularly important
aspects  to  this  found in the  McMahon Act  and the US – UK Agreement  of  1958.70 Conventional
weapons procurement,  in contrast,  had a much broader application that affected the entirety of the
Commonwealth. One of the more interesting examples of US involvement in conventional weapons
procurement was the FN FAL battle rifle. Here internal US interests caused the US to adopt the M14
67 Memorandum for Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 'Overseas visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs to Italy, 30 September 
1964', 1 October 1964 MV-B 2/213 SANDFA
68 Telegram from CRO to Canberra no. 606 3 July 1961 DO 164/17 UKNA
69 It is interesting to note that India would not test another device for another twenty-four years. It has been suggested that 
no further tests were carried out because of the potential such undertaking would have on the possibility of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty which was only four years old. - B. Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy (London: Praeger Security 
International, 2008) p 54
70 Cmnd 537 'Agreement... for co-operation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defence purposes' (London: HMSO, 
1958)
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rifle instead.  A Commonwealth pattern FN FAL, the L1A1 was developed for the Commonwealth.
Cooperation  in  procurement  and  standardisation  while  increasingly  common  was  still  subject  to
domestic political considerations.
Anglo-American nuclear relations were complicated from 1946 after the US put limits on the
amount of information it released to other countries relating to nuclear weapons development.71 This
was amended in 1954 to allow for the trade of information relating to nuclear technology for civilian
purposes, such as power generation. It was not until 1958 that the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement
provided for the trade of information of military-grade nuclear technology to the UK. This included the
use of the Nevada testing grounds in the US and the transfer of plutonium (although it was expected
that there would be certain strings attached to this deal).72 Wayne Reynolds links the fall-off of nuclear
testing in Australia with the increased access to US facilities. The decreased presence and interest in
Woomera was matched with increased involvement in US testing sites. It is a compelling argument that
the burden of having two nuclear  testing programmes was simply unsustainable by the UK. Thus
British involvement in the Australian project was ended in favour of British involvement in US testing.
In  this  sense,  the  capabilities  that  could  be  offered  by  the  US  had  a  detrimental  effect  on  the
Commonwealth pursuing Commonwealth-based research and designs. 
However, the decline in Anglo-Australian cooperation was not as rapid nor as instant as might
be  assumed.  Certainly  up  until  1963  there  was  strong  UK  support  for  the  defence  of  the
Commonwealth with the use of nuclear weapons, even if that defence came in the 'soft power' that
nuclear weapons imbued.73 Furthermore, there was a significant delay between defence research and
the introduction of that capability into the field. This was especially true of nuclear weapons. One of
the last 'Commonwealth' nuclear bombs the British designed, built, and tested in the Commonwealth,
was the Red Beard tactical nuclear bomb. It was designed in 1952 and tested in Australia in Operation
Buffalo in  late  1956.  It  was  subsequently stored at  RAF Tengah in addition to  being stationed in
71 For more on these limitations see M. Goodman, 'The Anglo-American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945-1958' 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18 (2003) p 155
72 Cabinet Conclusions D(58)32 16 July 1958 CAB 131/20 UKNA
73 It was considered that the use of nuclear weapons in a war would only be undertaken if 'the US was in [the war] too.' It 
was further thought that the UK possessing nuclear weapons would increase their influence 'with certain members of the
Commonwealth, particularly Australia and New Zealand'. It is also important to note in this regard that, although the 
Middle East saw deployment of tactical nuclear weapons only, the Far East would see both tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons. - Military strategy for circumstances short of global war 1960 – 1970. JP(60)16 Appendix B 'A Study on 
Nuclear Weapons' by the Joint Planning Staff 28 June 1960 DEFE 7 UKNA
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Cyprus, in the UK and aboard aircraft carriers from 1962 until 1970.74 The bombs themselves held a
two-fold purpose – initially they were to deter China and Indonesia.75 They were also used to ensure
access to US strategic nuclear strike plans.76 Eventually British nuclear weapons in the region formed
part of the nuclear component for SEATO Plan 4.77 It is interesting to note that there were no strike
plans for British nuclear weapons in South-East Asia until after they had been incorporated into US
strike plans.78 Red Beard's  replacement,  WE.177,  which became operationally active in  1970,  was
based  on  US  designs  and  assistance  from  the  late  1950s  onwards.  The  transition  period  from
Australian- to American- based cooperation in nuclear military between 1958-1963 did not have an
immediate effect. The nuclear weapons developed and tested in conjunction with Australia lasted for
years after 1963, the last date of Anglo-Australian tests. Similarly, the cancellation of Skybolt and the
subsequent  Nassau Agreement  in  1962 did not result  in the Royal  Navy operating the US Polaris
missile until 1968.79 This effectively resulted in a curious situation where for ten to twelve years after
the  UK ended  cooperation  with  Australia  they  operated  and  deployed  weaponry  which  had  been
developed in conjunction with Australia. The period between 1958 and 1963 can be seen as a turning
point in Anglo-Australian nuclear weapons research, certainly, but it was definitely not an end to the
deployment of the results of that research.
The  overall  picture  of  Commonwealth  defence  research  cooperation  is  more  than  a  little
misshapen. Although there were clear differences amongst the Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South
Africa, and the UK, a link between all of them certainly existed. The UK initially acted as a key supply
74 Letter from Chiefs of Staff to Minister of Defence, 12 November 1963 DEFE 11/319 UKNA
75 The use of nuclear weapons against the Indonesians had been considered, but did not gain any traction. - Annex to COS 
(63) 29 November 1963 DEFE 11/364 UKNA. Also see Minute from Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft for the 
Prime Minister Dispatch of V-Bombers to the Far East 27 November 1963 PREM11 27/11 UKNA. 
76 There was great interest in the UK that it would be in a position to deter Chinese aggression, and there was an 
outstanding concern that there was a 'case for them [nuclear weapons in the Far East] on grounds of morale and because 
the prestige of the UK land forces might suffer if we did not have these weapons' - Military strategy for circumstances 
short of global war 1960 – 1970. JP(60)16 Appendix B 'A Study on Nuclear Weapons' by the Joint Planning Staff 28 
June 1960 DEFE 7 UKNA
77 Not only did these weapons provide access to American plans for the region, but they were directly incorporated into the
planning itself as well. - Annex to COS 339(63) 12th December 1963 DEFE 11/319 UKNA
78 The commander of the British carrier in the Far East, although armed with nuclear weapons, confessed that he had no 
idea what targets his bombs were to strike in the event that the UK was struck with nuclear weapons. - Letter from 
Captain Lee copied to Colonel Cochas, Ministry of Defence, 11 October 1960 DEFE 7/2090 UKNA. This had been part 
of an ongoing difficulty that the UK had decided to avoid committing to any targets in the absence of direction and 
guidance from the US. See Chiefs of Staff Meetiing COS(60)252 26 February 1960 DEFE 7/2190 UKNA
79 See Minute by Ministry of Defence 'Skybolt'  23 July 1963 PREM11 PM/63/100 UKNA for the Nassau agreement, and 
Permanent Secretary to Chief of Air Staff 'Polaris' 16 June 1960 DO 169/5159 UKNA for deployment of the Polaris 
missile.
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and research centre for the Commonwealth, but between 1947 and 1970 that reliance was reduced.
Partly this was due to US involvement, which is certainly true for Canada, and partly because the UK
could no longer afford to provide the widespread selection of research and development that it had in
the past, especially not if there was another option readily available.
The decline of joint Commonwealth defence research between 1949 and 1981 was unsurprising.
It has been argued that the reasons for this were largely economic in nature, but it was also driven by a
variety  of  domestic  political  interests  unique  to  each  country.  The  UK  was  concerned  about  the
potentially wasted investment that would arise in the event of a duplication of research, and approached
defence research with an almost mercenary-like attitude with thought for, but little action to mitigate,
the  consequences  of  that  policy.  Australia  too  pursued  a  similar  strategy,  and  was  only  more
Commonwealth-centric in that those relationships – and specifically its relationship with the UK – was
more likely to provide the results it desired than any other. Indeed at least until 1956 it was assured of a
supply of nuclear weapons from the UK in the event of war. Canada's close proximity to the US, and its
position relative to the USSR, gave it an envious position in terms of reaping the benefits of technology
designed to defend against a nuclear strike – one it was unlikely to squander by pursuing defence
research with the UK or Australia when both of those countries were trying to obtain the level of access
that the Canadians already enjoyed. South Africa maintained a variety of military hardware that would
have been familiar to the rest of the Commonwealth in spite of arms embargoes thanks to arms sales
that  accompanied  the  Simonstown  naval  base  agreement,  and  the  growth  of  an  indigenous  arms
industry which focused on the heavy modification of existing designs – which were all British. That is
the key point in the continuation of a Commonwealth connection in terms of defence research. While
there was a decline in the UK as the primary supplier of the Commonwealth's military needs, and an
accompanying decrease in the uniformity of equipment amongst the Commonwealth, in practice this
happened at a far slower pace than the dates of such policies indicated. 
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Chapter six: Commonwealth cooperative efforts 1971 – 1982
Introduction
This chapter outlines how Commonwealth defence cooperation was reforged throughout the
1970s and culminated in the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force Rhodesia in 1980. It examines
how pre-1971 Commonwealth defence cooperation adapted to new political circumstances. It details
how the formal and expanded Commonwealth acted from 1971 and drove the changes that manifested
in the deployment of an internal policing force in a fellow Commonwealth country. Finally it highlights
the  perseverance  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  throughout  the  1970s  and beyond,  while
acknowledging the fundamental changes that it faced. It argues that the 1970s was a decade in which
the  rapid  expansion  of  the  Commonwealth  made  a  lasting  mark  on  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation. It suggests that while the overall Commonwealth response to a continuation of pre-1971
defence cooperation was mixed, Commonwealth defence cooperation enjoyed significant successes in
South-East  Asia.  This  is  framed  in  the  context  of  the  Commonwealth  as  a  collective  taking  a
commanding role in the future development of Commonwealth defence cooperation, but doing so in a
way that  did not  fundamentally threaten the substance of  pre-1971 defence cooperation  even if  it
obliged  some  superficial  changes.  This  argument  is  explored  in  the  chapter  by  pointing  to  the
importance of the 1971 Singapore Declaration and what that suggested for the future development of
Commonwealth defence cooperation. It highlights the changes in how the Commonwealth operated, as
well as the reaction of older Commonwealth defence cooperation in response to these changes. Finally
it notes the individual responses by Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and the UK to these
developments. It concludes by marking the deployment of the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring
Force Rhodesia as a key turning point in the progress of the Commonwealth to showcase how the
changed organisation saw the role of defence cooperation amongst its own members. 
The 1970s was a period of great change for the UK and many of the Commonwealth countries.
The withdrawal from east of the Suez had profound implications for British military strategy.1 The
announcement of the Guam doctrine by the US ended any hope that the new regional approach would
fully and entirely replace the globally-orientated strategy that had been a hallmark of the defensive
1 Ironically British contingency planning in the 1960s had been built around the loss of access to either or both of the 
bases in both Singapore and/or Malaya. Indeed there was a presumption that they would be lost, and the committee 
formed to investigate this entire situation was specifically precluded from offering commentary on if access to the bases 
remained viable. - Scott Committee Report on the Defence Questions relating to South-East Asia in paras 9(a) and 11 of 
D(60)33 25 September 1960 DEFE 7 UKNA
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arrangements  of  the  British  empire  and  the  Commonwealth.2 The  retreat  of  the  UK  and  the  US
radically  changed  the  strategic  situation  in  the  1970s.  It  spurred  the  retrenchment  of  various
Commonwealth countries towards a much more localised defence. This resulted in a reduction in the
scale of support for regional endeavours and created a scenario in which there were extremely limited
opportunities for continued engagement, and little political appetite for such endeavours either. In its
place was an increased focus on national defence,  a surge in peace-keeping efforts,  the causes for
which  often  had their  roots  in  issues  surrounding decolonisation,  and an  increased  interest  in  the
internal policies of other Commonwealth countries. 
The  deployment  of  the  Commonwealth  Electoral  Monitoring  Force  to  Rhodesia  marked  a
particularly  important  milestone  in  the  development  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  Its
formation  was  indicative  of  the  new  type  of  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  which  arose
following  decolonisation  and  the  more  diverse  nature  of  the  constituent  members  of  the
Commonwealth. It was representative of an approach that was wholly at odds with the Commonwealth
of the late 1940s and early 1950s that had formed the 1st Commonwealth Division and had discussed
the defence of the Middle East as a matter of their collective interest. 
That said, a semblance of the old system remained extant and active even after 1981. Some, like
the  Five  Powers  Defence  Arrangements,  were  pale  imitations  of  earlier  organisations  tasked  with
similar  goals,  like  its  predecessor  the  Anglo-Malayan Defence  Agreement.3 Other  efforts  involved
ensuring  the  security  of  a  Commonwealth  country,  similar  to  the  Emergency  in  Malaysia  and
Confrontation with Indonesia, now met with only limited support. The Falklands war, at the beginning
of the 1980s, saw the contribution of two small Royal New Zealand Navy warships for the purposes of
relieving  British  ships  elsewhere.  This  contribution  stood  in  stark  contrast  to  the  broadly  based
multinational efforts undertaken by the Commonwealth in earlier decades in Korea, the Middle East,
2 R. Nixon Public Papers of the Presidents of the US 1969 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2005) p 544-556
3 In reviewing the changed circumstances following the announcement of British withdrawal from the region and the 
implementation of the Five Power Defence Arrangements there was a consensus in Australian political and military 
circles that it 'is not stepping into British shoes and Australian forces will not fill the role played in the past by British 
forces'. It continued to say that 'the defence of Malaysia and Singapore will rest... with the two Governments concerned.' 
Although the deployment of Australian and British forces would continue, they would do so 'to enhance our [Australian]
political and diplomatic influence in the region, promote stability and confidence in the area, assist the development of 
Malaysia's and Singapore's military forces and foster defence cooperation between them'. This was quite a change from 
the urging of previous Australian governments to seek approval from the US to pre-emptively occupy the Songhkla 
position in the event of conflict in the region in order to defend Malaya. - Review of Defence Cooperation with Malaysia
and Singapore JS Report no. 56/59 A1838 Item 696/1/13 ANA
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and South-East Asia. These events, and others during the period, highlighted the shift that had occurred
in Commonwealth politics. 
The alteration of strategic doctrine in the 1970s by the UK effectively scuppered the possibility
of Commonwealth cooperation continuing in the manner it had previously. A suitable alternative to the
UK as a pivotal force around which the rest of the Commonwealth coordinated was not found. Even if
one had been found, the constituent members of the Commonwealth – including Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the UK – had by this stage diverged so significantly in their strategic interests that a
unified or cohesive approach to global issues was simply not possible. By the 1970s the conventional
defence of the interests of each state had shrunk to the point where it was dominated by local concerns.
The refocus of the UK to work with Europe also undermined the continued growth of any substantive
and lingering cooperation that had continued with Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia. Although it
had not ended it, any future cooperation in that respect appeared unlikely.4
Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  was  reinvigorated  from an unlikely source  –  the  New
Commonwealth.  The  interest  of  these  states  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  countries  of  the
Commonwealth provided a new outlet for defence cooperation better suited to the new strategic and
political climate. The rise of this new style of cooperation resulted in two different approaches to joint
Commonwealth defence cooperation. One was this new style of cooperation, which was recognized
and  declared  by  the  Commonwealth  to  be  a  Commonwealth  endeavour  and  fitted  the  political
atmosphere of the time but had no history as a form of Commonwealth defence cooperation. Indeed the
manner in which that form of cooperation manifested would have been the subject of serious objections
among the Commonwealth countries even twenty years  earlier.  The other,  which despite  a lack of
fanfare and title as to its status, was a tried and tested method of Commonwealth defence cooperation.
Furthermore, it was a style of cooperation that existed in part because of the long-standing cooperation
amongst Commonwealth countries that persisted over several decades and had struggled on in spite of
widespread political and strategic change.
4 Although there was no longer a commitment to the defence of South-East Asia, and in fact the Australian government 
believed that 'a degree of uncertainty about our [Australia's] position affords an important diplomatic instrument and 
enlarges our opportunity for influence', there was nevertheless an ongoing Australian and British presence in the region 
that had the effect of continuing – in a small but important measure – a connection amongst the Commonwealth 
countries of the region. - Review of Defence Cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore JS Report no. 56/59 A1838 Item 
696/1/13 ANA
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Almost  all  countries  of  the  Commonwealth  up  until  1947  had  some  level  of  military
engagement with the rest of the Commonwealth. By 1970, however, the number of Commonwealth
countries who cooperated with each other in matters of defence had more or less been at a standstill
since  1947 despite  explosive  growth.  Indeed,  interest  in  multinational  military activities  using  the
Commonwealth as a vehicle had dropped considerably in the intervening years even amongst those
who had once shown interest in such an enterprise. Canada and South Africa had ruled out further
cooperation, although in very different circumstances and for different reasons. Australian and New
Zealand support of Commonwealth related initiatives, while still present, was dwindling in the face of
their own strategic reorientation. The new entrants to the Commonwealth were not interested in the
traditional  style  of  military  engagement  that  the  Commonwealth  had  conducted.  Even  if  such  an
interest  had  been  expressed,  there  had  been  ongoing  concerns  throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s
concerning security leaks which complicated defence cooperation, these concerns extended even to
countries such as Australia.5 This was in addition to the normal difficulties that multinational military
cooperation would ordinarily entail for the Commonwealth.6 
Furthermore the fractious nature of the expanded Commonwealth was a point made time and
time again in the aftermath of the decolonisation process. India, which had initially shown an interest in
cooperative efforts in some form, fought a war against another Commonwealth country, Pakistan. This
war led to the creation of Bangladesh, another country which joined the Commonwealth. For much the
same reasons  as  India  and Pakistan,  Bangladesh  was  unable  to  consider  the  Commonwealth  as  a
potential framework for military cooperation. The UK's withdrawal from East of the Suez, and then
effectively back to Europe, removed the defence cooperation link between Commonwealth countries.
Meanwhile, the US Guam doctrine put an end to the notion that the US might take on the UK's role.
The strategic reorientation of the two major powers on which the continuation of the Commonwealth
link  was  founded  created  a  particularly  bleak  outlook  for  further  cooperation  of  any  sort  in  a
recognisable form.
5 M. Goodman, 'With a Little Help from my Friends,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 18 (2003), p 155
6 South Africa, for instance, remained very sensitive to the potential leak of information from or to the US or the UK 
which might embarrass one or the other. The outcome of this was the implementation of a new level of security 
clearance, 'Guard' which was used to indicate when a document was 'not to be communicated to a national of the the US 
of America without the prior agreement of the originator'. - Weekly Intelligence Summary UDF General Staff 
Intelligence Committee Report no 33/57 CO/138/2 20 September 1957 MV 208 MV/EF 151 SANDFA
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The Singapore Declaration
1971 was perhaps the most fateful year of the Commonwealth and cemented change that had
been  taking  place  since  1947.  The  Singapore  Declaration  of  1971  formally  established  the  new
direction of the Commonwealth in a way that had never been expressed before.  It  was not a new
direction that  was amenable to  continued military cooperation.  Although the  focus  on the internal
politics  of  its  constituent  member  states  had  been  self-evident  for  some  time,  the  Declaration
highlighted the approach the Commonwealth as a whole took to censuring its members. It ended any
lingering notion that may have existed that the Commonwealth was to be relied upon to support the
territorial and political sovereignty of any Commonwealth country. Smaller organisational changes, but
which were equally important to the overall atmosphere in the Commonwealth, were also implemented
from 1971. The start of the 1970s marked a new era of Commonwealth political priorities and focus. It
was an era in which the structures of the past were changed dramatically to reflect the new prevailing
political circumstances. 
There were also changes in the way the various political  leaders across the Commonwealth
interacted with each other.  The practice of holding meetings outside the UK was unusual,  but not
completely without precedent. Canada had hosted a number of Commonwealth meetings since the first
Colonial Conference in 1887. Nigeria held the first Commonwealth Prime Ministers meetings in 1966.
Canada  held  the  Commonwealth  Heads  of  Government  meeting  in  1973 and of  the  six  meetings
between 1971 and 1981 half were in 'Old Commonwealth'  countries.7  One of the remaining three
meetings was held in Singapore in 1971, which had made its intentions on the Commonwealth defence
relationship,  as  it  was  originally  envisaged,  quite  clear.  The  Commonwealth  was  not  particularly
revolutionary in its choice of locale throughout the decade. 
Significant effort was put into the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Canada in
1973 to ensure that the informal nature of the Commonwealth relationship was preserved in some form.
Given the enlarged Commonwealth the idea that an informal discussion could be held amongst all of
the assembled Prime Ministers (or, Heads of Government as they were now known) would seem an
impossibility.  Yet  the  practice  of  holding  meaningful  informal  talks  amongst  the  Commonwealth
regarding matters of collective interest was revived as well as the circumstances allowed. Strict rules
7 Canada held a meeting in 1973, the United Kingdom followed in 1977, and Australia then in 1981.
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may have been enforced on the retreat, but there was a clear interest in ensuring that the fundamental
character of Commonwealth meetings contained an element of the comparatively informal discussions
that had been a hallmark of Commonwealth relationships in the past.8 The retreat offered by Canada in
1973  was  the  nearby  resort  of  Monte-Tremblant.  This  was  a  far  cry  from the  country  house  at
Chequers, but the intent remained intact. There was a clear awareness, on the political side at least, that
the changes made to the Commonwealth had very far-reaching implications for all Commonwealth
activity.9 
Not only was the form of those meetings altered but the role and purpose of the Commonwealth
was adapting to the new circumstances as well. The changing nature of the Commonwealth had been
clear from 1949 with the addition of republics to the Commonwealth. Another early example of this
new approach  to  Commonwealth  politics  was  the  condemnation  of  South  Africa  and its  effective
ejection from the organisation.10 It was not until 1971 that the Commonwealth declared and formalised
the principles which had informed the condemnation of South Africa a decade earlier. The Singapore
Declaration  heralded  in  a  very public  and  concrete  way the  major  change  to  the  Commonwealth
structure but this was merely a reflection of that change and not something new. 
Chief amongst the changes undertaken across the Commonwealth was the increased interest in
precision of nomenclature. Existing Commonwealth traditions and practices fell under the axe as things
were made that more accurately reflected the new circumstances. Prime Ministers' Conferences were
relabelled as  Commonwealth Heads of  Government  meetings.  The last  remaining 'Commonwealth'
military formation, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, was re-designated as the 28th ANZUK Brigade.
The role, purpose, and intent of both remained exactly the same despite these changes. 
The  Singapore  Declaration  of  1971  was,  in  content  at  least,  generally  conservative.  It
8 The Head of Government, his wife, and a single aide (who would not always be in attendance) was the strict limit 
imposed to help control the size of the informal meetings, and even then the number of people involved in such informal
retreats could grow into the hundreds. 
9 Although the issues discussed were no less worrisome – such as the Irish withdrawal from the Commonwealth, a first in 
its history, in October 1948. - L. Pearson The Commonwealth 1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971) p 14
10 It has been further commented by other authors that the Commonwealth, while in its new version lacking a 'mutual 
commitment' has found its calling in other affairs – notable a North-South international dialogue which strikes at the 
very heart of this change which promoted racism, rather than other issues, to the top of its agenda at this time. - J.D. 
Miller, 'The Commonwealth and World Order: The Zimmern vision and after' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 8 (1979) p 172
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recognised that the Commonwealth was a 'voluntary association of independent states' which had been
established by declaration and practice since 1926.11 The ten, core principles of the Commonwealth
focused on humanitarian issues and the vast majority of them had already been the subject of the
Commonwealth's attention since 1949. One in particular, race relations, had already seen active and
arguably quite strong action with the effective dismissal of South Africa from the Commonwealth.
Where the Singapore Declaration was more extraordinary was in how it declared that it was 'rejecting
coercion as an instrument of policy'.12 This actively undermined an element of the Commonwealth
which had otherwise been left largely undisturbed by its expansion. The active defence of the territorial
integrity of Commonwealth countries had been a cornerstone of Commonwealth defence cooperation.
It was the fundamental principle which saw Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa join the
UK in a variety of conflicts, and which had seen the UK expend significant sums to ensure the defence
of new states like Malaysia and Belize. Its outright rejection undermined these efforts in a fundamental
way that had not previously been expressed.
The rejection of coercion by most of the new Commonwealth countries to the Commonwealth
is well-documented.  Almost every member of the Commonwealth was also a member of the Non-
Aligned Movement. India itself had been central to the launch of that Movement.13 Only a couple of the
Commonwealth  countries  that  joined  after  1947  actively  contributed  to  anything  that  might  be
considered the defence of the Commonwealth. This particular comment in the Declaration was very
much in keeping with the times and reflective of its circumstances, but it was extraordinary in that it
was now the declared policy of the Commonwealth as a whole. Commonwealth defence cooperation
had existed even without the full  participation of every country in the Commonwealth in previous
years.  Its  abolition,  which  was  in  effect  what  this  advocated,  put  an  end  to  the  use  of  the
Commonwealth as the overarching political framework for such cooperation. Hence in 1971 the abrupt,
and largely meaningless, name change of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to the 28th ANZUK Brigade.
Although the birth of the modern Commonwealth must surely be traced back to the independence of
India  and  Pakistan  in  1949  the  Singapore  Declaration  would  seem to  mark  a  fitting  end  of  the
formation of the modern Commonwealth. It detailed processes and values which had been reflected in
11 A transcript of the declaration can be found here: 'Inter-imperial relations committee: report, proceedings and 
memoranda November 1926 E(IR/26) series
12 Singapore declaration of Commonwealth Principles 1971 issued at the Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore 22 
January 1971
13 D. Rothermund, 'The Era of Non-Alignment' in N. Miskovic, H Fischer-Tine, N. Boskovska (eds) The Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Cold War: Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade (New York: Routledge, 2014) p 19
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its actions previously but never explicitly expressed. In that sense the Declaration also signalled the end
of  extant  forms  of  Commonwealth  cooperation  which  were  not  amenable  to  the  new  political
atmosphere.  The continuation of Commonwealth structures under other names,  notwithstanding the
rejection of coercion as a matter of policy, was fundamentally at odds with the Commonwealth that had
quite clearly existed in the first half of the twentieth century.
Throughout the 1970s the Commonwealth issued further declarations and statements. Although
the Singapore Declaration was one of the most influential and became one of the key documents of the
Commonwealth,  the  Lusaka  Declaration  in  1979  further  commented  on  racism  and  racial
discrimination.14 This was an issue which had been at the centre of Commonwealth disagreements for
the  past  thirty  years.  Although  the  Lusaka  Declaration  focused  on  racism,  as  well  as  continuing
Commonwealth criticism of South Africa's policy of apartheid, it advocated 'legal equality without any
distinction  or  exclusion  based on race,  colour,  sex,  descent,  or  national  or  ethnic  origin'.15 It  was
indicative of the balance of power inside the Commonwealth that neither the Singapore nor Lusaka
Declarations  made  any  reference  to  discrimination  or  conflict  arising  as  a  result  of  religion  and
contented itself with noting the broad spectrum of faiths practised within the Commonwealth. Despite
the obvious ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan (which resulted in Pakistan's withdrawal from
the Commonwealth in 1972) over religion and similar tensions elsewhere in the Commonwealth there
was little effort made to address these issues. This reflected a balance of power that was decidedly in
favour of  not  only the newer Commonwealth  countries,  but  also in  favour  of  India  and the Non-
Aligned  Movement.  This  was  hardly  surprising  given  that  the  membership  of  the  Non-Aligned
Movement and the Commonwealth overlapped quite significantly. The practical implications of this
cross-membership  were  profound and  help  explain  the  Commonwealth's  approach  to  international
issues.
Perhaps the most concrete outcome of the Singapore Declaration was that it finally addressed
the lingering questions and doubts that remained regarding the exact nature of the Commonwealth
14 An equally important, if somewhat anachronistic, debate at the time of the conference that led to the Lusaka declaration 
was the unseemly arguments between the United Kingdom and Zambia concerning the role and purpose of the queen in 
the Commonwealth political structure. - R. Craggs and H. Kumarasingham, 'Losing an Empire and Building a Role: The 
Queen, Geopolitics and the Construction of the Commonwealth Headship at the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting 1979' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43 (2015) p 81
15 Lusaka declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice 1979 issued at the Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka, 
Zambia, 7 August 1979
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relationship, both internationally and amongst the Commonwealth itself. It is important to note that the
Commonwealth of 1971 had become an organisation which offered and demanded mutual respect for
all countries under its banner, rather than a Commonwealth which offered and assumed mutual support.
The Commonwealth before 1971 was an organisation which actively, if not altogether successfully,
involved  itself  in  world  politics  and  encouraged  the  defence  of  its  constituent  Commonwealth
countries. It was far from successful in that regard, and it was certainly not always of one mind on
defence  issues.  The  Chanak  crisis  raised  the  issue  of  divergent  political  views  amongst  the
Commonwealth  countries  as  early as  1922,  and those  divergent  views  were  expressed  even  more
clearly with the announcement of Ireland's neutrality in 1939. There was also a rather mixed response
to the Suez crisis. The level of involvement of the states in these affairs had taken on a much more
regional  basis  since 1949.  However,  at  no point  did any member of  the Commonwealth object  to
'Commonwealth'  military  actions.  Neither  had  the  Commonwealth  advocated  the  chastisement  of
Commonwealth  countries  which  dissented  from  the  collective,  nor  had  it  demanded  or  obliged
involvement  in  any Commonwealth activities.  Pakistan  and South Africa's  non-involvement  in  the
Korean conflict was not met with a chorus of disapproval. Canada's decision to decline involvement in
the defence of the Middle East did not draw rebuke. It may not always have been favourably received
but  the  Commonwealth  had  demonstrated  a  willingness  to  be  quite  flexible  in  its  approach  and
expectations of individual countries. The Commonwealth after 1971 was a very different organisation.
Here its flexibility was not afforded to external defence issues, but rather internal policies. It exercised
an  inordinate  amount  of  flexibility  in  avoiding  passing  comment  on  the  ongoing  Indian-Pakistan
conflict.  It  declined  comment  on  the  missteps  of  a  whole  swathe  of  new  countries  to  the
Commonwealth. However, it offered no flexibility with regards to the use of the Commonwealth title
which  was  increasingly  seen  as  only  applicable  where  there  was  consensus  amongst  the
Commonwealth. This was distinct from the previous use of the term where it was considered applicable
even where a number of Commonwealth countries remained uninvolved.
In terms of Commonwealth military cooperation the consequences could not have been more
clear.  The change in  the  role  and attitude  of  the  Commonwealth  disturbed the  foundations  of  the
military relationship shared amongst Commonwealth countries.  Throughout  the 1970s and into the
1980s opportunities for Commonwealth defence cooperation presented themselves. Unlike the previous
three  decades  these  opportunities  passed  without  being  addressed  or  even  remarked  upon  to  any
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significant degree. Two major coups occurred during CHOGM's, one in Uganda in 1971 and another in
the Seychelles in 1977.16 Neither of these coups prompted a Commonwealth response. The Ugandan
coup was significant on account of the forced relocation of the Indian minority and the seizure of their
businesses and goods. These were all elements of serious and widespread atrocities carried out in the
country under the rule of General Amin. Although the Seychelles coup was not quite so dramatic, long-
standing  issues  from  the  decolonisation  process  continued  to  cause  political  upheaval  across  the
Commonwealth. Failed governments and repeated coups were common in both Ghana and Nigeria
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.17 Little attention was given across the Commonwealth to these issues,
and  the  possibility  of  joint  Commonwealth  military  intervention  for  the  stability  of  a  fellow
Commonwealth country was never raised even before the 1971 Singapore Declaration. 
The  capability  of  the  British  government  to  supply  the  lion's  share  of  the  military  force
necessary for  the defence of other  Commonwealth members  had been steadily eroded since 1949.
Arguably after the conclusion of the Confrontation with Indonesia that capability had well and truly
disappeared. There was no comparable effort by the Commonwealth, individually or collectively, to
step into that role. The notion of an increased level of Commonwealth military cooperation after 1963
never  became  a  serious  consideration.  In  fact  the  political  will  which  had  dominated  the
Commonwealth  during  this  time  was  actively  against  such  measures.  The  atmosphere  of  non-
involvement militarily was as much a reflection of a growing British inability to provide the basis of
such activity as it was of the new political atmosphere in the Commonwealth. This was a change that
had been happening for  decades  in  small  measures,  and by the  end of  the  1970s  almost  entirely
encompassed  the  Commonwealth  to  the  point  where  the  immediate  territorial  defence  of
Commonwealth countries was met with a lukewarm response from some quarters and what bordered on
active  hostility  from  others.  This  diverse  range  of  opinions  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the
Commonwealth's reaction to the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands in 1982.
The rejection of coercion and the primacy of mutual respect for the constituent countries of the
Commonwealth along acceptable lines stood in stark contrast to the pre-1971 Commonwealth which
had engaged in defence cooperation, and was totally alien to the wartime cooperation of the pre-1949
16 For Uganda see P.G. Okoth, 'The Political Economy of Human Rights Crisis in Uganda 1962-1985' Transafrican 
Journal of History 24 (1994) p 151, and for the Seychelles see J. Hatchard, 'Re-establishing a Multi-party State: Some 
Constitutional Lessons from the Seychelles' Journal of Modern African Studies 31 (1993) p 601
17 See C. Onwumechili, African Democratization and Military Coups (London: Praeger, 1998) pp 47-50
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Commonwealth.18 Military  cooperation  in  the  pre-1949  Commonwealth  was  a  very  distinct  and
important aspect of joint Commonwealth activities. The Commonwealth as a whole had fought two
wars over the preceding fifty years that had spanned the globe using troops and equipment from a
multitude of geographical locations and owing allegiance to a number of centres of political influence.
The Commonwealth from 1949 to 1971 had, as outlined in previous chapters, clearly followed the
approach and with much the same mindset but with varying results and a decreased interest in the
military cooperation. The rejection of coercion in 1971 marked a distinct end to that particular style of
military cooperation amongst the Commonwealth, at least officially. 
The New Commonwealth rises
Although not the direct subject of this study, it is worth looking briefly at some of the new
Commonwealth members, specifically India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan were the oldest of the
new  members  of  the  Commonwealth  and  their  relationship  both  with  each  other  and  with  the
Commonwealth was indicative of the difficulty caused by the decolonisation process. The long-term
consequences  of  these  difficulties  lasted  years  after  decolonisation  and  occasionally  resulted  in  a
situation which was rife with conflict. In 1971 the ongoing dispute over the Kashmir region was further
complicated by divisions between East and West Pakistan which eventually led to civil  war.19 The
Bengali ethnic group in East Pakistan had suffered considerably under the Pakistan regime, particularly
in the years leading up to the civil war.  Several months after the initial conflict  with the Bengalis
pressure  on  West  Pakistan  mounted  as  a  result  of  India  encouraging international  support  for  the
Bengali movement. This prompted a Pakistani attack on India early in December 1971. Although the
Indo-Pakistan war was finished relatively quickly,  it  is  one  of  the most  poignant  examples  of  the
difficulties the Commonwealth had in fostering military cooperation amongst the new countries of the
Commonwealth.20 India and Pakistan fought a number of wars since independence but this particular
18 Such distance would grow ever larger, with the Royal Commonwealth Society speaking in 1999, some 50 years after the
accession of India and Pakistan to the Commonwealth , that the Commonwealth possessed 5 'common goals': prosperity,
sustainable development, opportunity, security, and human rights. The transformation process that had gripped hold of 
Commonwealth affairs had turned the Commonwealth into the strangest of international organisations with goals and 
objectives in a notional, rather than concrete, context. - S.R. Ashton, 'British Government Perspectives on the 
Commonwealth 1964-71: An Asset or a Liability?' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35 (2007) p 90
19 For a detailed account of the conflict, and particularly its causes and the influence of key figures in the lead-up to the 
war see R. Sisson & L. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1990).
20 It is also worth mentioning that conflict has erupted between India and Pakistan on three separate occasions since 1947. -
A. Jalal, 'India's Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: An Historical Perspective' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 15 (1987) p 289
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outbreak led to a further deterioration of relations and spoke volumes about the overall nature of the
Commonwealth relationship.  Pakistan's departure from the Commonwealth in 1972 over the issue of
Bangladesh further highlighted the fractious nature of the organisation.21 Cooperation in anything but a
symbolic  or  limited  effort  had  been  problematic  for  the  Commonwealth  since  1947.  The  Indian-
Pakistan relationship had been at the core of that problem initially and it had not subsided over the
years.  The  decolonisation  process  had  proved  itself  troublesome  for  a  number  of  new  states.
Cooperation  inside  an  international  organisation  dominated  by those  countries  was  an  exercise  in
futility at best, and a cause of conflict at worst. 
The role which India and Pakistan played in poisoning the atmosphere of the Commonwealth
should not be underestimated. None of the territories that became independent from the British Empire
during this period drew upon a predominantly British history and culture. The vast majority underwent
some form of ethnic or cultural violence at some point between their independence and 1981. The
ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan highlighted the issues in decolonisation in a way that even
the  sectarian  troubles  in  Northern  Ireland  did  not.  Any  military  cooperation  amongst  the
Commonwealth would necessarily encounter the same issues which had forced Irish neutrality, and
prompted conflict between India and Pakistan. In effect, the political change that the Commonwealth
underwent  in  its  expansion  eroded  the  previously  hospitable  atmosphere  that  had  allowed  for
cooperative defence efforts. Even when such cooperation had not involved all of the Commonwealth
there was no underlying issue that actively prevented any such endeavour. This was no longer the case
for the post-1971 Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth had struggled with the influx of new member states, and the issues and
problems  that  each  carried.  Disagreements  and  divergence  in  priorities  on  external  matters  also
redirected the Commonwealth to focus internally. The departure of Pakistan, in much the same way as
the departure of South Africa before it, was indicative of that shift in perspective. The long-standing
issues  behind  the  departure  of  Pakistan  and  South  Africa  also  pointed  to  the  unsettled  nature  of
relations  inside  the  Commonwealth.  The  Commonwealth  became  a  force  for  imposing  particular
domestic policies on other Commonwealth countries. This was an approach that was entirely at odds
with the progression of Commonwealth relations from the 1931 Statute of Westminster. The effect that
21 J. Hollowell, Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) p 107
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this had on potential military cooperation was significant. Commonwealth military cooperation during
the First World War was assumed, and during the Second World War assured. Cooperation amongst the
older  Commonwealth  countries  fared  slightly better  in  this  new era  of  nationally-focused defence
priorities. This extended to such older initiatives as the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement which had
seen new life following the ratification of the Five Power Defence Arrangement.
The Falklands  War  unveiled  just  how little  military support  could  be  counted  on from the
Commonwealth. The only exception to effective non-involvement militarily was the deployment of the
Royal  New Zealand navy to the  Persian  Gulf  to  relieve  British warships  for  service  in  the South
Atlantic. The limited involvement of the Commonwealth, coupled with the weakness of the British
position in the conflict, served as a stark reminder of the deterioration of the UK's ability to conduct
large-scale operations. It also underscored the difficulties in ensuring a coordinated Commonwealth
effort  to  defend  the  territorial  integrity  of  a  fellow  Commonwealth  country.  The  inability  of  the
Commonwealth to support the territorial integrity of other Commonwealth country resurfaced again in
the Belize-Guatemalan tensions in the lead-up to Belize's independence in 1981.22 These three elements
– 1) a new approach to the Commonwealth organisation, 2) the weakening of the Commonwealth and
the UK's ability to act  either  independently or in conjunction with one another,  and 3) the apathy
towards the fate of another Commonwealth countries involved in armed conflict – formed the relatively
hostile  political  atmosphere  of  the  1970s  that  resulted  in  the  end  of  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation and quietly ushered in a new era for the Commonwealth. 
The reaction of the Old Commonwealth
Of the five countries initially involved in defence cooperation amongst the Commonwealth –
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK – much changed, not least of which was
that one of their number was no longer even in the Commonwealth. South Africa did not return to the
Commonwealth until elections were held under majority rule in 1994.23 Little changed in South Africa
with respect to Commonwealth military cooperation in the years it spent outside of the Commonwealth.
22 J. R. Maguire, 'The Decolonisation of Belize: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity' Virginia Journal of 
International Law 22 (1981) p 849
23 The reasons for South Africa's return were not solely limited to majority rule. In addition to the Commonwealth's 
preference for its internal organisation there was also a number of benefits that the newly revamped organisation could 
bring to South Africa namely Commonwealth aid, a friendly international forum for networking and other talks, and as a
reassurance to Afrikaners that South Africa. R. Hyam & P. Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok:Britain and South 
Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p 349
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It had, however, advanced its nuclear technology. The technology it developed, initially for peaceful
purposes such as the relatively rapid creation of artificial harbours, mine clearing, and other major civil
engineering projects, was eventually militarised. Their work in this area was further refined and by
1982 South Africa had successfully created a number of nuclear weapons. Interestingly these devices
were planned to be delivered by Buccaneer and Canberra aircraft, aircraft which had also been slated
for the deployment of nuclear weapons by the UK in certain tactical roles and supplied to South Africa
in the early 1960s. The remnants of Commonwealth defence cooperation lingered on in South Africa
long after it had ended its relationship with the Commonwealth.
While  cooperation  had remained an ongoing feature  of  Canadian  defence  policy,  Canadian
military strategy had shifted over the course of the years. Successive UN peace-keeping operations had
drawn  on  Canadian  military  forces  with  increased  regularity.  A history  of  major  peace-keeping
missions such as deployment to the Suez in 1957 and Cyprus in 1964, were built upon throughout the
1970s.  A second force deployed to the Suez involved yet  more Canadian forces in  1973,  while  a
ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the Yom Kippur War led to another deployment in 1974. An
Interim  force  was  deployed  to  the  Lebanon  a  few  years  later  in  1978.  Successive  Canadian
governments and senior military personnel were clearly willing to increase their contribution to peace-
keeping efforts. Outside of some non-military cooperation on technical matters, the most notable of
which  was  Canadian-Indian  nuclear  cooperation,  there  was  little  Canadian  engagement  with  the
Commonwealth  in  defence.  Canadian  efforts  had  primarily  focused  on  their  own  defence  and
cooperation with the US. Canada's focus was firmly set on helping meet the needs of the UN and
NATO specifically in the realm of helping secure its own territory and the US's northern front against
the USSR. 
South Africa and Canada continued to limit the level of engagement of their armed services
with instances of military cooperation amongst Commonwealth, albeit for very different reasons but
with much the same effect. However, successive governments in both of the Antipodean Dominions
pursued  the  Commonwealth  relationship  with  varying  degrees  of  vigour  and  success  after  1971.
Although both had been affected by their involvement in Vietnam, the 1970s and the opening years of
the  1980s  marked  a  distinctly  Commonwealth-influenced  approach  to  military  cooperation.  The
withdrawal of the UK from East of the Suez, and the US Guam doctrine, necessitated a reorientation to
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a  more  local  defence  posture.  The  Forward  Defence  approach  favoured  by successive  Australian
governments from the mid-1950s into the early 1970s was discarded to pursue a policy which focused
on the defence of the Australian continent.24 New Zealand's defence policy, usually in step with their
Australian neighbours, floundered following this change. New Zealand developed an interest in peace-
keeping, but also continued to participate in some cooperative efforts far beyond its borders. That can
be seen in the deployment of the Royal New Zealand Navy to relieve a Royal Navy vessel in the
Persian Gulf for transfer to the South Atlantic for the Falklands War. Both countries also continued
their regional, Commonwealth-based, multinational defence cooperative efforts. The Anglo-Malayan
Defence Agreement, which served as a framework of Commonwealth cooperation in the region, was
superseded by the Five Power Defence Arrangements which continued to link Australia,  Malaysia,
New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore.25 Australian interest in
the region, despite the shift to a more localised defence, continued if in a somewhat more haphazard
fashion.  The  Royal  Australian  Air  Force  had  squadrons  deployed  to  RAAF  (previously  RAF)
Butterworth in Malaysia until 1988. Both the Australian and New Zealand armed forces maintained a
permanent presence on the base for the purposes of keeping cooperative efforts with Singapore and
Malaysia alive long after 1980.26
This level of cooperation amongst Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK
was also met with a more proactive foreign policy in the region after 1980. The Australian government
was  approached  by a  number  of  countries  in  the  Pacific  in  1982,  many of  them Commonwealth
countries, to supply them with small patrol boats for the purposes of protecting the Exclusive Economic
Zone which had been assigned to all nations earlier that year by the UN. The centrality of Australia to
24 D. Denoon, A Trial Separation: Australia and the Decolonisation of Papua New Guinea (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 2012) p 15
25 Unlike the AMDA, however, the Five Power Defence Arrangements were a much looser treaty, even when considering 
the area in which it applied. The FPDA referred only to the Malayan peninsula itself. The deployment of forces to 
maintain a presence in Singapore/Malaysia carried with it no commitment to deploy our [Australian] forces to East 
Malaysia.' - Review of Defence Cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore JS Report no. 56/59 A1838 Item 696/1/13 
ANA
26 Starting from 1971 the joint Australian-New Zealand contribution to the FPDA forces in Malaysia amounted to a single 
destroyer or frigate based out of Singapore (with 'an annual visit of an RAN Task Group'). One battalion with few 
supporting elements based in Singapore, with a forward company at RAAF Butterworth and a contribution to the staff of
the Jungle Warfare Centre at Kota Tdigi. These would be supported by two squadrons of Mirage aircraft based out of 
RAAF Butterworth, and these squadrons – coupled with the Air Defence system at the airbase – would 'constitute a 
major aspect of our [Australian] military presence'. The New Zealand contribution was to consist of a single frigate 
based in Singapore, a battalion along Australian lines also in Singapore, and limited supporting air elements also in 
Singapore. - Review of Defence Cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore JS Report no. 56/59 A1838 Item 696/1/13 
ANA
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the defence of the region seemed to be yielding some positive action.27 This was approximately twenty
years too late to lend weight to Commonwealth defence cooperation of the traditional kind, such as had
been seen with the 28th ANZUK Brigade and its predecessors, but was nevertheless indicative of the
persistence of a Commonwealth military connection.
The difficulty with the Commonwealth defence relationship had always been its reliance on a
single member, the UK. Cooperative efforts between Commonwealth countries in military affairs for an
extended  period  which  did  not  involve  the  UK  were  almost  non-existent  before  1971  and  only
marginally present in the 1980s. The UK's announcement of a withdrawal from East of the Suez by
1971 in 1967 caused significant concern in Australia and New Zealand. Undoubtedly Commonwealth
cooperative efforts had the strongest outcome in South-East Asia. A British withdrawal from the region
seriously threatened gains made in that regard. Despite the withdrawal some elements were kept alive.
The air base at Butterworth remained the Headquarters of the Commonwealth effort in the region,
while British training grounds were maintained in  Brunei.28 British military efforts  were,  however,
scaled back by the withdrawal date. The British focused more on involvement in Europe and NATO,
particularly in providing an anti-submarine warfare capacity in the North Atlantic, as well as handling
internal difficulties, specifically the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Much of this shift can be attributed to
the economic difficulties faced by the UK throughout the post-war period. The steady reduction in
military capability since the decolonisation process began had at its core the need to develop a fiscally
sustainable military force that met  requirements.  In the context of regional defence initiatives,  this
resulted in the UK disavowing its role as the core element of Commonwealth defence cooperation in
favour of participating in a contributory capacity.29 The focus on Europe, where the British military in
its  reduced  capability  still  offered  a  significant  element  in  a  broader  context  of  multinational
cooperation,  proved  appealing.  The  US  declined  to  take  on  the  UK's  relinquished  role  with  its
announcement  of  the  Guam  doctrine  in  1969.  This  left  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  which  had
previously relied on the UK, the US, or both, for their protection isolated in a way that they had not
experienced since the disaster at Singapore in 1942. It is understandable that in the context of British
27 More limited efforts during the 1950s were typically based around securing British or American interest, which was not 
always successful. - R. Thompson, 'Conflict of Cooperation? Britain and Australia in the South Pacific 1950-1960' 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 23 (1995) p 312
28 A. J. Stockwell, 'Britain and Brunei 1945-1963: Imperial Retreat and Royal Ascendancy' Modern Asian Studies 38 
(2004) p 787
29 The possibility of the UK looking to contribute to the overall defensive effort, rather than maintaining a fully 
independent and coherent defensive capability, had been flagged as early as 1957 – Brief for the Prime Minister 
Balanced Collective Forces 12 November 1957 CAB 131/18 D(57)26 UKNA
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withdrawal and US non-involvement in broader initiatives, Australian policy turned to its immediate
defence.
The Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force
The Commonwealth did become much more active in military affairs after 1971. It developed a
role for itself in peace-keeping operations under the aegis of its broader interest in the internal affairs of
other Commonwealth countries.  The Commonwealth,  before 1960, had traditionally refrained from
commenting on the affairs of another Commonwealth country. This undoubtedly reflected Dominion
resistance against anything that might have felt like a resurgence of centralised interference in their
affairs from the UK. The Commonwealth of the 1980s had no such experience and operated on a very
different basis. Having already actively criticised South Africa to the point of obliging its withdrawal, it
further sought to pass comment on Rhodesia.30 It even went to the point of establishing a multinational
Commonwealth  force  to  ensure  that  the  internal  affairs  of  another  Commonwealth  country  were
managed along particular lines. This new approach, at odds with the Commonwealth of the first half of
the  twentieth  century,  was  very  much  in  alignment  with  international  discourse  at  the  UN.  The
deployment of  an electoral  monitoring force to  Rhodesia  was a  product  of its  time.  However,  the
Commonwealth was far from united on such subjects, and tensions inside the Commonwealth rose not
only on account of this renewed desire to 'fix' other countries, but also from ongoing border friction.
India and Pakistan remained constantly at odds with each other over the ongoing territorial dispute
between them. This dispute would take on a whole new character following the development of nuclear
weapons in both countries during the 1970s. The departure of Pakistan from the Commonwealth in
1972 was prompted by the inclusion of Bangladesh into the Commonwealth.  This highlighted the
disturbed state of affairs that had continued in the region since the British departure in 1947, and more
importantly, that such issues were bleeding over into the Commonwealth realm more generally.
The Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring Force suggested the emergence of a new trend in the
development of Commonwealth military cooperation. It was a style of cooperation in keeping with the
times that suited the relatively limited capabilities of individual Commonwealth member states and
better  reflected  the  current  state  of  affairs  within  the  Commonwealth.  The  notion  of  multilateral
30 Most interesting to note here is that the Canadian government was typically the first to censure Rhodesia. Whether it was
over Rhodesian constitutional development, encouraging Commonwealth discussion on the country, criticizing their 
UDI or blaming the British government for the mess Rhodesia was causing. - C. Watts, 'Britain, the Old Commonwealth,
and the Problem of Rhodesian Independence 1964-65' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36 (2008) p 90
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defence arrangements had long since lost favour, and continued only loosely in the form of the FPDA.
The lukewarm reception that the UK received when faced with external aggression further highlighted
just how unconcerned the Commonwealth had become with ensuring the territorial integrity of its own.
When it came to censuring members for their internal policies the Commonwealth as a whole was more
assertive. The monitoring force, which was formed to support the Commonwealth Observer Group in
Rhodesia was formed of troops from Australia, Fiji, Kenya, New Zealand, and the UK.31 It was formed
with the full political backing of the Commonwealth as an organisation.32 The political  will of the
Commonwealth to censure member states had been demonstrated before with South Africa. However,
the monitoring force represented the first  deployment  of troops to ensure that internal  reform was
carried out in a manner consistent with Commonwealth principles. It remains one of the peculiarities of
the historical development of the Commonwealth that it was more self assured when dealing with what
it saw to be egregious activities internal to the Commonwealth than it was in securing its territory from
outside aggression.
One compelling driving force in the growth of peace-keeping operations worldwide was the
UN.  At  a  time  when the  USSR and the  US dominated  international  relations  the  UN offered  an
alternative outlet, for less militarily capable powers, to engage militarily in the advancement of their
interests  in the way states have done since their  inception.  This new form of influence came with
peace-keeping operations. This had been recognised by Canada much earlier, in the late 1940s. The
twin pressures from the UN both in how it conducted its business politically, and in the organisation of
the military operations which it advocated, did not have traditional territorial defence in mind. This
created  an  atmosphere  of  international  relations  in  which  it  became  the  norm to  involve  foreign
countries in the internal affairs of others. This new political atmosphere was well received, especially in
the  Commonwealth.  The  reduced  level  of  military  capability  and  the  surge  in  cultural  and moral
interests can be traced back to the variety of political and social difficulties that were involved in the
decolonisation process. Such difficulties had been well demonstrated in India, Pakistan, Ireland, and
throughout  the  British  Empire.  Ultimately  such  interests  coalesced  amongst  those  Commonwealth
countries who were subjected to those difficulties. It was hardly surprising then that the members of the
31 A. Rouvez, M. Coco, & J-P Paddack, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-
Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994) p 269
32 This was, in fact, a backing sought by the United Kingdom in its resolution to the issue. Duncan Sandys, at the time of 
these comments Minister of Defence, believed that the Rhodesia situation was not just a challenge to Britain but 'the rest
of the Commonwealth' as well. - J. Wood, So Far and No Further (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2012) p 185-186
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Commonwealth readily switched their focus to the internal policies of other nations and became more
concerned  with  such  endeavours.  This  global  shift  in  contemporary military and political  thought
fundamentally altered  the  concepts  which  underpinned the  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation.  It
drove its progression in a manner which was at odds with the older style of Commonwealth defence
cooperation.
Conclusion
One of the few regions that maintained a significant level of Commonwealth cooperation after
1947 was South-East Asia. This continued well after the British withdrawal from East of the Suez in
1971  albeit  in  a  much  reduced  capacity.  Anglo-Australian-New  Zealand-Malayan-Singaporean
cooperation  had  started  as  far  back  as  1957  with  the  creation  of  the  Anglo-Malayan  Defence
Agreement. Despite its name the actions undertaken directly as a result of this agreement also included
Australia and New Zealand, with Singapore included as part of the Federation of Malaya.33 In 1963 the
AMDA was  altered  slightly to  the  Anglo-Malaysian  Defence  Agreement,  recognising  the  political
changes arising from the failure of the Federation of Malaya. This was the political instrument that
provided for joint Commonwealth operations in the region amongst these Commonwealth countries.
With the announcement of the British withdrawal from the region and in accordance with the expiry of
the AMDA a successor treaty with less legally binding terms, the Five Power Defence Arrangements,
was signed by all parties in 1971. 
A key practical outcome of the FPDA was the growth in operations of and deployment to the
Butterworth airbase in Malaya. The Butterworth airbase was notable for its transfer through three of the
five  signatories.  Originally  a  RAF  base,  it  was  transferred  to  the  RAAF  in  1957  following  the
independence of Malaya.34 The RAAF maintained it until 1988. It then came under the control of the
Royal  Malaysian  Air  Force  (RMAF).  The  reduced  capability  and  interest  of  the  UK reflected  an
acceptance  of  increased  Australian  involvement.  This  can  be  clearly  seen  in  the  force  levels
33 Much of the slowness to ensure Singapore was an element of the Federation came from Malaya rather than Singapore. 
Although the trend of promoting federations was still ascendant the actual drive for such formations in the affected 
areas, including here between Singapore and the rest of Malaya, was less enthusiastic. - M. Jones, 'Creating Malaysia: 
Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy 1961-63' Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 28 (2000) p 100 
34 RAAF Butterworth was of particular importance to the Australians. It being 'their only forward air base' and during their 
tenure they invested heavily in its operational capacity and efficiency. Its use also avoided issues which would arise 
through the use of the airbases at Singapore which caused some amount of difficulty in the 1960s between the 
Australians and Malaysians. - Report by E. N. Larmour 1 June 1962 DO 169 POL 58/2 52/118/2 UKNA
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permanently deployed to the region as part of the FPDA from 1971. Although the Royal Navy and the
Royal Air Force maintained a small number of officers with a British aircraft squadron on rotation
through RAAF Butterworth on a regular basis.35 Its overall contribution was significantly less than
either the Malaysian or Australian deployments. It is also worth noting that it was Australia which,
since transfer of Butterworth from the RAF in 1957, supplied the majority of the air squadrons and
supporting formations assigned to the base including the base commander. 
The FPDA provided the basis for cooperation in South-East Asia throughout the decade, which
included joint military exercises for both air and naval assets from all five countries. The first of these
was  organized  in  1981.  The continuation  of  pre-1971 Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  in  this
region was not a success replicated elsewhere. It is interesting to note that the two new Commonwealth
countries – Malaysia and Singapore – were not free of the ethnic and cultural difficulties that plagued
other  new Commonwealth countries.  Malaysia  and Singapore experienced difficulties  from within,
between, and indeed from outside relating to ethnic and cultural differences. Despite this Malaysia and
Singapore involved themselves in existing Commonwealth defence cooperation within the region.36
They were unique in doing so.  There clearly existed an atmosphere amongst  them that  was more
conducive  to  cooperation  for  Commonwealth  countries  in  South-East  Asia  which  did  not  exist
elsewhere. Furthermore, the UK continued to hold an interest in the region and it had been closely tied
to both Malaysia and Singapore following both the Emergency and Confrontation.  This  fits  into a
broader political framework of regional defence that had been fostered since 1957. In addition, it was a
framework which more successfully weathered the retraction from a global role of Commonwealth
endeavours to regional defence initiatives in the 1960s. Although undoubtedly shaken by the further
collapse of defence interests to a much more national-orientation in the 1970s it had a much firmer
basis of continuation than efforts elsewhere. 
While the Commonwealth enjoyed success in South-East Asia it had a more mixed evolution
elsewhere. Although by 1981 the draws on UK forces were a fraction of what they were in comparison
to the previous thirty years the UK was still responding to a number of crises around the globe. The
Falklands War of 1982 demonstrated how far-flung remnants of the British empire required a capability
35 This practice has continued since its transfer to the RMAF in 1988.
36 N. Ganesan, 'Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Some Recent Developments' Asian Affairs: An American Review 25 (1998) 
p 22
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in excess of what was readily available from the UK's own armed forces, or which could be relied upon
from their allies. By 1982 those allies could not really be said to include the Commonwealth as a
whole, but rather a number of independent states some of which were in the Commonwealth. The
Falklands War exposed the extent of the steep decline in British capabilities that had been ongoing
since  the  end  of  the  Malaysian-Indonesian  Confrontation  in  1963.  It  was  believed  that  without
significant allied support the UK did not possess the military capability to assemble and dispatch a
military force capable of reclaiming the islands from the Argentinians on their own.37 It was noted that
the lack of a major aircraft carrier, in conjunction with no nearby friendly airfields, severely limited
potential British operations in the region. This recalled an earlier debate between the Royal Air Force
and the Royal Navy regarding the choice between carrier procurement and overseas air bases regarding
the cuts made by the Treasury, and presented a situation where neither were available. Even when the
Ministry  of  Defence  was  tasked  with  considering  the  possibility  of  recapturing  the  islands  their
response was 'discouraging'.38 Problematically,  the support  that  was considered necessary to  mount
such an operation was unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Given the changed nature of Commonwealth cooperation by 1981 the Commonwealth could no
longer be relied upon to fill in gaps in operational capability as it had previously. The level of support
necessary to fill gaps in operational capability had been demonstrated in South-East Asia on a number
of occasions over the previous decades. Indeed, it is notable that of all the Commonwealth countries
only New Zealand, offered its armed forces to aid in the removal of a foreign power from British
territory. Even New Zealand's contribution, a single small ship, was offered only in an indirect way to
relieve Royal Navy vessels elsewhere and allow the Royal Navy to form a fleet of significant enough
strength that it might retake the islands. Such a token contribution was a far cry from the cooperation
amongst  the  Commonwealth  that  had  led  to  the  creation  of  a  multinational  Division  with  similar
training and doctrine and a  combined approach to  global  strategy on defence  issues.39 Instead  the
British government had to be content with political support from the Commonwealth, and some trade
restrictions imposed by a number of Commonwealth countries on Argentina. This was certainly a far
37 D. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 1998) p 
141
38 L. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 2: War and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 
2005) p 57
39 Joint training exercises had been a hallmark of cooperative efforts through the Commonwealth Brigade group between 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, even if there were occasional disputes as to the cost of such 
operations. - Annex to COS 399/27/3/61 'Note on Meeting of Australian Chiefs of Staff with General Hull' 9 March 
1961  DO 169 UKNA
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cry from the heady days of the 1st Commonwealth Division, or the active deployment of troops in
Malaya.
The Commonwealth's reaction to the war was lukewarm at best. In some countries it bordered
on the actively hostile. The announcement that New Zealand would supply a warship for the relief of
British warships in the Persian Gulf must certainly have caused some embarrassment to the Australian
government.40 The comparable Australian role in the affair was not to cause a fuss over the sale of HMS
Invincible falling through. South Africa, although long since lost to the Commonwealth more generally,
had its relationship with the UK sorely tested on account of strong economic and military ties between
Argentina and South Africa. Rumours that South Africa had been actively supplying Argentina with
weapons was rampant in intelligence circles although these were never fully corroborated.41 Canada's
reaction, while initially positive, was paralysed between a desire to adhere to the UN and to provide
support to the UK. The UN had failed to impose its will on either party. Furthermore, this was not a
conflict which could be resolved through peace-keeping endeavours which both the UN and Canada
had  advocated.  Interestingly  many  of  the  new  nations  of  the  Commonwealth  were  rather  more
sympathetic, and certainly in the early stages of the conflict were quite public in their support of the
UK  against  Argentina's  aggression.  That  support  wavered,  however,  as  the  conflict  continued.  In
particular  the  sinking  of  the  Argentinian  battleship  Belgrano proved  unpopular  across  the
Commonwealth. India's sudden announcement that while it still supported the UK it also recognised
that  the Argentinian claim to the islands  had some merit  was indicative of the sort  of ambivalent
support the Commonwealth provided throughout the whole affair.42 Outside of New Zealand, there was
little direct military support for the UK from the Commonwealth. If nothing else the Falklands War was
demonstrative of the end to the military aspect of the Commonwealth that had dominated its strategic
considerations since the start of the century. 
Another clear end to the military aspect of the Commonwealth came in the form of the change
in title for the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. This too was indicative of the recognition that what had
previously been accepted as Commonwealth before was no longer thought of in that way. Although the
40 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review Volume 32 p 44
41 'Reply to British request for South African arms embargo against Argentina' BTS1/20/3 Department of Foreign Affairs –
Note that this reply is not dated.
42 S. Badsey, M. Grove, & R. Havers, The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On (Oxford: Frank Cass, 2005) p 184 for 
analysis, and see The Times 13 May 1982 for a contemporary report of the speech given by the Indian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.
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demise  of  the  subsequently  renamed  ANZUK  brigade  occurred  a  few  years  later  in  1974  the
intervening period illustrated how Commonwealth military relations continued in spite of its supposed
end. This continued cooperation amongst Commonwealth countries which, in years prior, had been
described as Commonwealth cooperation was now described in other terms. There was no difference in
the substance of what was happening whether it was called 'Commonwealth' or not. It is also necessary
to draw a distinction between the Singapore Declaration in 1971 refusing coercion as a means of policy
in the Commonwealth with Commonwealth military cooperation more broadly. Although it was very
clear that the style of military cooperation previously undertaken by the Commonwealth was at odds
with  this  new approach,  the  Commonwealth  was not  ruling  out  military cooperation  entirely.  The
creation  of  the  monitoring  force  in  Rhodesia  drew  upon  a  long-standing  tradition  of  joint
Commonwealth military activity but funnelled it in a very different political direction. The end result
was the creation of a style of Commonwealth cooperation that was very new. However, the older style
of Commonwealth cooperation continued even if it was no longer associated with the Commonwealth.
This continuation of the older style of Commonwealth cooperation was significantly reduced in
scale  to  that  which  had  previously  been  undertaken.  While  the  ramifications  of  the  Singapore
declaration in 1971 on the practicalities of cross-Commonwealth defence cooperation was negligible,
since the 1960s there had been a reduction in these endeavours in line with the reorientation of strategic
interests to a more national focus. The continued interest in South-East Asia from all parties originally
involved was aided by sheer proximity and the existence of reasonable capabilities.43 In other regions,
where such proximity and capability did not exist, the drive for multinational cooperation was non-
existent. Endeavours had been made, for example, to form a federation out of the remaining British
territories in the Caribbean. Although this had failed by 1962 further attempts were made at something
similar for decades after.44 The invasion of Grenada in 1983, nor the underlying cause which prompted
the invasion, was not met with any substantive action by the Commonwealth. Similarly, in the same
region, the Belize-Guatemalan dispute saw support only from the UK. Although the Belize-Guatemalan
conflict was less volatile than the situation in Malaya during the Emergency, the attention it received
from the Commonwealth more generally was limited to expressions of political support and diplomatic
43 These were Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom.
44 R. Cox-Alomar, 'Britain's Withdrawal from the Eastern Caribbean 1965-67' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 31 (2003) p 74
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endeavours at the UN.45 It was nevertheless a tangible reflection of the change in strategic priorities
within the Commonwealth from the 1970s onward. The defence of the constituent elements of the
Commonwealth now ranked a poor second compared to the absolute need to maintain a self-proclaimed
moral high ground (at least on issues other than religion). 
In  effect  the  Commonwealth  was  transformed  from an  organisation  with  a  very  clear-cut
military role into a much more broad international organisation interested in the internal policies of its
members rather than their collective or individual security.46 This placed the Commonwealth, after the
opening years of the 1980s, in an interesting position on the geopolitical landscape. It served as a forum
for the growth of international  ideals  that  were espoused by new Commonwealth countries.  These
ideals  had been given substance with the announcement of the Singapore declaration in 1971 and
indicated the direction of the organisation. In a sense the British aim to use the Commonwealth as a
means of the preservation of its influence in the world worked. It became a vehicle for the advancement
of influence and ideals in the post-war period. It simply was not representative of British influence and
ideals, or even the ideals and concepts that had previously underpinned the Commonwealth.
45 R. Sanders, 'The Commonwealth as a Champion of Small States' p 83 in J. Mayal (ed), The Contemporary 
Commonwealth: An Assessment 1965-2009 (London: Routledge, 2010).
46 Indeed there seemed to have been a belief held in British political circles, and expressed by Mr. Watkinson in his role as 
Minister of Defence in 1961, that because South Africa was 'now an independent country' that 'we [the United Kingdom]
are not responsible [for its defence]'. The implication being clear, given that the comments were made shortly after South
Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, that there could well have been some responsibility for its defence were it 
still within the Commonwealth. This in fact was the view of the South Africa government as they reviewed Mr. 
Watkinson's parliamentary replies. - Report of the Visit of Minister of Defence to London 21 July 1961 MV 128/12 File  




This thesis has argued that there were, in effect, four stages of development in Commonwealth
defence since 1947. The first started in 1947 as the UK, and the rest of the Commonwealth, realised the
serious implications for the defence of the Empire and the Commonwealth following the independence
of India and the rapid development of new advanced technologies. These developments had somewhat
undermined existing military strategies. The second stage beginning in the early 1950s started when the
UK and the Commonwealth started to address those implications through regional defence structures
while remaining cognizant of the international situation. The third stage in the 1960s was dominated by
how international and domestic pressures undermined the regional structures that arose from the second
stage and the consequences of the expansion of the Commonwealth and the rise in the importance of
the US on defence issues. Finally, the last stage was heralded by the Singapore Declaration of 1971 and
saw the  Commonwealth  as  a  whole  develop  its  own outlook  on  defence  cooperation,  an  outlook
independent  of  how  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  had  manifested  before.  This  stage  was
complicated by the parallel continuation of a reduced, but extant, version of Commonwealth defence
cooperation of a kind similar to Commonwealth defence cooperation before 1971. 
The distinction between pre- and post-1971 Commonwealth defence cooperation is crucial. Pre-
1971 Commonwealth defence cooperation focused on the territorial defence of the countries of the
Commonwealth, and did not require the full participation or assent of the Commonwealth. Post-1971
Commonwealth defence cooperation was based on a  rejection of  force as a  means of engagement
within the Commonwealth, which was subsequently redefined to accept a form and format of defence
cooperation  that  supported  a  peacekeeping  role  in  line  with  Commonwealth  values.  Post-1971
Commonwealth defence cooperation was based on the ideals and desires of the majority in the new and
expanded Commonwealth. Such new ideals were notably not representative of the key countries in the
Commonwealth which had previously driven Commonwealth defence cooperation. 
The continued presence of an unspoken Commonwealth defence cooperation that did not rely
on the unanimous approval of the Commonwealth membership lay in the roots of Commonwealth
defence cooperation dating back to Irish neutrality during the Second World War. The precedent that
Commonwealth defence cooperation could exist without the assent of the whole organisation of the
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Commonwealth had been well-established and could even be traced back to Canadian participation in
the  Boer  war,  or  South  Africa's  resistance  to  deploy  during  the  First  World  War.  Subsequent
developments in the 1950s, particularly regarding the defence of the Middle East, further emphasised
how  decoupled  the  political  Commonwealth  structure  had  become  from  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation. Commonwealth defence cooperation, of the form that was known and recognisable as
such  since  1947,  had  much  more  in  common  with  organisations  like  the  Five  Powers  Defence
Arrangements and the 28th ANZUK Brigade than it had with the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring
Force in Rhodesia.
That is  at  the heart  of the explanation offered here for the development  of Commonwealth
defence  cooperation  between  1947  and  1982.  There  were  two  paths  along  which  Commonwealth
defence cooperation progressed after 1971. On one path there is a clear continuation of cooperation
fulfilling Commonwealth strategic goals that loses the title Commonwealth but changes nothing in
substance.  On the other  path there is  a  clear  political  expression of what  Commonwealth military
activity should be, and this was clearly demonstrated with the Commonwealth Electoral Monitoring
Force. The reasons behind that dual-outcome progression of Commonwealth defence relations can be
explained by pointing to the prevailing attitudes of new Commonwealth countries to defence questions,
Commonwealth relations particularly regarding race and religion, the technology available, a variety of
nation-specific difficulties in Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and the UK, and the rising
importance  of  local  defence  issues  in  national  considerations.  This  was not  a  particularly inviting
atmosphere for the continuation of the global scale of defence cooperation that the Commonwealth had
showcased in the First and Second World Wars. Yet, it is clear that South-East Asia developed into a
bastion  of  Commonwealth  activity.  A  stable  basis  of  cooperation  amongst  new  and  existing
Commonwealth countries was brought into existence in a process that was not replicated elsewhere.
The cooperation was Commonwealth in its objectives and practices, as it would have been understood
before 1971. It continued, largely unabated, whether the adjective 'Commonwealth' was applied or not. 
The  unspoken  commitment  to  the  territorial  defence  of  the  member  states  of  the
Commonwealth, as had existed before 1971 and extended to include Singapore and Malaysia since
1957 with the creation of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Area, continued through the FPDA. The creation
of the AMDA in 1957, in part to provide a basis for Australian and New Zealand contributions to the
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region,  highlighted  the  distinctiveness  of  Commonwealth  activity  in  South-East  Asia.  Equally  it
demonstrated  the  underlying  break  that  had  been  made  between  1939  and  1957  in  terms  of  the
expectations Commonwealth countries had of each other. After 1971 with the creation of the FPDA the
situation in South-East Asia effectively returned to the state of affairs that had existed throughout the
Commonwealth in  1939.  The expectation of  defence may have been present,  but  there existed no
obligation or requirement.  Compare this  level of cooperation and interest  with the Commonwealth
reaction to the Falklands, the Guatemala-Belize conflict, and the coup and subsequent US invasion of
Grenada. The Commonwealth reaction to the Falklands war was lacklustre. India's support for the UK
was present, but circumspect. Even older members of the Commonwealth, such as Canada, Australia,
and even New Zealand provided little in the way of support. A small warship from New Zealand, that
was not to be deployed to the combat zone, marked the high point of what was an embarrassingly
paltry  cooperative  effort.  Indeed,  much  like  the  Suez  crisis,  there  was  greater  cooperation  and
involvement  between  French  and  British  forces  than  there  was  between  the  members  of  the
Commonwealth. The Caribbean, hardly a hotbed of Commonwealth cooperation but equally far from
free  of  its  own troubles,  provided ample  opportunity for  defence  cooperation.  The border  dispute
between Guatemala and Belize saw little more than a half-hearted effort  from the UK in securing
Belize's external defence and near-complete disinterest from other Commonwealth countries.
Evolution, and nomenclature
The style and form of Commonwealth defence cooperation was constantly changing in response
to technological and political developments. It is important to recognize that this would have occurred
irrespective of developments in the Commonwealth. Commonwealth defence cooperation before 1951
was largely predicated on the concept  that  it  would be possible  for  manpower and material  to  be
transferred from around the world to the affected region and be operationally and strategically viable
once transported. The reality of long-range bombers and nuclear weapons of various types made this an
increasingly unlikely prospect. Although the shift from a global to a regional approach followed these
developments, there was some brief consideration of the viability of the older approach to defence
continuing in spite of these developments. This was conceptualised in the theory of Broken Backed
Warfare. While a fundamentally flawed doctrine it was nevertheless indicative of the attempts made to
adapt existing Commonwealth defence cooperation to the realities of contemporary warfare. 
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As Commonwealth defence cooperation was expected, and indeed obliged, to change during the
1950s to account for the new technological developments, it also had to adapt to new political realities.
It  was this  many-faceted drive for strategic  change in the period that  gave rise to an illusion that
decolonisation was at the heart of change in cooperation. In fact the decolonisation process was but one
factor in the overall progression of the cross-Commonwealth defence relationship. The rapidly and
extensively changing requirements  for  the  UK,  and  indeed the  rest  of  the  Commonwealth,  in  the
organisation and employment of their  armed forces was certainly affected by the sheer size of the
territory transferred to new states. Additionally, these changes prompted reduced priority to be given to
a variety of regions involved in plans for an overall Commonwealth defence. This was especially true
of those regions, such as the Indian subcontinent, which had previously been a priority to defend in the
past but were now untenable or no longer as relevant. 
Although  the  contribution  of  new  Commonwealth  countries  to  Commonwealth  defence
cooperation is outside the scope of this study it is important to acknowledge that the increased conflict
of national priorities prompted a different approach to Commonwealth defence cooperation in specific
circumstances. Cooperation with South Africa, in particular, was challenged and led to a decline in
technological and logistic cooperation and uniformity.
Furthermore, a question arises as to whether there can only be a single thread of cooperation
which can be accurately labelled as Commonwealth defence cooperation. Commonwealth cooperation
before 1971 was characterised by a flexibility of membership and a liberal approach to the use of the
Commonwealth title.  The lack of involvement by certain Commonwealth countries had little or no
effect on the existence of defence cooperation. In recognising this, however, the revocation of the title
'Commonwealth'  from  military  formations  in  1971  becomes  clear  as  a  defining  moment  in  the
evolution of Commonwealth defence cooperation. Although the practical implications were minor, it
reflected a change in approach to Commonwealth defence cooperation that indicated a major shift in
how Commonwealth defence cooperation was to be approached and handled – and, for our purposes,
how it should be studied. 
Interest & engagement
One of the more curious aspects about the development of Commonwealth defence cooperation
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must  certainly  be  the  varying  level  of  interest  in  the  political  establishments  of  the  different
Commonwealth countries for such activity. There is also a distinction that needs to be made between
interest and the capability to act on that interest meaningfully. Canada and South Africa, for instance,
both  had  very little  interest  in  becoming  overly involved  in  Commonwealth  military  cooperation.
Although their interest was diminished for very different reasons they demonstrated a capability to
cooperate substantially and meaningfully over the course of the period.1 Canada demonstrated that
capability  through  its  contribution  to  the  1st Commonwealth  Division,  while  South  Africa  did  so
through ongoing bilateral military exchange with the UK directly. Indeed the Canadian contribution to
the Division was the largest after the UK itself. South African involvement was much more strategic in
nature. The arrangements regarding Simonstown between South Africa and the UK helped ensure a
route from the UK to the pillar of Commonwealth cooperation in South-East Asia.2 This effectively
ensured an alternative route to the Far East remained open. This avoided the problems the British faced
in the Middle East which had become clear during the Suez Crisis.
Australia and New Zealand (and it is difficult to separate the two in respect of Commonwealth
defence  cooperation)  are  rather  different.  Both  had  a  clear  and  active  interest  in  Commonwealth
cooperation. Indeed the security of both countries required a global cooperative approach to defence.
Although that reliance had not yielded consistent or favourable results, a reorientation to their own
local defence did not occur until all available possibilities regarding securing British (or American)
support had failed. Australian and New Zealand representatives were not only present at the Middle
East Defence Conference in 1950, but were eager to contribute. It was only following a recognition of
the difficulties, brought on by political and technological change, with the development in the 1960s of
regionally based defence organisations that their interests correspondingly shifted. 
The UK certainly benefited the most from these cooperative efforts. However,  the typically
small size of these endeavours paled in comparison to the sheer scale of the task faced by the British
1 Canada's interests were directed at its global role as a 'middle power' in the new international landscape. Meanwhile 
South Africa's interest in Commonwealth activities declined amongst its politicians over the Commonwealth and the 
complications that arose out of its policy of apartheid.
2 This had been openly recognised in the exchanges of letters between the United Kingdom and South Africa regarding 
the continued use of the base and access to important facilities such as wireless telegraphy installations, accommodation 
and offices. It also allowed for the creation of a 'joint maritime war planning committee' to coordinate joint efforts as the 
need should arise. Operational control of the region would, however, rest with the senior Royal Navy commander for the
region. - See 'Exchanges of Letters on Defence matters between Governments of the Union of South Africa and the 
United Kingdom June 1955'  MV 190 Simonstad SANDFA
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military in the post-war years. Despite some successes in the field of Commonwealth defence relations
the type and scale of Commonwealth support took a very different form. It had become focused on the
supply  of  specific  capabilities  from  the  Commonwealth  to  supplement  existing  British  military
strength.  The  1st Commonwealth  Division  is  an  example  of  this  supply  of  specialist  capabilities
following the inclusion of an Indian Field Ambulance. Other examples of this can be seen throughout
the period. The deployment of Rhodesia, Australia, and New Zealand special forces to Malaysia during
Confrontation, for example, emphasised the contribution of capabilities rather than the supply of core
troop elements. The possibility of this sort of specialised contribution suited the political atmosphere of
many Commonwealth countries. It also avoided placing an undue burden on Commonwealth countries
to contribute to the effort, allowing even small states to contribute to deployments – as Rhodesia did in
Malaysia. 
These contributions were in addition to more conventional involvement. Although only a small
percentage  of  the  total  amount  necessary for  the  UK to  achieve  their  goals  was  supplied  by the
Commonwealth on this basis, it is illustrative of the strength of such connections that such cooperation
continued  longest  where  the  contribution  from  the  Commonwealth  was  greatest.  The  28th
Commonwealth Brigade (subsequently the ANZUK Brigade) represented, in effect, a greater shared
capability  with  respect  to  the  amount  of  resources  employed  by  any  one  participant.  Provided
agreement could be found on role and employment, as it was in South-East Asia between Australia,
New Zealand,  and the UK with respect  to  their  jointly operated brigade,  this  style  of  cooperation
represented a type of force multiplication of available resources that possessed greater efficiency of
expenditure  than  could  be  attained  by any individual  state  operating  independently.  The  UK was
perhaps better placed than most other imperial powers to take advantage of this given their relative
success in the decolonisation process, significantly so if one was to include the Dominions in that
process. Complications arising out of domestic political priorities must be seen against similar changes
occurring in the UK as well. Although it is certainly true that changing strategic and political realities
forced  a  refocusing  on  the  immediate  national  defence  by  the  1980s,  the  decolonisation  process
removed the raison d'etre for the UK to deploy significant troop numbers overseas. The last remnants
of  its  empire  may  still  have  proved  problematic  to  defend  but  the  need  and  interest  in  defence




The invasion of Grenada by the US in 1983 provides some final insight into some of the issues
raised  here.  Joint  Commonwealth  activities  which  had  been  central  to  combating  uprisings  and
communist elements elsewhere were noticeably absent in the Caribbean. The Regional Security System
founded in  1982 is  an  interesting  example  of  a  post-1972 defence  organisation  which  included  a
number of Commonwealth countries. It was formed to address certain security concerns which the
Commonwealth as a whole had declined to engage with since 1971.3 In fact, since its establishment the
Regional  Security System has dealt  solely with internal  policing and military assistance – such as
providing  relief  efforts  following  natural  disasters,  coups,  serious  criminal  problems  and  other
disturbances. The Regional Security System was another example of the style of cooperation that had
resulted in the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It, in effect, provided for the joint defence of nearby
Commonwealth  states  in  a  style  and  manner  that  would  have  been  familiar  to  Commonwealth
initiatives of the early 1950s.
What the invasion of Grenada made very clear was that the Commonwealth did not support
organisations like the RSS, and it could not even be counted upon to support their interests in the public
arena.4 The  origins  of  the RSS and its  links  to  the Federation of  the  West  Indies  and subsequent
developments,  including the invasion of  Grenada,  is  beyond the  scope of  this  study.  Yet  the  RSS
highlighted the basis for defence cooperation, a basis established in Commonwealth history, that was
never capitalised on by the Commonwealth or the UK but was instead usurped by the US.5
Subsequent  developments  in  Commonwealth  defence  relations  amongst  Australia,  Canada,
South Africa, New Zealand and the UK after the Falklands War are also outside the scope of this study,
but helpfully contextualise developments. South African involvement with the Commonwealth did not
resume until 1994.6 Cooperation since then has been based on a more international basis, particularly
with the UN, and with the emphasis on peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The supply
3 A. Bakan, D. Cox, & C. Leys, Imperial Power and Regional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative (Waterloo: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1993) p 54
4 It is notable that the RSS was supportive of the invasion of Grenada, which was publicly condemned by Canada, the 
UK, and the rest of the Commonwealth at the UN.
5 H. Muniz, Boots, Boots, Boots: Intervention, Regional Security and Militarisation in the Caribbean (Rio Piedras: 
Caribbean Project for Justice and Peace, 1987) p 6
6 I. Taylor, Stuck in Middle Gear: South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Relations (London: Praeger, 2001) p 154
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of armaments to South Africa maintained that pattern. Cooperation, in effect, had all but ended and had
not been renewed or relaunched following the alteration of South Africa's domestic policies and its re-
admittance  to  the  Commonwealth.  Canada  similarly  stuck  to  its  position  with  respect  to
Commonwealth  cooperation.  Its  focus  has  remained  on  international  peacekeeping,  particularly  in
conjunction with the UN. It was with respect to the US rather than the UK or other members of the
Commonwealth  that  Canada  continued  to  be  involved  in  more  conventional  defence  cooperation.
Although the increased level of cooperation in defence matters with the US grew even after 1971,
Commonwealth-only cooperation continued in  South-East  Asia.  The creation of  a  permanent  force
stationed in Malaysia constituted forces from all five signatories to the FPDA. Although somewhat
removed  from  the  active  employment  of  such  forces  and  organisational  efforts  like  the  28 th
Commonwealth Brigade the constant continuation of such efforts, even on a limited scale, suggests that
such cooperation survived in spite of new developments. 
The endeavours of both Australia and New Zealand to encourage US deployments to the region
had met with success coming in the form of ANZUS in 1951. In the 1950s the Antipodean Dominions
interest in engaging with the US separately to the UK caused some backlash in British political and
military circles. Anglo-New Zealand-Australian cooperation, which had continued substantially until
1971 was no longer a primary basis of the defence of the region or of Australia and New Zealand
specifically. Commonwealth cooperation was very much relegated to second position and the absence
of the US was not replaced by the UK when difficulties had quite clearly arisen.
This  was  in  line  with  the  direction  that  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  appeared  to
develop following the UK retreat from East of Suez. Cooperation, although it still existed, was steadily
scaled  back  and  reduced  in  favour  of  other  mechanisms  for  a  combined  defence.  Where  such
cooperation  continued  and  maintained  its  vigour  it  was  in  concert  with  the  US  and  regional
organisations, which typically included four of the five members under study here (Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the UK), that had a basis in post-war inter-operability efforts. One example of such
cooperation can be seen in the ABCA armies international group, which included all four in some form
by 1965 and in full status by 2006.7 The Air and Space Interoperability Council also included all four
7 New Zealand was only included as an associate member in 1965 by Australia's explicit request. - T. Durrell-Young, 
'Cooperative Diffusion through Cultural Similarity: The Postwar Anglo-Saxon Experience' in E. Goldman, and L. 
Eliason (eds), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) p 108
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by 1965. The Technical Cooperation Programme, included all  five by 1969.8 This built  on similar
intelligence organisations and cooperative efforts which had been established between 1945 and 1955.9
This basis of interoperability created a structured version of what had developed between the UK and
the Commonwealth nations  naturally:  national  forces  that  operated much the  same equipment  and
utilised similar tactics, doctrine, and were favourably disposed to cooperation.
Conclusion
Joint Commonwealth military activity has its roots in the earliest forms of imperial coordination
and worldwide deployments.10 The employment of Australia and New Zealand forces in the Middle
East and the Mediterranean, Canadian forces in Europe, and British forces in the jungles of the Far East
were a common sight in the first half of the twentieth century. Rapid political and technological change
since  1947  undermined  that  global  system of  defence  and  coordination.  The  practical  realities  of
contemporary war,  especially when the potential  effect  of  nuclear  weapons were considered,  were
fundamentally at odds with such a system. The reorientation to a regionally based defence in the 1950s
was an effort to reduce the financial and manpower burden. However, it was also a recognition of the
fact that world-wide conflict, like that seen during First World War and Second World War could no
longer rely on the infrastructure required for such long-range and extensive coordination continuing for
long into the conflict. 
Political developments external to the Commonwealth further complicated this by undermining
already  precarious  supply  lines  between  significant  bastions  of  military  force  amongst  the
Commonwealth. Political developments internal to the Commonwealth, mostly but certainly not all,
centred around the difficulties of a rapidly expanding Commonwealth which threatened to undermine
the political basis of the entire system of well-established cooperation. It speaks to the resilience of the
flexible and informal Commonwealth system of defence cooperation – as it was originally envisaged
8 E. Goldman and L. Eliason (eds), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford University Press, 2003) p 
105
9 Intelligence cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States had been ongoing throughout, and after, the
Second World War. This was subsequently expanded in 1955 to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. - 
Annexure J1 to Annex J to Amendment no. 4 to the Appendices to the UKUSA Agreement (Third Edition) HW-80-11 
UKNA
10 This is not, however, to say that this remained static.  It changed significantly over the period. So much so in fact that 
there remained an undercurrent of a desire in certain sections of the British services to 'return to the Commonwealth 
planning of old'. - Letter from Commissioner General Rob Scott to COS Secretariat, 6th December 1957 DEFE 11/192 
UKNA
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and executed – that it survived this turbulent period of change in some form. What is perhaps even
more remarkable is that it managed to survive in spite of the fact that it became effectively disowned by
the  Commonwealth!  Although  much  can,  and  indeed  should,  be  made  of  this  rather  bizarre
accomplishment none of this takes from the fact that Commonwealth defence cooperation, as it existed
at the dawn of the 1980s, was a pale comparison to such cooperation from decades earlier. Its scope and
extent had changed drastically.
The New Commonwealth – ever anxious as it was to do its utmost to act contrary to the original
vision of the organisation – brought a strange new approach to the Commonwealth defence relations.11
The deployment of troops to ensure the internal politics of a Commonwealth country were suitable to
prevailing political opinion would have sparked outrage before 1949. Whatever might be said about the
particulars of such efforts it must be recognised that it did endeavour to restart Commonwealth defence
cooperation in  some manner.  A limited,  and a little  underwhelming in comparison perhaps,  but   a
nevertheless extant body of Commonwealth troops performing a Commonwealth function together.
It is clear that Commonwealth defence cooperation took two forms: the first offered a style and
form of military cooperation that was amenable to the new political atmosphere of the Commonwealth,
and the second continued 'Commonwealth' cooperation under the guise of bilateral and multilateral
engagements.  Although the particulars had changed somewhat,  the core purpose and realisation of
cooperation  was  still  fundamentally  the  same.  The  uniqueness  and  ad-hoc  nature  of  the
Commonwealth,  which  had adapted  to  changes  in  the  international  situation  since  the  end  of  the
Second World War,  once more emphasised its ability to adapt itself  to suit  the prevailing political
desires.  However,  in  an  era  of  increasing  reliance  on  multinational  initiatives  and  projects  it  is
surprising  that  Commonwealth  defence  cooperation  decreased  as  significantly  as  it  did.  Lester
Pearson's assertion that 'only self-interest would hold the new Commonwealth together' was prophetic
of both the inward-orientated nature of the Commonwealth's new take on defence relations and of the
growing distance between the countries of the Commonwealth.12
11 This in itself was not an unusual reaction during the decolonisation process. Elements and symbols of imperial rule were
often the subject of internal disturbances both of an illegal nature and as a result of direct policy by the new government.
In most cases this was restricted to a relatively limited effect on the local economy, but in some areas – such as East 
Africa – the result could be disastrous. - I. Maekawa, 'Neocolonialism Reconsidered: A Case Study of East Africa in the 
1960s and 1970s' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43 (2015) p 320
12 J. Munro and A. Inglis (eds), Mike: the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2 1948-57 
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